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State of Arizona
Office
of the
Auditor General
PERFORMANCE AUDIT
Criminal Information
Services Bureau,
Access Integrity Unit, and
Fingerprint Identification Bureau
Report to the Arizona Legislature
By Debra K. Davenport
Auditor General
DEPARTMENT
OF
PUBLIC SAFETY
October 2001
Report No. 01-28
The Auditor General is appointed by the Joint Legislative Audit Committee, a bipartisan committee
composed of five senators and five representatives. Her mission is to provide independent and impar-tial
information and specific recommendations to improve the operations of state and local government
entities. To this end, she provides financial audits and accounting services to the state and political
subdivisions and performance audits of state agencies and the programs they administer.
The Joint Legislative Audit Committee
Senator Ken Bennett, Chairman
Representative Roberta L. Voss, Vice-Chairman
Senator Herb Guenther Representative Robert Blendu
Senator Dean Martin Representative Gabrielle Giffords
Senator Peter Rios Representative Barbara Leff
Senator Tom Smith Representative James Sedillo
Senator Randall Gnant (ex-officio) Representative James Weiers (ex-officio)
Audit Staff
Dot Reinhard—Manager
and Contact Person (602) 553-0333
Ryan Curtis—Team Leader
Cathleen Akers—Team Member
Jay DePree—Team Member
Copies of the Auditor General’s reports are free.
You may request them by contacting us at:
Office of the Auditor General
2910 N. 44th Street, Suite 410
Phoenix, AZ 85018
(602) 553-0333
Additionally, many of our reports can be found in electronic format at:
www.auditorgen.state.az.us
2910 NORTH 44th STREET • SUITE 410 • PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85018 • (602) 553-0333 • FAX (602) 553-0051
DEBRA K. DAVENPORT, CPA
AUDITOR GENERAL
STATE OF ARIZONA
OFFICE OF THE
AUDITOR GENERAL
WILLIAM THOMSON
DEPUTY AUDITOR GENERAL
October 1, 2001
Members of the Arizona Legislature
The Honorable Jane Dee Hull, Governor
Colonel Dennis Garrett, Director
Department of Public Safety
Transmitted herewith is a report of the Auditor General, A Performance Audit of the
Department of Public Safety’s Criminal Information Services Bureau, Access Integrity
Unit, and Fingerprint Identification Bureau. This report is in response to a June 16,
1999, resolution of the Joint Legislative Audit Committee. The performance audit was
conducted as part of the Sunset review set forth in A.R.S. §41-2951 et seq. I am also
transmitting with this report a copy of the Report Highlights for this audit to provide a
quick summary for your convenience.
As outlined in its response, the Department of Public Safety agrees with all of the
findings and recommendations.
My staff and I will be pleased to discuss or clarify items in the report.
This report will be released to the public on October 2, 2001.
Sincerely,
Debra K. Davenport
Auditor General
Enclosure
Program Fact Sheet
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Department of Public Safety—
Criminal Information Services Bureau
Access Integrity Unit
Fingerprint Identification Bureau
Services: The Criminal Information Services Bureau, the Access Integrity Unit, and the Fingerprint
Identification Bureau are part of the Department of Public Safety’s Criminal Justice Support Division.
They are responsible for providing criminal justice information services to criminal justice agencies in
Arizona, such as sheriff’s offices, police departments, and state courts. The entities reviewed for this
audit are responsible for two DPS information systems: 1) The Arizona Criminal Justice Information
System (ACJIS), which is a system of databases with information regarding such things as criminal
history records, sex offenders, and stolen property; and 2) The Arizona Automated Fingerprint Identifi-cation
System (AZAFIS), which is an automated system that links fingerprints to criminal history re-cords.
Revenue: $7.6 million
(fiscal year 2001)
0.0
1,000.0
2,000.0
3,000.0
4,000.0
5,000.0
6,000.0
7,000.0
8,000.0
Millions of Dollars
Processing and other fees
Criminal Justice Enhancement Fund
State General Fund
Responsibilities:
n Criminal Information Services Bu-reau—
maintains criminal history records
and other records, such as motor vehicle
accident reports and Arizona’s sex of-fender
database.
n Access Integrity Unit—coordinates
access to ACJIS, and audits and provides
training to criminal justice agencies that
use ACJIS.
n Fingerprint Identification Bureau—
maintains Arizona’s central repository of
fingerprint information and performs
criminal history background searches for
employment and licensing purposes.
Personnel: 106 full-time equivalent
positions
0
20
40
60
Criminal
Information
Services
Bureau (40)
Fingerprint
Identification
Bureau
(55)
Access
Integrity
Unit (11)
Facilities: The Criminal Information Services
Bureau and the Fingerprint Identification Bu-reau
perform their duties at the DPS Phoenix
complex, a state-owned facility. The Criminal
Information Services Bureau also leases ap-proximately
8,000 sq. ft. of storage space at an
annual cost of approximately $71,000. The Ac-cess
Integrity Unit is located in a leased building
adjacent the DPS compound in Phoenix that
costs approximately $36,000 annually.
Criminal Access Fingerprint
Information Integrity Identification
Services Unit Bureau
Bureau
Program Fact Sheet
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
“To provide efficient and re-sponsive
criminal information
and regulatory services to the
criminal justice community
and the public as mandated by
federal and state law.”
Equipment:
The Criminal Information Services Bureau
and the Access Integrity Unit perform their
duties using standard office equipment.
The Fingerprint Identification Bureau uses
specialized equipment including:
n Machines that electronically digitize a
person’s fingerprints;
n Scanners that digitize fingerprints
taken using ink and paper; and
n A computer system that stores and
searches fingerprint archives for crimi-nal
and non-criminal justice purposes.
This system was purchased in 1995 for
approximately $2 million.
Adequacy of Goals and Performance
Measures: (Fiscal Years 2001-2003)
The goals of the Criminal Information and
Licensing Subprograms are: 1) To provide
efficient, responsive, and effective service;
2) to provide professional development
opportunities to employees and clients; 3)
to improve efficiency and effectiveness in
administering mandated programs; and 4)
to improve customer service.
The mission and goals of the Criminal
Information and Licensing Subprogram
are reasonably aligned with each other. A
review of the performance measures indi-cates:
n The measures do not incorporate the
key responsibilities of all units. For ex-ample,
the Access Integrity Unit de-votes
the majority of its resources to
conducting audits of all ACJIS users on
a biennial basis, yet there is no measure
that addresses this activity.
n DPS should establish measures to bet-ter
reflect such things as the cost, effec-tiveness,
or quality of the services it
provides. For example, DPS measures
its employee satisfaction but does not
have measures to assess the satisfaction
of customers it serves, such as organi-zations
that use background search re-sults
for employment or licensing deci-sions.
n Finally, because there are multiple enti-ties
contained in the subprogram, DPS
should group its goals and measures by
individual organizational units.
The Criminal Information Services Bureau,
the Access Integrity Unit, and the Finger-print
Identification Bureau are part of the
Criminal Information and Licensing Sub-program,
whose mission is:
i
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
SUMMARY
The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance
audit of the Criminal Information Services Bureau, Access Integ-rity
Unit, and Fingerprint Identification Bureau within the Ari-zona
Department of Public Safety (DPS). This audit was part of a
Sunset review of DPS and was conducted pursuant to a June 16,
1999, resolution of the Joint Legislative Audit Committee. It was
conducted under the authority vested in the Auditor General by
Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §41-2951 et seq and is the
eighth in a series of nine audits of DPS.
The three Department entities reviewed for this audit are
responsible for providing criminal justice information services to
police departments, sheriff’s offices, courts, and other criminal
justice agencies in Arizona. The three entities have responsibili-ties
for two DPS systems:
¾ The Arizona Criminal Justice Information System
(ACJIS), a system of databases with information such as
criminal history records, sex offender registration, and stolen
property information.
¾ The Arizona Fingerprint Identification System (AZAFIS),
an automated system linking fingerprints to criminal history
records.
DPS Could Better Ensure
the Integrity of the State’s
Criminal History Records System
(See pages 9 through 18)
DPS is statutorily mandated to serve as the central repository of
criminal history records and related criminal justice information
in Arizona. Recent efforts by DPS and other criminal justice
agencies have improved the integrity of information in the
State’s criminal history records system, but many records remain
Summary
ii
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
incomplete. A 1990 Auditor General’s review found extensive
problems with the system’s management. However, since that
time, DPS has taken action on a number of fronts. For example,
DPS has added procedures and quality controls to help ensure
timely and accurate data entry by its staff. It has also established
an evaluation program to identify and address problems and has
worked with criminal justice agencies to revise a key form for
submitting information.
Other agencies have also taken action. The Arizona Criminal Jus-tice
Commission and the Arizona Administrative Office of the
Courts are working with criminal justice agencies to help fund
and develop technology allowing criminal justice agencies to
submit information electronically to DPS.
However, these efforts have not fully addressed the problem.
The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that Arizona’s system is 1
of 12 nationwide containing final disposition information for less
than half of the arrests in its records. Criminal justice agencies are
statutorily required to report criminal history information, such
as details of arrest charges and how the charges were resolved, to
DPS in a timely manner, but these agencies’ compliance with
reporting requirements vary widely. This is often because agen-cies
are not fully aware of all requirements. As the State’s central
repository, DPS is statutorily responsible for the completeness
and accuracy of all criminal justice information; therefore, DPS
needs to pursue additional efforts to ensure the integrity of this
information. These efforts should include significantly expand-ing
its reviews of criminal justice agencies’ reporting practices
and specifying data submission requirements through adminis-trative
rules as required by statute.
DPS Should Expedite and
Improve Background Checks
(See pages 19 through 27)
DPS needs to expedite and improve background checks. These
checks, which are used to determine if an individual should
work in sensitive areas, such as with children or handling
money, involve searches of state and Federal Bureau of Investi-gation
(FBI) criminal history records. Because some em-
Summary
iii
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
ployers allow individuals to work in these areas while their back-ground
checks are being conducted, completing the checks as
quickly as possible is important. However, under DPS’ current
technology and practices, these checks can take several weeks to
complete. A large portion of the time is spent on the FBI’s part of
the check.
DPS is seeking ways to expedite and improve the background
check process. Its plan centers on submitting fingerprints elec-tronically
to the FBI and conducting fingerprinting-based
searches, rather than less reliable demographic-based searches,
for the state record searches. While these efforts would result in
quicker and more reliable searches, DPS estimates that the costs
associated with computer system expansion and additional
personnel would cost several million dollars. However, many
factors have changed since DPS originally estimated these costs
in 1999. Therefore, DPS needs to re-evaluate the costs associated
with these changes and seek dedicated funding sources, such as
grants, to fund the necessary start-up costs. Additionally, DPS
should raise background check application fees as necessary to
cover ongoing system maintenance and personnel costs if the
program is to remain self-supporting.
Whether or not DPS obtains electronic submission technology, it
should take the steps necessary to become a full participant in
the National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact. Full par-ticipation
in this Compact, an information-sharing project involv-ing
the FBI and states that ratify the Compact, would allow DPS
to perform some of its own national-level background searches
and reduce the number of fingerprints DPS would need to send
to the FBI. Although the Governor ratified the Compact by ex-ecutive
order, DPS should obtain legislative approval of the
Compact. Additionally, DPS needs to work with the FBI to make
necessary changes to its data systems and processes to fully par-ticipate.
iv
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
(This Page Intentionally Left Blank)
v
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Introduction and Background............................. 1
Finding I: DPS Could Better Ensure
the Integrity of the State’s
Criminal History Records System.................. 9
DPS Serves As Central Repository.................................... 9
Efforts Made to Improve Records
Management and Integrity................................................ 10
Problems with Inaccurate and
Incomplete Records Continue........................................... 13
DPS Should Initiate
Further Improvements....................................................... 15
Recommendations ............................................................. 18
Finding II: DPS Should Expedite
and Improve Background Checks .................19
Background Checks Can
Be Time Consuming.......................................................... 19
DPS Should Continue Efforts
to Expedite and Improve
Background Checks........................................................... 22
DPS Should Become A
Full Participant in An
Interstate Compact............................................................. 24
Recommendations ............................................................. 27
Agency Response
Table of Contents
vi
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Concl’d)
Page
Table and Items
Table 1 Department of Public Safety
Criminal Information Service Bureau,
Access Integrity Unit, and
Fingerprint Identification Bureau
Statement of Revenues, Expenditures,
and Changes in Fund Balance
Years Ended June 30, 2000 and 2001
(In Thousands)
(Unaudited)...................................................... 5
Item 1 Central State Repository Duties....................... 10
Item 2 Types of Agencies That Require
Clearance Card Checks.................................... 20
Item 3 Examples of Agencies That
Require General Employment and
Licensing Checks.............................................. 21
1
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance
audit of the Department of Public Safety’s (DPS) Criminal Infor-mation
Services Bureau, the Access Integrity Unit, and the Fin-gerprint
Identification Bureau as part of a Sunset review of the
agency. This audit was conducted pursuant to a June 16, 1999,
resolution of the Joint Legislative Audit Committee. This audit
was conducted under the authority vested in the Auditor Gen-eral
by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §41-2951 et seq. This is
the eighth in a series of nine audits of the Department of Public
Safety.1
Duties, Organization,
and Staffing
The Criminal Information Services Bureau, the Access Integrity
Unit, and the Fingerprint Identification Bureau are part of the
Criminal Justice Support Division and are responsible for coor-dinating
and providing criminal justice information services to
criminal justice agencies. DPS serves as the central repository of
criminal information in Arizona by maintaining the Arizona
Criminal Justice Information System (ACJIS) and the Arizona
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AZAFIS):
¾ ACJIS is a computerized system of several different data-bases
that contain criminal justice information, such as crimi-nal
history records, sex offender registration, wanted per-sons,
and stolen property information. DPS oversees the
input and use of information in the system by over 700 agen-cies
throughout the State, such as sheriff’s offices, local
1 Performance audits have been previously issued on DPS’ Aviation Section
(Report No. 00-7), Scientific Analysis Bureau (Report No. 00-12), Drug
Abuse Resistance Education Program (Report No. 01-3), Telecommunica-tions
Bureau (Report No. 01-5), Licensing Bureau (Report No. 01-10),
Highway Patrol Division (Report No. 01-20), and Criminal Investigation
Division (Report No. 01-22). The remaining audit will cover the agency-wide
Sunset Factors.
Introduction and Background
2
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
police departments, and Arizona’s courts. These agencies
have varying levels of access to both input and retrieve
criminal justice information from the system. While many
different agencies use the system, DPS is statutorily responsi-ble
for ensuring that it contains complete and accurate infor-mation.
¾ AZAFIS is a database of criminal fingerprints and related
information received from Arizona’s criminal justice agen-cies.
The system can be used to positively identify arrested
persons based on their fingerprints and to obtain criminal
history information on these persons. It can also be used to
compare fingerprints found at a crime scene to archived fin-gerprints
to help investigators identify potential suspects.
The specific services provided by the Criminal Information Ser-vices
Bureau, the Access Integrity Unit, and the Fingerprint Iden-tification
Bureau, including their responsibilities related to ACJIS
and AZAFIS, and the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) em-ployees
for each, are described below.
¾ The Criminal Information Services Bureau (40 FTEs)—
maintains criminal history and other records, such as motor
vehicle accident reports. An administrative manager, who is
assisted by a secretary, oversees the Bureau’s three units:
Criminal History Records Unit (24 FTEs)—This unit
maintains criminal history information and operates 24
hours a day to provide information regarding warrants to
on-duty officers. The unit enters criminal history record
information, submitted by criminal justice agencies
throughout the State, into the Arizona Computerized
Criminal History system, a component of ACJIS.
Department Records Unit (7 FTEs)—This unit main-tains
DPS’ accident, offense, and incident reports, as well
as supplemental paperwork, such as evidence analysis
reports, by archiving paper files and electronically log-ging
limited data into the Department Accident Report
Tracking system. Upon request, the Department Records
Unit also provides copies of accident reports and associ-ated
photos to the public for a fee.
Introduction and Background
3
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Sex Offender Compliance Unit (7 FTEs)—This unit
confirms and updates the addresses of sex offenders reg-istered
in the State of Arizona, maintains a Web site of the
more serious sex offenders sentenced or released after
June 1996, and monitors the sex offender community no-tification
process carried out by Arizona’s local law en-forcement
agencies. This information is maintained in the
Sex Offender Profile and Notification File, which is part of
ACJIS.
¾ The Access Integrity Unit (11 FTEs)—This unit’s activities
are directly related to the accuracy and proper use of infor-mation
contained in ACJIS. The unit conducts federal and
state-mandated biennial operational audits of Arizona crimi-nal
justice agencies that record and use ACJIS information.
These audits review input procedures and controls over ter-minal
access and security, and ensure that the system is used
only for criminal justice purposes. The unit also coordinates
training for the ACJIS statewide operator certification pro-gram,
oversees monthly validation of criminal justice data,
and collects Arizona’s crime statistics for annual reports. Fi-nally,
the unit conducts an evaluation and training program
to improve the exchange of criminal history information
within counties.
¾ The Fingerprint Identification Bureau (55 FTEs)—
Maintains Arizona’s central repository of criminal fingerprint
information and performs criminal history background
checks for employment and licensing purposes. It has six
FTEs devoted to administrative oversight. There are also four
full-time employees of the fingerprint computer system con-tractor
who are assigned to maintain the system. The remain-ing
Bureau personnel are divided between two sections.
The Arizona Automated Fingerprint Identification
System Section (17 FTEs)—This section stores all crimi-nal
fingerprints and related information received from
Arizona’s criminal justice agencies in AZAFIS and
provides fingerprinting services to criminal justice agen-cies.
These services include using an arrested person’s
fingerprints to positively identify him or her and to obtain
prior arrest information. Over 90 percent of fingerprints
Introduction and Background
4
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
are now submitted to DPS electronically. Other prints are
mailed to DPS on fingerprint cards that use the traditional
“ink and roll” method and must be scanned into the sys-tem.
Applicant Processing Group (32 FTEs)—The DPS ap-plicant
processing group has two teams that perform
background checks of individuals required to have them
for certain types of employment or licensing purposes.
These checks involve searches of Arizona criminal history
records for disqualifying criminal information and send-ing
the fingerprints to the FBI for a national background
search. One team conducts background checks for gen-eral
employment purposes and for licensing agencies.
The Bureau distributes the search results to employers or
licensing agencies to make hiring or licensing decisions.
The second team conducts background checks for appli-cants
who must receive a clearance card from DPS to
work with vulnerable adult populations or children. DPS
charges fees for these background checks that range from
$18 to $44, depending upon the type of search conducted.
Funding and Budget
As illustrated in Table 1 (see page 5), the Criminal Information
Services Bureau’s total revenue in fiscal year 2001 was approxi-mately
$2 million. The Bureau received approximately $1.7 mil-lion
(88 percent) from the General Fund, but also generated ap-proximately
$238,000 from fees it collected for services it pro-vides
to the public, such as copies of accident reports.
The Access Integrity Unit’s fiscal year 2001 revenues were ap-proximately
$449,000. This unit is entirely funded by the General
Fund.
Introduction and Background
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
5
Table 1
Department of Public Safety
Criminal Information Service Bureau, Access Integrity Unit, and Fingerprint Identification Bureau
Statement of Revenues, Expenditures, and Changes in Fund Balance
Years Ended June 30, 2000 and 2001
(In Thousands)
(Unaudited)
Criminal Information
Service Bureau Access Integrity Unit
Fingerprint
Identification Bureau
2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001
Appropriations:
State General Fund $1,760.6 $1,725.4 $468.9 $449.0 $1,667.1 1 $ 386.9
Criminal Justice Enhancement Fund 2 2,149.6 2,028.5
Processing and other fees 218.6 238.3 5,109.3 5,218.7
Total revenues 1,979.2 1,963.7 468.9 449.0 8,926.0 7,634.1
Expenditures:
Personal services and employee-related 1,457.6 1,569.5 459.6 439.9 1,871.3 2,027.5
Professional and outside services 232.6 8.4 3.1 1.1 225.0 159.3
Travel .9 2.4 5.7 7.1 4.6 5.2
Aid to organizations 106.4 167.3 51.2
Other operating 283.1 160.8 24.3 17.5 4,856.2 3 4,966.4 3
Equipment 246.0 75.1 15.1 2.5 1,384.1 4 1,678.9 4
Total expenditures 2,326.6 1,983.5 507.8 468.1 8,341.2 8,888.5
Excess of revenues over (under) expenditures (347.4) (19.8) (38.9) (19.1) 584.8 (1,254.4)
Reversion to the State General Fund 229.2 41.2 2.3 14.4 5.4
Excess of revenues over (under) expenditures and reversions
to the State General Fund (576.6) (61.0) (41.2) (33.5) 579.4 (1,254.4)
Fund balance, beginning of year 908.4 331.8 81.5 40.3 2,036.8 2,616.2
Fund balance, end of year $ 331.8 $ 270.8 $ 40.3 $ 6.8 $2,616.2 $1,361.8
1 Includes $876,000 appropriated for one-time costs of centralizing the state fingerprinting resources. In addition, includes $308,000 to purchase equipment needed to
process fingerprints of nursing care institutions, home health care agencies, and residential care i nstitution employees.
2 Consists of fines and forfeits deposited in the Criminal Justice Enhancement Fund and appropriated to the Department.
3 Includes approximately $3.1 million and $3.8 million for 2000 and 2001, respectively, paid to the Federal Bureau of Investigations for national-level background searches.
4 Consists primarily of equipment and software purchased to expand the Arizona Automated Fingerprint Identification System.
Source: Auditor General Staff analysis of financial information provided by the Department of Public Safety.
Introduction and Background
6
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
The Fingerprint Identification Bureau’s total revenue for fiscal
year 2001 was approximately $7.6 million. A large portion, ap-proximately
$5.2 million, or nearly 68 percent, of this revenue is
derived from fees paid by background check applicants. Reve-nue
raised through fees enables the Bureau’s Applicant Process-ing
Group to be self-supporting. The Bureau also received ap-proximately
$2 million, or 27 percent of its revenues, from the
Criminal Justice Enhancement Fund.1 The Bureau also received
approximately $386,900 or nearly 5 percent, of its revenues from
the General Fund.
Audit Scope and
Methodology
Audit work focused on two areas: 1) DPS’ role as the central re-pository
of criminal information in Arizona; and 2) the timeliness
of DPS’ criminal history background checks for employment and
licensing purposes. This report contains findings and recom-mendations
in two areas:
¾ The need for DPS to better ensure the integrity of the State’s
criminal history records system (see Finding I, pages 9
through 18); and
¾ The need for DPS to pursue methods of expediting and im-proving
fingerprint background checks of individuals for
employment and licensing purposes (see Finding II, pages 19
through 27).
Auditors used a number of research methods to study the issues
addressed in this report. Specifically, to determine how DPS
could better coordinate the timeliness, completeness, and accu-racy
of criminal history information, auditors:
1 The Criminal Justice Enhancement Fund was established by A.R.S. §41-
2401. Monies in the fund come from a percentage of fines, penalties, and
forfeitures imposed by the courts for criminal offenses, traffic violations, or
violations of game and fish statutes. The funds are distributed by the State
Treasurer’s Office for various criminal justice purposes and monitored by
the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission.
Introduction and Background
7
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
n Interviewed DPS staff and representatives of several other
criminal-justice-related organizations, including the FBI, the
Arizona Criminal Justice Commission, the Arizona Adminis-trative
Office of the Courts, and seven local criminal justice
agencies;
n Reviewed Arizona Revised Statutes and related administra-tive
rules to determine reporting requirements of agencies
that submit criminal history information to DPS, and re-viewed
the Access Integrity Unit’s audit and training func-tions.
n Interviewed representatives of six states identified by the Bu-reau
of Justice Statistics as having the most complete criminal
history records in the United States to identify how criminal
justice agencies submit criminal history records in those
states;1 and
n Reviewed current procedures manuals and internal man-agement
reports regarding database statistics, data entry per-formance
levels, and program administration from fiscal
years 1999 through 2001.
To determine how DPS could improve and expedite fingerprint
background check processing, auditors:
n Interviewed DPS staff regarding its current background
check processes and representatives of the FBI regarding the
benefits of electronically exchanging fingerprint information
between DPS and the FBI and an interstate compact that en-able
participating states to perform some of their own na-tional
criminal record searches;
n Reviewed literature regarding the interstate compact and in-terviewed
representatives of seven states that participate in
the interstate compact and/or process background checks
electronically with the FBI;2
1 Auditors interviewed representatives of Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Massa-chusetts,
North Carolina, and South Dakota.
2 Auditors interviewed representatives of California, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Montana, Oregon, and Texas.
Introduction and Background
8
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
n Interviewed representatives from seven organizations who
have a high volume of applicants going through the back-ground
check process. This included organizations such as a
school district, healthcare organizations, and state agencies
such as the Department of Gaming;
n Reviewed complaints filed with the State’s Ombuds-man/
Citizens’ Aide Office regarding background checks;
and
n Compared data in the Fingerprint Identification Bureau’s
tracking database to paper files to determine the reliability of
the database and to determine how long it takes DPS and the
FBI to complete their portions of the background check.
This audit was conducted in accordance with government audit-ing
standards.
The Auditor General and staff express appreciation to the direc-tor
and staff of the Department of Public Safety for their coopera-tion
and assistance during the audit.
9
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
FINDING I DPS COULD BETTER
ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF
THE STATE’S CRIMINAL
HISTORY RECORDS SYSTEM
Although the Department of Public Safety (DPS) is statutorily
responsible for collecting criminal history information from Ari-zona’s
criminal justice agencies, about one-half of the records in
the criminal history records system lack information on the final
disposition of the arrest charges. Although statute requires crimi-nal
justice agencies to provide criminal history information to
DPS in a timely manner, DPS remains ultimately accountable for
the completeness and accuracy of Arizona’s criminal history
records. While DPS and other criminal justice agencies have un-dertaken
efforts to improve the system, problems such as in-complete
records persist. Because statute mandates that DPS en-sure
the integrity of the system, DPS should pursue additional
efforts to better fulfill this responsibility.
DPS Serves As
Central Repository
DPS is statutorily mandated to serve as the central repository of
criminal history records and related criminal justice information
in Arizona. DPS is also responsible for ensuring that Arizona
criminal justice agencies accurately record and appropriately use
criminal justice information. As the central state repository, DPS
uses a computerized network of databases called the Arizona
Criminal Justice Information System (ACJIS) to maintain differ-ent
types of criminal justice information. For example, the Ari-zona
Computerized Criminal History (ACCH) database in
ACJIS contains criminal history records for offenders arrested in
Arizona. DPS also maintains an automated fingerprint identifica-tion
system that links fingerprints from arrest records to ACCH.
According to A.R.S. §41-1750, DPS is responsible for the com-pleteness
and accuracy of all criminal justice information in the
repository.
Criminal history records
contain arrest and dispo-sition
information.
Finding I
10
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Criminal justice agencies, including DPS, police departments,
sheriff’s offices, county attorneys, and the courts, record and use
criminal history record information to perform their duties.
Criminal justice agencies are statutorily required to report crimi-nal
history record information, such as details of arrest charges
and how the charges were resolved, to the central state reposi-tory.
An individual’s criminal history record is considered com-plete
when DPS has information about the outcome, or disposi-tion,
of each arrest charge in the person’s ACCH record.
Complete and accurate criminal history records are vital for both
criminal justice and noncriminal justice purposes. For example,
complete criminal history records are critical for ensuring that
judges make appropriate sentencing decisions. Additionally,
criminal history records are increasingly used for noncriminal
justice purposes, such as employment and other types of back-ground
checks. For example, complete and accurate criminal his-tory
records are necessary to prevent people who have commit-ted
particular offenses from purchasing handguns or working
with children.
Efforts Made To Improve
Records Management
and Integrity
DPS and other criminal-justice-related agencies have worked to
improve the management and integrity of Arizona’s criminal
history records. DPS has corrected previously identified data
Item 1 Central State Repository Duties
As the central state repository, DPS shall:
¾ Procure accurate and complete information from the State’s criminal
justice agencies;
¾ Provide training and proficiency testing to these agencies; and
¾ Adopt rules to assist in carrying out its responsibility as the State’s cen-tral
repository of criminal justice information.
Source: A.R.S. §41-1750.
Complete criminal history
records are important for
criminal and noncriminal
justice purposes.
Finding I
11
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
management problems and has initiated efforts to help other
criminal justice agencies submit complete and accurate informa-tion
to the central state repository. In addition, the Arizona
Criminal Justice Commission and the Arizona Administrative
Office of the Courts, a division of Arizona’s Supreme Court, have
also initiated projects to help improve criminal history records in
the State.
DPS has corrected past internal problems—DPS has resolved
issues identified by the Auditor General’s Office in 1990 regard-ing
problems with its data entry and monitoring of ACJIS use
(see Report No. 90-5). Specifically, DPS has established proce-dural
improvements and quality control methods that:
¾ Verify accuracy—Supervisors of DPS’ data entry staff rou-tinely
check the accuracy of ACCH entries against paper re-cords
and direct staff to make appropriate corrections. In ad-dition,
DPS requires criminal justice agencies that directly en-ter
data into ACJIS to validate their noncriminal history data,
such as missing persons and stolen vehicle information, on a
monthly basis. In contrast, in 1990, DPS data entry supervi-sors
performed only periodic quality control checks, and lo-cal
agencies did not regularly verify data they had entered.
¾ Better ensure timeliness—Supervisors better ensure timely
entry of data in ACCH by closely monitoring work volume
and adjusting staff time devoted to other activities, if neces-sary.
DPS currently meets its goals for entering information it
receives within 30 days. In 1990, DPS did not consistently en-ter
arrest data in a timely manner and had a backlog of over
100,000 disposition forms awaiting entry into ACCH.
¾ Audit system users—Since 1992, DPS has biennially con-ducted
operational audits of all agencies in Arizona that have
direct computer terminal access to ACJIS, in accordance with
a federal requirement. These audits, conducted by the Access
Integrity Unit, ensure that each agency has adequate system
security measures and that system users enter and use crimi-nal
information appropriately. In 1990, DPS did not comply
with the federal audit requirement.
DPS has improved qual-ity
control procedures.
Finding I
12
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
DPS has assisted criminal justice agencies with data submis-sion—
In addition to improving internal data management con-trols,
DPS has also worked with other criminal justice agencies to
assist them in submitting information to the central state reposi-tory.
DPS’ efforts include:
¾ Electronic fingerprint imaging—In 1994, DPS funded the
installation of electronic fingerprint imaging equipment in all
sheriff’s offices throughout Arizona. In subsequent years,
federal grants and other funds enabled other law enforce-ment
agencies to install fingerprint-imaging equipment at
their sites. The imaging system enables law enforcement to
forward the fingerprint data electronically to DPS, thereby
expediting the process that routes arrest charges through the
criminal justice system. DPS reports that it currently receives
93 percent of arrest fingerprint data electronically.
¾ Criminal History Reporting Reviews—In early 1999, the
Access Integrity Unit at DPS established an evaluation and
training program called the Criminal History Reporting Re-view
program, which focuses on improving the exchange of
criminal history information within a county. The program
was initially grant-funded through a federal initiative to im-prove
the overall quality and completeness of state criminal
history records. In the reviews, DPS staff first evaluate the ac-curacy,
completeness, and timeliness of a sample of felony
arrest documentation from various criminal justice agencies
in a county, such as the sheriff’s office, the county prosecu-tors’
office, and Superior Court. DPS staff then provides
customized, county-wide training to address the issues and
problems revealed in the evaluation phase. As of June 2001,
DPS had completed reviews of Graham, Greenlee, La Paz,
and Pinal Counties.1
¾ Revised disposition form—In December 1999, DPS intro-duced
a revised disposition form for law enforcement agen-cies,
prosecutors, and the courts to report the outcomes of ar-rest
charges to the central state repository. DPS worked with
criminal justice agencies to modify the form in an attempt to
make it easier to use and to ensure that it contained all neces-
1 DPS was conducting a review of Navajo County at the time of this audit.
DPS has established a
program to improve the
exchange of criminal his-tory
information.
Finding I
13
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
sary data fields. As a result of additional feedback from users
of the revised form, DPS anticipates issuing a further modi-fied
version of the disposition form by mid-2002.
Other agencies assist in improvement efforts—The Arizona
Criminal Justice Commission and the Administrative Office of
the Courts have also been working to improve the exchange of
criminal history records with the central state repository. The
Arizona Criminal Justice Commission (Commission) is man-dated
by statute to assist in the coordination and enhancement of
Arizona’s criminal justice system. The Commission requests and
administers federal grant funds for a variety of criminal justice
initiatives in Arizona, such as automating criminal history re-cords.
At the time of this audit, the Commission was also con-ducting
an evaluation of the impact of federal grant projects in
improving the accuracy and completeness of ACCH. In addition,
Commission staff hold regular meetings with criminal justice
agencies about criminal history records and annually update the
Arizona Criminal Justice Records Improvement Plan to provide
direction for the further automation and integration of criminal
justice information throughout the State.
The Administrative Office of the Courts (Office) developed a
manual and an automated distance-learning program on dispo-sition
reporting for clerks of the court. This effort aims to im-prove
the quality and timeliness of disposition information sub-mitted
by the courts. Additionally, at the time of this audit, the
Office was piloting a project at Peoria Municipal Court to submit
dispositions electronically to DPS. Further, the Office plans to
implement electronic transmission in Coconino County’s courts
by the end of 2001 and eventually into courts throughout the
State.
Problems with Inaccurate and
Incomplete Records Continue
In spite of various improvements, inaccurate and incomplete
criminal history records remain a problem. According to the Bu-reau
of Justice Statistics, Arizona was 1 of 12 states reporting that
it had no more than 50 percent of final disposition information
Finding I
14
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
recorded for all arrests in its computerized criminal history re-cord
systems.1 In July 2001, DPS reported that:
¾ Over 839,000, or 46 percent, of individual arrest charges in
ACCH dating between 1995 and 1999 lack dispositions.
However, DPS does not know which criminal justice agency
failed to submit each disposition. Many arrest charges dating
prior to 1995, as well as more recent arrests, also lack disposi-tions;
however, DPS does not consider a record incomplete
until arrest charges are two or more years old to allow time
for the charges to be resolved.
¾ Over 20,000 dispositions were rejected by ACCH during fis-cal
year 2001 because information provided by criminal jus-tice
agencies did not meet system requirements. For example,
if sentencing information for a guilty verdict is missing or a
statutory violation code does not match the violation’s de-scription,
ACCH rejects the disposition altogether. To resolve
these rejected dispositions, DPS needs corrected or additional
information from over 300 criminal justice agencies including
sheriff’s offices, county attorneys, and Superior Courts.
Although DPS is statutorily responsible to collect such informa-tion,
the success of DPS’ efforts depends on the cooperation of
other criminal justice agencies. These other agencies are man-dated
in statute to provide specific information to DPS in a
timely manner; however, levels of compliance vary widely
among agencies and their employees.
n In a Criminal History Reporting Review, DPS found that a
county sheriff’s office failed on numerous occasions to accu-rately
and completely report to DPS all the charges contained
in the arresting officers’ reports. In addition, in two-thirds of
the sampled cases where the county attorney’s office decided
not to file arrest charges in court, the county attorney’s office
failed to provide this information to DPS.
1 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice
Statistics. Prepared by SEARCH, The National Consortium for Justice In-formation
and Statistics. Survey of State Criminal History Information Sys-tems–
1999. Washington, D.C.: October 2000.
DPS depends on other
criminal justice agencies
to submit accurate and
timely criminal history
records.
Finding I
15
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
n Representatives from three superior courts informed auditors
of other instances where dispositions are not correctly for-warded
to DPS. Representatives from two superior courts in-formed
auditors that some dispositions are not forwarded to
DPS because the court never received the original disposition
reports generated at the time of arrest. Without these reports,
DPS would not be able to link the disposition to the original
arrest charges. Further, DPS would not know if a county at-torney
or the court amended the original arrest charges. Ad-ditionally,
a data entry clerk at another county superior court
told auditors that she makes only one attempt to correct re-jected
dispositions. If DPS rejects the disposition a second
time, the clerk files it with the court’s own records and makes
no further attempt to reconcile the disposition.
DPS Should Initiate
Further Improvements
Despite reliance on other criminal justice agencies to provide ac-curate
and complete information, DPS is best positioned to im-prove
the integrity of the State’s criminal history records and
should pursue additional efforts to do so. First, to better identify
and address factors that contribute to inaccurate or incomplete
criminal records, DPS should perform more comprehensive
Criminal History Reporting Reviews of all counties on a regular
basis and seek additional staff. Additionally, DPS should better
communicate record submission requirements that criminal jus-tice
agencies must follow by formalizing such requirements in
administrative rules as required by statute.
DPS should conduct expanded Criminal History Reporting Re-views
on a regular basis—An expanded Criminal History Re-porting
Review program that includes reviews of criminal justice
agencies in all counties on a regular basis could be an effective
method for improving the integrity of the State’s criminal history
records. However, DPS does not have a plan or the resources for
completing them.
Regular Criminal History Reporting Reviews could help im-prove
the integrity of Arizona’s criminal history records in three
main ways. First, criminal justice agencies’ compliance with re-
Expanded Criminal His-tory
Reporting Reviews
could improve criminal
history information.
Finding I
16
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
cord submission requirements varies, and regular reviews
would continually help DPS identify the reasons why agencies
fail to comply. These reviews could help DPS recommend ways
to help noncompliant agencies improve. Second, through regular
reviews, DPS could continually adjust the training it provides to
criminal justice agencies based on the reasons that some prob-lems
persist. Finally, DPS could follow up on recommendations
it makes and the training it provides to verify that recommenda-tions
are implemented and determine if training has been effec-tive.
Currently, DPS does not have a plan or the necessary resources
to conduct these reviews in all counties on a regular basis. The
program was initially staffed with three grant-funded positions,
and DPS staff noted that the agencies reviewed had increased the
completeness and accuracy of the disposition reports submitted
shortly after the review. However, the grant has since expired,
and DPS currently dedicates only one auditor position for con-ducting
these reviews. The Arizona Criminal Justice Commis-sion
told auditors that losing these positions was a significant
“setback” in DPS’ efforts to improve the State’s criminal history
records.
Because of the benefits these reviews could have on identifying
and correcting problems with criminal history reporting in Ari-zona,
DPS should develop a plan for completing regular Crimi-nal
History Reporting Reviews that includes the following:
n Developing a schedule to complete reviews of criminal jus-tice
agencies within all counties on a regular basis;
n Seeking the additional staff necessary to complete those re-views;
n Ensuring that the recommendations and any training DPS
provides address the reasons why problems identified in the
reviews occur;
n Verifying that the reviews’ recommendations are fully im-plemented;
and
Finding I
17
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
n Establishing program goals and measures so DPS can meas-ure
the review’s impact on criminal history information in
Arizona.
DPS should specify submission requirements in its administra-tive
rules—DPS could better communicate requirements for
submitting criminal records to the central state repository by
formalizing such requirements in administrative rules as re-quired
by statute. A.R.S. §41-1750 requires DPS to adopt admin-istrative
rules relating to the central state repository; however, it
has not done so. Such rules should clarify the manner and meth-ods
by which criminal justice agencies should forward informa-tion.
Criminal History Reporting Reviews have revealed that
some criminal justice agencies were not always aware of the
statutory requirements to report criminal history information to
the central state repository.
Finding I
18
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Recommendations
1. DPS should develop a plan for completing regular Criminal
History Reporting Reviews that:
a. Includes a schedule to complete reviews of criminal jus-tice
agencies in all counties on a regular basis;
b. Seeks the additional staff necessary to complete those re-views;
c. Ensures that the recommendations and any training DPS
provides continually address the reasons why problems
identified in the reviews occur;
d. Verifies that the reviews’ recommendations are fully im-plemented;
and
e. Establishes program goals and measures so DPS can
measure the review’s impact on criminal history informa-tion
in Arizona.
2. To better communicate requirements for submitting criminal
history records to the central state repository, DPS should
formalize such requirements in administrative rules as re-quired
by statute.
19
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
FINDING II DPS SHOULD EXPEDITE
AND IMPROVE
BACKGROUND CHECKS
DPS needs to take additional steps to ensure it completes thor-ough
fingerprint background checks for employment and licens-ing
purposes in a timely manner. Timely completion of back-ground
checks is important because many of the individuals re-quired
to have them work with populations such as children and
vulnerable adults and are often able to do so while the back-ground
check is being completed. However, completing back-ground
checks currently can take several weeks, and involves a
search of Arizona’s criminal history records by DPS and a na-tional
search by the FBI. To expedite and improve this process,
DPS should continue pursuing technology to electronically ex-change
fingerprint information with the FBI by re-evaluating its
original cost estimates and seeking dedicated funding sources.
Further, DPS should take the additional steps necessary to be-come
full participants in an interstate compact that would allow
it to conduct some of its own national searches.
Background Checks Can
Be Time Consuming
DPS performs background checks for individuals required to
have them for employment or licensing purposes, but some of
these checks take a long time. Individuals required to submit to
background checks supply their fingerprints, and either the ap-plicant
or the organizations requiring the checks pay the process-ing
costs.1 DPS performs two different types of background
checks that both include state- and national-level criminal history
searches:
1 The processing fees range from $18 to $44 depending on the type of back-ground
check DPS must conduct. The type of check depends on if the
search is for licensing, paid employment, or volunteer work purposes.
Background checks in-clude
state and national
criminal history searches.
Finding II
20
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
n Clearance card checks—For applications received during
calendar year 2000, DPS completed 80 percent of the back-ground
checks in 83 days or less where it is responsible for
determining if the applicant is eligible for employment.1 For
these checks, a DPS fingerprint technician scans applicant
fingerprints into Ari-zona’s
Automated Fin-gerprint
Identification
System. The automated
system enables the fin-gerprint
technician to
compare the applicants’
fingerprints to thousands
of criminally related fin-gerprints
in the system to
determine if applicants
have been arrested
and/or convicted of crimes in Arizona. If so, DPS staff can
then link the fingerprints to criminal history records found in
the Arizona Computerized Criminal History (ACCH) data-base.
DPS also mails the fingerprints to the FBI for a national-level
criminal history record search. Based on the information
obtained from both searches, DPS issues clearance cards to
applicants who have not committed disqualifying offenses,
as specified by statute.2
During calendar year 2000, DPS reports that it completed ap-proximately
45,000 clearance checks.3 While several factors
1 These checks typically took 48 or 76 days depending on the amount of
time it took to conduct the state search portion of the background check.
Reasons the state check may take longer include the applicant having a
criminal record in Arizona or DPS having to reject the submitted finger-prints
because they are of poor quality.
2 Clearance cards are valid for three years. However, they can be suspended
if a person commits a disqualifying offense after the clearance card was is-sued.
Disqualifying offenses include such crimes as robbery, aggravated
assault, and child abuse.
3 In addition, DPS reports that it completed approximately 22,000 other
checks during calendar year 2000 for applicants who had been issued a
clearance letter. Because legislation during the 2001 regular session com-bined
the clearance card and clearance letter processes into one, auditors
did not evaluate the clearance letter process.
Clearance cards are re-quired
to work with cer-tain
populations, such as
children.
Item 2 Types of Agencies
That Require
Clearance Card Checks
¾ Department of Economic Security
for child care personnel
¾ Department of Education for
teacher certification
¾ Department of Health Services
for home- and community-based
service providers
Finding II
21
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
may affect the amount of time the state-level search takes, the
FBI’s national-level search typically takes about 28 days.
Once DPS obtains the results of the state- and national-level
searches, it typically takes about 18 days to determine an in-dividual’s
eligibility for employment.
n General employment and licensing checks—DPS typi-cally
takes about 36 days to perform background checks for
general employment and licensing purposes for organiza-tions
and state agencies. Like the clearance card checks, these
searches also involve a
state- and national-level
search of criminal his-tory
records, but differ in
two ways. First, DPS
uses demographic data,
such as the applicant’s
name or date of birth,
rather than fingerprints,
for its initial search of
state criminal history records. DPS says it uses demographic
information because its fingerprint system does not have the
capacity to store these applicants’ fingerprints and because it
does not have the personnel to complete additional finger-print-
based searches. Second, rather than determining if the
applicant is eligible to receive a clearance card, DPS simply
forwards the results of the state and national searches to the
organizations making employment or licensure decisions.
During calendar year 2000, DPS reports that it completed ap-proximately
140,000 general employment and licensing
checks. While these checks typically take approximately 36
days to be completed, the national-level searches take about
31 of those days according to DPS data.1
1 Auditors could not verify the accuracy of this data because DPS does not
maintain applicant files.
Item 3 Examples of
Agencies That Require
General Employment
and Licensing Checks
¾ Department of Gaming
¾ Board of Nursing
¾ Department of Insurance
Finding II
22
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
DPS Should Continue Efforts
To Expedite and Improve
Background Checks
DPS should continue to pursue ways to expedite and improve
the background checks it performs. Recently, DPS has sought a
combination of computer system upgrades and additional per-sonnel
that would allow it to exchange fingerprint information
electronically with the FBI and conduct fingerprint-based
searches on all background check applicants. While these efforts
would expedite and improve background checks, the costs asso-ciated
with them have stalled their implementation. DPS should
re-evaluate its cost estimates for each aspect of this endeavor and
seek dedicated funding sources for their implementation.
DPS has sought changes to expedite and improve background
checks—DPS has sought computer system upgrades and addi-tional
personnel that would allow it to significantly expedite the
national-level searches done through the FBI and enable DPS to
conduct fingerprint-based state searches on all background
check applicants. By exchanging fingerprint information elec-tronically
with the FBI, DPS could reduce the time typically
needed for the national-level searches from about one month to
an estimated 24 hours or less. This would happen for two rea-sons.
First, the FBI reports that the electronic transmission of ap-plicant
fingerprints and search results between DPS and the FBI
would be instantaneous, rather than the days it now takes to
mail fingerprint cards and search results. Second, according to
the FBI, electronic processing of fingerprints also significantly
reduces the FBI’s processing time because mailed fingerprints
have to be scanned into the FBI fingerprint system before it can
run a fingerprint-based search. Currently, 25 states submit at
least a portion of their applicant fingerprints to the FBI electroni-cally.
Auditors spoke with five of those states and they all indi-cated
that their national-level searches were generally completed
within a few hours.1
1 Auditors spoke with representatives from the California Department of
Justice, Georgia Department of Public Safety, Montana Department of Jus-tice,
Oregon State Police, and Texas Department of Public Safety.
Finding II
23
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
In addition to expediting the national-level search portion of
background checks, DPS’ proposed changes would also improve
the effectiveness of its state criminal history record search by
enabling DPS to complete fingerprint-based searches for all ap-plicants.
Currently, only clearance card applicants’ state criminal
history searches are fingerprint-based, while state searches of
other applicants are based on demographic information. As
mentioned previously, state searches for the approximately
140,000 annual general employment and licensing applicants be-gin
with a demographic-based search only because DPS indi-cates
its fingerprint system does not have the capacity to store
these applicants’ fingerprints and it does not have the personnel
to complete additional searches. However, fingerprint-based
searches are a much more reliable means of identifying a per-son’s
criminal history than demographic-based searches because
an applicant can falsify information on the application. If an ap-plicant
with a criminal record falsifies information, his or her
criminal history would not be identified until the FBI conducted
its fingerprint-based national search.
Costs associated with changes have stalled implementation—
While DPS’ proposed changes would expedite and improve the
background checks it performs, DPS indicates that high costs
have stalled implementation so far. DPS originally estimated that
it would cost $2.8 million to initially expand, equip, and staff its
fingerprint system for electronic processing and conducting fin-gerprint-
based searches on all applicants. In addition, DPS esti-mated
it would need approximately $950,000 annually to cover
the ongoing personnel and maintenance costs associated with
the proposed changes. In the 2001 legislative session, a bill failed
that would have appropriated only $2 million to DPS to allow
for the electronic exchange of applicant information with the FBI
and additional staff for conducting more fingerprint-based
searches.
DPS should re-evaluate costs and seek dedicated funding—DPS
should re-evaluate the costs for both electronically exchanging
fingerprint information with the FBI and for conducting finger-print-
based searches for all background check applicants. DPS
should consider several factors when re-evaluating the cost esti-mates
it originally calculated in 1999. Specifically,
Electronic submission
could significantly reduce
processing time.
Fingerprint-based
searches are considered
more reliable than demo-graphic-
based searches.
Finding II
24
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
¾ DPS should estimate the costs for implementing electronic
processing and performing fingerprint-based state searches
on all applicants separately. While both are important, they
could be done independently of each other.
¾ DPS should look for ways to reduce its projected costs. For
example, a portion of the 1999 estimate was related to buying
additional electronic storage capacity for general employ-ment
applicants’ fingerprints. However, storing fingerprints
for general employment applicants, unlike clearance card
applicants, is unnecessary because DPS does not continue to
monitor the criminal history records of these applicants as it
does for clearance card applicants.
¾ DPS should consider changes that have been made to the
Fingerprint Identification Bureau’s workload and staffing.
For example, DPS has recently added one new fingerprint
technician, which means it needs fewer additional staff. Ad-ditionally,
the original cost projections were based on a pro-jected
workload of approximately 275,000 applications annu-ally,
but DPS now projects it would process closer to 250,000
applications annually.
After DPS re-evaluates the costs for pursuing each of these im-provements,
it should search for a viable funding source to cover
its start-up costs. Several states have funded their electronic
submission technology through federal grants. In addition, once
these improvements are implemented, DPS should raise its ap-plication
fees to cover the ongoing system maintenance and per-sonnel
costs if the program is to remain self-funded. Based on the
number of applications DPS projects it will process under the
proposed changes, an average fee increase of $4 per application
would provide over $1 million annually.
DPS Should Become
A Full Participant in
An Interstate Compact
Whether or not DPS obtains electronic submission technology, it
should take the steps necessary to become a full participant in an
interstate compact that would allow it to complete some of its
Finding II
25
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
own national searches. The National Crime Prevention and Pri-vacy
Compact was established in 1998 to facilitate the direct ex-change
of criminal history information for noncriminal justice
purposes, such as employment background checks, through an
existing criminal history information network.1 Full participation
in the Compact will provide several benefits to Arizona, such as
obtaining more detailed criminal history information quickly
from participating states. The Governor ratified the Compact by
executive order in August 2001; however, DPS still must take
additional steps to become a full participant in the Compact.
Compact will improve the quality and timeliness of some back-ground
searches—The Compact will allow Arizona to quickly
exchange comprehensive criminal history information with par-ticipating
states for background check applicants who have exist-ing
criminal records in Arizona. To ensure the network is used
for valid noncriminal justice purposes, states that join the com-pact
may not make name-based inquiries through the network;
rather, inquiries for noncriminal justice purposes must contain a
unique state or FBI identification number. State and/or FBI
numbers are assigned to individuals when they are arrested and
their fingerprints are recorded on the state and/or FBI system.
Therefore, under the Compact, if DPS found that a background
check applicant had a criminal history record in Arizona, it could
use the unique identifier number assigned to the applicant to
immediately search an index of participating states’ criminal his-tory
records.2 The FBI would also supply information it has from
nonparticipating states and for federal charges. However, if an
applicant does not have a criminal history record in Arizona,
DPS would have to send the applicant’s fingerprints to the FBI
for the national-level search because it would not have an identi-fication
number for the applicant. Therefore, participation in the
Compact does not eliminate DPS’ need for electronic processing
with the FBI.
1 The Compact uses the Interstate Identification Index network, which 43
states (including Arizona) currently use for criminal justice purposes.
2 Fourteen states had ratified the Compact as of September 2001: Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, and South Carolina.
Finding II
26
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Full participation in the Compact will provide several benefits
that include the following:
n DPS will be able to conduct some of its own national-level
searches and reduce the number of fingerprints it has to send
to the FBI.
n DPS will receive some applicants’ criminal history records
more quickly, with or without electronic processing.
n DPS will receive more comprehensive criminal history in-formation
from participating states than it receives currently
from the FBI. States typically have much more comprehen-sive
records of crimes that were committed in their states
than those maintained by the FBI.
n The FBI is encouraging all states to participate in the Com-pact.
If all states join the Compact, it will help decentralize
criminal history records from the federal government to the
states.
DPS should take additional steps to fully implement the Com-pact—
Although the Governor ratified the Compact by executive
order in August 2001 (No. 2001-15), DPS must take additional
steps to become a full participant. For example, of the 14 states
that have ratified the Compact, only Florida is prepared to begin
exchanging information with the FBI and other Compact states.
Other ratifying states are working with the FBI to make neces-sary
changes to their data systems and processes to become full
participants in the Compact. The FBI reports that states’ start-up
costs for joining the Compact are reasonable and all Compact
states auditors spoke with reported little to no start-up costs.1 In
addition, DPS should obtain approval of the Compact from the
Legislature. Although the Compact does not specifically prevent
ratification of the Compact by executive order, recent interstate
compacts joined by Arizona were first approved by the Legisla-ture.
Further, the FBI Compact coordinator indicated that the 13
other Compact states had ratified the Compact through their leg-islatures.
1 Auditors spoke with representatives from Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and
Montana.
Finding II
27
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Recommendations
1. DPS should continue to pursue methods to expedite and
improve its processes for conducting fingerprint back-ground
checks. Specifically, DPS should do the following:
a. Re-evaluate its original cost estimates for electroni-cally
exchanging fingerprint information with the FBI
and for conducting fingerprint-based searches for all
applicants;
b. Seek viable funding sources, such as grants, to sup-port
the necessary computer system expansion costs;
and,
c. Raise background check application fees as necessary
to cover the ongoing system maintenance and per-sonnel
costs if the program is to remain self-funded.
2. DPS should take additional steps to become a full partici-pant
in the National Crime Prevention and Privacy Com-pact.
Specifically, DPS should:
a. Obtain legislative approval of the Compact; and
b. Work with the FBI to make necessary changes to its
data systems and processes.
28
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
(This Page Intentionally Left Blank)
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
AGENCY RESPONSE
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
(This Page Intentionally Left Blank)
September 27, 2001
Ms. Debra K. Davenport, CPA
Auditor General, State of Arizona
Office of the Auditor General
2910 North 44th Street
Phoenix, Arizona 85018
Dear Ms. Davenport:
Enclosed is the Department's written response to the Auditor General’s draft report of the performance
audit of the Department of Public Safety Criminal Information Services bureau, Access Integrity Unit, and
the Fingerprint Identification bureau. Please do not hesitate to contact my office if you have any questions.
Sincerely,
Dennis A. Garrett, Colonel
Director
lb
Enclosures
Response to Auditor General’s Report for the Criminal Information Services Bureau, Access Integrity
Unit, and the Fingerprint Identification Bureau
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
1
GENERAL
The Arizona Department of Public Safety, Criminal Information Services
Bureau, Access Integrity Unit, and the Fingerprint Identification Bureau
recognizes that inspections and audits provide a valuable means to evaluate
Department operations from an external source and make recommendations
for improvement. The following is in response to the information provided
and recommendations made.
FINDING I DPS COULD BETTER
ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF
THE STATE’S CRIMINAL
HISTORY RECORDS SYSTEM
Recommendations
1. DPS should develop a plan for completing regular Criminal History
Reporting Reviews (CHRR) that:
a. Includes a schedule to complete reviews of criminal justice
agencies in all counties on a regular basis;
b. Seeks the additional staff necessary to complete those reviews;
c. Ensures that the recommendations and any training DPS
provides continually address the reasons why problems
identified in the reviews occur;
d. Verifies that the reviews’ recommendations are fully
implemented; and
e. Establishes program goals and measures so DPS can measure
the review’s impact on criminal history information in Arizona.
Response
The finding of the Auditor General is agreed to and the audit
recommendation will be implemented.
DPS customizes training for each county after the completion of each
CHRR. Areas addressed in the reports are covered in each county wide
training class.
Response to Auditor General’s Report for the Criminal Information Services Bureau, Access Integrity
Unit, and the Fingerprint Identification Bureau
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
2
DPS will develop and implement a plan for all the above
recommendations. In order for complete arrest information to be
reflected on the Arizona Computerized Criminal History database
accurately and completely, all criminal justice entities statewide will
need to make a cooperative effort to assist in achieving this goal.
2. To better communicate requirements for submitting criminal history
records to the central state repository, DPS should formalize such
requirements in administrative rules as required by statute.
Response
The finding of the Auditor General is agreed to and the audit
recommendation will be implemented.
Response to Auditor General’s Report for the Criminal Information Services Bureau, Access Integrity
Unit, and the Fingerprint Identification Bureau
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
3
FINDING II DPS SHOULD EXPEDITE
AND IMPROVE
BACKGROUND CHECKS
Recommendations
1 DPS should continue to pursue methods to expedite and improve its
processes for conducting fingerprint background checks. Specifically,
DPS should do the following:
a. Re-evaluate its original cost estimates for electronically exchanging
fingerprint information with the FBI and for conducting fingerprint-based
searches for all applicants;
b. Seek viable funding sources, such as grants, to support the necessary
computer system expansion cost; and,
c. Raise background check application fees as necessary to cover the
ongoing system maintenance and personnel costs if the program is to
remain self-funded.
Response
a. The finding of the Auditor General is agreed to and the audit
recommendation will be implemented. Separate budget projections are
being researched to determine the estimated costs and operational
benefits of 1) electronically submitting applicant fingerprint records
directly to the FBI, without first searching them against the Arizona
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AZAFIS), vs. 2)
searching all applicant fingerprints against the State AFIS, followed by
electronic submission the FBI to be searched against the bureau’s
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS).
b. The finding of the Auditor General is agreed to and the audit
recommendation will be implemented.
c. The finding of the Auditor General is agreed to and the audit
recommendation will be implemented. If the Legislature approves
either of the programs discussed in recommendation 1.a. (above), and
if the Legislature deems the ongoing system maintenance and
personnel costs be self- funded, the Fingerprint Identification Bureau
will submit a fee-increase recommendation to the DPS Director.
Response to Auditor General’s Report for the Criminal Information Services Bureau, Access Integrity
Unit, and the Fingerprint Identification Bureau
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
4
2. DPS should take additional steps to become full participants in the
National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact. Specifically, DPS
should:
a. Obtain legislative approval of the Compact; and
b. Work with the FBI to make necessary changes to its data systems and
processes.
Response
The finding of the Auditor General is agreed to and the audit
recommendation will be implemented.
Other Performance Audit Reports Issued Within
the Last 12 Months
01-10
Future Performance Audit Reports
Department of Public Safety—Sunset Factors
Perinatal Substance Abuse Pilot Program
01-1 Department of Economic Security—
Child Support Enforcement
01-2 Department of Economic Security—
Healthy Families Program
01-3 Arizona Department of Public
Safety—Drug Abuse Resistance
Education (D.A.R.E.) Program
01-4 Arizona Department of
Corrections—Human Resources
Management
01-5 Arizona Department of Public
Safety—Telecommunications
Bureau
01-6 Board of Osteopathic Examiners in
Medicine and Surgery
01-7 Arizona Department
of Corrections—Support Services
01-8 Arizona Game and Fish Commission
and Department—Wildlife
Management Program
01-9 Arizona Game and Fish
Commission—Heritage Fund
01-10 Department of Public Safety—
Licensing Bureau
01-11 Arizona Commission on the Arts
01-12 Board of Chiropractic Examiners
01-13 Arizona Department of
Corrections—Private Prisons
01-14 Automobile Theft Authority
01-15 Department of Real Estate
01-16 Department of Veterans’ Services
Arizona State Veteran Home,
Veterans’ Conservatorship/
Guardianship Program, and
Veterans’ Services Program
01-17 Arizona Board of Dispensing
Opticians
01-18 Arizona Department of Correct-ions—
Administrative Services
and Information Technology
01-19 Arizona Department of Education—
Early Childhood Block Grant
01-20 Department of Public Safety—
Highway Patrol
01-21 Board of Nursing
01-22 Department of Public Safety—
Criminal Investigations Division
01-23 Department of Building and
Fire Safety
01-24 Arizona Veterans’ Service
Advisory Commission
01-25 Department of Corrections—
Arizona Correctional Industries
01-26 Department of Corrections—
Sunset Factors
01-27 Arizona Board of Regents
Object Description
| Rating | |
| TITLE | Performance audit, Department of Public Safety, Criminal Information Services Bureau, Access Integrity Unit, and Fingerprint Identification Bureau report to the Arizona Legislature |
| CREATOR | Office of the Auditor General |
| SUBJECT | Arizona Department of Public Safety--Auditing |
| Browse Topic |
Government and politics |
| DESCRIPTION | This title contains one or more publications |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Office of the Auditor General |
| Material Collection | State Documents |
| Source Identifier | LG 6.2:R 36 |
| Location | o48130930 |
| REPOSITORY | Arizona State Library, Archives and Public Records--Law and Research Library |
Description
| TITLE | Performance audit, Department of Public Safety, Criminal Information Services Bureau, Access Integrity Unit, and Fingerprint Identification Bureau : breport to the Arizona Legislature |
| DESCRIPTION | 47 pages (PDF version). File size: 270 KB |
| TYPE |
Text |
| Acquisition Note | Report No. 01-28 |
| RIGHTS MANAGEMENT | Copyright to this resource is held by the creating agency and is provided here for educational purposes only. It may not be downloaded, reproduced or distributed in any format without written permission of the creating agency. Any attempt to circumvent the access controls placed on this file is a violation of United States and international copyright laws, and is subject to criminal prosecution. |
| DATE ORIGINAL | 2001-10 |
| Time Period |
2000s (2000-2009) |
| ORIGINAL FORMAT | Born Digital |
| Source Identifier | LG 6.2:R 36 |
| Location | o48130930 |
| DIGITAL IDENTIFIER | 01-28.pdf |
| DIGITAL FORMAT | PDF (Portable Document Format) |
| REPOSITORY | Arizona State Library, Archives and Public Records--Law and Research Library. |
| File Size | 275612 Bytes |
| Full Text | State of Arizona Office of the Auditor General PERFORMANCE AUDIT Criminal Information Services Bureau, Access Integrity Unit, and Fingerprint Identification Bureau Report to the Arizona Legislature By Debra K. Davenport Auditor General DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY October 2001 Report No. 01-28 The Auditor General is appointed by the Joint Legislative Audit Committee, a bipartisan committee composed of five senators and five representatives. Her mission is to provide independent and impar-tial information and specific recommendations to improve the operations of state and local government entities. To this end, she provides financial audits and accounting services to the state and political subdivisions and performance audits of state agencies and the programs they administer. The Joint Legislative Audit Committee Senator Ken Bennett, Chairman Representative Roberta L. Voss, Vice-Chairman Senator Herb Guenther Representative Robert Blendu Senator Dean Martin Representative Gabrielle Giffords Senator Peter Rios Representative Barbara Leff Senator Tom Smith Representative James Sedillo Senator Randall Gnant (ex-officio) Representative James Weiers (ex-officio) Audit Staff Dot Reinhard—Manager and Contact Person (602) 553-0333 Ryan Curtis—Team Leader Cathleen Akers—Team Member Jay DePree—Team Member Copies of the Auditor General’s reports are free. You may request them by contacting us at: Office of the Auditor General 2910 N. 44th Street, Suite 410 Phoenix, AZ 85018 (602) 553-0333 Additionally, many of our reports can be found in electronic format at: www.auditorgen.state.az.us 2910 NORTH 44th STREET • SUITE 410 • PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85018 • (602) 553-0333 • FAX (602) 553-0051 DEBRA K. DAVENPORT, CPA AUDITOR GENERAL STATE OF ARIZONA OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL WILLIAM THOMSON DEPUTY AUDITOR GENERAL October 1, 2001 Members of the Arizona Legislature The Honorable Jane Dee Hull, Governor Colonel Dennis Garrett, Director Department of Public Safety Transmitted herewith is a report of the Auditor General, A Performance Audit of the Department of Public Safety’s Criminal Information Services Bureau, Access Integrity Unit, and Fingerprint Identification Bureau. This report is in response to a June 16, 1999, resolution of the Joint Legislative Audit Committee. The performance audit was conducted as part of the Sunset review set forth in A.R.S. §41-2951 et seq. I am also transmitting with this report a copy of the Report Highlights for this audit to provide a quick summary for your convenience. As outlined in its response, the Department of Public Safety agrees with all of the findings and recommendations. My staff and I will be pleased to discuss or clarify items in the report. This report will be released to the public on October 2, 2001. Sincerely, Debra K. Davenport Auditor General Enclosure Program Fact Sheet OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL Department of Public Safety— Criminal Information Services Bureau Access Integrity Unit Fingerprint Identification Bureau Services: The Criminal Information Services Bureau, the Access Integrity Unit, and the Fingerprint Identification Bureau are part of the Department of Public Safety’s Criminal Justice Support Division. They are responsible for providing criminal justice information services to criminal justice agencies in Arizona, such as sheriff’s offices, police departments, and state courts. The entities reviewed for this audit are responsible for two DPS information systems: 1) The Arizona Criminal Justice Information System (ACJIS), which is a system of databases with information regarding such things as criminal history records, sex offenders, and stolen property; and 2) The Arizona Automated Fingerprint Identifi-cation System (AZAFIS), which is an automated system that links fingerprints to criminal history re-cords. Revenue: $7.6 million (fiscal year 2001) 0.0 1,000.0 2,000.0 3,000.0 4,000.0 5,000.0 6,000.0 7,000.0 8,000.0 Millions of Dollars Processing and other fees Criminal Justice Enhancement Fund State General Fund Responsibilities: n Criminal Information Services Bu-reau— maintains criminal history records and other records, such as motor vehicle accident reports and Arizona’s sex of-fender database. n Access Integrity Unit—coordinates access to ACJIS, and audits and provides training to criminal justice agencies that use ACJIS. n Fingerprint Identification Bureau— maintains Arizona’s central repository of fingerprint information and performs criminal history background searches for employment and licensing purposes. Personnel: 106 full-time equivalent positions 0 20 40 60 Criminal Information Services Bureau (40) Fingerprint Identification Bureau (55) Access Integrity Unit (11) Facilities: The Criminal Information Services Bureau and the Fingerprint Identification Bu-reau perform their duties at the DPS Phoenix complex, a state-owned facility. The Criminal Information Services Bureau also leases ap-proximately 8,000 sq. ft. of storage space at an annual cost of approximately $71,000. The Ac-cess Integrity Unit is located in a leased building adjacent the DPS compound in Phoenix that costs approximately $36,000 annually. Criminal Access Fingerprint Information Integrity Identification Services Unit Bureau Bureau Program Fact Sheet OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL “To provide efficient and re-sponsive criminal information and regulatory services to the criminal justice community and the public as mandated by federal and state law.” Equipment: The Criminal Information Services Bureau and the Access Integrity Unit perform their duties using standard office equipment. The Fingerprint Identification Bureau uses specialized equipment including: n Machines that electronically digitize a person’s fingerprints; n Scanners that digitize fingerprints taken using ink and paper; and n A computer system that stores and searches fingerprint archives for crimi-nal and non-criminal justice purposes. This system was purchased in 1995 for approximately $2 million. Adequacy of Goals and Performance Measures: (Fiscal Years 2001-2003) The goals of the Criminal Information and Licensing Subprograms are: 1) To provide efficient, responsive, and effective service; 2) to provide professional development opportunities to employees and clients; 3) to improve efficiency and effectiveness in administering mandated programs; and 4) to improve customer service. The mission and goals of the Criminal Information and Licensing Subprogram are reasonably aligned with each other. A review of the performance measures indi-cates: n The measures do not incorporate the key responsibilities of all units. For ex-ample, the Access Integrity Unit de-votes the majority of its resources to conducting audits of all ACJIS users on a biennial basis, yet there is no measure that addresses this activity. n DPS should establish measures to bet-ter reflect such things as the cost, effec-tiveness, or quality of the services it provides. For example, DPS measures its employee satisfaction but does not have measures to assess the satisfaction of customers it serves, such as organi-zations that use background search re-sults for employment or licensing deci-sions. n Finally, because there are multiple enti-ties contained in the subprogram, DPS should group its goals and measures by individual organizational units. The Criminal Information Services Bureau, the Access Integrity Unit, and the Finger-print Identification Bureau are part of the Criminal Information and Licensing Sub-program, whose mission is: i OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL SUMMARY The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance audit of the Criminal Information Services Bureau, Access Integ-rity Unit, and Fingerprint Identification Bureau within the Ari-zona Department of Public Safety (DPS). This audit was part of a Sunset review of DPS and was conducted pursuant to a June 16, 1999, resolution of the Joint Legislative Audit Committee. It was conducted under the authority vested in the Auditor General by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §41-2951 et seq and is the eighth in a series of nine audits of DPS. The three Department entities reviewed for this audit are responsible for providing criminal justice information services to police departments, sheriff’s offices, courts, and other criminal justice agencies in Arizona. The three entities have responsibili-ties for two DPS systems: ¾ The Arizona Criminal Justice Information System (ACJIS), a system of databases with information such as criminal history records, sex offender registration, and stolen property information. ¾ The Arizona Fingerprint Identification System (AZAFIS), an automated system linking fingerprints to criminal history records. DPS Could Better Ensure the Integrity of the State’s Criminal History Records System (See pages 9 through 18) DPS is statutorily mandated to serve as the central repository of criminal history records and related criminal justice information in Arizona. Recent efforts by DPS and other criminal justice agencies have improved the integrity of information in the State’s criminal history records system, but many records remain Summary ii OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL incomplete. A 1990 Auditor General’s review found extensive problems with the system’s management. However, since that time, DPS has taken action on a number of fronts. For example, DPS has added procedures and quality controls to help ensure timely and accurate data entry by its staff. It has also established an evaluation program to identify and address problems and has worked with criminal justice agencies to revise a key form for submitting information. Other agencies have also taken action. The Arizona Criminal Jus-tice Commission and the Arizona Administrative Office of the Courts are working with criminal justice agencies to help fund and develop technology allowing criminal justice agencies to submit information electronically to DPS. However, these efforts have not fully addressed the problem. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that Arizona’s system is 1 of 12 nationwide containing final disposition information for less than half of the arrests in its records. Criminal justice agencies are statutorily required to report criminal history information, such as details of arrest charges and how the charges were resolved, to DPS in a timely manner, but these agencies’ compliance with reporting requirements vary widely. This is often because agen-cies are not fully aware of all requirements. As the State’s central repository, DPS is statutorily responsible for the completeness and accuracy of all criminal justice information; therefore, DPS needs to pursue additional efforts to ensure the integrity of this information. These efforts should include significantly expand-ing its reviews of criminal justice agencies’ reporting practices and specifying data submission requirements through adminis-trative rules as required by statute. DPS Should Expedite and Improve Background Checks (See pages 19 through 27) DPS needs to expedite and improve background checks. These checks, which are used to determine if an individual should work in sensitive areas, such as with children or handling money, involve searches of state and Federal Bureau of Investi-gation (FBI) criminal history records. Because some em- Summary iii OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL ployers allow individuals to work in these areas while their back-ground checks are being conducted, completing the checks as quickly as possible is important. However, under DPS’ current technology and practices, these checks can take several weeks to complete. A large portion of the time is spent on the FBI’s part of the check. DPS is seeking ways to expedite and improve the background check process. Its plan centers on submitting fingerprints elec-tronically to the FBI and conducting fingerprinting-based searches, rather than less reliable demographic-based searches, for the state record searches. While these efforts would result in quicker and more reliable searches, DPS estimates that the costs associated with computer system expansion and additional personnel would cost several million dollars. However, many factors have changed since DPS originally estimated these costs in 1999. Therefore, DPS needs to re-evaluate the costs associated with these changes and seek dedicated funding sources, such as grants, to fund the necessary start-up costs. Additionally, DPS should raise background check application fees as necessary to cover ongoing system maintenance and personnel costs if the program is to remain self-supporting. Whether or not DPS obtains electronic submission technology, it should take the steps necessary to become a full participant in the National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact. Full par-ticipation in this Compact, an information-sharing project involv-ing the FBI and states that ratify the Compact, would allow DPS to perform some of its own national-level background searches and reduce the number of fingerprints DPS would need to send to the FBI. Although the Governor ratified the Compact by ex-ecutive order, DPS should obtain legislative approval of the Compact. Additionally, DPS needs to work with the FBI to make necessary changes to its data systems and processes to fully par-ticipate. iv OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL (This Page Intentionally Left Blank) v OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Introduction and Background............................. 1 Finding I: DPS Could Better Ensure the Integrity of the State’s Criminal History Records System.................. 9 DPS Serves As Central Repository.................................... 9 Efforts Made to Improve Records Management and Integrity................................................ 10 Problems with Inaccurate and Incomplete Records Continue........................................... 13 DPS Should Initiate Further Improvements....................................................... 15 Recommendations ............................................................. 18 Finding II: DPS Should Expedite and Improve Background Checks .................19 Background Checks Can Be Time Consuming.......................................................... 19 DPS Should Continue Efforts to Expedite and Improve Background Checks........................................................... 22 DPS Should Become A Full Participant in An Interstate Compact............................................................. 24 Recommendations ............................................................. 27 Agency Response Table of Contents vi OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS (Concl’d) Page Table and Items Table 1 Department of Public Safety Criminal Information Service Bureau, Access Integrity Unit, and Fingerprint Identification Bureau Statement of Revenues, Expenditures, and Changes in Fund Balance Years Ended June 30, 2000 and 2001 (In Thousands) (Unaudited)...................................................... 5 Item 1 Central State Repository Duties....................... 10 Item 2 Types of Agencies That Require Clearance Card Checks.................................... 20 Item 3 Examples of Agencies That Require General Employment and Licensing Checks.............................................. 21 1 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance audit of the Department of Public Safety’s (DPS) Criminal Infor-mation Services Bureau, the Access Integrity Unit, and the Fin-gerprint Identification Bureau as part of a Sunset review of the agency. This audit was conducted pursuant to a June 16, 1999, resolution of the Joint Legislative Audit Committee. This audit was conducted under the authority vested in the Auditor Gen-eral by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §41-2951 et seq. This is the eighth in a series of nine audits of the Department of Public Safety.1 Duties, Organization, and Staffing The Criminal Information Services Bureau, the Access Integrity Unit, and the Fingerprint Identification Bureau are part of the Criminal Justice Support Division and are responsible for coor-dinating and providing criminal justice information services to criminal justice agencies. DPS serves as the central repository of criminal information in Arizona by maintaining the Arizona Criminal Justice Information System (ACJIS) and the Arizona Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AZAFIS): ¾ ACJIS is a computerized system of several different data-bases that contain criminal justice information, such as crimi-nal history records, sex offender registration, wanted per-sons, and stolen property information. DPS oversees the input and use of information in the system by over 700 agen-cies throughout the State, such as sheriff’s offices, local 1 Performance audits have been previously issued on DPS’ Aviation Section (Report No. 00-7), Scientific Analysis Bureau (Report No. 00-12), Drug Abuse Resistance Education Program (Report No. 01-3), Telecommunica-tions Bureau (Report No. 01-5), Licensing Bureau (Report No. 01-10), Highway Patrol Division (Report No. 01-20), and Criminal Investigation Division (Report No. 01-22). The remaining audit will cover the agency-wide Sunset Factors. Introduction and Background 2 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL police departments, and Arizona’s courts. These agencies have varying levels of access to both input and retrieve criminal justice information from the system. While many different agencies use the system, DPS is statutorily responsi-ble for ensuring that it contains complete and accurate infor-mation. ¾ AZAFIS is a database of criminal fingerprints and related information received from Arizona’s criminal justice agen-cies. The system can be used to positively identify arrested persons based on their fingerprints and to obtain criminal history information on these persons. It can also be used to compare fingerprints found at a crime scene to archived fin-gerprints to help investigators identify potential suspects. The specific services provided by the Criminal Information Ser-vices Bureau, the Access Integrity Unit, and the Fingerprint Iden-tification Bureau, including their responsibilities related to ACJIS and AZAFIS, and the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) em-ployees for each, are described below. ¾ The Criminal Information Services Bureau (40 FTEs)— maintains criminal history and other records, such as motor vehicle accident reports. An administrative manager, who is assisted by a secretary, oversees the Bureau’s three units: Criminal History Records Unit (24 FTEs)—This unit maintains criminal history information and operates 24 hours a day to provide information regarding warrants to on-duty officers. The unit enters criminal history record information, submitted by criminal justice agencies throughout the State, into the Arizona Computerized Criminal History system, a component of ACJIS. Department Records Unit (7 FTEs)—This unit main-tains DPS’ accident, offense, and incident reports, as well as supplemental paperwork, such as evidence analysis reports, by archiving paper files and electronically log-ging limited data into the Department Accident Report Tracking system. Upon request, the Department Records Unit also provides copies of accident reports and associ-ated photos to the public for a fee. Introduction and Background 3 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL Sex Offender Compliance Unit (7 FTEs)—This unit confirms and updates the addresses of sex offenders reg-istered in the State of Arizona, maintains a Web site of the more serious sex offenders sentenced or released after June 1996, and monitors the sex offender community no-tification process carried out by Arizona’s local law en-forcement agencies. This information is maintained in the Sex Offender Profile and Notification File, which is part of ACJIS. ¾ The Access Integrity Unit (11 FTEs)—This unit’s activities are directly related to the accuracy and proper use of infor-mation contained in ACJIS. The unit conducts federal and state-mandated biennial operational audits of Arizona crimi-nal justice agencies that record and use ACJIS information. These audits review input procedures and controls over ter-minal access and security, and ensure that the system is used only for criminal justice purposes. The unit also coordinates training for the ACJIS statewide operator certification pro-gram, oversees monthly validation of criminal justice data, and collects Arizona’s crime statistics for annual reports. Fi-nally, the unit conducts an evaluation and training program to improve the exchange of criminal history information within counties. ¾ The Fingerprint Identification Bureau (55 FTEs)— Maintains Arizona’s central repository of criminal fingerprint information and performs criminal history background checks for employment and licensing purposes. It has six FTEs devoted to administrative oversight. There are also four full-time employees of the fingerprint computer system con-tractor who are assigned to maintain the system. The remain-ing Bureau personnel are divided between two sections. The Arizona Automated Fingerprint Identification System Section (17 FTEs)—This section stores all crimi-nal fingerprints and related information received from Arizona’s criminal justice agencies in AZAFIS and provides fingerprinting services to criminal justice agen-cies. These services include using an arrested person’s fingerprints to positively identify him or her and to obtain prior arrest information. Over 90 percent of fingerprints Introduction and Background 4 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL are now submitted to DPS electronically. Other prints are mailed to DPS on fingerprint cards that use the traditional “ink and roll” method and must be scanned into the sys-tem. Applicant Processing Group (32 FTEs)—The DPS ap-plicant processing group has two teams that perform background checks of individuals required to have them for certain types of employment or licensing purposes. These checks involve searches of Arizona criminal history records for disqualifying criminal information and send-ing the fingerprints to the FBI for a national background search. One team conducts background checks for gen-eral employment purposes and for licensing agencies. The Bureau distributes the search results to employers or licensing agencies to make hiring or licensing decisions. The second team conducts background checks for appli-cants who must receive a clearance card from DPS to work with vulnerable adult populations or children. DPS charges fees for these background checks that range from $18 to $44, depending upon the type of search conducted. Funding and Budget As illustrated in Table 1 (see page 5), the Criminal Information Services Bureau’s total revenue in fiscal year 2001 was approxi-mately $2 million. The Bureau received approximately $1.7 mil-lion (88 percent) from the General Fund, but also generated ap-proximately $238,000 from fees it collected for services it pro-vides to the public, such as copies of accident reports. The Access Integrity Unit’s fiscal year 2001 revenues were ap-proximately $449,000. This unit is entirely funded by the General Fund. Introduction and Background OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL 5 Table 1 Department of Public Safety Criminal Information Service Bureau, Access Integrity Unit, and Fingerprint Identification Bureau Statement of Revenues, Expenditures, and Changes in Fund Balance Years Ended June 30, 2000 and 2001 (In Thousands) (Unaudited) Criminal Information Service Bureau Access Integrity Unit Fingerprint Identification Bureau 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 Appropriations: State General Fund $1,760.6 $1,725.4 $468.9 $449.0 $1,667.1 1 $ 386.9 Criminal Justice Enhancement Fund 2 2,149.6 2,028.5 Processing and other fees 218.6 238.3 5,109.3 5,218.7 Total revenues 1,979.2 1,963.7 468.9 449.0 8,926.0 7,634.1 Expenditures: Personal services and employee-related 1,457.6 1,569.5 459.6 439.9 1,871.3 2,027.5 Professional and outside services 232.6 8.4 3.1 1.1 225.0 159.3 Travel .9 2.4 5.7 7.1 4.6 5.2 Aid to organizations 106.4 167.3 51.2 Other operating 283.1 160.8 24.3 17.5 4,856.2 3 4,966.4 3 Equipment 246.0 75.1 15.1 2.5 1,384.1 4 1,678.9 4 Total expenditures 2,326.6 1,983.5 507.8 468.1 8,341.2 8,888.5 Excess of revenues over (under) expenditures (347.4) (19.8) (38.9) (19.1) 584.8 (1,254.4) Reversion to the State General Fund 229.2 41.2 2.3 14.4 5.4 Excess of revenues over (under) expenditures and reversions to the State General Fund (576.6) (61.0) (41.2) (33.5) 579.4 (1,254.4) Fund balance, beginning of year 908.4 331.8 81.5 40.3 2,036.8 2,616.2 Fund balance, end of year $ 331.8 $ 270.8 $ 40.3 $ 6.8 $2,616.2 $1,361.8 1 Includes $876,000 appropriated for one-time costs of centralizing the state fingerprinting resources. In addition, includes $308,000 to purchase equipment needed to process fingerprints of nursing care institutions, home health care agencies, and residential care i nstitution employees. 2 Consists of fines and forfeits deposited in the Criminal Justice Enhancement Fund and appropriated to the Department. 3 Includes approximately $3.1 million and $3.8 million for 2000 and 2001, respectively, paid to the Federal Bureau of Investigations for national-level background searches. 4 Consists primarily of equipment and software purchased to expand the Arizona Automated Fingerprint Identification System. Source: Auditor General Staff analysis of financial information provided by the Department of Public Safety. Introduction and Background 6 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL The Fingerprint Identification Bureau’s total revenue for fiscal year 2001 was approximately $7.6 million. A large portion, ap-proximately $5.2 million, or nearly 68 percent, of this revenue is derived from fees paid by background check applicants. Reve-nue raised through fees enables the Bureau’s Applicant Process-ing Group to be self-supporting. The Bureau also received ap-proximately $2 million, or 27 percent of its revenues, from the Criminal Justice Enhancement Fund.1 The Bureau also received approximately $386,900 or nearly 5 percent, of its revenues from the General Fund. Audit Scope and Methodology Audit work focused on two areas: 1) DPS’ role as the central re-pository of criminal information in Arizona; and 2) the timeliness of DPS’ criminal history background checks for employment and licensing purposes. This report contains findings and recom-mendations in two areas: ¾ The need for DPS to better ensure the integrity of the State’s criminal history records system (see Finding I, pages 9 through 18); and ¾ The need for DPS to pursue methods of expediting and im-proving fingerprint background checks of individuals for employment and licensing purposes (see Finding II, pages 19 through 27). Auditors used a number of research methods to study the issues addressed in this report. Specifically, to determine how DPS could better coordinate the timeliness, completeness, and accu-racy of criminal history information, auditors: 1 The Criminal Justice Enhancement Fund was established by A.R.S. §41- 2401. Monies in the fund come from a percentage of fines, penalties, and forfeitures imposed by the courts for criminal offenses, traffic violations, or violations of game and fish statutes. The funds are distributed by the State Treasurer’s Office for various criminal justice purposes and monitored by the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission. Introduction and Background 7 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL n Interviewed DPS staff and representatives of several other criminal-justice-related organizations, including the FBI, the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission, the Arizona Adminis-trative Office of the Courts, and seven local criminal justice agencies; n Reviewed Arizona Revised Statutes and related administra-tive rules to determine reporting requirements of agencies that submit criminal history information to DPS, and re-viewed the Access Integrity Unit’s audit and training func-tions. n Interviewed representatives of six states identified by the Bu-reau of Justice Statistics as having the most complete criminal history records in the United States to identify how criminal justice agencies submit criminal history records in those states;1 and n Reviewed current procedures manuals and internal man-agement reports regarding database statistics, data entry per-formance levels, and program administration from fiscal years 1999 through 2001. To determine how DPS could improve and expedite fingerprint background check processing, auditors: n Interviewed DPS staff regarding its current background check processes and representatives of the FBI regarding the benefits of electronically exchanging fingerprint information between DPS and the FBI and an interstate compact that en-able participating states to perform some of their own na-tional criminal record searches; n Reviewed literature regarding the interstate compact and in-terviewed representatives of seven states that participate in the interstate compact and/or process background checks electronically with the FBI;2 1 Auditors interviewed representatives of Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Massa-chusetts, North Carolina, and South Dakota. 2 Auditors interviewed representatives of California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Montana, Oregon, and Texas. Introduction and Background 8 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL n Interviewed representatives from seven organizations who have a high volume of applicants going through the back-ground check process. This included organizations such as a school district, healthcare organizations, and state agencies such as the Department of Gaming; n Reviewed complaints filed with the State’s Ombuds-man/ Citizens’ Aide Office regarding background checks; and n Compared data in the Fingerprint Identification Bureau’s tracking database to paper files to determine the reliability of the database and to determine how long it takes DPS and the FBI to complete their portions of the background check. This audit was conducted in accordance with government audit-ing standards. The Auditor General and staff express appreciation to the direc-tor and staff of the Department of Public Safety for their coopera-tion and assistance during the audit. 9 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL FINDING I DPS COULD BETTER ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE STATE’S CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS SYSTEM Although the Department of Public Safety (DPS) is statutorily responsible for collecting criminal history information from Ari-zona’s criminal justice agencies, about one-half of the records in the criminal history records system lack information on the final disposition of the arrest charges. Although statute requires crimi-nal justice agencies to provide criminal history information to DPS in a timely manner, DPS remains ultimately accountable for the completeness and accuracy of Arizona’s criminal history records. While DPS and other criminal justice agencies have un-dertaken efforts to improve the system, problems such as in-complete records persist. Because statute mandates that DPS en-sure the integrity of the system, DPS should pursue additional efforts to better fulfill this responsibility. DPS Serves As Central Repository DPS is statutorily mandated to serve as the central repository of criminal history records and related criminal justice information in Arizona. DPS is also responsible for ensuring that Arizona criminal justice agencies accurately record and appropriately use criminal justice information. As the central state repository, DPS uses a computerized network of databases called the Arizona Criminal Justice Information System (ACJIS) to maintain differ-ent types of criminal justice information. For example, the Ari-zona Computerized Criminal History (ACCH) database in ACJIS contains criminal history records for offenders arrested in Arizona. DPS also maintains an automated fingerprint identifica-tion system that links fingerprints from arrest records to ACCH. According to A.R.S. §41-1750, DPS is responsible for the com-pleteness and accuracy of all criminal justice information in the repository. Criminal history records contain arrest and dispo-sition information. Finding I 10 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL Criminal justice agencies, including DPS, police departments, sheriff’s offices, county attorneys, and the courts, record and use criminal history record information to perform their duties. Criminal justice agencies are statutorily required to report crimi-nal history record information, such as details of arrest charges and how the charges were resolved, to the central state reposi-tory. An individual’s criminal history record is considered com-plete when DPS has information about the outcome, or disposi-tion, of each arrest charge in the person’s ACCH record. Complete and accurate criminal history records are vital for both criminal justice and noncriminal justice purposes. For example, complete criminal history records are critical for ensuring that judges make appropriate sentencing decisions. Additionally, criminal history records are increasingly used for noncriminal justice purposes, such as employment and other types of back-ground checks. For example, complete and accurate criminal his-tory records are necessary to prevent people who have commit-ted particular offenses from purchasing handguns or working with children. Efforts Made To Improve Records Management and Integrity DPS and other criminal-justice-related agencies have worked to improve the management and integrity of Arizona’s criminal history records. DPS has corrected previously identified data Item 1 Central State Repository Duties As the central state repository, DPS shall: ¾ Procure accurate and complete information from the State’s criminal justice agencies; ¾ Provide training and proficiency testing to these agencies; and ¾ Adopt rules to assist in carrying out its responsibility as the State’s cen-tral repository of criminal justice information. Source: A.R.S. §41-1750. Complete criminal history records are important for criminal and noncriminal justice purposes. Finding I 11 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL management problems and has initiated efforts to help other criminal justice agencies submit complete and accurate informa-tion to the central state repository. In addition, the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission and the Arizona Administrative Office of the Courts, a division of Arizona’s Supreme Court, have also initiated projects to help improve criminal history records in the State. DPS has corrected past internal problems—DPS has resolved issues identified by the Auditor General’s Office in 1990 regard-ing problems with its data entry and monitoring of ACJIS use (see Report No. 90-5). Specifically, DPS has established proce-dural improvements and quality control methods that: ¾ Verify accuracy—Supervisors of DPS’ data entry staff rou-tinely check the accuracy of ACCH entries against paper re-cords and direct staff to make appropriate corrections. In ad-dition, DPS requires criminal justice agencies that directly en-ter data into ACJIS to validate their noncriminal history data, such as missing persons and stolen vehicle information, on a monthly basis. In contrast, in 1990, DPS data entry supervi-sors performed only periodic quality control checks, and lo-cal agencies did not regularly verify data they had entered. ¾ Better ensure timeliness—Supervisors better ensure timely entry of data in ACCH by closely monitoring work volume and adjusting staff time devoted to other activities, if neces-sary. DPS currently meets its goals for entering information it receives within 30 days. In 1990, DPS did not consistently en-ter arrest data in a timely manner and had a backlog of over 100,000 disposition forms awaiting entry into ACCH. ¾ Audit system users—Since 1992, DPS has biennially con-ducted operational audits of all agencies in Arizona that have direct computer terminal access to ACJIS, in accordance with a federal requirement. These audits, conducted by the Access Integrity Unit, ensure that each agency has adequate system security measures and that system users enter and use crimi-nal information appropriately. In 1990, DPS did not comply with the federal audit requirement. DPS has improved qual-ity control procedures. Finding I 12 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL DPS has assisted criminal justice agencies with data submis-sion— In addition to improving internal data management con-trols, DPS has also worked with other criminal justice agencies to assist them in submitting information to the central state reposi-tory. DPS’ efforts include: ¾ Electronic fingerprint imaging—In 1994, DPS funded the installation of electronic fingerprint imaging equipment in all sheriff’s offices throughout Arizona. In subsequent years, federal grants and other funds enabled other law enforce-ment agencies to install fingerprint-imaging equipment at their sites. The imaging system enables law enforcement to forward the fingerprint data electronically to DPS, thereby expediting the process that routes arrest charges through the criminal justice system. DPS reports that it currently receives 93 percent of arrest fingerprint data electronically. ¾ Criminal History Reporting Reviews—In early 1999, the Access Integrity Unit at DPS established an evaluation and training program called the Criminal History Reporting Re-view program, which focuses on improving the exchange of criminal history information within a county. The program was initially grant-funded through a federal initiative to im-prove the overall quality and completeness of state criminal history records. In the reviews, DPS staff first evaluate the ac-curacy, completeness, and timeliness of a sample of felony arrest documentation from various criminal justice agencies in a county, such as the sheriff’s office, the county prosecu-tors’ office, and Superior Court. DPS staff then provides customized, county-wide training to address the issues and problems revealed in the evaluation phase. As of June 2001, DPS had completed reviews of Graham, Greenlee, La Paz, and Pinal Counties.1 ¾ Revised disposition form—In December 1999, DPS intro-duced a revised disposition form for law enforcement agen-cies, prosecutors, and the courts to report the outcomes of ar-rest charges to the central state repository. DPS worked with criminal justice agencies to modify the form in an attempt to make it easier to use and to ensure that it contained all neces- 1 DPS was conducting a review of Navajo County at the time of this audit. DPS has established a program to improve the exchange of criminal his-tory information. Finding I 13 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL sary data fields. As a result of additional feedback from users of the revised form, DPS anticipates issuing a further modi-fied version of the disposition form by mid-2002. Other agencies assist in improvement efforts—The Arizona Criminal Justice Commission and the Administrative Office of the Courts have also been working to improve the exchange of criminal history records with the central state repository. The Arizona Criminal Justice Commission (Commission) is man-dated by statute to assist in the coordination and enhancement of Arizona’s criminal justice system. The Commission requests and administers federal grant funds for a variety of criminal justice initiatives in Arizona, such as automating criminal history re-cords. At the time of this audit, the Commission was also con-ducting an evaluation of the impact of federal grant projects in improving the accuracy and completeness of ACCH. In addition, Commission staff hold regular meetings with criminal justice agencies about criminal history records and annually update the Arizona Criminal Justice Records Improvement Plan to provide direction for the further automation and integration of criminal justice information throughout the State. The Administrative Office of the Courts (Office) developed a manual and an automated distance-learning program on dispo-sition reporting for clerks of the court. This effort aims to im-prove the quality and timeliness of disposition information sub-mitted by the courts. Additionally, at the time of this audit, the Office was piloting a project at Peoria Municipal Court to submit dispositions electronically to DPS. Further, the Office plans to implement electronic transmission in Coconino County’s courts by the end of 2001 and eventually into courts throughout the State. Problems with Inaccurate and Incomplete Records Continue In spite of various improvements, inaccurate and incomplete criminal history records remain a problem. According to the Bu-reau of Justice Statistics, Arizona was 1 of 12 states reporting that it had no more than 50 percent of final disposition information Finding I 14 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL recorded for all arrests in its computerized criminal history re-cord systems.1 In July 2001, DPS reported that: ¾ Over 839,000, or 46 percent, of individual arrest charges in ACCH dating between 1995 and 1999 lack dispositions. However, DPS does not know which criminal justice agency failed to submit each disposition. Many arrest charges dating prior to 1995, as well as more recent arrests, also lack disposi-tions; however, DPS does not consider a record incomplete until arrest charges are two or more years old to allow time for the charges to be resolved. ¾ Over 20,000 dispositions were rejected by ACCH during fis-cal year 2001 because information provided by criminal jus-tice agencies did not meet system requirements. For example, if sentencing information for a guilty verdict is missing or a statutory violation code does not match the violation’s de-scription, ACCH rejects the disposition altogether. To resolve these rejected dispositions, DPS needs corrected or additional information from over 300 criminal justice agencies including sheriff’s offices, county attorneys, and Superior Courts. Although DPS is statutorily responsible to collect such informa-tion, the success of DPS’ efforts depends on the cooperation of other criminal justice agencies. These other agencies are man-dated in statute to provide specific information to DPS in a timely manner; however, levels of compliance vary widely among agencies and their employees. n In a Criminal History Reporting Review, DPS found that a county sheriff’s office failed on numerous occasions to accu-rately and completely report to DPS all the charges contained in the arresting officers’ reports. In addition, in two-thirds of the sampled cases where the county attorney’s office decided not to file arrest charges in court, the county attorney’s office failed to provide this information to DPS. 1 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Prepared by SEARCH, The National Consortium for Justice In-formation and Statistics. Survey of State Criminal History Information Sys-tems– 1999. Washington, D.C.: October 2000. DPS depends on other criminal justice agencies to submit accurate and timely criminal history records. Finding I 15 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL n Representatives from three superior courts informed auditors of other instances where dispositions are not correctly for-warded to DPS. Representatives from two superior courts in-formed auditors that some dispositions are not forwarded to DPS because the court never received the original disposition reports generated at the time of arrest. Without these reports, DPS would not be able to link the disposition to the original arrest charges. Further, DPS would not know if a county at-torney or the court amended the original arrest charges. Ad-ditionally, a data entry clerk at another county superior court told auditors that she makes only one attempt to correct re-jected dispositions. If DPS rejects the disposition a second time, the clerk files it with the court’s own records and makes no further attempt to reconcile the disposition. DPS Should Initiate Further Improvements Despite reliance on other criminal justice agencies to provide ac-curate and complete information, DPS is best positioned to im-prove the integrity of the State’s criminal history records and should pursue additional efforts to do so. First, to better identify and address factors that contribute to inaccurate or incomplete criminal records, DPS should perform more comprehensive Criminal History Reporting Reviews of all counties on a regular basis and seek additional staff. Additionally, DPS should better communicate record submission requirements that criminal jus-tice agencies must follow by formalizing such requirements in administrative rules as required by statute. DPS should conduct expanded Criminal History Reporting Re-views on a regular basis—An expanded Criminal History Re-porting Review program that includes reviews of criminal justice agencies in all counties on a regular basis could be an effective method for improving the integrity of the State’s criminal history records. However, DPS does not have a plan or the resources for completing them. Regular Criminal History Reporting Reviews could help im-prove the integrity of Arizona’s criminal history records in three main ways. First, criminal justice agencies’ compliance with re- Expanded Criminal His-tory Reporting Reviews could improve criminal history information. Finding I 16 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL cord submission requirements varies, and regular reviews would continually help DPS identify the reasons why agencies fail to comply. These reviews could help DPS recommend ways to help noncompliant agencies improve. Second, through regular reviews, DPS could continually adjust the training it provides to criminal justice agencies based on the reasons that some prob-lems persist. Finally, DPS could follow up on recommendations it makes and the training it provides to verify that recommenda-tions are implemented and determine if training has been effec-tive. Currently, DPS does not have a plan or the necessary resources to conduct these reviews in all counties on a regular basis. The program was initially staffed with three grant-funded positions, and DPS staff noted that the agencies reviewed had increased the completeness and accuracy of the disposition reports submitted shortly after the review. However, the grant has since expired, and DPS currently dedicates only one auditor position for con-ducting these reviews. The Arizona Criminal Justice Commis-sion told auditors that losing these positions was a significant “setback” in DPS’ efforts to improve the State’s criminal history records. Because of the benefits these reviews could have on identifying and correcting problems with criminal history reporting in Ari-zona, DPS should develop a plan for completing regular Crimi-nal History Reporting Reviews that includes the following: n Developing a schedule to complete reviews of criminal jus-tice agencies within all counties on a regular basis; n Seeking the additional staff necessary to complete those re-views; n Ensuring that the recommendations and any training DPS provides address the reasons why problems identified in the reviews occur; n Verifying that the reviews’ recommendations are fully im-plemented; and Finding I 17 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL n Establishing program goals and measures so DPS can meas-ure the review’s impact on criminal history information in Arizona. DPS should specify submission requirements in its administra-tive rules—DPS could better communicate requirements for submitting criminal records to the central state repository by formalizing such requirements in administrative rules as re-quired by statute. A.R.S. §41-1750 requires DPS to adopt admin-istrative rules relating to the central state repository; however, it has not done so. Such rules should clarify the manner and meth-ods by which criminal justice agencies should forward informa-tion. Criminal History Reporting Reviews have revealed that some criminal justice agencies were not always aware of the statutory requirements to report criminal history information to the central state repository. Finding I 18 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL Recommendations 1. DPS should develop a plan for completing regular Criminal History Reporting Reviews that: a. Includes a schedule to complete reviews of criminal jus-tice agencies in all counties on a regular basis; b. Seeks the additional staff necessary to complete those re-views; c. Ensures that the recommendations and any training DPS provides continually address the reasons why problems identified in the reviews occur; d. Verifies that the reviews’ recommendations are fully im-plemented; and e. Establishes program goals and measures so DPS can measure the review’s impact on criminal history informa-tion in Arizona. 2. To better communicate requirements for submitting criminal history records to the central state repository, DPS should formalize such requirements in administrative rules as re-quired by statute. 19 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL FINDING II DPS SHOULD EXPEDITE AND IMPROVE BACKGROUND CHECKS DPS needs to take additional steps to ensure it completes thor-ough fingerprint background checks for employment and licens-ing purposes in a timely manner. Timely completion of back-ground checks is important because many of the individuals re-quired to have them work with populations such as children and vulnerable adults and are often able to do so while the back-ground check is being completed. However, completing back-ground checks currently can take several weeks, and involves a search of Arizona’s criminal history records by DPS and a na-tional search by the FBI. To expedite and improve this process, DPS should continue pursuing technology to electronically ex-change fingerprint information with the FBI by re-evaluating its original cost estimates and seeking dedicated funding sources. Further, DPS should take the additional steps necessary to be-come full participants in an interstate compact that would allow it to conduct some of its own national searches. Background Checks Can Be Time Consuming DPS performs background checks for individuals required to have them for employment or licensing purposes, but some of these checks take a long time. Individuals required to submit to background checks supply their fingerprints, and either the ap-plicant or the organizations requiring the checks pay the process-ing costs.1 DPS performs two different types of background checks that both include state- and national-level criminal history searches: 1 The processing fees range from $18 to $44 depending on the type of back-ground check DPS must conduct. The type of check depends on if the search is for licensing, paid employment, or volunteer work purposes. Background checks in-clude state and national criminal history searches. Finding II 20 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL n Clearance card checks—For applications received during calendar year 2000, DPS completed 80 percent of the back-ground checks in 83 days or less where it is responsible for determining if the applicant is eligible for employment.1 For these checks, a DPS fingerprint technician scans applicant fingerprints into Ari-zona’s Automated Fin-gerprint Identification System. The automated system enables the fin-gerprint technician to compare the applicants’ fingerprints to thousands of criminally related fin-gerprints in the system to determine if applicants have been arrested and/or convicted of crimes in Arizona. If so, DPS staff can then link the fingerprints to criminal history records found in the Arizona Computerized Criminal History (ACCH) data-base. DPS also mails the fingerprints to the FBI for a national-level criminal history record search. Based on the information obtained from both searches, DPS issues clearance cards to applicants who have not committed disqualifying offenses, as specified by statute.2 During calendar year 2000, DPS reports that it completed ap-proximately 45,000 clearance checks.3 While several factors 1 These checks typically took 48 or 76 days depending on the amount of time it took to conduct the state search portion of the background check. Reasons the state check may take longer include the applicant having a criminal record in Arizona or DPS having to reject the submitted finger-prints because they are of poor quality. 2 Clearance cards are valid for three years. However, they can be suspended if a person commits a disqualifying offense after the clearance card was is-sued. Disqualifying offenses include such crimes as robbery, aggravated assault, and child abuse. 3 In addition, DPS reports that it completed approximately 22,000 other checks during calendar year 2000 for applicants who had been issued a clearance letter. Because legislation during the 2001 regular session com-bined the clearance card and clearance letter processes into one, auditors did not evaluate the clearance letter process. Clearance cards are re-quired to work with cer-tain populations, such as children. Item 2 Types of Agencies That Require Clearance Card Checks ¾ Department of Economic Security for child care personnel ¾ Department of Education for teacher certification ¾ Department of Health Services for home- and community-based service providers Finding II 21 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL may affect the amount of time the state-level search takes, the FBI’s national-level search typically takes about 28 days. Once DPS obtains the results of the state- and national-level searches, it typically takes about 18 days to determine an in-dividual’s eligibility for employment. n General employment and licensing checks—DPS typi-cally takes about 36 days to perform background checks for general employment and licensing purposes for organiza-tions and state agencies. Like the clearance card checks, these searches also involve a state- and national-level search of criminal his-tory records, but differ in two ways. First, DPS uses demographic data, such as the applicant’s name or date of birth, rather than fingerprints, for its initial search of state criminal history records. DPS says it uses demographic information because its fingerprint system does not have the capacity to store these applicants’ fingerprints and because it does not have the personnel to complete additional finger-print- based searches. Second, rather than determining if the applicant is eligible to receive a clearance card, DPS simply forwards the results of the state and national searches to the organizations making employment or licensure decisions. During calendar year 2000, DPS reports that it completed ap-proximately 140,000 general employment and licensing checks. While these checks typically take approximately 36 days to be completed, the national-level searches take about 31 of those days according to DPS data.1 1 Auditors could not verify the accuracy of this data because DPS does not maintain applicant files. Item 3 Examples of Agencies That Require General Employment and Licensing Checks ¾ Department of Gaming ¾ Board of Nursing ¾ Department of Insurance Finding II 22 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL DPS Should Continue Efforts To Expedite and Improve Background Checks DPS should continue to pursue ways to expedite and improve the background checks it performs. Recently, DPS has sought a combination of computer system upgrades and additional per-sonnel that would allow it to exchange fingerprint information electronically with the FBI and conduct fingerprint-based searches on all background check applicants. While these efforts would expedite and improve background checks, the costs asso-ciated with them have stalled their implementation. DPS should re-evaluate its cost estimates for each aspect of this endeavor and seek dedicated funding sources for their implementation. DPS has sought changes to expedite and improve background checks—DPS has sought computer system upgrades and addi-tional personnel that would allow it to significantly expedite the national-level searches done through the FBI and enable DPS to conduct fingerprint-based state searches on all background check applicants. By exchanging fingerprint information elec-tronically with the FBI, DPS could reduce the time typically needed for the national-level searches from about one month to an estimated 24 hours or less. This would happen for two rea-sons. First, the FBI reports that the electronic transmission of ap-plicant fingerprints and search results between DPS and the FBI would be instantaneous, rather than the days it now takes to mail fingerprint cards and search results. Second, according to the FBI, electronic processing of fingerprints also significantly reduces the FBI’s processing time because mailed fingerprints have to be scanned into the FBI fingerprint system before it can run a fingerprint-based search. Currently, 25 states submit at least a portion of their applicant fingerprints to the FBI electroni-cally. Auditors spoke with five of those states and they all indi-cated that their national-level searches were generally completed within a few hours.1 1 Auditors spoke with representatives from the California Department of Justice, Georgia Department of Public Safety, Montana Department of Jus-tice, Oregon State Police, and Texas Department of Public Safety. Finding II 23 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL In addition to expediting the national-level search portion of background checks, DPS’ proposed changes would also improve the effectiveness of its state criminal history record search by enabling DPS to complete fingerprint-based searches for all ap-plicants. Currently, only clearance card applicants’ state criminal history searches are fingerprint-based, while state searches of other applicants are based on demographic information. As mentioned previously, state searches for the approximately 140,000 annual general employment and licensing applicants be-gin with a demographic-based search only because DPS indi-cates its fingerprint system does not have the capacity to store these applicants’ fingerprints and it does not have the personnel to complete additional searches. However, fingerprint-based searches are a much more reliable means of identifying a per-son’s criminal history than demographic-based searches because an applicant can falsify information on the application. If an ap-plicant with a criminal record falsifies information, his or her criminal history would not be identified until the FBI conducted its fingerprint-based national search. Costs associated with changes have stalled implementation— While DPS’ proposed changes would expedite and improve the background checks it performs, DPS indicates that high costs have stalled implementation so far. DPS originally estimated that it would cost $2.8 million to initially expand, equip, and staff its fingerprint system for electronic processing and conducting fin-gerprint- based searches on all applicants. In addition, DPS esti-mated it would need approximately $950,000 annually to cover the ongoing personnel and maintenance costs associated with the proposed changes. In the 2001 legislative session, a bill failed that would have appropriated only $2 million to DPS to allow for the electronic exchange of applicant information with the FBI and additional staff for conducting more fingerprint-based searches. DPS should re-evaluate costs and seek dedicated funding—DPS should re-evaluate the costs for both electronically exchanging fingerprint information with the FBI and for conducting finger-print- based searches for all background check applicants. DPS should consider several factors when re-evaluating the cost esti-mates it originally calculated in 1999. Specifically, Electronic submission could significantly reduce processing time. Fingerprint-based searches are considered more reliable than demo-graphic- based searches. Finding II 24 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL ¾ DPS should estimate the costs for implementing electronic processing and performing fingerprint-based state searches on all applicants separately. While both are important, they could be done independently of each other. ¾ DPS should look for ways to reduce its projected costs. For example, a portion of the 1999 estimate was related to buying additional electronic storage capacity for general employ-ment applicants’ fingerprints. However, storing fingerprints for general employment applicants, unlike clearance card applicants, is unnecessary because DPS does not continue to monitor the criminal history records of these applicants as it does for clearance card applicants. ¾ DPS should consider changes that have been made to the Fingerprint Identification Bureau’s workload and staffing. For example, DPS has recently added one new fingerprint technician, which means it needs fewer additional staff. Ad-ditionally, the original cost projections were based on a pro-jected workload of approximately 275,000 applications annu-ally, but DPS now projects it would process closer to 250,000 applications annually. After DPS re-evaluates the costs for pursuing each of these im-provements, it should search for a viable funding source to cover its start-up costs. Several states have funded their electronic submission technology through federal grants. In addition, once these improvements are implemented, DPS should raise its ap-plication fees to cover the ongoing system maintenance and per-sonnel costs if the program is to remain self-funded. Based on the number of applications DPS projects it will process under the proposed changes, an average fee increase of $4 per application would provide over $1 million annually. DPS Should Become A Full Participant in An Interstate Compact Whether or not DPS obtains electronic submission technology, it should take the steps necessary to become a full participant in an interstate compact that would allow it to complete some of its Finding II 25 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL own national searches. The National Crime Prevention and Pri-vacy Compact was established in 1998 to facilitate the direct ex-change of criminal history information for noncriminal justice purposes, such as employment background checks, through an existing criminal history information network.1 Full participation in the Compact will provide several benefits to Arizona, such as obtaining more detailed criminal history information quickly from participating states. The Governor ratified the Compact by executive order in August 2001; however, DPS still must take additional steps to become a full participant in the Compact. Compact will improve the quality and timeliness of some back-ground searches—The Compact will allow Arizona to quickly exchange comprehensive criminal history information with par-ticipating states for background check applicants who have exist-ing criminal records in Arizona. To ensure the network is used for valid noncriminal justice purposes, states that join the com-pact may not make name-based inquiries through the network; rather, inquiries for noncriminal justice purposes must contain a unique state or FBI identification number. State and/or FBI numbers are assigned to individuals when they are arrested and their fingerprints are recorded on the state and/or FBI system. Therefore, under the Compact, if DPS found that a background check applicant had a criminal history record in Arizona, it could use the unique identifier number assigned to the applicant to immediately search an index of participating states’ criminal his-tory records.2 The FBI would also supply information it has from nonparticipating states and for federal charges. However, if an applicant does not have a criminal history record in Arizona, DPS would have to send the applicant’s fingerprints to the FBI for the national-level search because it would not have an identi-fication number for the applicant. Therefore, participation in the Compact does not eliminate DPS’ need for electronic processing with the FBI. 1 The Compact uses the Interstate Identification Index network, which 43 states (including Arizona) currently use for criminal justice purposes. 2 Fourteen states had ratified the Compact as of September 2001: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, and South Carolina. Finding II 26 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL Full participation in the Compact will provide several benefits that include the following: n DPS will be able to conduct some of its own national-level searches and reduce the number of fingerprints it has to send to the FBI. n DPS will receive some applicants’ criminal history records more quickly, with or without electronic processing. n DPS will receive more comprehensive criminal history in-formation from participating states than it receives currently from the FBI. States typically have much more comprehen-sive records of crimes that were committed in their states than those maintained by the FBI. n The FBI is encouraging all states to participate in the Com-pact. If all states join the Compact, it will help decentralize criminal history records from the federal government to the states. DPS should take additional steps to fully implement the Com-pact— Although the Governor ratified the Compact by executive order in August 2001 (No. 2001-15), DPS must take additional steps to become a full participant. For example, of the 14 states that have ratified the Compact, only Florida is prepared to begin exchanging information with the FBI and other Compact states. Other ratifying states are working with the FBI to make neces-sary changes to their data systems and processes to become full participants in the Compact. The FBI reports that states’ start-up costs for joining the Compact are reasonable and all Compact states auditors spoke with reported little to no start-up costs.1 In addition, DPS should obtain approval of the Compact from the Legislature. Although the Compact does not specifically prevent ratification of the Compact by executive order, recent interstate compacts joined by Arizona were first approved by the Legisla-ture. Further, the FBI Compact coordinator indicated that the 13 other Compact states had ratified the Compact through their leg-islatures. 1 Auditors spoke with representatives from Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Montana. Finding II 27 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL Recommendations 1. DPS should continue to pursue methods to expedite and improve its processes for conducting fingerprint back-ground checks. Specifically, DPS should do the following: a. Re-evaluate its original cost estimates for electroni-cally exchanging fingerprint information with the FBI and for conducting fingerprint-based searches for all applicants; b. Seek viable funding sources, such as grants, to sup-port the necessary computer system expansion costs; and, c. Raise background check application fees as necessary to cover the ongoing system maintenance and per-sonnel costs if the program is to remain self-funded. 2. DPS should take additional steps to become a full partici-pant in the National Crime Prevention and Privacy Com-pact. Specifically, DPS should: a. Obtain legislative approval of the Compact; and b. Work with the FBI to make necessary changes to its data systems and processes. 28 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL (This Page Intentionally Left Blank) OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL AGENCY RESPONSE OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL (This Page Intentionally Left Blank) September 27, 2001 Ms. Debra K. Davenport, CPA Auditor General, State of Arizona Office of the Auditor General 2910 North 44th Street Phoenix, Arizona 85018 Dear Ms. Davenport: Enclosed is the Department's written response to the Auditor General’s draft report of the performance audit of the Department of Public Safety Criminal Information Services bureau, Access Integrity Unit, and the Fingerprint Identification bureau. Please do not hesitate to contact my office if you have any questions. Sincerely, Dennis A. Garrett, Colonel Director lb Enclosures Response to Auditor General’s Report for the Criminal Information Services Bureau, Access Integrity Unit, and the Fingerprint Identification Bureau ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 1 GENERAL The Arizona Department of Public Safety, Criminal Information Services Bureau, Access Integrity Unit, and the Fingerprint Identification Bureau recognizes that inspections and audits provide a valuable means to evaluate Department operations from an external source and make recommendations for improvement. The following is in response to the information provided and recommendations made. FINDING I DPS COULD BETTER ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE STATE’S CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS SYSTEM Recommendations 1. DPS should develop a plan for completing regular Criminal History Reporting Reviews (CHRR) that: a. Includes a schedule to complete reviews of criminal justice agencies in all counties on a regular basis; b. Seeks the additional staff necessary to complete those reviews; c. Ensures that the recommendations and any training DPS provides continually address the reasons why problems identified in the reviews occur; d. Verifies that the reviews’ recommendations are fully implemented; and e. Establishes program goals and measures so DPS can measure the review’s impact on criminal history information in Arizona. Response The finding of the Auditor General is agreed to and the audit recommendation will be implemented. DPS customizes training for each county after the completion of each CHRR. Areas addressed in the reports are covered in each county wide training class. Response to Auditor General’s Report for the Criminal Information Services Bureau, Access Integrity Unit, and the Fingerprint Identification Bureau ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 2 DPS will develop and implement a plan for all the above recommendations. In order for complete arrest information to be reflected on the Arizona Computerized Criminal History database accurately and completely, all criminal justice entities statewide will need to make a cooperative effort to assist in achieving this goal. 2. To better communicate requirements for submitting criminal history records to the central state repository, DPS should formalize such requirements in administrative rules as required by statute. Response The finding of the Auditor General is agreed to and the audit recommendation will be implemented. Response to Auditor General’s Report for the Criminal Information Services Bureau, Access Integrity Unit, and the Fingerprint Identification Bureau ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 3 FINDING II DPS SHOULD EXPEDITE AND IMPROVE BACKGROUND CHECKS Recommendations 1 DPS should continue to pursue methods to expedite and improve its processes for conducting fingerprint background checks. Specifically, DPS should do the following: a. Re-evaluate its original cost estimates for electronically exchanging fingerprint information with the FBI and for conducting fingerprint-based searches for all applicants; b. Seek viable funding sources, such as grants, to support the necessary computer system expansion cost; and, c. Raise background check application fees as necessary to cover the ongoing system maintenance and personnel costs if the program is to remain self-funded. Response a. The finding of the Auditor General is agreed to and the audit recommendation will be implemented. Separate budget projections are being researched to determine the estimated costs and operational benefits of 1) electronically submitting applicant fingerprint records directly to the FBI, without first searching them against the Arizona Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AZAFIS), vs. 2) searching all applicant fingerprints against the State AFIS, followed by electronic submission the FBI to be searched against the bureau’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). b. The finding of the Auditor General is agreed to and the audit recommendation will be implemented. c. The finding of the Auditor General is agreed to and the audit recommendation will be implemented. If the Legislature approves either of the programs discussed in recommendation 1.a. (above), and if the Legislature deems the ongoing system maintenance and personnel costs be self- funded, the Fingerprint Identification Bureau will submit a fee-increase recommendation to the DPS Director. Response to Auditor General’s Report for the Criminal Information Services Bureau, Access Integrity Unit, and the Fingerprint Identification Bureau ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 4 2. DPS should take additional steps to become full participants in the National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact. Specifically, DPS should: a. Obtain legislative approval of the Compact; and b. Work with the FBI to make necessary changes to its data systems and processes. Response The finding of the Auditor General is agreed to and the audit recommendation will be implemented. Other Performance Audit Reports Issued Within the Last 12 Months 01-10 Future Performance Audit Reports Department of Public Safety—Sunset Factors Perinatal Substance Abuse Pilot Program 01-1 Department of Economic Security— Child Support Enforcement 01-2 Department of Economic Security— Healthy Families Program 01-3 Arizona Department of Public Safety—Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) Program 01-4 Arizona Department of Corrections—Human Resources Management 01-5 Arizona Department of Public Safety—Telecommunications Bureau 01-6 Board of Osteopathic Examiners in Medicine and Surgery 01-7 Arizona Department of Corrections—Support Services 01-8 Arizona Game and Fish Commission and Department—Wildlife Management Program 01-9 Arizona Game and Fish Commission—Heritage Fund 01-10 Department of Public Safety— Licensing Bureau 01-11 Arizona Commission on the Arts 01-12 Board of Chiropractic Examiners 01-13 Arizona Department of Corrections—Private Prisons 01-14 Automobile Theft Authority 01-15 Department of Real Estate 01-16 Department of Veterans’ Services Arizona State Veteran Home, Veterans’ Conservatorship/ Guardianship Program, and Veterans’ Services Program 01-17 Arizona Board of Dispensing Opticians 01-18 Arizona Department of Correct-ions— Administrative Services and Information Technology 01-19 Arizona Department of Education— Early Childhood Block Grant 01-20 Department of Public Safety— Highway Patrol 01-21 Board of Nursing 01-22 Department of Public Safety— Criminal Investigations Division 01-23 Department of Building and Fire Safety 01-24 Arizona Veterans’ Service Advisory Commission 01-25 Department of Corrections— Arizona Correctional Industries 01-26 Department of Corrections— Sunset Factors 01-27 Arizona Board of Regents |
