Performance audit, Department of Public Safety, Criminal Investigations Division

              State of Arizona
Office
of the
Auditor General
PERFORMANCE AUDIT
Criminal Investigations
Division
Report to the Arizona Legislature
By Debra K. Davenport
Auditor General
DEPARTMENT
OF
PUBLIC SAFETY
Criminal Investigations
Division
September 2001
Report No. 01-22
The Auditor General is appointed by the Joint Legislative Audit Committee, a bipartisan committee
composed of five senators and five representatives. Her mission is to provide independent and impar-tial
information and specific recommendations to improve the operations of state and local government
entities. To this end, she provides financial audits and accounting services to the state and political
subdivisions and performance audits of state agencies and the programs they administer.
The Joint Legislative Audit Committee
Senator Ken Bennett, Chairman
Representative Roberta L. Voss, Vice-Chairman
Senator Herb Guenther Representative Robert Blendu
Senator Dean Martin Representative Gabrielle Giffords
Senator Peter Rios Representative Barbara Leff
Senator Tom Smith Representative James Sedillo
Senator Randall Gnant (ex-officio) Representative James Weiers (ex-officio)
Audit Staff
Dot Reinhard—Manager
and Contact Person (602) 553-0333
Catherine Dahlquist—Team Leader
Michele Diamond—Team Member
Anne Hunter—Team Member
Ulyses Garcia—Team Member
Jason Wolfe—Team Member
Copies of the Auditor General’s reports are free.
You may request them by contacting us at:
Office of the Auditor General
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Phoenix, AZ 85018
(602) 553-0333
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2910 NORTH 44th STREET • SUITE 410 • PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85018 • (602) 553-0333 • FAX (602) 553-0051
DEBRA K. DAVENPORT, CPA
AUDITOR GENERAL
STATE OF ARIZONA
OFFICE OF THE
AUDITOR GENERAL
WILLIAM THOMSON
DEPUTY AUDITOR GENERAL
September 17, 2001
Members of the Arizona Legislature
The Honorable Jane Dee Hull, Governor
Colonel Dennis A. Garrett, Director
Department of Public Safety
Transmitted herewith is a report of the Auditor General, A Performance Audit of the
Department of Public Safety’s Criminal Investigations Division. This report is in
response to a June 16, 1999, resolution of the Joint Legislative Audit Committee. The
performance audit was conducted as part of the Sunset review set forth in A.R.S. §41-
2951 et seq. I am also transmitting with this report a copy of the Report Highlights for
this audit to provide a quick summary for your convenience.
This is the seventh in a series of nine reports to be issued on the Department of Public
Safety.
As outlined in its response, the Department of Public Safety plans to implement 6 of the
8 recommendations, implement 1 of the recommendations differently, and does not
plan to implement 1 recommendation.
My staff and I will be pleased to discuss or clarify items in the report.
This report will be released to the public on September 18, 2001.
Sincerely,
Debra K. Davenport
Auditor General
Enclosure
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Program Fact Sheet
Department of Public Safety
Criminal Investigation Division
Services: The Criminal Investigation Division provides statewide investigative, specialized
enforcement, and high-risk response support to federal, state, and local criminal justice agen-cies.
The Division conducts investigations involving narcotic trafficking, organized crime,
criminal intelligence, vehicle theft, gangs, computer and financial crimes, and major crime
investigations when requested to do so by other criminal justice agencies. The Division also
provides specialized high-risk response to acts of extraordinary violence.
Program Revenue: $32.33 million
(estimated for fiscal year 2002)
$0
$5,000
$10,000
$15,000
$20,000
$25,000
$30,000
$35,000
2000 2001 2002 (Est.)
Other
Intergovernmental
Arizona Highway Patrol Fund
General Fund
Personnel: 396 full-time staff
(285 sworn officers and 111 civilians
in fiscal year 2001)
Rocky Mountain
Information
Network (50)
Administration and
Governor’s Protection
Detail (16) Narcotics
Bureau (106)
Special
Enforcement
Bureau (88)
Intelligence
Bureau (56)
Investigation
Bureau (80)
Equipment:
To perform its various functions, the
Division uses 452 vehicles at an approxi-mate
value of $8.6 million and an exten-sive
array of specialized equipment with
a total value of approximately $7.5 mil-lion1,
including:
  Night vision equipment
  Clandestine listening equipment
  Clandestine video and still cameras
  Building entry tools
  Body transmitters
  Self-contained breathing apparatus
  Air monitors
  Surveillance vehicles
  Wire tap recording tape decks
  Tactical body armor
  Assault and sniper rifles
  Explosive robot
  X-ray equipment
  Hazardous materials vehicles
1 Based on the Criminal Investigations Division’s
vehicle and capital equipment inventories main-tained
by the Arizona Department of Public Safety.
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Program Goals (fiscal year 2001):
1. To aggressively target drug- and gang-related
violent crimes.
2. To enhance specialized investigative
and operational assistance to DPS and
other governmental entities.
3. To ensure the professional develop-ment
of Division employees through
job-specific training.
4. To enhance Division operations and
information sharing through automa-tion
and technology.
5. To collect, analyze, and share timely
and relevant criminal intelligence.
6. To enhance community partnerships in
support of the Criminal Investigations
Division’s mission.
Adequacy of Performance Goals
and Measures:
The Division’s six goals appear aligned
with its mission:
“To protect the public by de-terring
crime using innovative
investigative and specialized
enforcement strategies and
resources.”
In support of its goals, the Division has
established 15 objectives and 24 perform-ance
measures.1 A review of the perform-ance
measures indicates:
  The majority of the Division’s perform-ance
measures (18) are output meas-ures.
Although output measures are
important, they only measure the
amount of services provided and not
the quality or effectiveness of the Divi-sion’s
services.
  Additionally, the Division should ex-pand
its measures to include quality,
efficiency, and outcome measures. The
Division lacks quality measures, which
reflect its effectiveness in meeting cus-tomers’
and stakeholders’ expectations,
such as other law enforcement agen-cies’
satisfaction with the Division’s
services. In addition, the Division
should expand its efficiency and out-come
measures. Efficiency measures
evaluate the agency’s productivity,
such as the cost per case. Outcome
measures help the agency determine
the actual results or impact of its ser-vices.
For example, establishing a per-formance
measure, such as the percent-age
of its cases referred for prosecution
that were successfully prosecuted,
could help the Division determine the
overall results of its investigations.
1 In addition to Division-wide objectives and perform-ance
measures, each of the Division’s five bureaus has
also developed objectives and performance measures
unique to its function. Similar to the Division, these
performance measures are primarily output meas-ures.
i
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
SUMMARY
The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance
audit of the Department of Public Safety’s Criminal Investigations
Division as part of a Sunset review of the agency. This audit was
conducted pursuant to a June 16, 1999, resolution of the Joint Leg-islative
Audit Committee. This audit was conducted under the
authority vested in the Auditor General by Arizona Revised Stat-utes
(A.R.S.) §41-2951 et seq. This is the seventh in a series of nine
audits of the Department of Public Safety (DPS). The other areas
audited include DPS’ Aviation Section (Report No. 00-7), Scien-tific
Analysis Bureau (Report No. 00-12), Drug Abuse Resistance
Education Program (Report No. 01-3), Telecommunications Bu-reau
(Report No. 01-5), Licensing Bureau (Report No. 01-10), and
Highway Patrol Division (01-20). The remaining audits will cover
the Criminal Information Services and Fingerprint Identification
Bureaus and the agency-wide Sunset Factors.
The Criminal Investigations Division provides statewide investi-gative,
specialized enforcement, and high-risk response support
to federal, state, and local criminal justice agencies. Some of the
specific activities undertaken by the Division’s 396 authorized
personnel include conducting investigations involving narcotics
trafficking, organized crime, vehicle theft, gangs, and computer
and financial crimes; enforcing state drug and liquor laws; col-lecting,
analyzing, and disseminating criminal intelligence in-formation
to law enforcement personnel; protecting the Gover-nor
and her family; apprehending fugitives; and responding to
high-risk situations involving explosives and violence. To
achieve statewide coverage, Division personnel are assigned to
more than 50 squads and multi-agency task forces located
throughout Arizona.1
1 A squad typically consists of a DPS sergeant and six to seven officers,
while a task force comprises DPS officers and personnel from other crimi-nal
justice agencies.
Summary
ii
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
The Division Lacks Formal
Evaluation Processes for
Task Force Participation
(See pages 9 through 18)
The Division needs to formalize its processes for determining
participation on multi-agency task forces. The number of task
forces the Division participates on has nearly doubled in the past
ten years, and a significant percentage of the Division’s resources
are dedicated to such endeavors. Specifically, in fiscal year 2001,
the Division committed 52 percent of its sworn officers and $10.9
million to 28 multi-agency task forces. The level of Division re-sources
committed to task forces heightens the need to formally
evaluate whether commitments to new task forces are in the Di-vision’s
and the State’s best interest. In addition, law
enforcement accreditation standards recommend a formalized
process that would include a documented evaluation of such
things as level of criminal activity, the task force’s mission and
goals, and the projected costs and benefits of participation.
The Division also lacks written orders or policies that specifically
address how DPS officers assigned to task forces should be su-pervised.
While the Division does have general supervision pro-cedures
that apply to all staff, these procedures are inadequate
for addressing the task force investigators who work on projects
that generally are administered and controlled by other agencies.
Finally, the Division lacks adequate management information on
the task forces to evaluate the benefits of continued participation.
The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Stan-dards
and Goals determined that special units tend to be self-perpetuating
if no formal periodic review is conducted. Some of
the task forces on which the Division is participating have been
operating for nearly 20 years; however, the Division has no for-mal
process for evaluating the appropriateness of continued par-ticipation.
Summary
iii
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
The Division Needs to Improve
Its Case Management Practices
(See pages 19 through 27)
The Division still needs to improve its case management prac-tices
even though it has taken steps to address a similar finding
in an Auditor General report issued almost ten years ago. First,
the Division continues to accept cases without considering if they
are the best use of investigative resources. A 1992 audit report
(Report No. 92-6) indicated that the Division did not have suffi-cient
guidelines to help its officers determine whether a case was
worth pursuing. As a result, the Division implemented a policy
that requires all cases to be opened by a supervisor to ensure the
case is worthy of initiation. However, most supervisors of Divi-sion
squads still do not use specific criteria to decide whether to
open a case. Further, some supervisors believe they cannot de-cline
a case requested by another law enforcement agency be-cause
the Division and local law enforcement agencies have in-terpreted
DPS’ enabling statutes as a mandate to assist other law
enforcement agencies in all crime areas. Because DPS does not
have unlimited resources, it needs to develop case-screening pro-cedures
that will allow it to balance the requests of local agencies
with statewide enforcement needs and priorities.
In addition to insufficient case screening, the Division has not en-sured
that its case oversight procedures are being adequately fol-lowed.
In the previous audit, it was found that once a case was
opened, the Division had no mechanism to determine if it war-ranted
continuation and could not ensure that its investigators’
time was spent effectively. Although the Division now requires
supervisors to review active cases every 30 days, many cases are
still not being reviewed in a timely manner. In addition, al-though
the Division developed policies and procedures address-ing
the proper documentation and storage of investigative case
reports and files, problems in these areas continue.
Finally, the Division continues to lack critical case management
information necessary to report on and assess its activities and
ensure that it is effectively using its resources. The Division’s case
management system lacks complete and accurate information.
Summary
iv
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Some investigators have historically not entered case information
into the system. In addition, the system’s programming pre-cludes
the tracking of complete information for cases initiated by
other agencies on which Division personnel participate. The Di-vision
has indicated that it is in the process of identifying a new
system and the necessary funding to implement it, in hopes of
addressing these case management problems. However, without
regular training and proper procedures, these problems will con-tinue
even under a new system.
v
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Introduction and Background............................. 1
Finding I: The Division Lacks
Formal Evaluation Processes
for Task Force Participation............................ 9
Majority of Division’s Officers
Work Full-Time on Task Forces ........................................ 9
The Division Needs a Formal
Process for Deciding When To
Participate on a Task Force................................................ 13
The Division Needs Task Force
Supervision Policies ........................................................... 15
The Division Needs to Evaluate
Its Continued Involvement
on Task Forces.................................................................... 16
Recommendations ............................................................. 18
Finding II: The Division Needs
To Improve Its Case
Management Practices ................................... 19
Division Squads Offer Numerous
Law Enforcement Services................................................. 19
The Division Does Not
Screen Cases Sufficiently.................................................... 21
Case Oversight Policies
Not Followed...................................................................... 23
Table of Contents
vi
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Concl’d)
Page
Finding II (Concl’d)
The Division Lacks Critical
Case Management Information......................................... 24
Recommendations ............................................................. 27
Agency Response
Tables
Table 1 Department of Public Safety
Criminal Investigations Division
Statement of Revenues, Expenditures,
and Changes in Fund Balance
Years Ended or Ending June 30, 2000,
2001, and 2002 (In Thousands)
(Unaudited)...................................................... 4
Table 2 Department of Public Safety
Criminal Investigations Division
Participation in Multi-Agency Task Forces
Year Ended June 30, 2001................................. 11
Table 3 Department of Public Safety
Criminal Investigations
Division Squads
Year Ended June 30, 2001................................. 20
1
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance
audit of the Department of Public Safety’s Criminal Investigations
Division as part of a Sunset review of the agency. This audit was
conducted pursuant to a June 16, 1999, resolution of the Joint Leg-islative
Audit Committee. This audit was conducted under the
authority vested in the Auditor General by Arizona Revised Stat-utes
(A.R.S.) §41-2951 et seq. This is the seventh in a series of nine
audits of the Department of Public Safety (DPS). The other areas
audited include DPS’ Aviation Section (Report No. 00-7), Scien-tific
Analysis Bureau (Report No. 00-12), Drug Abuse Resistance
Education Program (Report No. 01-3), Telecommunications Bu-reau
(Report No. 01-5), Licensing Bureau (Report No. 01-10), and
Highway Patrol Division (01-20). The remaining audits will cover
the Criminal Information Services and Fingerprint Identification
Bureaus and the agency-wide Sunset Factors.
Criminal Investigations Division
Provides Investigative and Specialized
Enforcement Services to Arizona’s
Law Enforcement Community
The Criminal Investigations Division provides statewide investi-gative,
specialized enforcement, and high-risk response support
to federal, state, and local criminal justice agencies. The Division
conducts investigations involving narcotic trafficking, organized
crime, criminal intelligence, vehicle theft, gangs, computer and
financial crimes, and major crime investigations when requested
to do so by other criminal justice agencies. The Division also
provides specialized high-risk response to acts of extraordinary
violence.
Organization and Staffing
The Division operates statewide and is currently organized into
five bureaus. Each bureau has a separate focus and, except for
Introduction and Background
2
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
the Rocky Mountain Information Network, is led by a com-mander.
In addition to the 380 full-time equivalent (FTE) em-ployees
distributed among the 5 bureaus, there are another 9
FTEs assigned to the Governor’s Protection Detail and 7 FTEs re-sponsible
for administering the Division.
¾ The Narcotics Bureau (106 FTEs)—consists of 15 squads
and multi-agency task forces organized into three regional
districts—northern, central, and southern.1 Their focus is on
enforcing state drug laws by conducting investigations of
groups and individuals who manufacture, distribute, and sell
illegal drugs.
¾ The Investigation Bureau (80 FTEs)—consists of 13 squads
and multi-agency task forces organized into three functional
areas: 1) vehicle theft interdiction, which focuses on stolen
vehicle recovery; 2) general investigation, which assists law
enforcement agencies with follow-up investigation of finan-cial,
liquor, and other crimes; and 3) major crimes investiga-tion,
which conducts internal investigations, assists other
agencies with administrative investigations, investigates
computer crimes, and provides other law enforcement agen-cies
with investigative support into serious crimes.
¾ The Intelligence Bureau (56 FTEs)—consists of several en-tities,
including three squads of intelligence collectors, a
criminal intelligence analysis unit, a criminal information re-search
unit, a files management unit, and two multi-agency
narcotics intelligence initiatives. These entities focus on gath-ering
and analyzing criminal intelligence information and
disseminating it to law enforcement personnel.
¾ The Special Enforcement Bureau (88 FTEs)—consists of
19 squads organized into three functional areas: 1) gang en-forcement,
which addresses street, motorcycle, and prison
gang activity and crime; 2) tactical operations, which con-ducts
clandestine drug lab, explosives, hazardous materials,
1 A squad typically consists of a sergeant and six to seven officers, while a
task force comprises DPS officers and personnel from other criminal justice
agencies.
Introduction and Background
3
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
and fugitive arrest operations; and 3) canine operations,
which uses trained dogs to help detect narcotics and explo-sives.
¾ The Rocky Mountain Information Network (50 FTEs)—
supports law enforcement agencies in the Rocky Mountain
region in the detection, enforcement, and prosecution of
multi-jurisdictional criminal activities by providing an on-line
network of intelligence databases, analytical services, in-vestigative
assistance, and specialized surveillance equip-ment
to all member law enforcement agencies.
Budget
The Division received $31.9 million in fiscal year 2001 (see Table
1, page 4). While General Fund monies comprised most of the
funding, the Division received additional funds from other
sources, including the Governor’s Office of Highway Safety, the
Arizona Automobile Theft Authority, the Arizona Criminal Jus-tice
Commission, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the Office
of National Drug Control Policy. In addition, the Division re-ceived
$1.5 million in Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organi-zation
monies for items such as officer overtime and equipment.
Noteworthy Recognitions
Over the years, the Division has received frequent recognition
for its criminal investigation efforts.
¾ The U.S. Attorney General’s Law Enforcement Coordinating
Committee recognized the Division’s Phoenix Narcotics
Squad, Phoenix Interdiction Squad, and Financial Task Force
for “Excellence in Law Enforcement” for 1999-2000.
¾ The Executive Office of the President and the Office of Na-tional
Drug Control Policy recognized the Arizona High In-tensity
Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Intelligence Support
Center as an “Outstanding HIDTA Investigative Support
Center” for 2000.
Introduction and Background
4
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Table 1
Department of Public Safety
Criminal Investigations Division
Statement of Revenues, Expenditures, and Changes in Fund Balance
Years Ended or Ending June 30, 2000, 2001, and 2002
(In Thousands)
(Unaudited)
2000 2001 2002
(Actual) (Actual) (Estimated)
Revenues:
Appropriations:
State General Fund $20,560.0 $21,972.5 $21,899.5
Arizona Highway Patrol Fund 792.9
Intergovernmental 8,138.8 9,944.5 10,430.6
Other .2
Total revenues 29,491.7 31,917.2 32,330.1
Expenditures:
Personal services 17,650.5 18,187.0 20,242.2
Employee related 3,982.8 4,171.9 4,180.3
Professional and outside services 79.2 54.5 114.4
Travel, in-state 269.5 270.7 378.8
Travel, out-of-state 261.4 246.8 258.0
Aid to organizations 3,194.5 3,422.4 2,957.8
Other operating 1,883.2 2,761.5 2,420.5
Equipment 1,603.2 2,138.4 2,159.1
Total expenditures 28,924.3 31,253.2 32,711.1
Excess of revenues over (under) expenditures 567.4 664.0 (381.0)
Reversions to the State General Fund 257.4 379.9
Excess of revenues over (under) expenditures
and reversions to the State General Fund 310.0 284.1 (381.0)
Fund balance, beginning of year 807.1 1,117.1 1,401.2
Fund balance, end of year $ 1,117.1 $ 1,401.2 $ 1,020.2
Source: Auditor General staff analysis of financial information provided by the Department of
Public Safety.
Introduction and Background
5
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
¾ The International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Na-tional
Insurance Crime Bureau recognized the Arizona Vehi-cle
Theft Task Force with an “Award of Merit” for 1999.
Prior Audit Findings
This audit reviewed the Division’s progress in implementing
recommendations identified in a 1992 performance audit (No.
92-6). Several of the problems identified in the 1992 report still
exist and are addressed in Findings I and II (see pages 9 through
27). Below are the findings and recommendations from the 1992
report not specifically discussed in the current report.1
¾ Poor case prosecution rate—The 1992 report found that
due to the poor quality of investigations, Maricopa County
prosecutors refused to prosecute Bureau cases more often
than similar cases prepared by other law enforcement agen-cies.
Therefore, the report recommended that the Bureau de-velop
a process for obtaining prosecutor feedback.
Current status—During recent interviews with prosecutors
handling Division cases, no concerns were cited regarding
the quality of the cases. In addition, it was noted in inter-views
with prosecutors and Division investigators that the
two parties often begin working together during the early
stages of the investigation to better ensure the case will be
prosecutable.
¾ Inexperienced supervisory personnel—The 1992 report
found that the Bureau placed personnel in management posi-tions
who, at the time of placement, had no experience in
conducting narcotics or intelligence investigations. Because
the types of cases the Bureau worked on often required ex-tensive
planning and supervision to ensure success and offi-cer
safety, the report recommended that the Bureau consider
developing a placement system for management personnel
that requires prior experience in investigations and narcotics
cases.
1 In 1992, the Criminal Investigations Division was referred to as the Crimi-nal
Investigations Bureau.
Introduction and Background
6
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Current status—Although the Division has still chosen not
to limit Division management positions to only those with
prior experience in investigations and narcotics cases, in fiscal
year 2001, it drafted selection requirements for entry-level
supervisory positions in the Division. These requirements
stipulate that a supervisor new to the Division be placed in
charge of a squad with a less intensive investigative focus,
such as fugitive arrest, liquor/general investigations, or vehi-cle
theft. In addition, the person’s immediate supervisor will
be responsible for ensuring that the new supervisor receives
any additional investigative training needed.
¾ Inadequate control over undercover funds and flash
monies—The 1992 report found that investigators were
spending undercover monies inappropriately. These monies
are intended for paying informants, purchasing evidence
(such as drugs), and paying for emergency investigative ex-penses.
In addition, flash roll monies, which are large sums of
monies shown to potential suppliers of illegal drugs to prove
an undercover officer’s ability to purchase contraband, were
being issued without proper approvals and were not always
returned in a timely manner. To protect these monies from
abuse, loss, and theft, the report recommended that DPS de-velop
and enforce strong internal controls regarding the issu-ance
and tracking of these monies.
Current status—The current review found that the Division
has developed and implemented policies and procedures re-garding
the authorization, use, and tracking of both under-cover
funds and flash monies. In addition, the Division’s fi-nance
manager routinely audits the flash roll monies.
Audit Scope and Methodology
The audit focused on the adequacy of the Division’s decision-making
process used to determine if it should commit resources
to multi-agency task forces and current case management prac-tices.
One area of the Division was not reviewed during this au-dit—
the Rocky Mountain Information Network (RMIN). RMIN
was excluded from this review because it is a federal grant pro-ject,
with DPS’ role being that of grant administrator.
Introduction and Background
7
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
This audit presents findings and recommendations in two areas:
¾ The need for the Division to formalize its process for deciding
whether to participate on multi-agency task forces and to de-velop
supervisory guidelines to ensure effective use of its
task force personnel.
¾ The need for the Division to improve its case management
practices to ensure effective use of resources.
Several methods were used to study the issues addressed in this
audit, including:
¾ Observing seven investigative and tactical operations to be-come
familiar with the procedures, resources, and time in-volved
in initiating and conducting investigations, and re-sponding
to requests for assistance;
¾ Reviewing 49 case files to determine the reliability of selected
data fields in the Division’s automated case management sys-tem
and to assess compliance with Division procedures re-garding
case documentation and supervision;
¾ Reviewing law enforcement standards developed by the
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agen-cies,
Inc. and by the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals that address case selec-tion
criteria, task force participation, and officer and case
oversight;
¾ Interviewing personnel from 11 other federal, state, and local
agencies that interact with the Division on a regular basis to
identify concerns and determine satisfaction with Division
services.
This audit was conducted in accordance with government audit-ing
standards.
The Auditor General and staff express appreciation to the direc-tor
of the Department of Public Safety, and the assistant director,
chief of staff, and staff of the Criminal Investigations Division for
their cooperation and assistance throughout the audit.
8
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(This Page Intentionally Left Blank)
9
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
FINDING I THE DIVISION LACKS
FORMAL EVALUATION
PROCESSES FOR TASK
FORCE PARTICIPATION
The Division needs to formalize its processes for determining
participation on multi-agency task forces. The number of task
forces the Division participates on has nearly doubled in the past
ten years, and more than half its sworn officers are now assigned
to them. However, the Division does not have formal processes
for 1) deciding whether to participate on a task force; 2) supervis-ing
Division staff assigned to task forces controlled by other
agencies; and 3) annually evaluating whether it should continue
its participation on a task force.
Majority of Division’s Officers
Work Full-Time on Task Forces
More than half of the Criminal Investigations Division’s officers
work full-time on multi-agency task forces. Task forces are
formed to enhance the coordination of federal, state, and local
law enforcement efforts, and to pool key resources such as man-power,
investigative experience, and specialized crime-solving
equipment. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, ap-proximately
half of the state police agencies in the United States
participate to some degree on such task forces.1 Task force offi-cers
typically concentrate on investigating a specific area of
criminal activity, such as narcotics, vehicle theft, or gangs. The
number of officers assigned to a task force varies, depending on
things such as the scope of the crime problem and the size of the
community being served. Currently, 52 percent of the Division’s
investigators, or 147 FTEs, are assigned to 28 multi-agency task
forces located throughout Arizona.
1 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Law Enforcement
Management and Administrative Statistics 1997: Data for Individual State and
Local Agencies with 100 or More Investigators, April 1999.
More than 50 percent of
Division officers are as-signed
full-time to task
forces.
Finding I
10
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
The key features of the task forces on which the Division partici-pates
are outlined in Table 2 (see pages 11 through 12). Basic
operational components of the task forces are as follows:
¾ Administration and Supervision—Task forces are generally
formed and administered by a single agency, which also as-signs
a sergeant or lieutenant as the task force commander.
Other law enforcement agencies will then assign staff who
are supervised by the task force sergeant or lieutenant. For
example, the Division has assigned an investigator to the
Santa Cruz HIDTA Task Force administered by the Santa
Cruz County Sheriff’s Department. The investigator works
out of an office in Nogales and is supervised on a daily basis
by a sergeant from the Nogales Police Department. All but 2
of the 28 task forces are administered and supervised by
other agencies.1
¾ Assignments and Duties—The Division’s task force inves-tigators
are assigned full-time to the task force to work on in-vestigative
activities. The length of assignment to a task force
can vary, depending on individual task force policies. During
their tenure on a task force, Division investigators work with
other agencies’ law enforcement personnel to conduct regu-lar
investigative activities, such as locating and interviewing
witnesses and conducting surveillance. For example, the Di-vision
investigator assigned to the DEA narcotics task force
in Tucson works with Pima County Sheriff’s deputies, Tuc-son
Police Department detectives, and Oro Valley Police De-partment
detectives investigating drug trafficking crimes.
¾ Governance—Typically, a board of directors comprising lo-cal
prosecutors and participating agencies’ top management
personnel governs each task force. The boards meet monthly
or every other month to receive status reports from the task
forces and to provide guidance and oversight. In addition,
some governing boards are formed to administer grants and
approve task force budgets.
1 The two task forces administered by the Division are the Vehicle Theft
Task Force and the Gang Intelligence Team Enforcement Mission.
Finding I
11
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Table 2
Department of Public Safety—Criminal Investigations Division
Participation in Multi-Agency Task Forces
Year Ended June 30, 2001
Task Force
Name/Date DPS
joined Focus
Other
participating
agencies
Number of
sworn
positions
assigned 1
Division
estimated
task force
expenditures
Apache County Cooperative
Enforcement Narcotics
Team/1988
Narcotics
interdiction and
violent crimes
1 County Sheriff’s Office 1 $ 60,000
Arizona High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas (HIDTA)
Center/1997
Drug trafficking
organizations
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,
Bureau of Land Management, Drug Enforcement
Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Joint Counter Narcotics Task Force, Joint Task
Force 6, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs, 1
County Sheriff’s Office, 1 Police Department
1 626,000
Border Alliance Group/
1987
Narcotics,
violent crime,
and other
criminal activity
Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Customs,
Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Arizona
Game and Fish Department, 1 County Attorney’s
Office, 1 County Sheriff’s Office, 4 Police
Departments
7 539,000
Drug Enforcement
Administration Phoenix
Task Force/1982
Narcotics
interdiction
Drug Enforcement Administration, 1 County
Sheriff’s Office, 3 Police Departments
1 80,000
Federal Bureau of
Investigation Mountain Eagle
Safe Streets Task Force/2000
Identify violent
criminal
enterprises
Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Forest
Service, U.S. Marshal’s Office, 1 County Sheriff’s
Office, 1 Police Department
1 65,000
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Violent Street Gangs Task
Force/2000
Gangs Federal Bureau of Investigation, Arizona
Department of Corrections, 2 Police Departments
1 69,000
Fugitive Investigation
Strike Team/1986
Fugitive
apprehension
Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Marshal’s
Office, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, 1
County Sheriff’s Office, 1 Police Department,
1 60,000
Gang Intelligence Team
Enforcement Mission/1994
Gangs 10 County Sheriff’s Offices, 38 Police
Departments
54 4,071,000
Gila County Narcotics
Task Force/1990
Narcotics
interdiction
1 County Sheriff’s Office, 3 Police Departments 3 142,000
HIDTA Enforcement
Agencies Task Force/1999
Narcotics
interdiction
Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S.
Marshal’s Office, 1 County Attorney’s Office, 1
County Sheriff’s Office, 1 Police Department
1 72,000
Joint Drug Intelligence
Group/1995
Drug trafficking
organizations
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Joint Counter
Narcotics Task Force, Joint Task Force 6,
Immigrations and Naturalization Service, Rocky
Mountain Information Network, 1 County
Sheriff’s Office, 1 Police Department
2 351,000
Maricopa County
Methamphetamine
Task Force/1994
Methampheta-mine
operations
Drug Enforcement Administration, Arizona
National Guard, 1 County Sheriff’s Office, 6
Police Departments
4 469,000
Metro Area Narcotic
Trafficking Interdiction
Squads/1998
Narcotics
interdiction
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug
Enforcement Administration, U.S. Customs, 1
County Sheriff’s Office, 5 Police Departments
2 155,000
Mohave Area General
Narcotics Enforcement
Team/1988
Narcotics
interdiction
1 County Sheriff’s Office, 2 Police Departments 6 425,000
Multi Agency Surveillance
Team/1998
Narcotics and
surveillance
Drug Enforcement Administration, 1 County
Sheriff’s Office, 1 Police Department
1 70,000
Finding I
12
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Table 2 (Concl’d)
Task Force
Name/Date DPS
joined Focus
Other
participating
agencies
Number of
sworn
positions
assigned
Division
estimated
task force
expenditures
Navajo County Major
Crime Apprehension Team/1988
Gang and other
criminal activity
1 County Sheriff’s Office, 3 Police Departments 1 63,000
Northern Arizona Street
Crimes Task Force/1986
Narcotics and
other criminal
activity
Arizona Department of Liquor Licenses and Control, 1
County Sheriff’s Office, 2 Police Departments
1 60,000
Phoenix Financial
Task Force/1995
Money
laundering
Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S.
Customs, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Arizona
National Guard
6 440,000
Phoenix Interdiction
Task Force/2000
Narcotics
interdiction
Drug Enforcement Administration 8 326,000
Pima County HIDTA
Task Force/1994
Narcotics
interdiction
1 County Sheriff’s Office, 2 Police Departments,
Tucson Airport Authority
1 71,000
Pinal County HIDTA
Task Force/1988
Narcotics and
other criminal
activity
1 County Sheriff’s Office, 1 Police Department 5 375,000
Prescott Area Narcotics
Task Force/1989
Narcotics and
other criminal
activity
1 County Sheriff’s Office, 6 Police Departments 5 292,000
Santa Cruz County
HIDTA Task Force/1988
Narcotics
interdiction and
money
laundering
Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs, U.S.
Marshal’s Office, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, 1
County Sheriff’s Office, 1 Police Department
1 78,000
Southeastern Arizona
Narcotics and Violent
Crime Task Force 2/1987
Narcotics and
violent crime
Drug Enforcement Administration, 2 County Sheriff’s
Offices
4 228,000
Southwest Border
Alliance/1985
Narcotics, violent
crime, and other
criminal activity
U.S. Border Patrol, 4 Police Departments 4 223,000
Tucson Drug Enforcement
Administration Task Force/1985
Narcotics
interdiction
1 County Sheriff’s Office, 2 Police Departments 1 75,000
Vehicle Theft Task Force/
1997
Vehicle theft National Insurance Crime Bureau, Arizona
Department of Insurance, Arizona Motor Vehicle
Division, 3 County Sheriff’s Offices, 7 Police
Departments
24 1,381,000
1 The Division also has 20 civilian positions assigned to task forces. These civilian positions are primarily research analysts and
are assigned to the Arizona HIDTA Center, Joint Drug Intelligence Group, and Vehicle Theft Task Force.
2 The Southeastern Arizona Narcotics and Violent Crime Task Force comprises of two task forces, one operating out of Graham
County and the other operating out of Greenlee County.
Source: Auditor General staff analysis of Division documents and expenditure data provided by the Arizona Department of
Public Safety.
Finding I
13
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
¾ Funding and Equipment—Operations of the task forces are
funded from a variety of sources. Home agencies typically
pay their investigators’ salaries, with any overtime generally
paid by the administering agency. Some federally funded
task forces will provide cars for investigators; however, in-vestigators
generally use the cars and equipment provided to
them by their home agency. There are no formal rules
concerning specialized equipment. If special equipment is
needed for a case, it will be provided by whichever officer
can obtain the equipment.
The Division Needs a Formal
Process for Deciding When To
Participate on a Task Force
The level of Division resources committed to task forces height-ens
the need to formally evaluate whether commitments to new
task forces are in the Division’s and the State’s best interest. Cur-rently,
the Division does not have a formal evaluation process in
place that could assist management in deciding whether to join a
task force. Having such a process in place would aid the Division
in determining the costs and benefits of participating on a task
force, as well as assist it in meeting current law enforcement
standards relevant to task forces. The Division also lacks formal
intergovernmental agreements identifying goals and objectives
for some of the task forces on which it currently participates.
Level of resource allocation warrants formal assessment proc-ess—
Because the Division’s participation on task forces has
grown, it needs to formally assess whether it should join new
task forces. In 1992, when the Auditor General’s Office last con-ducted
a performance audit of the Division, the Division partici-pated
on 17 task forces. As mentioned previously, the Division
now participates on 28 task forces and commits 52 percent of its
sworn officers to these efforts. Despite the increasing resources
committed to task forces, the Division has not developed a for-mal
assessment process for deciding whether to participate on a
task force. According to Division management, the decision-making
process is not documented and consists only of informal
discussions and occasional limited research on such things as the
Finding I
14
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
targeted crime and proposed methods of combating it, as well as
consideration of which agency is making the request.
Because the Division lacks a formal assessment process, it cannot
demonstrate that it thoroughly and consistently reviews the ap-propriateness
of task force participation. Further, the Division is
unable to demonstrate that its task force participation is an effec-tive
use of resources and is in line with law enforcement stan-dards.
According to the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, when law enforcement
management believe that criminal activities require specialized
employment of agency resources, management should clearly
identify the problem to be addressed, assess the potential impact
of specialized employment, and consider all alternatives for re-solving
the problem.
While task forces can enhance the coordination of federal, local,
and state law enforcement efforts, to ensure that the resources
the Division allocates to task force participation are beneficial, the
Division should develop formal, documented criteria to assist in
determining whether it should participate in these special as-signments.
A formalized process for deciding whether to partici-pate
on a specific task force should include documented evalua-tions
of such things as level of criminal activity, the task force’s
mission and goals, and the projected costs and benefits of par-ticipation.
The Division needs completed agreements for each task force—
The Division also needs to ensure it has completed intergovern-mental
agreements for each task force it participates on. Law en-forcement
accreditation standards recommend that participating
agencies establish written agreements identifying the task force’s
goals and objectives.1 The Division has such agreements for 21 of
the 28 task forces but lacks them for the remaining 7. According
to Division personnel, agreements sent to participating agencies
for signatures are not always returned. In addition, agreements
were not in the central file in DPS’ Legal Section as required by
DPS policy.
1 The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc.,
Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies, Third Edition, April 1994.
Law enforcement stan-dards
recommend that a
task force’s potential im-pact
be assessed when
considering whether to
participate on it.
Finding I
15
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
The Division Needs Task Force
Supervision Policies
The Division also does not have written orders or policies spe-cifically
concerning the supervision of its personnel assigned to
task forces. While the Division does have general supervision
and evaluation procedures for its staff, these procedures are in-adequate
for addressing the unique situation of task force inves-tigators,
who work on projects that generally are administered
and controlled by other agencies. The Division needs to develop
written supervisory orders that are appropriate for its investiga-tors
assigned to task forces controlled by others.
Task force assignments can create accountability problems and
concerns—Task force assignments involve unique challenges to
accountability, in that an investigator may be employed by the
Division but work on a project that is controlled by another
agency. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals (Commission) recommends that whenever
a police agency determines it should deploy its resources, corre-sponding
supervisory controls should be incorporated into the
program. According to the Commission, if a policy is not in writ-ing,
it cannot be considered a firm commitment and personnel
cannot be held strictly accountable to it.
Although the Division has guidelines regarding investigator su-pervision
that apply to all personnel, these guidelines do not ap-pear
adequate and appropriate for personnel assigned to task
forces. For example, the Division’s performance appraisal man-ual
does not address how Division supervisors shall observe
employee performance when investigators are assigned to task
forces and may be located at another office. The lack of clear ac-countability
steps has caused concern among some Division su-pervisors,
who said they could not be certain that investigators
assigned to task forces were following Division policies and pro-cedures.
Written guidelines needed—The Division needs to develop su-pervisory
policies that are specific to personnel assigned to task
forces, and to consider requiring the documentation of certain
supervisory tasks. Policies should outline such things as the fre-quency
and type of supervision necessary for investigators on
Law enforcement stan-dards
indicate that writ-ten
policy is necessary to
hold personnel strictly ac-countable.
Finding I
16
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
task forces. In addition, the Division should consider requiring
documentation of routine, ongoing communication between Di-vision
supervisors and task force commanders. For example, a
Division commander suggested that the Division establish a pol-icy
stipulating a Division sergeant should meet periodically with
the sergeant or commander from the agency administering the
task force to confer about the activities and performance of Divi-sion
personnel assigned to the task force. This type of require-ment
could be part of the inter-agency agreement, and would
serve to keep all involved parties aware of current operational
activities and potential supervisory problems.
The Division Needs to Evaluate
Its Continued Involvement
on Task Forces
Because task forces can be self-perpetuating, the Division needs a
process for regularly assessing the appropriateness of continued
participation. Some of the task forces on which the Division is
participating have been operating for nearly 20 years. However,
the Division currently lacks a process for making ongoing as-sessments
of whether continued participation is in the State’s
best interests.
National guidelines call for formal periodic review of task
forces—The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals determined that special units tend to be
self-perpetuating if no formal periodic review is conducted. This
tendency heightens the importance of regular evaluations of the
effect that task forces are having on the targeted problem, the
community, and the agencies involved. In this regard, the Com-mission
on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies rec-ommends
that there be a written directive requiring an annual
review of each specialized unit for the purpose of determining
whether it should be continued. The review should include an
evaluation of the task force’s results and an assessment of its con-tinued
necessity.
The Division’s current approach is neither regular nor specific.
Division management review of task force activity is primarily
limited to information that is combined into monthly narrative
Task forces tend to be self-perpetuating
if no formal
periodic review is con-ducted.
Law enforcement stan-dards
recommend task
forces be reviewed annu-ally.
Finding I
17
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
reports provided by Bureau commanders. Although the Bureau
commander may receive statistical reports from individual task
forces, these statistics are combined with statistics from other Di-vision
investigations. Therefore, the reports do not distinguish
between the activities of task force personnel and other Division
investigators. While these monthly narratives are an effective
means for quickly updating management on overall activities,
they do not serve as an adequate means for evaluating whether
continued task force participation is beneficial. In addition, DPS’
director or the Division’s assistant director participate in the an-nual
review that the HIDTA-funded task forces must provide to
obtain federal funding for the next year. However, these reviews
have not been used to formally evaluate the Division’s participa-tion
on these task forces.
Formal review process needed—The Division should develop a
process to formally review on an annual basis the need for its
continued participation on task forces. This review should en-compass
an assessment of the productivity of task force person-nel,
as well as review of the overall performance of the entire task
force, since Division personnel may represent only a small part
of overall activities. To assist in reviewing productivity of task
force personnel, the Division should review the investigative ac-tivity,
such as arrests made and evidence seized, that task force
officers enter on the Division’s case management system. In so
doing, the Division will also need to ensure that the information
being compiled is complete. As discussed in Finding II (see
pages 19 through 27), information in the case management sys-tem
currently suffers from a lack of completeness. Specifically,
the case management system’s programming design precludes
the tracking of critical information, such as case outcomes, num-ber
of days a case is opened, and supervisory review informa-tion,
on many of the task force cases.
As part of the continuing re-evaluation effort, Division officials
should also examine any activity reports produced by the agency
administering the task force. For example, the Vehicle Theft Task
Force generates a monthly activity report and a year-end report
that are disseminated to its board of directors and Division man-agement.
Finding I
18
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Recommendations
1. The Division should develop and implement a formal proc-ess
to help it determine whether it should join a task force.
The process should be documented and include such things
as the level of criminal activity, the task force’s mission and
goals, and the projected costs and benefits of participation.
2. The Division should seek to acquire complete formal agree-ments
for each task force that it participates on by again re-questing
that those participating agencies that have not com-pleted
formal agreements do so. These agreements should be
located in a central file in DPS’ Legal Section.
3. The Division should develop and implement a supervision
policy specific to task forces. This policy should include, at a
minimum, the frequency and type of supervision required
for investigators assigned to task forces.
4. The Division should develop and implement formal assess-ment
and review procedures for the purpose of determining
whether to continue task force participation. The reviews
should be conducted yearly and be appropriately docu-mented.
To aid in these reviews, the Division should obtain
adequate management information, such as management re-ports
from the task force governing boards, and activity in-formation
from its case management system.
19
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
FINDING II THE DIVISION NEEDS
TO IMPROVE ITS CASE
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
The Division still needs to improve its case management prac-tices
as was recommended in an Auditor General report almost
ten years ago. Although the Division has taken several steps to
address the issues raised in the last report, it needs to do more to
ensure compliance with proper case management practices. First,
the Division needs to develop a better screening mechanism to
ensure the cases it accepts are in line with its priorities and are a
good use of investigative resources. Second, it needs to ensure
compliance with its supervisory review and case file documenta-tion
requirements. Finally, the Division needs to improve its case
management information so that it can report critical information
about its activities and assess whether it is achieving its objec-tives.
Division Squads Offer Numerous
Law Enforcement Services
In addition to its participation on multi-agency task forces, the
Division has numerous investigative squads comprising only
DPS personnel. These squads provide a wide range of investiga-tive
services and are available to all law enforcement entities that
request assistance. For example, as illustrated in Table 3 (see
page 20), the Division has one squad dedicated to the disman-tling
of and disposing of explosives and explosive chemicals,
such as bombs and chemicals used in methamphetamine labora-tories.
In addition, it has another squad that investigates com-puter
crimes, such as child pornography and fraud, and assists
other agencies in the seizure and analysis of computer records.
Finding II
20
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Table 3
Department of Public Safety
Criminal Investigations Division Squads1
Year Ended June 30, 2001
Squad2 Primary activities
Number of
sworn
positions
Division
estimated
expenditures
Computer
Crimes
Investigates computer crimes including child pornography, cyber
stalking, and fraud, and assists other agencies in the seizure and
analysis of computer records.
4 $ 257,000
Explosives
Ordinance
(Bomb squad)
Assists in the dismantling and disposing of explosives and explosive
chemicals, and in investigating explosive-related incidents.
4 354,000
Fugitive Apprehends individuals with outstanding felony warrants. 7 320,000
General
Investigations
Supports highway patrol officers with follow-up investigations on
narcotics and hit-and-run cases, conducts routine liquor inspections,
enforces underage drinking laws, and provides investigative support
to other law enforcement agencies.
24 1,578,000
Governor’s
Protection
Provides security and transportation to the Governor and Governor’s
family.
9 497,000
Hazardous
Materials
Responds statewide to hazardous materials incidents, provides
technical expertise to agencies requesting assistance, and assists with
investigation and cleanup of clandestine drug labs.
2 195,000
Narcotics Investigates groups and individuals who manufacture and sell illegal
drugs and assists highway patrol officers in processing drug seizures.
30 1,548,000
Special
Investigations
Investigates internal and criminal conduct cases involving DPS
personnel, assists other agencies with their internal and criminal
conduct cases, and investigates misconduct cases involving public
officials and employees.
9 512,000
Special
Operations
(SWAT)
Conducts high-risk search warrant entries involving high-violence
situations and clandestine drug labs for DPS and other law
enforcement agencies statewide.
8 663,000
______________________________
1 In addition to the listed squads, the Division supports other DPS Divisions and other law enforcement agencies
through its canine-assists and crimin al intelligence collection efforts. Currently, there are 20 sworn positions
assigned to assist the Highway Patrol with canine-related drug searches and 20 sworn positions assigned to collect
criminal intelligence information.
2 Generally, there is only one of each squad. However, there are four general investigation and five narcotics
squads.
Source: Auditor General staff analysis of Division documentation and expenditure data provided by the Arizona
Department of Public Safety.
Finding II
21
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
The Division Does Not
Screen Cases Sufficiently
The Division does not screen cases sufficiently to ensure it is
spending its resources on cases that are the best uses of investiga-tive
resources. Although the Division implemented a case initia-tion
policy since the last audit, it does not result in case screening.
As such, the Division needs to develop specific criteria for
accepting cases to ensure that its resources are spent
appropriately.
Case initiation policy does not screen cases—The Division con-tinues
to accept cases without considering if they are the best use
of investigative resources. A 1992 Auditor General report (No.
92-6) indicated that the Division did not have sufficient guide-lines
to help its officers determine whether a case was worth
pursuing. Since then, the Division implemented a policy that re-quires
all cases to be opened by a supervisor to ensure the case is
worthy of initiation. However, most supervisors of Division
squads still do not use specific criteria to decide whether to open
a case because they rarely decline cases, particularly when an-other
law enforcement agency requests assistance. This is due to
the Division’s interpretation of A.R.S. §41-1711(a), which states,
“there shall be a Department of Public Safety which is responsi-ble
for creating and coordinating services for use by local law en-forcement
agencies in protecting the public safety.” The Division
and local law enforcement agencies have interpreted this statute
as a mandate for DPS to assist other law enforcement agencies in
all crime areas. However, local enforcement priorities may vary
widely among jurisdictions, creating pressures from local juris-dictions
for DPS to assist on crimes in some jurisdictions that
may be low priorities throughout the rest of the State. Because
DPS does not have unlimited resources, it needs to be judicious
in how it uses its manpower. Further, as a state police agency, it
needs to balance the requests of local jurisdictions with statewide
enforcement needs and priorities. This can be best done by de-veloping
specific criteria for screening cases so that all parties, in-cluding
local jurisdictions, understand where DPS’ resources can
best be used.
Most Division supervi-sors
do not use specific
criteria to help them ac-cept
cases.
Finding II
22
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Better case screening is necessary—The Division should develop
case screening procedures to help balance the requests of local
jurisdictions with statewide enforcement needs and priorities.
According to The Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies, the ob-jective
of case screening is to assign available personnel to those
investigations that have the best chance of being successful.1 The
standards also state that the agency should have a written direc-tive
that specifies how case screening is to be conducted and
what criteria should be used. Below are some examples that
demonstrate effective case screening for successful outcomes
based on the priorities of the agencies.
¾ The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force—a
federal task force that targets large-scale drug operations, and
has a case-screening form that must be completed prior to ac-cepting
cases. The form requires information about the tar-geted
organization, types and quantities of drugs involved,
names of possible suspects, and the potential for drug
and/or asset seizures. This information assists the task force
in determining if the case is relevant to its mission based on
the type and level of crime committed.
¾ A narcotics task force—in which the Division participates
has developed specific, written criteria to determine when it
will respond to highway patrol narcotics cases. These guide-lines
are meant to exclude cases that do not involve drug
sales (i.e., personal use) and include those that have a good
chance of leading to a mid-level drug dealer. For example,
the squad requires that the highway patrol officer encounter
at least two items that are indicative of sales, such as scales
and drug ledgers (i.e., written records of drug sales). In addi-tion,
there must be potential for apprehending additional
drug dealers by having a cooperative suspect willing to di-vulge
the source or destination of drugs, or physical evidence
that tends to incriminate other persons not yet apprehended.
1 The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc.,
Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies, Third Edition, April 1994.
Finding II
23
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Case Oversight Policies
Not Followed
Although the Division implemented some case oversight proce-dures,
the procedures are not being adequately followed. Spe-cifically,
some supervisors are not conducting timely reviews of
active cases and the Division continues to have documentation
problems with its case files. Therefore, the Division needs to take
steps to ensure adequate supervisory oversight and appropriate
case file documentation.
Supervisory requirements and case documentation policies not
followed—The Division also continues to have problems with
case oversight and case documentation. In the last report, audi-tors
found that once a case was opened, the Division had no
mechanism to determine if a case warranted continuation. For
example, the report cited a case in which an investigator spent
800 hours (the equivalent of four-and-a-half months) on a sur-veillance
in which he never saw the suspect. Although the Divi-sion
now requires supervisors to review active cases every 30
days, auditors found that the Division had 254 active cases out of
4,012 (or 6 percent) that had not received a supervisory review
for 90 days or more; 23 percent of these cases were over 200 days
past due.
The Division also continues to have documentation problems
with its case files. The purpose of a case file is to document the
events surrounding an investigation and to serve as a basis for
supervisory review of officers’ actions. The 1992 audit report
cited problems with incomplete records and files that were diffi-cult
to locate. Since then, the Division has developed policies and
procedures that recognize the importance of proper documenta-tion
as noted in its procedure manual, which states “reports are a
mechanism for recording and organizing information gained
through criminal investigations. . .” and that they are “essential
to the proper processing, storage and retrieval of accurate crimi-nal
justice information.” In addition, DPS policy requires closed
investigative cases to be sent to its centralized Records Unit
(DRU). This policy ensures the files’ preservation and availability
for other investigators who may subsequently need a case file for
other related cases.
Although Division proce-dure
requires supervisory
review of active cases
every 30 days, 6 percent
had not received a review
for 90 days or more.
Finding II
24
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
In spite of the importance of a centralized file system, some in-vestigators
do not send their files to DRU. Specifically, when
auditors pulled a sample of 49 closed cases from the DRU, 22 of
the cases were incomplete. For example, one file, which involved
approximately 10,000 hours, contained a cover sheet and crime
lab request form. In contrast, the file should have contained,
based on the Division’s own procedures manual, at least an in-vestigator
narrative, suspect and witness information, and case
outcome information, since the case was listed as successfully
prosecuted on the case management system.
The Division Lacks Critical
Case Management Information
The Division also continues to lack critical case management in-formation
necessary to report on and assess its activities, both as
related to its own investigations and its participation on multi-agency
task forces. Although the Division implemented a case
management system to address the concerns raised in the last
audit, the system lacks complete and accurate information.
Without complete and accurate management information, the
Division cannot ensure it is using its resources effectively.
Division unable to ensure effective use of resources—Although
the Division implemented a case management system to address
similar concerns identified in the 1992 Auditor General report,
the system lacks complete and accurate information on the Divi-sion’s
activities and outcomes. While the system has the capabil-ity
of tracking all critical case data, such as case type, hours ex-pended,
and case outcomes, it is not a useful management tool
because of the following problems:
n Some officers do not enter case information into the sys-tem—
Three squads from the Special Enforcement Bureau
have historically not entered case information into the Divi-sion’s
automated case management system. This practice has
occurred in spite of the Division’s own policy that all officers
enter case activity information into the system on a daily ba-sis.
Although these squads changed their policy and began
entering some case information into the system as of July 1,
The Division cannot en-sure
effective use of its re-sources
because it lacks
complete and accurate
management information.
Finding II
25
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
2001, two out of the three still do not plan on entering case
outcome information.
n Programming design limits tracking of some informa-tion—
The system is not capturing complete information on
non-DPS cases opened by Division officers. Non-DPS cases
are cases that are initiated by other law enforcement agencies,
but in which DPS participates. Non-DPS cases are most likely
to be opened by Division officers assigned to task forces.
However, some officers on Division squads also open and
work on non-DPS cases. When the Division’s case manage-ment
system was first developed, it was designed to capture
only limited information on non-DPS cases such as date the
case is open, case location, and case type. Such information as
case outcome, number of days a case is open, and supervi-sory
review information is not available for non-DPS cases,
even though Division officers are working directly on these
cases. Auditors’ review of Division management reports
found that Division officers on 18 squads and task forces
opened more than 1,200 non-DPS cases between July 1998
and April 2001.
n Case outcome codes do not reflect all activities—The Di-vision
has not developed sufficient case outcome codes to
adequately capture all of its activities. For example, the Fugi-tive
squad, responsible for apprehending felons who have
absconded, closes all of its cases administratively, even if they
have been successful in arresting a fugitive.1 According to the
squad supervisor, this is done because there is no code that
accurately captures a successful apprehension, only a "suc-cessful
prosecution." Because the Division conducts numer-ous
activities that do not involve the prosecution of a suspect,
additional codes are important for accurately tracking the
outcome of its cases.
n Officers do not receive regular training—The Division
should re-establish a formalized training program with a
qualified trainer. The Division stopped providing formal
training on its automated system four years ago. Instead, it
1 Per the case management procedures manual, a case may be closed ad-ministratively
when there is a lack of further leads, an unavailability of in-vestigative
resources, or the case lacks sufficient seriousness.
Finding II
26
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
assigned the responsibility to supervisors who also may not
have received any formal training or may have received it
many years ago when the system was first implemented.
Formalized training by a qualified trainer ensures that new-comers
to the Division receive consistent and proper instruc-tion
on how to use the system and its codes.
The Division has expressed dissatisfaction with its current auto-mated
system, stating that it is outdated and difficult to use. As
such, the Division is in the process of identifying a new system
and the necessary funding to implement it, in hopes of address-ing
these case management problems. However, without regular
training and procedures to ensure all squads enter comprehen-sive
and accurate information into the system, inadequate man-agement
information will continue even under a new system.
The Division should assess its activities and outcomes to ensure
priorities are met—Once critical case information for the entire
Division is available, the Division should assess its activities and
outcomes to ensure its goals and priorities are being met. Ac-cording
to the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Jus-tice
Standards and Goals, law enforcement executives must be
able to assess the degree to which the agency is fulfilling its role
and achieving its goals and objectives. This information could be
used to shift resources and/or demonstrate the need for addi-tional
resources.
Finding II
27
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Recommendations
1. The Division should develop specific criteria for accepting
cases to help it balance the requests of local jurisdictions with
statewide enforcement needs and priorities.
2. The Division should ensure adequate case oversight and ap-propriate
documentation by:
a. Enforcing policies requiring supervisory review every 30
days.
b. Enforcing policies on supervisory review of the paper
case file to ensure it contains appropriate documentation.
c. Enforcing its policy that closed case files be sent to the Re-cords
Unit.
3. The Division should improve its case management informa-tion
regardless of whether it purchases a new system or con-tinues
with the current one by:
a. Enforcing the policy requiring all Division investigators
to enter case information into the Division’s automated
system.
b. Making the necessary programming changes to allow
non-DPS cases the same internal tracking capability as
DPS cases.
c. Expanding the case outcome codes to more accurately re-flect
current activities the Division conducts.
d. Re-establishing a formalized training program to ensure a
better understanding of the system and proper use of
codes.
4. Once critical case information for the entire Division is avail-able,
the Division should assess its activities and outcomes to
ensure its priorities are being met.
Finding II
28
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
(This Page Intentionally Left Blank)
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Agency Response
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
(This Page Intentionally Left Blank)
Arizona Department of Public Safety
Criminal Investigation Division
Response to the Auditor General Performance Audit
The following is the Criminal Investigation Division response to the Performance Audit
conducted by the Auditor General’s Office.
The Criminal Investigation Division wishes to compliment the Auditor General’s audit staff
for their professionalism and close working relationships with Criminal Investigation
Division personnel during the audit.
I. Response to Findings
Finding # 1: The Division lacks a formal evaluation process for task force
participation.
Recommendation # 1: The Division should develop and implement a formal
process to help determine whether or not to join a task force. The process
should be documented and include the level of criminal activity, the task force
mission and goals and projected costs and benefits of participation.
Division Response: The finding of the Auditor is partially agreed to and the
recommendation will be implemented.
Multi jurisdictional task forces have been a vital element in state and national efforts to
reduce the availability and use of illegal drugs, and to reduce the level of violent crimes. It
has been the policy of the Department of Public Safety to participate in multi agency task
forces in order to combine talents of a variety of law enforcement agencies to best utilize
resources.
DPS participation in multi agency task forces dates back to the creation of this agency.
Decentralized multi agency task forces were created to combat local community crime
issues in support to the mission of the Department of Public Safety. Additional multi agency
task forces address specific criminal targeting and support roles. The majority of the task
forces with the exception of those federally directed, are overseen by a management board.
This board consists of command representatives from the participating agencies to include
the Department of Public Safety. Day to day supervision of personnel in 16 of 28 task
forces is accomplished by a Criminal Investigation Division supervisor.
While there is no Criminal Investigation Division formal evaluation procedure, task force
participation is evaluated by the CI Division command. Upon the reorganization of the
Department and the Criminal Investigation Division, two detective squads assigned to
federal task forces were reassigned back to the Division because the federal assignment did
not meet the Division's Strategic Plan criteria.
While the CI Division itself does not formally have an evaluation process, many of the task
forces themselves must provide productivity reports on a yearly basis to obtain continued
funding. All eleven HIDTA funded task forces must provide year-end presentations on
their activities to obtain next year funding. The DPS Director or the Assistant Director for
Criminal Investigations is involved in this review process. The GITEM and Vehicle Theft
task force that is managed and supervised by DPS provides quarterly and yearly reports on
the task forces’ progress.
The Division will formalize the evaluation process using existing reports submitted by each
task force and DPS criteria. However, participation in task forces is critical to the mission
of the Department of Public Safety. Participation allows the Department’s Mission to be
accomplished which is to carry one of its primary mandates which is to support other
criminal justice agencies. The Division is also implementing an audit program to involve
all Division elements to include task forces.
Recommendation #2: The Division needs a formal process for deciding when
to participate in a task force.
Division Response: The finding of the Auditor is agreed to and the
recommendation will be implemented.
The Audit report indicates inter-agency agreements for seven out of 21 task forces were not
on file. The Division drafted inter-agency agreements and submitted them to all
participating DPS task forces. However, those seven were never returned.
The CI Division will continue to work with the remaining seven task forces and their
respective controlling political subdivisions to obtain those agreements.
Recommendation # 3: The Division needs task force supervision policies.
Division Response: The finding of the Auditor is partially agreed to and the
recommendation will be implemented.
The Department’s Performance Appraisal System Manual outlines requirements for the
evaluation of Department personnel. The policy includes supervisors who have personnel
working for them directly and those who have personnel detailed to a task force. In
addition, the Criminal Investigation Division has performance appraisal criteria specific to
the investigative function. However, the Division will supplement this with Task Force
Supervision criteria for both the supervisor and the detectives assigned. The Division is in
the process of implementing a revised policy manual and these issues will be included in
the manual.
Recommendation # 4: The Division needs to evaluate its continued
involvement on task forces.
Division Response: The findings of the Auditor General are partially agreed to
and a different method will be implemented.
While there is no CI Division formal evaluation procedure, task force participation is
evaluated by the CI Division command. Upon the reorganization of the Department and
the Criminal Investigations Division, two detective squads assigned to federal task forces
were reassigned back to the Division because their federal assignment did not meet the
Division's Strategic Plan criteria.
While the Division itself does not formally have an evaluation process, many of the task
forces themselves must provide productivity reports on a yearly basis to obtain continued
funding. All eleven HIDTA funded task forces must make year-end presentations on their
activities in order to obtain next year funding. The Department of Public Safety Director or
the Assistant Director for Criminal Investigations serves on this review process. The
GITEM and Vehicle Theft task forces managed and supervised by DPS provide quarterly
and yearly reports on the task forces progress.
The Division will formalize the evaluation process using existing reports submitted by the
task forces and DPS criteria. However, participation in task forces is critical to the mission
of the Department of Public Safety. Participation allows the Department to carry out one of
its primary mandates and that is to support other criminal justice agencies. The Division is
also implementing an Audit program that will involve all Division elements to include task
forces.
Finding # 2: The Division needs to improve its case management practices.
Recommendation #1: The Division does not screen cases sufficiently.
Division Response: The findings of the Auditor are not agreed to and the
recommendation will not be implemented.
The Department of Public Safety was created to support and assist other criminal justice
agencies. Prior to the reorganization of the Department in April 2000, one of the main
complaints was the lack of investigative response. Currently, commanders in the CI
Division have the authority to decline cases or requests for assistance based on available
resources. However, it is the position of the Division that all requests must be followed up
on. Many of the other jurisdictions have no other to turn to for assistance. What is a small
case in one jurisdiction may be monumental in another. The excellent reputation this
Division enjoys is based largely on our support to requesting agencies. To limit this support
would create serious problems for the Department and for the citizens of Arizona.
Recommendation #2: Case oversight policies are not followed.
Division Response: The findings of the Auditor are agreed to and have been
implemented.
Recommendation #3: The Division lacks critical case management
information.
Division Response: The findings of the Auditor are agreed to and will be
implemented.
The Division is in the process of selecting a case management system that will provide
complete and accurate information on the Division’s activities and outcomes.
Recommendation #4: Once critical case information for the entire Division is
available, the Division should access its activities and outcomes to ensure
priorities are being met.
Division Response: The findings of the Auditor are agreed to and will be
implemented
Other Performance Audit Reports Issued Within
the Last 12 Months
01-10
Future Performance Audit Reports
Arizona Department of Corrections—Arizona Correctional Industries
Department of Building and Fire Safety
01-1 Department of Economic Security—
Child Support Enforcement
01-2 Department of Economic Security—
Healthy Families Program
01-3 Arizona Department of Public
Safety—Drug Abuse Resistance
Education (D.A.R.E.) Program
01-4 Arizona Department of
Corrections—Human Resources
Management
01-5 Arizona Department of Public
Safety—Telecommunications
Bureau
01-6 Board of Osteopathic Examiners in
Medicine and Surgery
01-7 Arizona Department
of Corrections—Support Services
01-8 Arizona Game and Fish Commission
and Department—Wildlife
Management Program
01-9 Arizona Game and Fish
Commission—Heritage Fund
01-10 Department of Public Safety—
Licensing Bureau
01-11 Arizona Commission on the Arts
01-12 Board of Chiropractic Examiners
01-13 Arizona Department of
Corrections—Private Prisons
01-14 Arizona Automobile Theft
Authority
01-15 Department of Real Estate
01-16 Department of Veterans’ Services
Arizona State Veteran Home,
Veterans’ Conservatorship/
Guardianship Program, and
Veterans’ Services Program
01-17 Arizona Board of Dispensing
Opticians
01-18 Arizona Department of Correct-ions—
Administrative Services
and Information Technology
01-19 Arizona Department of Education—
Early Childhood Block Grant
01-20 Department of Public Safety—
Highway Patrol
01-21 Board of Nursing