The Governor's Advisory Blue Ribbon Panel February 11, 2004 BRP |
Previous | 1 of 8 | Next |
|
|
Small
Medium
Large
Extra Large
Full-size
Full-size archival image
|
This page
All
|
brp021104 TRANSCRIPT OF GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY BLUE RIBBON PANEL Phoenix, Arizona February 11, 2004 3:08 p.m. REPORTED BY: PAMELA J. MAYER, RMR-CRR Certified Court Reporter Certificate No. 50207 PREPARED FOR: (Copy) 2 1 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS was 2 taken on February 11, 2004, commencing at 3:08 p.m., at 3 the Governor's Office, 1700 East Washington, Phoenix, 4 Arizona, before PAMELA J. MAYER, a Certified Court Page 1 brp021104 5 Reporter in and for the County of Maricopa, State of 6 Arizona. 7 8 PANEL MEMBERS: 9 Dennis Burke, Co-Chair 10 Herb Guenther, Co-Chair 11 Grant Woods, Co-Chair 12 Roger Vanderpool 13 Tom Stickrath 14 Chase Riveland 15 Mike Branham 16 Leesa Morrison 17 Roberto Villasenor (Telephonically) 18 John Cohen (Telephonically) 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 3 1 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 2 MR. BURKE: Good afternoon. My name is Dennis 3 Burke. I'm the Governor's chief of staff of policy. And 4 this is an advisory ad hoc panel that's been put together 5 under the direction of the Governor in response to the 6 escape attempt and eventual hostage situation that 7 included two officers at the Lewis Correctional Facility 8 that began on January 18th. 9 I have my co-chairs, and I want to thank them 10 Page 2 brp021104 for participating in this, especially on very short 11 notice, former Attorney General of the State of Arizona, 12 Grant Woods, and former senator and current director of 13 the Department of Water Resources, Herb Guenther. And I 14 wanted to go over a couple points at first, and then why 15 don't we go around to the other panelists, and then I 16 know we have some folks on the phone too and make sure 17 that those people who are here and the transcriber who's 18 transcribing this are aware of their presence and their 19 role in this. 20 This -- a couple positive observations about the 21 escape and hostage situation that I'd note first before 22 we kind of get on into the process and the Governor's 23 charge. And our perspective today, I think I can speak 24 for our co-chairs and let them speak at their time, is 25 trying to get organizational today, go through process. 4 1 We've sent out a notice on several meetings that we are 2 having coming up, talking about those for the panelists 3 to make sure that they fit with the schedule, get a sense 4 of their presence on those, and then figure out a game 5 plan. 6 What the Governor noted in her charge to us was 7 that she would like to have a report -- a preliminary 8 report back to her within 30 days of her announcement on 9 it, which would be March 4th. And what she had asked was 10 that we look at the predicates that led to the hostage 11 taking; two, the precise details on how the prisoners 12 were able to take control of the watchtower; and, three, 13 what changes need to take place to ensure this cannot 14 happen again. In other words, the what, the why, and how 15 to prevent. Page 3 brp021104 16 She noted to determine the predicates of the 17 escape attempt and hostage-taking. She further directed 18 us to examine the training and supervision at the 19 Department of Corrections, staffing levels, staff 20 recruitment and retention, security protocol, security 21 capacity, and inmate classification, and, as I indicated, 22 was looking for a preliminary report from this body 23 roughly around March 4th, giving a factual explanation of 24 what happened on the morning of January 18th, how did it 25 happen, and initial recommendations on how to prevent 5 1 such an incident from ever occurring again. 2 Now, we are proceeding on a few different fronts 3 here. First of all, as Director Schriro will discuss in 4 her presentation today, her investigators have already 5 been working with the Maricopa County Attorney's Office. 6 I believe as of today, there was a lengthy meeting, 7 preparing for prosecution of the two inmates involved in 8 this incident. That's the first track. 9 The second track is, with any escape incident at 10 the Department, there's an internal administrative review 11 that's conducted, and that is separate and apart from the 12 criminal referral by the Department, and Director Schriro 13 will also be discussing that, and I believe we'll have an 14 opportunity today to talk to her officials who are 15 working on that. 16 The third front is this, is this ad hoc panel 17 that the Governor has asked us to put together to review 18 not only the administrative report that's being put 19 together -- and let me add that assisting in that 20 administrative review report is assistant police chief Page 4 brp021104 21 from Tucson, Roberto Villasenor, who, I believe -- 22 Roberto, you are on the line? 23 MR. VILLASENOR: Yes, I am. 24 MR. BURKE: There you are. 25 And John Phelps, who's the deputy director for 6 1 the Office of Homeland Security for the State of 2 Arizona. They are assisting in that administrative 3 review and providing independent commentary on that. 4 And the third prong is this entity here, the, 5 for lack of a better term, the blue ribbon panel, who 6 includes experts in the field, indeed from other states, 7 and individuals, respected individuals from this state, 8 who are asked to provide not only review and commentary 9 but their independent analysis of the work being 10 conducted by the Department of Corrections in the post- 11 incident analysis but also with regards to what steps 12 should be taken in the future. 13 Let me just clarify before I let Grant and Herb 14 provide comments on where they'd like to see us proceed 15 on this. We are -- we had initially put out a notice, I 16 think yesterday, on some of the meetings, that had gone 17 out to the press too, the first one, of course, being 18 today, this initial organizational meeting of the blue 19 ribbon panel. 20 We have tomorrow a meeting at the Lewis 21 facility, and the point of that meeting as well as the 22 one on Friday, February 13th, and Wednesday, 23 February 25th, and Thursday, February 26th, those are 24 four separate meetings that we put together for employees 25 of the Department of Corrections to provide feedback to Page 5 brp021104 7 1 us. And those will be open to the media, but for 2 security purposes, those are, since they are on the 3 facility, we're going to have to keep those limited to -- 4 they're not completely open meetings for security 5 reasons. We can, and the panel, we can discuss this, if 6 there's a need to have separate public meetings, but with 7 regards to those four, I don't want anyone to be misled, 8 they'll be open to the media because we can credential 9 them, but since they're on the facility, they're not 10 going to be open to the general public. 11 We are then trying to get this panel back on 12 Monday, March 1st, and Tuesday, March 2nd, to deliberate, 13 review the transcripts from those earlier hearings and 14 the recommendations and input we've had during this 15 process. 16 And I think those are kind of the general 17 housekeeping things I wanted to touch upon at first. 18 I view my role as not only a co-chair but as, 19 since the Governor had directed me to keep directing the 20 entire overall process that we're conducting here, as 21 more of making sure that things are getting done and 22 getting done on time. There's going to be absolutely no 23 limitation by anyone on this panel on their 24 participation, their questioning, what directions they 25 want to go into. Those are absolute independent 8 1 determinations for this panel to be making. But the 2 Governor had asked me to be in charge of this to make 3 sure that we are thorough and we are moving forward and Page 6 brp021104 4 the process is being conducted. 5 So, with that, Grant, do you have any thoughts, 6 or have I thoroughly confused you? 7 MR. WOODS: No, you haven't. I won't go into 8 the discrepancy between the time commitment you told me 9 when you got me to agree to this and what I see on the 10 schedule. Sort of a rope-a-dope strategy you've got 11 there. 12 First, I'd like to -- I want to commend the 13 Governor for the way she's approaching this. I think 14 it's -- it's just the right way to do it. She's got a 15 lot of expertise she's bringing to the table, both within 16 the state and outside of the state, and a few others, 17 like myself, who hopefully are able to take an 18 independent look at what we find. So I think that's -- I 19 think it's great that she's done this, and I commend her 20 for it. 21 I think the questions I've heard over the last 22 24 hours, mainly from the media, I can address a couple 23 of those. First, as far as the independence of this 24 committee, I can just say, you know, I come to this with 25 no preconceived notions about anything relating to our 9 1 task. And I think we all come to it with pretty much the 2 same thought, and that is, we want to find out what 3 happened, look at the policies and procedures that may 4 have affected what happened, and my goal, and I think 5 it's probably mirrored by everyone else, I just don't 6 want to see any other officer ever put into this position 7 here in the state of Arizona. It's not any more 8 complicated than that. Page 7 brp021104 9 As Attorney General, I represented the 10 Department of Corrections for eight years. I argued on 11 their behalf in front of the United States Supreme 12 Court. I have great respect for the men and women who 13 work with the Department of Corrections, and they should 14 not have to have gone through an ordeal like this. But 15 things like this happen, and now we have to examine it 16 closely so that hopefully it doesn't ever happen again. 17 We all share that. 18 So, from my own perspective, that's where I'm 19 coming from. I'm proud the Governor asked me to be 20 involved in this. I think it's very worthwhile. And I'm 21 going to be looking at anything possible to see if there 22 are any improvements that can be made so that no officer 23 ever faces this situation again. For me, it's not any 24 more complicated than that. 25 I was asked several times about whether officers 10 1 could feel free to be candid with us and without fear of 2 retaliation if they were critical of their superiors, and 3 all I can say to that is, we have a whistleblower law in 4 this state, and I'm confident it will be fully enforced, 5 that if there was any retaliation against anybody who 6 made critical statements, that they would -- that 7 situation would be dealt with according to the law. 8 We do have a former Attorney General and former 9 United States Attorney as Governor. We have a former 10 Attorney General as -- former Assistant Attorney General 11 on this panel. You have a very active and capable 12 Attorney General in this state. I think between all of 13 us, we'd see that the whistleblower law is going to be Page 8 brp021104 14 enforced. So I would just say to the men and women who 15 might want to come forward and talk with us, they should 16 come forward and talk to us freely, so that, again, we 17 can all fulfill this goal of making sure this doesn't 18 happen again. 19 So, again, I look forward to it. It's a quick 20 timeline. The Governor is the boss, so if that's the 21 timeline she wants, that's what we'll do. But if it 22 takes more time, then I would imagine that we'd take more 23 time. 24 Lastly, regarding the legislature and some 25 comments about whether they should be doing their own 11 1 thing and their own review of this, my view on that is, 2 sure. I would think they have plenty to do so that 3 they -- it would make sense to me that they would wait 4 and see what we came up with and then review that, and I 5 would expect them to review it. And if they weren't 6 satisfied, they should do their own thing. All of us in 7 this state, all the concerned citizens like myself and 8 all elected officials, should have the same desire here. 9 So it's within the -- completely within the purview of 10 the legislature to take a long, hard look at this. And I 11 hope that they will take our report, and if there are 12 changes, that they would implement them. But I would 13 certainly welcome them to listen closely to what we come 14 up with, and if they feel further action is necessary, to 15 take it. 16 So, Dennis, I thank you for the opportunity. 17 MR. BURKE: Thank you, Grant. I appreciate that 18 very much. Page 9 brp021104 19 Senator? 20 MR. GUENTHER: Well, it's somewhat of a pleasure 21 to be here, I think. Anyway, I'm looking forward to 22 getting as much of the information as possible so that we 23 can try to put together the picture and the scenario that 24 evolved into a rather tense and long hostage situation. 25 I would hope that no one here, either with the 12 1 Department or others involved directly with the 2 Department, would think that we're going -- we're here to 3 probe and punish, because that is not our intent, as I 4 understand it. It is simply to offer constructive 5 criticism if in fact there is constructive criticism 6 warranted so that we make the improvements necessary to 7 prevent a reoccurrence of this type of activity. 8 I think there's many areas that we have to look 9 into. We have, obviously, a large task in a short amount 10 of time. I would hope that we have access to all the 11 information necessary in order to make informed 12 decisions. 13 I know some of the areas of my concern involve, 14 obviously, classification of inmates, release to work 15 assignments, especially involving search and job 16 assignments of inmates relative to classification; access 17 to the tower, including ingress and egress, as well as 18 the need for that access; operation of the tower as far 19 as the standard operational procedure, staffing of 20 obviously the equipment, including firearms and other 21 items of inmate control. And then the accessory use of 22 the tower I think is going to be an important component 23 here, again, the need to access and the need to restrict Page 10 brp021104 24 that access to those who have the need to be there, 25 especially in such a secure environment. 13 1 I think some other areas will be medical 2 assistance and medications, where are those medications 3 stored, and medical assistance after an event like this, 4 where either injured inmates and/or correctional officers 5 need medical assistance. Staff training. I know there's 6 a lot of indication in some of the preliminary reports as 7 to drills, simulations versus reality, and how people 8 would react differently to that, or if they do react 9 differently to that. Access to keys in an emergency 10 situation, especially when inmates have control over a 11 certain portion of the facility and you have guards and 12 other teams coming in to respond. Communications, 13 whether or not there's ways to limit communications when 14 inmates capture, control of communication equipment. And 15 I guess the weapons. I think one of the keys that we 16 have in this whole thing is the inmate weapons, the hand- 17 crafted weapons and how they were made, where they were 18 hidden, were they accessed on the morning of the 19 takeover. I think all of that is relatively important. 20 So, without belaboring that to any larger 21 degree, I think I'm ready to go and put in as much time 22 as necessary to get the factual information out so that 23 we can make recommendations to the Governor to prevent a 24 reoccurrence. 25 MR. BURKE: Thank you, Senator. 14 1 I'm going to allow the other panelists to 2 introduce themselves, get a little bit of background just Page 11 brp021104 3 to see what a diverse board we have here with a lot of 4 experience. 5 But let me just clarify for the panelists that 6 we will be transcribing these meetings, and so if 7 there's -- because I know this will put a crimp, with our 8 tight schedule on this, on their outstanding commitments, 9 like their day jobs, and so those will be transcribed, so 10 if there are not opportunities for panelists to be at 11 those, they will have the opportunity to review that 12 before we meet again to deliberate some of the 13 recommendations and the findings of the administrative 14 review being conducted by the administrative panel. 15 Mike Branham, the acting director of juvenile 16 corrections. 17 Mike. 18 MR. BRANHAM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 19 Hi. Again, I'm Mike Branham, the director of 20 the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission and the interim 21 director at the Arizona Department of Juvenile 22 Corrections. I'm really honored to be here as well and 23 would echo many of the things that you've heard here a 24 moment ago. 25 I'd also like us to look at how this affects the 15 1 entire criminal justice system when an event like this 2 happens. I think there are many lessons that local, 3 county, and state and federal agencies can all learn from 4 this. Although the outcome was the return of the two 5 officers and the return of the facility back into the 6 hands of the Department of Corrections, in many ways we 7 all were held to a point of learning some lessons about Page 12 brp021104 8 how an institution could be held hostage. If we don't 9 learn from this, then I think much of what you heard 10 before will probably happen again and there will probably 11 be the need for other bodies like this to convene. So 12 I'm looking forward to us finding ways to make the entire 13 system better. 14 MR. BURKE: Leesa Morrison, director of 15 Department of Liquor Control but also a former state 16 prosecutor for many years. 17 Lisa. 18 MS. MORRISON: Good afternoon. I'm also honored 19 to be here today. 20 I spent the last 17 years as an Assistant 21 Attorney General, the last 12 of which as a prosecutor. 22 Prior to that, I was part of the administrative unit and 23 the civil unit of the Attorney General's Office. I'm 24 currently the Director of the Liquor Licenses and 25 Control. And I'm looking forward to taking the facts 16 1 that are presented to us, analyzing them, and drawing 2 conclusions that can assist the Governor and the director 3 in understanding exactly what happened and preventing it 4 from happening again. 5 Thank you. 6 MR. BURKE: Thank you, Leesa. 7 We have three individuals from out of state, two 8 that have traveled here and one over the phone, with a 9 wealth of experience not only in the correctional field 10 but in tactical and security consulting. Chase Riveland, 11 who's served as executive director of the Colorado 12 Department of Corrections, secretary of the Washington Page 13 brp021104 13 State Department of Corrections, and deputy director of 14 the Wisconsin Department of Corrections is here today. 15 And I really appreciate your presence here, 16 Chase. Do you have any comments with regards to the 17 panel at this time? 18 MR. RIVELAND: Well, I followed this story 19 primarily in the media, and, of course, having been in 20 corrections for in excess of 30 years, found it quite 21 interesting. And I happen to have one connection with it 22 in that I'm an old colleague of Director Schriro, and I 23 have enormous respect for her, so I felt even more 24 sensitive towards the events as they unfolded. And 25 it's -- I find it very interesting that the Governor has 17 1 chosen to proceed this way. I think it's very helpful to 2 do so, but particularly with a great deal of 3 transparency. And it's a pleasure for me to be a part of 4 that. 5 MR. BURKE: Thank you, Chase 6 Tom Stickrath, who's the deputy director of the 7 Ohio Department of Corrections. I want to thank him also 8 for coming out. 9 MR. STICKRATH: Thanks, Dennis. And I'm also 10 very pleased to be able to assist the panel in any way 11 possible. 12 I've been with the Ohio Department of 13 Corrections since 1979, and for the past 13 years, I've 14 served as assistant director of that system, and as most 15 of you or all of you are aware, Ohio had a very tragic 16 incident at its Lucasville facility about 11 years ago, 17 and I think from that, I have a sense of what the Arizona Page 14 brp021104 18 Department of Corrections and the citizens of Arizona are 19 experiencing and have experienced and will experience in 20 the weeks and months ahead, and I hope I can bring some 21 lessons learned from what happened in Ohio 11 years ago 22 to this panel. 23 MR. BURKE: Excellent. Thank you, Tom. 24 John Cohen, are you on the line? 25 MR. COHEN: Yes, sir, I am. 18 1 MR. BURKE: John is a homeland security 2 consultant and tactical expert, former investigator for 3 the United States House Judiciary Committee and as well 4 as the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Earlier 5 in his career, he had served on SWAT teams himself in 6 L.A. County and for DEA. And we've asked John to also 7 partake in this panel. 8 John, any of your thoughts initially? 9 MR. COHEN: Yeah. I think the other panelists 10 and the three co-chairs sort of have said everything I 11 would say. It's unfortunate that we have to come 12 together under circumstances like this, but I commend the 13 Governor for pulling together this group, and I think the 14 lessons learned can not only benefit the state but other 15 correctional systems throughout the country. So, again, 16 I applaud the fact that the State is pulling this type of 17 review together. 18 MR. BURKE: Thank you, John. 19 Roger Vanderpool, the sheriff of Pinal County, 20 who not only runs his own jail system but does try to 21 work with the State correctional system, with the 22 Florence facility that resides in his county. And Roger Page 15 brp021104 23 has a long history in law enforcement and brings a lot of 24 expertise with regard to his experience at the County. 25 Roger, any of your thoughts. 19 1 MR. VANDERPOOL: Just delighted to be here and 2 honored to be here, but, you know, on behalf of the 3 sheriffs of Arizona, this could have occurred at really 4 any institution. You've got institutions that deal with 5 people, and to deal with those people, you have to have 6 people to deal with them. So you've got the human factor 7 involved all the way around. And hopefully we can learn 8 what happened, why it happened, how can we prevent it, 9 and how can we improve not only within the Department of 10 Corrections but really the detention centers throughout 11 the state ran by the sheriffs' offices, because we really 12 are in this all together. 13 MR. BURKE: Thank you, Sheriff. 14 Roberto Villasenor, who's assistant police chief 15 for Tucson, who's working on the administrative panel 16 with John Phelps. 17 Roberto, do you have any thoughts at this 18 point? 19 MR. VILLASENOR: Well, I do thank you for the 20 opportunity to review this. As a former commander of our 21 hostage negotiation unit as well as our professional 22 standards bureau, I hope to look at this from a viewpoint 23 looking at both the tactical aspect as well as the 24 administrative review aspect, and I'm looking at it from 25 the same viewpoint as Mr. Woods, how do we prevent this 20 Page 16 brp021104 1 from happening to any other officers in the future. 2 MR. BURKE: Thank you both, Roberto and John. 3 Let me just clarify for the panel so we kind of 4 have a common understanding before we let Director 5 Schriro give kind of an overview on the issues at hand. 6 With the Governor's charge to have a preliminary 7 report by March 4th, what our recommendation would be for 8 the panel, especially since the administrative review is 9 under -- being initiated already, is to break this up 10 into two stages. One is to focus on the facts that 11 happened on the morning of January 18th, how they 12 happened, and some initial recommendations with regards 13 to that, and then the 15 days after the two inmates with 14 the hostages entered the tower and the tactical 15 negotiation issues, focus on that afterwards. 16 So we'll complete as much as we can on that 17 period in the morning before they entered the tower and 18 focus on that as the preliminary report to the Governor, 19 one being that those are the questions firsthand that the 20 Governor has asked, how did that happen and why did it 21 happen, and two, those are the questions that are most 22 important to the director and the Department so they can 23 continue to function and whatever changes they need to be 24 making can be implemented sooner. 25 The other reason why the Governor has provided 21 1 such a quick timetable on this is that we need to realize 2 that the director has a 30,000 inmate facility system 3 that she needs to be operating and is operating every 4 day, so -- are there any questions about that format? Is 5 there agreement on that? Page 17 brp021104 6 MR. WOODS: Yes. 7 MR. BURKE: Great. I'd like to at this time now 8 let Director Schriro provide kind of an overview of some 9 of the issues, let her comment on that, and have a 10 dialogue with the panel on that. 11 MS. SCHRIRO: Thank you, Mr. Chair and 12 Mr. Co-chairs, members of the panel. I'm Dora Schriro, 13 the director of the Arizona Department of Corrections. I 14 am very grateful for your time and your attention and all 15 of your efforts that you have put to this endeavor in 16 which we too share a very deep stake. We're very, very 17 grateful to you. 18 I want to pledge that everyone in the Department 19 is going to support your efforts and do our level best to 20 serve you well so that you have access to all of the 21 information, physical plant, anything else that you may 22 require so that you can develop a product that the state 23 richly deserves. 24 What I hope to do for you in a descriptive way 25 as a preamble to my remarks is to provide you with the 22 1 situation with which we grappled for the 15 days, and 2 certainly when we leave this building and then go to 3 Lewis, you'll see firsthand the enormity of the task that 4 we faced. 5 Briefly, as you know, and as many of you have 6 referenced, very early on the morning of Sunday, 7 January 18, two inmates were successful in their efforts 8 to make their way to the tower in the Morey unit. And if 9 I can make -- refer to the materials that I passed out 10 and bring your attention to the first of the slides, this Page 18 brp021104 11 provides you with an overview of the Lewis facility. The 12 Lewis facility is the newest of the State's prison 13 complexes. It consists of six units, the Morey unit 14 being one of those six. And you'll see it on the western 15 side of the facility. 16 The facility confines a significantly diverse 17 population. And by that I mean, there are a number of 18 custody levels contained within the complex, and at some 19 of the units, including the Morey unit, we may have a 20 similar classification of prisoner, in this case, 21 protective segregation, but protective segregation 22 inmates cut across three of the five custody levels, 23 levels 2, 3, and 4. And that also presents some 24 considerable challenges for the Department. 25 When we are at Lewis later this afternoon and I 23 1 have an opportunity to introduce you to the warden, 2 Warden Gaspar, he'll provide you with additional 3 information about the nature and the number of the 4 populations that are confined in each of the specific 5 units and some of the ramifications that it has for its 6 overall operation. As those of you with corrections 7 experience know already in these early remarks, that when 8 a system is overcrowded, as ours is, and you start to mix 9 populations because you don't have the opportunity to 10 provide the separation, you're building in some 11 additional dynamics to the day-to-day operation. 12 The second screen on the lower portion of that 13 first page is a closer up view of the aerial photograph 14 on the upper part of the page, and this is the Morey unit 15 in particular. The Morey unit has four housing units, Page 19 brp021104 16 and they are the four buildings that are shaped like the 17 letter H, and the inmates in question were housed, 18 Wassenaar and Coy, were housed in housing unit 2, and 19 early on the morning of Sunday the 18th were released 20 from their housing unit with a total of 17 other inmates, 21 all assigned to the kitchen, where they reported for 22 their inmate work assignment. 23 The kitchen is located in B building. The B 24 building is a multipurpose building. It serves a number 25 of support functions, including the kitchen and the 24 1 dining area. 2 The other things to point out, at the opposite 3 end of the yard, on the western side, is what's referred 4 to as the A building. That's the administration 5 building. You'll notice that there is what looks like a 6 dark line that connects the A and the B building where -- 7 and in the middle is the tower, which intersects. That 8 dark line is referred to as the spline. And you'll hear 9 that over and over again. The spline is a paved path 10 that is -- that is enclosed inside of a high chain-link 11 fence. And the spline divides the two sides of the yards 12 so that, even within -- even within a unit, the complex 13 can be subdivided and superimpose additional control over 14 inmate movement. And so you'll hear more about the 15 spline. 16 To give you some of the distances so that you 17 can begin to appreciate some of the tactical challenges 18 that all of the agencies who responded to support the 19 Department and the Department faced, from the B building 20 to the tower, that's 54 yards. From the tower to the A Page 20 brp021104 21 building is 100 yards. And so you have a tower that is 22 placed in the center of an area. It is, of course, 23 intended through its design, its construction, and its 24 equipping to be a place that cannot be taken. It is 25 intended to be a secure location from which all inmate 25 1 movement can be monitored. And in this instance, it then 2 became, I think for all who responded to this situation 3 and to all that we reached out for additional technical 4 assistance, the most difficult, the most challenging 5 tactical situation that responders at the state, local, 6 and federal level had ever confronted. And so certainly 7 to understand the situation better is essential by the 8 very nature of its design. 9 If I then direct your attention to the second 10 page, to the photograph at the top, this is a closer 11 picture of the Morey tower. It was taken during the 12 course of the 15 days but prior to the time that Inmate 13 Wassenaar went onto the roof and removed most of the 14 awning material. He did so for two purposes, both of 15 which we surmised correctly. One was to increase his 16 ability to observe our movement, and secondly, to use the 17 material to fashion blackout curtains to further obstruct 18 our view of their activity inside the tower. You can see 19 here more closely the spine in terms of its fencing 20 configuration and the constantine ribbon that's along the 21 top of the fence lines. 22 There are actually four approaches to the 23 tower. Along the spline, there is -- there is a door on 24 either side. You can see one of them in that 25 photograph. It is to the left of what is the air Page 21 brp021104 26 1 conditioning handling unit. And then on the opposite 2 side of the tower, not visible in this photograph, is the 3 other access. You can also see by the additional 4 fencework that there are pass-through doors that are 5 intended for officers' use to pass material back and 6 forth to officers in the yard and those in the tower, and 7 indeed, it references some of Senator Guenther's remarks 8 about assumptions that went -- that were fundamental to 9 the design and construction of the various purposes that 10 this tower was intended to serve when the facility was 11 first constructed. 12 The photograph at the bottom of that second page 13 provides you with a view standing with the tower at your 14 back and looking 54 yards towards the B building, how one 15 experiences the spline from ground level, and again, I 16 think represents the kind of challenges that the tactical 17 teams faced in every consideration and configuration that 18 was developed for strategies to take the tower by 19 tactical force should that become necessary. 20 And then finally, on page 3 is a closer picture 21 of the tower and a clearer view of the door. This is the 22 door through which Inmates Wassenaar and Coy surrendered 23 and our remaining corrections officer was released back 24 to safety. As you may recall, the first of the two 25 officers was released by means of a ladder which was 27 1 placed alongside the tower from which he descended. 2 So that gives you a little bit of a feel as to 3 some of what you will see this afternoon when we -- when 4 we go out to the facility. Page 22 brp021104 5 As you know, it went from early in the morning 6 of January 18 through late in the afternoon on 7 January 26th that two of our corrections officers 8 remained in the tower, held by two inmates, Coy and 9 Wassenaar, both of whom had access to weapons that are 10 typically assigned to the tower given its functions. 11 The tower, as I mentioned before, is intended to 12 be a place from which inmate movement is monitored and a 13 place from which inmate movement can be managed, even by 14 force, indeed lethal force, should the occasion arise. 15 Under ordinary circumstances, it is a two-person post. 16 One officer is assigned to the second level and manages 17 the controls typically from that location, and at any 18 time when there's inmate movement in the yard, the other 19 officer is expected to be on the roof so that they can 20 respond quickly with force, either nonlethal or lethal, 21 should the situation arise. 22 It was almost eight days later that our second 23 officer was released, on February 1st. And what I'd like 24 to do briefly is to summarize for you the strategies that 25 were realized to secure the peaceful surrender of the 28 1 inmates and the successful release of our two staff. 2 In a hostage situation -- 3 MR. WOODS: Director Schriro, can I ask you just 4 a couple things? 5 How did they get to the tower? Were they trying 6 to get -- the only thing I've heard from listening to the 7 radio, I heard a little bit of McKinney's interview with 8 one of the inmates. Were they trying to escape and 9 somehow ended up in the tower, or was their goal to get Page 23 brp021104 10 to the tower? 11 MS. SCHRIRO: As they have described it -- and 12 I'll hasten to add that we have endeavored as part of the 13 criminal investigation to interview both of the inmates. 14 One has refused to cooperate but not invoked his right 15 not to speak. The other inmate, Wassenaar, has invoked 16 his right. And so -- 17 MR. WOODS: So you have no statements from 18 either one? 19 MS. SCHRIRO: The statements we have are the 20 statements that were provided over the course of the 21 negotiations, all of which are captured on tape, as well 22 as the interview that Mr. McKinney conducted with Inmate 23 Wassenaar. What they provided in those statements, in a 24 fairly consistent manner, is that they intended to escape 25 from the facility and that it was their plan to go to the 29 1 tower for the purpose of obtaining weapons from the 2 tower, which they anticipated would assist them in their 3 escape. It was not their intent to remain in the tower, 4 based on the limited information that they have provided 5 in that regard. 6 MR. WOODS: And you mentioned the weapons. What 7 weapons are held there, and where are they? 8 MS. SCHRIRO: There is an AR-15 and a shotgun 9 with ammunition that is considered regular issue in the 10 tower. In addition, there are some nonlethal weapons 11 that have stinger rounds, for example, and also tear gas 12 canisters, those things that are ordinarily utilized to 13 maintain or retain control of the yard, if necessary. 14 MR. WOODS: And how were they stored? Do these Page 24 brp021104 15 inmates, they'd need a key to get them out of a closet, 16 or are they just sitting around? 17 MS. SCHRIRO: I'm not sure I can provide you 18 with a complete answer at this point in time. Some of 19 the weapons were available. There is a locked cabinet, 20 and it is -- there's a secure cabinet, and it is secured 21 with a key. And until there's a full debriefing, I'm not 22 sure that I know yet to tell you today what material was 23 out, but that -- 24 MR. WOODS: What weapons did they have? Once 25 you made contact with them, what weapons did they have? 30 1 MS. SCHRIRO: They had access to all of the 2 weapons that I've just delineated. 3 MR. WOODS: Okay. And they wouldn't have gotten 4 those just off of the officers, necessarily, would they? 5 Or could they have? The officers could have had those in 6 their possession? 7 MS. SCHRIRO: They certainly could have. But I 8 don't have the particulars for you right now. 9 MR. WOODS: So it was either that or they got 10 the key and got them out of something that was locked. 11 MS. SCHRIRO: Yeah. It's my -- it's my belief, 12 but I'm not sure that it's validated, that both of the 13 weapons were in the area, and that's in part because the 14 movement had started on the yard, and so the officer 15 would be either ready to take position or was on position 16 in anticipation of movement. 17 MR. WOODS: Is it common knowledge among the 18 inmates that there are weapons stored in the tower? 19 MS. SCHRIRO: In -- I believe in a general Page 25 brp021104 20 sense, yes, because on occasion, those weapons are 21 utilized. Certainly, they do not know, and so we would 22 be reluctant to describe the number of rounds of 23 ammunition and things of that sort. But I think they are 24 aware that the weapons are there. 25 MR. WOODS: And then one other question before 31 1 you go much further there. 2 On the tower, this dilemma of making it 3 inpenetrable in its daily use but having that work 4 against you in a situation like this, is there any other 5 design that would allow for the inpenetrability of the 6 tower to be lessened if they were in a distressed 7 situation? 8 MS. SCHRIRO: I'm not sure I understand the 9 question. 10 MR. WOODS: You want the tower not to be 11 penetrable. Correct? 12 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. 13 MR. WOODS: Because it's right there in the 14 middle, and inmates are walking around, and you don't 15 want them to have access to it. But once you got into 16 this situation, that worked against you because now it's 17 not penetrable to you as well. 18 MS. SCHRIRO: That's correct. 19 MR. WOODS: Is there some other design where 20 perhaps -- you know, I don't know what it would be, but I 21 could envision maybe you push a button and things 22 collapse, things change, and that would not be within the 23 tower, that would be maybe over in admin or something 24 like that, I don't know, but in other states, have they Page 26 brp021104 25 dealt with this problem? 32 1 MS. SCHRIRO: I don't know that they've dealt 2 with this problem, per se, but we have been in 3 consultation with the architects of this facility from 4 the time that the event first began to unfold. And it's 5 our intent through the review to confer with other 6 architects to determine the varieties of ways in which 7 these towers can be retrofitted as well as future towers 8 be constructed so as to be more user-friendly. I have 9 already a partial list of retrofits that I think are 10 worthy of further review, and a little bit later on, I'd 11 be glad to share some of them with you. 12 MR. WOODS: And the last question, but do we 13 have this same situation in all the other prisons in 14 Arizona, with a tower that's inpenetrable? 15 MS. SCHRIRO: This particular tower is primarily 16 at the Lewis facility, again, this is the most recent of 17 our facilities, but this tower design was also added 18 after the fact at several other locations. And I'll have 19 that list for you. But there are other towers with other 20 configurations but all designed with the same thought in 21 mind, that they be secure locations that inmates would 22 not have access to. 23 MR. WOODS: Do you need a tower? I mean, does 24 everybody have a tower that holds prisoners throughout 25 the United States? 33 1 MS. SCHRIRO: Towers are -- 2 MR. WOODS: Or is there an alternative to a Page 27 brp021104 3 tower? 4 MS. SCHRIRO: Towers are fairly typical as a 5 method of inmate monitoring and inmate management. 6 Depending on the facility and its design and the time of 7 its construction, you're going to see quite a variety. 8 For example, in Missouri, where I served last, the old 9 penitentiary there had some 14 towers around its 10 perimeter. Newer facilities have a tower in a central 11 location, as does Lewis. Lewis actually has six towers, 12 one for each of its units. 13 Some systems have moved away from towers and 14 have used alternative means of monitoring. But that also 15 speaks to the original intent of the facilities in terms 16 of the nature and the number of inmates that are 17 anticipated to be confined at that particular location. 18 MR. WOODS: Are you going to tell us how these 19 guys got in there? 20 MS. SCHRIRO: Yeah, if I get the chance. 21 MR. WOODS: All right. 22 MR. RIVELAND: Do I assume correctly that the 23 glazing on the windows of this tower are bulletproof? 24 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes, they were. 25 MR. RIVELAND: So the snipers were valuable only 34 1 if the people came up to the roof or outside of the 2 tower. 3 MS. SCHRIRO: Actually, the tactical teams that 4 responded, and I haven't had the opportunity yet but will 5 to describe the three parts of the response, the tactical 6 teams were issued weapons with ammunition that could 7 penetrate these windows, but these windows on the towers, Page 28 brp021104 8 as you'll see when you're on site, are positioned at an 9 angle, and so the tactical teams practiced at length, 10 so -- recognizing that if they had a clear shot to the 11 inmates, that they wouldn't have more but the one 12 opportunity to shoot to kill. And so they practiced at 13 length at the Rast unit, which, if you look back to the 14 first of the slides, is the unit that's also on the -- on 15 the western side of the facility but at the northwest 16 corner. 17 In terms of their movement, Mr. Co-chair, from 18 the housing unit to the kitchen to the tower, as I 19 mentioned, these two inmates were two of 17 who were 20 released to report to the kitchen for their inmate work 21 assignment. 22 There in the kitchen, the inmates overcame the 23 one corrections officer and the one civilian contract 24 employee who was in the kitchen at that time. They took 25 the uniform from the officer who was in the kitchen, and 35 1 Inmate Wassenaar put that uniform on. The officer was 2 restrained with his own cuffs, and the other employee was 3 restrained otherwise. 4 In the course of the time that they were in the 5 kitchen, they also took the remaining inmate workers and 6 secured them in a supply room that's inside of the 7 kitchen area, so they were secured there. While they 8 were still in the -- in the kitchen, an officer who was 9 reporting to his post earlier than scheduled and so a 10 surprise to the two inmates, he -- when he radioed, he 11 came into the scene -- I'm sorry. I'm going to have to 12 get my notes. I want to not misspeak at all. Page 29 brp021104 13 MR. WOODS: The other 15 inmates, then, they had 14 nothing to do with this? 15 MS. SCHRIRO: No. In fact, the two inmates said 16 something to the effect, "This can be your lucky day. 17 You know, you're with us or you're not." None of the 18 inmates wanted to participate, and so they were all moved 19 to that storage area, where they were -- 20 MR. WOODS: So they, at least from what you 21 know, they could have joined in. 22 MS. SCHRIRO: They could have joined in. 23 MR. WOODS: You could have had 17. 24 MS. SCHRIRO: And they elected not to. 25 MR. WOODS: And the two who were doing this, 36 1 were they -- had they planned this ahead of time? Do you 2 know? 3 MS. SCHRIRO: They -- that is what they have 4 stated in their limited statements. But I can't speak 5 to -- with any certainty as to the length of time that 6 they planned it or how well they planned it. 7 It -- while they have not proffered this, it 8 strikes me in my review that there are some similarities 9 in their efforts and the efforts that were made in the 10 Texas Department of Corrections where inmates there too 11 overcame a group of officers, moved to the tower, with 12 the purpose of removing weapons from the tower, and then 13 were successful in actually escaping from the facility, 14 where it was a number of days before they were 15 apprehended. 16 MR. WOODS: Can I ask you, if these two were 17 able -- because I don't know what happened next, but if Page 30 brp021104 18 these two were able to make it to the tower and take over 19 the tower, does that mean that if two could do it, 17 20 could have done it? 21 MS. SCHRIRO: I don't know. That is -- that is 22 a question that I cannot answer. Perhaps as I finish to 23 describe -- 24 MR. WOODS: If two could do it, how could 17 not 25 be able to do it? 37 1 MS. SCHRIRO: I don't know that they can or 2 can't. You're asking a hypothetical question. 3 MR. WOODS: Would that complicate things if you 4 had 17 people in the tower? 5 MS. SCHRIRO: 17 inmates? 6 MR. WOODS: Yes. 7 MS. SCHRIRO: It may have. I think it would 8 also depend on how many additional officers, if any, they 9 brought with them. 10 MR. WOODS: It sounds like you could have had 17 11 people in the tower if those 15 would have just gone 12 along. 13 MS. SCHRIRO: The reason that I hesitate in 14 answering a hypothetical question is, if there were that 15 many additional inmates moving across the yard, I think 16 it would have been also more visible to staff, and the 17 response of staff, excellent as it was in this instance, 18 may have been different with a greater number of inmates 19 moving across the yard. And so that's why it's difficult 20 for me to answer that hypothetical for you. 21 MR. GUENTHER: Grant, one thing that's important 22 here is that we had one person acting as a trojan horse, Page 31 brp021104 23 with the uniform on, he got buzzed in, because it just 24 was another corrections officer on a TV camera in the 25 thing. Now, once he took control of the tower, then I 38 1 think it was a matter of who else was going to join him. 2 But the key was that he had to play the role of a 3 corrections officer in order to gain access to the tower. 4 MR. WOODS: And the other guy was doing what 5 while he was getting buzzed in? 6 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, if I can continue with the 7 chronology, I think I can answer those questions. 8 MR. WOODS: Okay. 9 MS. SCHRIRO: Thank you. 10 MR. WOODS: And just so I'm not misunderstood, 11 if one guy was waiting, then, to get buzzed in, after the 12 other guy took it, if there were 16 laying there in 13 wait -- it sounds like -- to me, like that would have 14 been very possible. 15 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, again, I think as we move 16 along, we can discuss that. 17 As I mentioned, an officer reported to the 18 kitchen earlier than the beginning of his post, and he 19 was encountered by Inmate Coy. And Inmate Coy approached 20 him with a shank, which was described previously as an 21 inmate-made weapon, and he directed him to the kitchen 22 office, which is where the first officer had been 23 restrained after his uniform had been removed. And the 24 Inmate Coy, he took the cuffs from this second officer 25 and also restrained him to a fixture in the kitchen 39 1 office. Page 32 brp021104 2 There was then some matter of minutes later, 3 sometime before 5 o'clock, a radio call into the officer 4 in the kitchen, at which point, Coy released that second 5 officer that had come to his post early, and he released 6 him to go to the door because it was an officer standing 7 outside of the dining room asking to be let in. There 8 were actually two officers outside of the dining room who 9 were reporting to their post. Again, after the food 10 service preparation begins in the kitchen, additional 11 officers come to staff the mess hall, where they monitor 12 the inmates during the feeding of the breakfast. 13 When Coy released that second officer to go to 14 the door to let the two officers in, he breaks away from 15 Coy and starts to go across the yard and summon for 16 help. So he acts as quickly as he could to solicit 17 assistance. 18 The two officers who are in the dining room now 19 with Coy confront Coy. And Coy, again brandishing the 20 shank, cuts one of the officers, and so he sustains a 21 facial injury. 22 MR. WOODS: They're unarmed, the officers? 23 MS. SCHRIRO: That's correct. Not armed in 24 terms of lethal -- 25 MR. WOODS: What do they have? 40 1 MS. SCHRIRO: They are typically issued Mace for 2 that kind of a situation. 3 The -- 4 MR. WOODS: They didn't -- did they pull out 5 their Mace? 6 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes, and utilized it with little Page 33 brp021104 7 effect on Coy. 8 MR. WOODS: They did get him, sprayed him? 9 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. 10 MR. WOODS: But he kept going? 11 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. 12 MR. GUENTHER: I think they had a wind situation 13 which was contrary to their accuracy. 14 MS. SCHRIRO: The -- so there are through this 15 course of events a total of four officers, the first 16 officer in the kitchen, the second officer who comes to 17 the kitchen before shift, the two -- the two officers who 18 report to the dining room. Each in their own way attempt 19 to intercede with first Wassenaar, who I've neglected 20 because I jumped ahead to answer the other question, has 21 donned the officer's uniform, he has started to make his 22 way to the tower, not yet detected because, as Senator 23 Guenther indicated, he is wearing an officer's uniform. 24 We know that he -- he rings the bell so as to be 25 let into the tower, and one of the officers buzzes the 41 1 gate first and then the door second, providing him with 2 access to the tower. 3 In anticipation of your question, and it's been 4 asked by others, there is additional debriefing that will 5 ensue with at least one, if not both of the officers, so 6 I can tell you that the officer provided the inmate in 7 the officer's uniform with access to the tower, but I 8 can't speak with what the beliefs of that officer were at 9 that time or the precautions that were taken prior to 10 buzzing in the person who he believed to be the officer, 11 the trojan horse, as the senator referred to him. Page 34 brp021104 12 MR. WOODS: Did the uniform fit him? 13 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. They were -- the officer and 14 the inmate were both of similar size, and actually, they 15 resembled each other in terms of coloring and facial 16 characteristics. So there were some similarities between 17 the two. 18 MR. GUENTHER: That was after the shave. 19 Correct? 20 MS. SCHRIRO: That's correct. The inmate 21 removed his facial hair still in the kitchen prior to 22 moving across the yard dressed in an officer's uniform. 23 MR. WOODS: How did he do that? 24 MS. SCHRIRO: He had a razor, and I don't know 25 how he had access to a razor. 42 1 MR. WOODS: Was there anything about his 2 appearance in retrospect that should have tipped somebody 3 off that he was an inmate in a guard's uniform rather 4 than a guard? 5 MS. SCHRIRO: Corrections officer. 6 Actually, there was an officer who was walking 7 across the yard at the time that Wassenaar was departing 8 the kitchen, and that officer recognized the inmate as an 9 inmate despite the fact that he was wearing the uniform, 10 and he too called for an IMS. 11 An IMS is our -- the process that this 12 department has adopted to respond to any critical 13 incident. It actually stands for inmate management 14 system, but it is the method by which staff organize and 15 respond to any critical incident at a facility. And 16 so -- Page 35 brp021104 17 MR. WOODS: Did he recognize the inmate or that 18 this was -- something didn't look right? 19 MS. SCHRIRO: No, he recognized the inmate by 20 face, and so knew something was amiss, which, again, I 21 think speaks to the value of having staff with some 22 seniority who are familiar with the inmates in a variety 23 of different ways, certainly to recognize them but also 24 to know their characteristics and whatnot. 25 MR. WOODS: Could you have something at the -- 43 1 that anyone wanting to gain access to the tower or other 2 important areas of the prison, that they had to 3 physically show something or put something up against, 4 some sort of security device in order to get in, rather 5 than just being buzzed in? Could that be done? 6 MS. SCHRIRO: It would require additional 7 equipment at this point in time. Given the distance of 8 the observation position on the second floor to the place 9 where the officer is, certainly you have a clear view of 10 the officer and you can ascertain that they're wearing an 11 ID badge, but from that distance, I think anyone would be 12 hard pressed to make a positive identification. 13 MR. WOODS: Have you thought about that? Is 14 that a good idea to have some -- they would actually have 15 to put something -- 16 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, we've given considerable 17 consideration to that, and there are varieties of 18 technologies that are available. There are bar codes, 19 which would not necessarily have worked in this 20 instance. There is the iris scan, for example, where you 21 can provide positive identification by reading the print Page 36 brp021104 22 of the iris of the eye. There are a variety of other 23 strategies. 24 I might hasten to add that one of the additional 25 corrective measures that was taken as we critiqued this 44 1 situation is that -- and again, it goes back to the 2 design of the facility and some of the assumptions about 3 inmate movement and management at the time that the 4 facility was first laid out -- is that there were 5 opportunities to cross yards through different gates, and 6 what we have now superimposed, which helps us to achieve 7 some of that additional verification absent the 8 introduction of additional technology, is that the 9 officers will now only access the tower by either of the 10 two spines. 11 MR. BURKE: That's post February -- that's post 12 January 18th? 13 MS. SCHRIRO: That's correct. 14 But that means that they have to come through a 15 building, and so they pass a check point where that 16 verification occurs, and indeed you'll see that when you 17 go to the facility, as you would see at any facility when 18 you're going through a check point. 19 MR. WOODS: What happens there, at that check 20 point? 21 MS. SCHRIRO: You would provide your ID to the 22 officer. They would make a visual verification at close 23 distance that the person standing before you is the 24 person in the photograph. At a number of junctures, 25 there are also requirements to sign in, and the ID has a Page 37 brp021104 45 1 signature on the back, and so -- 2 MR. WOODS: Is that person armed? 3 MS. SCHRIRO: In that control center, no. 4 MR. WOODS: So he could just overwhelm that 5 person as well since he overwhelmed everybody else. 6 MS. SCHRIRO: No. I think we're having a 7 different conversation. I was describing the retrofit 8 that we added by requiring the employee now to go through 9 the administrative building. 10 MR. WOODS: Let's say he goes through there, 11 this guy has the uniform on, he goes through there, and 12 there's someone asking for his ID. He could just 13 overwhelm that person. 14 MS. SCHRIRO: No, because he's in a control 15 center. He would -- when you come into the control 16 center, as you'll see this afternoon, there's a pass- 17 through, and so, on one side, before you're permitted in, 18 you submit your ID card into the secure room, and the 19 observation of the officer, he's holding your card from 20 inside the safety of that control center. That person is 21 standing outside. 22 MR. GUENTHER: You know, it would really help 23 once we get out there and look at the setup, because I 24 think these pictures are helping already, and now, once 25 we get to see the facility and follow the route that the 46 1 prisoners took in getting both to the B building and 2 taking over the tower, it probably would help. 3 MR. BURKE: For Tom and Chase, in the states 4 you've worked in, do they have any kind of scanners like Page 38 brp021104 5 we're talking about with regards to the tower? 6 MR. RIVELAND: There are a variety of 7 technologies, I think as Dora said. 8 What is a bit unique here in the design is that 9 in probably 80, 90 percent of the prisons, higher 10 security prisons in the country, the recreation yards are 11 towards the perimeter and the towers in the perimeter 12 double as surveillance entities, the armed surveillance 13 entities of the recreation yards and as perimeter 14 security, and they're accessed from outside the security 15 perimeter. 16 These yards -- correct me if I'm wrong, Director 17 Schriro -- are done only for the protection and 18 surveillance of the recreation yards on either side of 19 the spline and possibly some of the interior egress 20 points but nothing that is dealing with the perimeter at 21 all. 22 MS. SCHRIRO: That's correct. And that makes 23 this a unique design. 24 MR. RIVELAND: Very unique. 25 MS. SCHRIRO: And as Chase said, it's just, it's 47 1 different. 2 MR. RIVELAND: The typical prison that I 3 described previously, with the towers on the external 4 perimeter, would normally not have a weapon inside the 5 security perimeter at all unless there were a disturbance 6 and people went in armed, such as a SWAT team or some 7 other entity like that. So this is really quite an 8 unusual design comparatively. 9 MR. BURKE: And this, Director Schriro, has been Page 39 brp021104 10 mimicked in other facilities in Arizona since the 11 building of Lewis, did you say earlier? 12 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, there are placements of 13 towers inside perimeters at a number of locations, but 14 the actual tower as it's designed and constructed at 15 Lewis has been replicated at other sites, yes. 16 MR. STICKRATH: Similar to what Chase said, in 17 Ohio, we don't use this type of design. We are familiar 18 with the technology that you described. We do use one of 19 those technologies, it's more of a fingerprint/handprint 20 technology, at our highest security prison for access and 21 egress. But we don't have that type of inside tower. 22 MS. SCHRIRO: I think, you know, as I mentioned 23 before, the challenge here, because there are mixed 24 custody levels both within the units and between the 25 units, in part because of the overcrowding situation that 48 1 we have, to implement the utilization of that technology 2 successfully means to ensure that those facilities are 3 dedicated to those populations for which they're 4 intended. 5 If I can, I was just going to continue with a 6 little bit of the overview about the strategies that were 7 deployed. 8 MR. BRANHAM: Could I ask one favor, 9 Mr. Chairman and Director, it would probably be helpful 10 for some folks to hear just a minute about what an IMS 11 means for you. 12 MS. SCHRIRO: The IMS is the emergency 13 response. There's a very extensive policy that 14 delineates who the first responders are, what the Page 40 brp021104 15 incident command structure is, and all of the details 16 specific to the ordinary range of incidents to which a 17 correctional system can anticipate it might respond to, 18 everything from fights on the yard up to and including 19 escape attempts and hostage situations. So it tries to 20 contemplate a full range of situations that may occur in 21 a correctional system. More often than not, though, as 22 you know, it's usually the smaller situations that 23 arise. 24 The IMS also contemplates that there will be 25 frequent scenarios, and I think Senator Guenther referred 49 1 to that previously, but that there are not a number of 2 simulations that are called on a regular basis, so that 3 this is a policy that is not only taught in the academy 4 during their preservice instruction but it is practiced 5 through a variety of drills in the units and at each of 6 the prisons. 7 And just building on the Senator's remarks from 8 before, they had a number of drills at the Morey unit, 9 and while staff response was exactly in keeping with the 10 IMS, it was such an unusual set of circumstances that 11 some thought initially in their debriefing statements 12 that this was a simulation. 13 MR. WOODS: Had you simulated the tower being 14 taken over by inmates? 15 MS. SCHRIRO: Actually, at another facility just 16 several weeks before, that simulation had been practiced. 17 Just briefly, the three strategies that are 18 employed in a situation such as this are the tactical, 19 the intelligence, and the negotiation. And we will talk Page 41 brp021104 20 in greater detail about each of them. Suffice it to say 21 that they are three approaches that are pursued always 22 simultaneously. It's never an either/or situation. It's 23 always a combination and coordination of all three 24 efforts. 25 In a situation such as this, where as we've 50 1 begun to discuss, this tower was tactically a virtual 2 impossibility. Now, let me provide a clarification. It 3 was feasible to rush and take the tower. But it was 4 everyone's belief, and continues to be to this day, that 5 had we taken the tower, that it would have been at the 6 loss of the lives of our officers. As much as the 7 tactical teams practiced at the Rast unit and indeed 8 improved their response time over the period of time that 9 they practiced, we could never reduce the time to the 10 small number of seconds that would have been required for 11 us to move clear across the yard from any of the 12 positions that you saw in terms of where the buildings 13 are and then breach the fences, which had already been 14 cut at different points along the 15-day period of time, 15 but run across the yard with ladders and then take the 16 tower, which would have to be done not only from ground 17 level at the doors but by affixing explosive to the 18 windows and then make an assault from both top and 19 bottom. 20 And so tactical was always practiced, but it 21 was -- it was never issued so long as there was 22 reasonable belief that we could bring our officers out 23 safely, as in fact we did do. 24 MR. WOODS: So you had concluded, then, sometime Page 42 brp021104 25 in advance of this incident that if the tower was taken 51 1 by inmates, that you couldn't -- that it would be very 2 difficult, if not impossible, to take control of the 3 situation and resolve it tactically without losing the 4 lives of officers. 5 MS. SCHRIRO: Our assessment from the first day 6 of the situation is that it would not be -- it would not 7 be feasible to rush and take the tower without that 8 occurring. 9 Some people have also asked why, when we saw one 10 inmate on the roof, as occurred on an infrequent but 11 regular basis, why we didn't take the one inmate out. 12 And the answer is very straightforward. It was always 13 our belief and in fact it was the debriefing provided by 14 our officers that whenever one of the inmates was on the 15 roof, the other inmate always had a weapon loaded, 16 cocked, and pointed at one or both of the hostages. 17 MR. WOODS: I just want to -- you would -- if 18 you've come to that -- if you had come to that 19 conclusion, then, you had to have also come to the 20 conclusion that under no circumstances can we ever have a 21 situation where the tower is taken, then, or else we're 22 not going to be able to do anything about it except 23 negotiate. 24 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, this is -- our conclusion 25 and my evaluation I'm just describing to you is from the 52 1 time that the situation -- 2 MR. WOODS: Well, I'm talking about prior to 3 that. You've done training before, you've done Page 43 brp021104 4 simulations and concluded that there's really not much 5 you could do in a scenario -- 6 MS. SCHRIRO: I cannot speak to that. I will 7 confer with the wardens who practice those simulations. 8 The situation at those facilities was different, however, 9 than it is at Lewis. 10 MR. RIVELAND: Just for clarification, did I 11 understand that you did have SWAT teams available for 12 this entire period of time? 13 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. And I was going to continue, 14 as part of the tactical, there were sniper teams 15 reporting in from a number of agencies, including the 16 Department of Corrections, the Sheriff's Department, and 17 others, and they were always positioned 24 hours a day on 18 the roofs of the facilities. There were also tactical 19 teams deployed on the ground as well. And so while some 20 were practicing over at the Rast unit, others were always 21 deployed, ready to respond to command. 22 The intelligence facet of this particular 23 hostage-taking was very difficult, in part because of the 24 design and the construction of the tower. There have 25 been some accounts provided of that already in our 53 1 efforts to utilize a variety of different kinds of 2 listening devices and placing of bugs on the building. 3 We also called upon a number of other agencies that had 4 infrared capability to fly overhead as well as to try to 5 ascertain movement from the ground, and in all of these 6 instances, we were not successful. 7 There was one particular bugging strategy that 8 was utilized that provided us with some limited Page 44 brp021104 9 information, but because of the placement, or the 10 movement of the inmates in the tower, it was -- it didn't 11 provide very much useful intelligence at all. 12 In the end, much of our intelligence came from 13 our collective years of experience in the business in 14 terms of reasonably anticipating what their movements 15 would be, coupled with the extensive debriefing that the 16 first officer provided after the time that he was 17 released, recognizing, of course, that they were likely 18 to change up their movements, knowing that we would be 19 debriefing him. 20 The third facet of this particular situation is 21 negotiation. And the negotiation, as you all know, has 22 really two facets to it. There are the convincing 23 strategies and the pressuring strategies. And this, of 24 course, really speaks to the interaction and the 25 continuous collaboration that has and did occur between 54 1 the tactical, the intelligence, and the negotiating 2 units, so that as information was collected, it was 3 provided to the negotiating teams, and that frequently 4 the pressuring strategies that are part of the 5 negotiation were also the maneuvers that were 6 accomplished by the tactical teams. So when we would 7 approach the tower and place a cut in the fence, for 8 example, that was a pressuring strategy, but it was also 9 executed by the tactical teams. 10 Some of the other pressuring strategies to 11 modify the environment included shutting off the water 12 for a number of days and cutting off electrical power to 13 the tower as well. Page 45 brp021104 14 In order to inform our decision-making through 15 the negotiation and the tactical discussions, another 16 form of intelligence was our utilization of profilers, 17 experts who were asked to profile each of the two inmates 18 as individuals, and every bit as important, to profile 19 the two of them working together in a team, looking not 20 only for the buttons we could push for each of them but 21 where there may be opportunities where they might have 22 common goals that would advance our negotiation process 23 or opportunities to drive wedges between them. 24 As is the case with many negotiations, we also 25 called upon and utilized TPIs, third-party 55 1 intermediaries, identifying from the first day family 2 members who could provide us with both intelligence and 3 then perhaps some assistance as a TPI, and then 4 continuing to cull through family members who would be 5 most effective for direct contact. And TPIs provided 6 both taped statements, some of which were played for the 7 inmates, and in other instances, direct contact under the 8 guidance of negotiators through the course of the 9 negotiations. 10 In all instances, the three teams were staffed, 11 as I've mentioned before, with responders from within the 12 Department of Corrections and other agencies. Again, I 13 think one of the things that speaks to this situation and 14 I think touches on some of Mike's observations, because 15 he was one of the agencies who assisted us with the 16 response as well, is that this is a situation that went 17 on for a considerable length of time, and so, to develop 18 command structures and to maintain the coordination that Page 46 brp021104 19 was necessary, not just over a course of minutes or hours 20 but over a period of days so as to achieve the desired 21 outcome. 22 As a brief summary, in the end, on February 1, 23 the situation which started in the kitchen and moved 24 across a yard was contained to the tower, and neither the 25 rest of the unit nor the complex was ever involved in the 56 1 situation. That also speaks, as a pause, to important 2 modifications that we made to our IMS response. Because 3 of the nature of this critical incident and the duration 4 of this critical incident, we ultimately created two 5 command structures at Lewis, one to manage the focus on 6 the tower and the other activity in the Morey unit, but 7 then the rest to manage the prison complex, which could 8 at a moment's notice have become involved as well. And 9 so we can speak more about that when we're at the 10 facility, that additional information will be provided. 11 And clearly, the escape attempt of these two 12 inmates was thwarted. They never left the Morey unit nor 13 left the Lewis compound. There was no loss of life, 14 certainly not of our staff nor of any responders who were 15 prepared to take the tower, if necessary, and who did 16 indeed approach the tower on a number of occasions, for 17 some of the reasons that I've described to you 18 previously. 19 At this point in time, there appear to be no 20 apparent accomplices that are known to us. And just as 21 two other updates, the investigative team -- and I will 22 be introducing them to you shortly, with permission of 23 the co-chairs -- the investigative team, which is made up Page 47 brp021104 24 of law enforcement personnel from the Departments of 25 Correction and Public Safety and operate under the 57 1 direction of the prosecuting attorney, they have provided 2 the prosecuting attorney's office with a preliminary 3 report, and that preliminary report has been discussed, 4 and a request for some additional information has been 5 directed by Mr. Romley's office, and so they will 6 continue to move with full speed to meet the remaining 7 informational needs that Mr. Romley and his staff has put 8 forward. 9 The two inmates, Coy and Wassenaar, are 10 currently still in the state of Arizona. They are being 11 housed in a Bureau of Prisons facility. And that is 12 accomplished as a result of an interagency agreement 13 between the Department and the Bureau of Prisons. 14 I'd like to go forward briefly and talk about 15 managing the aftermath, because it is indeed every bit as 16 important as our management of the 15-day -- 17 MR. WOODS: Can I just ask you, what concessions 18 were made to the officers -- to the prisoners to secure 19 their surrender? 20 MS. SCHRIRO: In the end, none, in my opinion. 21 From early on, we were interested in transferring them 22 from the state. These are two inmates that had intimate 23 knowledge now of the tower and, in our view, could not 24 remain in the state. We could never be certain that they 25 would not have access to any opportunity to provide 58 1 information to any other inmate. And so it was always Page 48 brp021104 2 our intent to move them. So I'm not sure that there were 3 concessions, per se. 4 MR. WOODS: Is that what they wanted, though? 5 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, you know, part of what made 6 this so difficult was trying to elicit from them what it 7 is that they did want. And a lot of the negotiation 8 process was endeavoring to have them articulate what it 9 is that they expected to accomplish by being in the tower 10 and under what circumstances they would walk out of the 11 tower and let our staff go. 12 In the profiling of these inmates, it suggested 13 that Wassenaar was the leader and had prepared much of 14 the plan, to the extent that there was a plan. Wassenaar 15 was not quick in making decisions, and in my assessment, 16 particularly short on ideas, and so part of the 17 difficulty was introducing -- introducing strategies that 18 he would adopt as his own so as to move it forward. 19 Much of the negotiation process was -- was not 20 only working on a pressuring strategy to push him towards 21 making those final decisions that we had established as 22 our goal from the beginning, but the convincing aspect 23 was to have them believe that we were going to do the 24 thing that we would do in the ordinary course of 25 business. 59 1 As Chase and John know, but others may not, it 2 is routine in state correctional agencies to have 3 interstate compact agreements with other correctional 4 systems because at some point in time every correctional 5 system has some small number of inmates, for -- usually 6 for management reasons and infrequently for protective Page 49 brp021104 7 purposes or for compassionate purposes, will move those 8 inmates to some other location. Arizona has interstate 9 corrections compacts with the majority of the other 10 states in the country, and indeed, we have a hundred 11 inmates today who are serving time for crimes committed 12 in Arizona but they are serving their time in other 13 states. Likewise, Arizona has in its custody a hundred 14 inmates from other jurisdictions, including five now, it 15 used to be six, inmates who were transferred to Arizona 16 from Ohio after the Lucasville disturbance. 17 And so that thing which we would do which is in 18 our department's best interest to do still required 19 efforts on our part for them to believe that this in fact 20 was to be accomplished. 21 MR. WOODS: Is there a downside to that? Could 22 you address -- you know, there is a theory in other 23 situations, anyway, that are analogous that you don't 24 negotiate concessions. And I understand what you're 25 saying is this is what you would have done anyway, but 60 1 creating the appearance amongst prisoners that you did 2 negotiate and that you did concede something flies 3 counter to the idea that we will not under any 4 circumstances negotiate with, in this case, prisoners in 5 this situation. Is that -- could you just comment on 6 that, on whether that's a good idea or a bad idea? 7 MS. SCHRIRO: I appreciate the question. I'd be 8 very happy to comment on it. 9 It is our responsibility to preserve life and to 10 protect our staff, and to secure their release from the 11 tower alive was only in this instance to be accomplished Page 50 brp021104 12 by negotiation. And we were unwavering in our commitment 13 to bring them out alive, and indeed, we succeeded in our 14 goal. 15 That these men will be facing significantly -- a 16 significantly long list each of charges and that that 17 time will be served under the most onerous situations, 18 they will clearly be classified as high custody inmates 19 and will be confined under the most restricted situations 20 that any correctional system can impose is the -- is what 21 they have facing them as a result of the additional 22 felony crimes that they have committed. 23 MR. GUENTHER: Director Schriro, before you go 24 to the aftermath, can I just ask a couple of questions 25 about the facility? 61 1 MS. SCHRIRO: Certainly. 2 MR. GUENTHER: Is the blue to the north and the 3 red to the south, in the -- you've got two different 4 sections within the Morey unit, one being blue, one being 5 red. 6 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. 7 MR. GUENTHER: Blue north, red south. 8 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. 9 MR. BRANHAM: A and B I think is the best way to 10 look at that. 11 MR. GUENTHER: And the other is that, did I 12 misunderstand you that there was an officer crossing the 13 yard when Wassenaar was going down the spline that 14 recognized him? 15 MS. SCHRIRO: I don't -- was that in the yard or 16 in the kitchen? Page 51 brp021104 17 MR. McHUGH: To my knowledge, there was not 18 another officer who recognized Wassenaar. 19 MS. SCHRIRO: I thought I -- let me check. I 20 thought I recalled reading that from -- 21 MR. GUENTHER: Because I thought the only IMS 22 that was issued, or at least the first one, was from 23 Correctional Officer Dubon (phonetic) at about 500 hours. 24 MS. SCHRIRO: I read that somewhere, and that's 25 the problem with reading a lot of preliminary reports. 62 1 I'm not sure what was supposition and what is fact, and 2 that's the purpose of the administrative review. 3 MR. BURKE: We will be able to clarify that 4 during the administrative review. It will be provided to 5 us. Is that correct? 6 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes, sir. 7 MR. GUENTHER: And then just one last question. 8 Currently, there are only two gates to the splines, one 9 on each end, one from the A building, one from the B 10 building, and there's no other access to the doors at the 11 base of the tower. 12 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, there are other gates, but 13 they are now secured and only to be utilized in response 14 to an IMS. 15 MR. GUENTHER: So they're locked. 16 MS. SCHRIRO: That's correct. 17 MR. GUENTHER: Thank you. 18 MR. BURKE: Director, I have a few questions on 19 the design. 20 This -- having -- I understand from what you've 21 stated and what Chase and Tom stated, having this tower Page 52 brp021104 22 in the center of the yard is a unique design for a prison 23 setup like this. 24 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. 25 MR. BURKE: Do you know what year the Morey unit 63 1 was built? 2 MS. SCHRIRO: It was the first of the units that 3 was constructed at Lewis. I think it's been open about 4 five years. I don't know if someone recalls. 5 Mike, if you know. 6 MR. SMARIK: I think it was '97. '97, '98. 7 MR. BURKE: A typical setup, would it be to have 8 more towers on the perimeter as opposed to a tower in the 9 middle? 10 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, in more modern designs, they 11 tried to move away from multiple towers because those are 12 posts that tend to demand a lot of staff time. 13 MR. BURKE: So this was a cost-cutting measure, 14 to stick the tower in the middle? 15 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, perhaps. In some of the 16 facilities that we constructed in Missouri, for example, 17 there would be a building positioned with an observation 18 deck, but it would be considered outside of a secure 19 perimeter. So, I mean, there are different ways to 20 accomplish monitoring of the yard and even the issuance 21 of lethal weapons but not have them available as they're 22 available in this set of circumstances. 23 MR. STICKRATH: I would describe it more as 24 architectural philosophy at the time it was built, more 25 so than cost cutting, per se. Most of the cost cutting 64 Page 53 brp021104 1 comes, as the director indicated, from cutting the 2 perimeter towers that you used to see in many facilities. 3 MR. WOODS: Where would you put -- if you were 4 going to do one tower, though, where could you put it in 5 this design? 6 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, I'm not sure, according to 7 this design, you really could. I mean, you could have -- 8 you could keep the tower where it is but revisit the 9 assumption about deploying weapons to it, and so the 10 response would come from the perimeters either by ground 11 level or by roof. 12 MR. GUENTHER: Are there any other lethal 13 weapons within the perimeter? 14 MS. SCHRIRO: No. Not within the perimeter. 15 MR. BURKE: If the tower were not in the middle 16 and were on the perimeter -- I guess this is asking you 17 how it was set up in other states -- there is less chance 18 of inmate access, I assume, to those particular towers 19 than this setup. 20 MS. SCHRIRO: You know, it really depends on 21 architecturally as well as an inmate management 22 perspective what it is you intend the tower to 23 accomplish. In earlier designs, where towers were 24 constructed around the perimeter, sometimes at the four 25 corners, sometimes at additional points along the way, it 65 1 was as much to monitor contraband movement from the 2 outside in as well as inmate movement withinside of the 3 secure perimeter. So, again, depending on what it is you 4 want the tower to accomplish is where you would place it 5 and how you would equip and staff it. Page 54 brp021104 6 MR. BURKE: Thank you. 7 MR. RIVELAND: Dora, I had a question or two on 8 this also. You said earlier that when you had two 9 officers in the tower, that one would operate the 10 controls and the other one, if the yards were occupied, 11 would have a person on the roof. Do I assume that that 12 person was armed, visibly armed, carrying the AR-15 at 13 that point, on the roof? 14 MS. SCHRIRO: It would be -- it would be readily 15 available to them. I can't -- I don't know that I can -- 16 I'm going to have to ask the warden for you as to whether 17 or not -- the manner in which it was displayed or not. 18 MR. RIVELAND: And the person in control, what 19 other places of egress could they control from that 20 control room? Do we know? Or is that easier to answer 21 out there? 22 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, we can certainly show you 23 when we go to the tower, but you had -- you had control 24 to the gates and the various doors. 25 MR. RIVELAND: On the buildings also? 66 1 MS. SCHRIRO: No. 2 MR. RIVELAND: Just the gates, the internal 3 gates. 4 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. 5 So if where you're going is to what extent does 6 this mirror a control center, it is designed to be 7 different. 8 Now, we did have opportunity from other 9 locations to control a number of things in the tower. 10 For example, we were able to disable phone jacks from the Page 55 brp021104 11 distance. We were able to disable a number of things 12 from other locations. But the reverse is not true. The 13 tower doesn't have the same ability to affect -- 14 MR. BURKE: Did the Huntsville, Texas, incident 15 involve the taking of a tower? 16 MS. SCHRIRO: It involved accessing the tower to 17 obtain weapons that were stored in the tower. But they 18 did not take the tower. 19 MR. BURKE: Was it a similar design to Lewis? 20 MS. SCHRIRO: I don't think so. But, again, 21 similar in its equipment. 22 MR. STICKRATH: I had a question, Director, if I 23 could, back to the security levels. You mentioned at the 24 outset, I think, that there are multiple security 25 levels. Could you just real briefly clarify for me how 67 1 many security levels you have in the Department and which 2 ones you had at the Morey unit? 3 MS. SCHRIRO: Certainly. 4 There are five custody levels in the 5 Department. Level 1 is minimum, level 5 is maximum, 6 level 3 is medium, and then level 2 is low-medium, and 7 level 4 is high-medium. 8 At the -- at the Morey unit, you had a number of 9 different custody levels, 2, 3, and 4. The common 10 denominator is that they were all classified not only by 11 custody level but by additional management requirements 12 as requiring protective segregation. 13 MR. STICKRATH: Thank you. 14 MR. VANDERPOOL: Director, does being buzzed in 15 also require voice identification, like giving a badge Page 56 brp021104 16 number or some identification, like "Jones 123"? 17 MS. SCHRIRO: I don't know at that tower. But 18 I'll get that for you when we get out to that tower. 19 That's going to vary around the Department. 20 I don't know, Mike, if you can answer that now. 21 I don't know that there's an audio -- I don't recall 22 seeing it when I was there. 23 MR. GUENTHER: And the other question would be, 24 you know, "Why do you want in?" I mean, you know, as far 25 as the staff in the tower. You know, "Why do you want in 68 1 my tower?" 2 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, I mean, certainly. And 3 that's the reason that you have the two pass-through 4 windows, so that if materials that are kept in the tower 5 need to be exchanged, there's the opportunity to make 6 that exchange without opening the door. 7 MR. VANDERPOOL: Two follow-ups to that. 8 Do the -- do the officers have stab-resistant 9 vests, and are they -- would they be worn by these 10 officers that were involved in this incident? 11 MS. SCHRIRO: The Department has in its regular 12 issue vests that are resistant to shanks. They are 13 typically issued at certain housing units and certain 14 housing custody levels. For example, if you went to 15 SMU 2, it is required of every officer that protective 16 gear be worn in those situations. That would not be 17 typically required in this particular situation. 18 MR. VANDERPOOL: And then, the officers 19 involved, do they have portables? 20 MS. SCHRIRO: Portable radios. Page 57 brp021104 21 MR. VANDERPOOL: Portable radios. And do they 22 have the alert? 23 MS. SCHRIRO: No. That's one of the things that 24 I mentioned before, that the radios that our department 25 has issued staff do not have a man down button on them, 69 1 nor are they issued a separate man down alarm. 2 MR. WOODS: I missed -- I just missed a little 3 bit of the story. It sounds like a lot of people have 4 examined the details of this already. I have not. 5 The first inmate who had the officer's uniform 6 on gained access, he was buzzed in. 7 MS. SCHRIRO: That's correct. 8 MR. WOODS: What happened next? 9 MS. SCHRIRO: After he made his way to the tower 10 and was permitted access, he overcame one officer first 11 and then the second officer. At that point, he had 12 control of the tower. 13 At the point that Coy, the other inmate, still 14 in the inmate uniform, came across the yard, there were 15 staff who were already in the process of responding. 16 Wassenaar, from the door on the lower level, used one of 17 the weapons and fired into the yard, which made it 18 possible for Coy to reach the tower and enter as well. 19 Okay. If I can just continue, then. I was 20 going to discuss managing the aftermath, which is a 21 matter of great weight and equal importance and a part of 22 which you play a significant role. 23 As Mr. Burke provided in his opening remarks, 24 the critical review has three parts. There is the 25 criminal investigation, and I've described the method by Page 58 brp021104 70 1 which that is proceeding. There's also an administrative 2 review. And the administrative review is an activity 3 that the Department pursues in the ordinary course of 4 business in response to any IMS that is called and 5 activated. 6 In this instance, the administrative review has 7 been substantially expanded in several different ways, 8 and shortly, I'll introduce to you the two gentlemen who 9 are both participating in the criminal investigation as 10 well as the administrative review. 11 The administrative review endeavors to 12 accomplish answers to a number of the questions that the 13 Governor has raised in her charge and that you have all 14 spoken of today. It's to establish the predicates that 15 lead up to the incident in the kitchen, to reconstruct in 16 complete and accurate detail all of the events that 17 occurred in the kitchen, across the yard, and into the 18 tower, as a first step of the inquiry. We're going to 19 then, as Mr. Burke mentioned, then hope to reconstruct 20 the 15 days that the two inmates and the two and then one 21 officer were in the tower. 22 The administrative review in this instance is 23 enhanced by additional subject matter experts who will be 24 working with Mr. Smarik, who I'll introduce to you 25 shortly. Mr. Smarik is the division director in whose 71 1 unit the administrative reviews, the criminal 2 investigations, are conducted. 3 Working with Mr. Smarik is John Phelps, who's Page 59 brp021104 4 the deputy director of the State's Department of Homeland 5 Security, and also our assistant chief, who I think is 6 still on the line, from the Tucson Police Department, and 7 so the three of them will be overseeing the work that is 8 conducted. 9 When I introduce the gentlemen to you, they will 10 provide you with an overview, a template, if you will, of 11 the questions that are ordinarily included in the 12 investigation of an attempted escape, which, amongst many 13 other things, these 15 days were. Clearly, that template 14 is going to be modified so as to incorporate all of the 15 other inquiries that need to be made to provide you with 16 that complete and accurate reconstruction, and so provide 17 you with full and correct information to the questions 18 that you've put forward today. 19 And then finally, the critical incident review 20 is going to involve your work. And as I mentioned as I 21 first addressed you, we are dedicated to meeting all of 22 your informational needs and providing you with access to 23 whatever it is that you require so that you can make your 24 report as excellent as it needs to be. 25 Part of the management of the aftermath as well 72 1 concerns communication, and I'd like to describe just 2 briefly the communication that occurred both during the 3 15-day period of time as well as our efforts for 4 communication since then. 5 During the incident, there were, on my part, 6 e-mail updates that I provided to all of the ADC staff on 7 a daily basis. And I would provide them with these 8 updates at the end of the day, frequently pretty early in Page 60 brp021104 9 the morning, and advise them in general terms as to the 10 status of our efforts and to inform them of welfare 11 checks that were accomplished that day of the staff and 12 to provide other information that could be shared at that 13 point in time. 14 It was also an opportunity for me to present for 15 all of them questions that were bubbling up, indeed, many 16 of the questions that you and the others have asked 17 today, and to provide as complete answers as I could to 18 staff as we went through it. And I think that was a 19 really excellent exercise to have pursued, and it's a 20 process that I'm continuing to -- well, I had done it 21 before with them, but I'm continuing to provide them with 22 periodic updates, so that they knew about the creation of 23 the three-part process, for example, and their 24 opportunity to participate in the four hearings that have 25 been announced. 73 1 Also, during the incident, there were periodic 2 briefings with the legislature. The leadership was 3 contacted when the incident first arose and then 4 briefings were provided periodically to leadership and 5 others that they suggested that we reach out to as well. 6 With the executive, there were briefings that occurred 7 more than once daily so that there was a regular flow of 8 information as well to the executive branch. 9 MR. BRANHAM: May I ask a quick question? 10 Director, just prior to the communications 11 piece, though, was there ever a thought in your mind that 12 this particular incident was a part of anything larger as 13 it related to the prison system itself? Page 61 brp021104 14 MS. SCHRIRO: That is always something that we 15 contemplate, and thank you for asking the question. 16 When any situation kicks off, whether it be a 17 fight in the yard or, in this extreme example, the taking 18 of the tower, we respond to it for what it is, but we 19 also assume that it could mean something else as well. 20 And so, in this particular instance, the command 21 structure that is contemplated in the IMS was 22 particularly useful, because, as I've referenced before, 23 there were not only the two command centers at Lewis, one 24 to manage the incident and the other to manage the rest 25 of the facility, but the agencywide command center, which 74 1 was operated around the clock from central office, and I 2 was its incident commander. And the reason is, we don't 3 know, you know, until an event evolves and indeed as the 4 investigation ensues whether, if this thing is just one 5 of a number of things that are -- were intended to kick 6 off at the same time or that it could trigger a response 7 from the population or, over the course of the days, that 8 there could even be copycat situations. 9 And so, throughout this event, not only were we 10 responsible for coordinating the communication and the 11 activities of the three functions that I was describing 12 to you, but also to have leadership on site in each of 13 the other facilities around the clock, and they provided 14 to us written updates on an hourly basis so that we could 15 ensure that there would be no other situations related to 16 this situation so that, should such a situation arise, we 17 could respond to that quickly. 18 Likewise, as it became clear to us on the Page 62 brp021104 19 Saturday that the first officer was released and the 20 Sunday that the second officer was released, that these 21 events were likely to occur, we were hoping that they 22 were to occur, there was additional coordination with the 23 rest of the facilities so that we could accomplish 24 several things. First, respond instantaneously to any 25 kind of reaction that the inmate population might have in 75 1 response to the news that the first officer and then the 2 second officer were released, but also so that we could 3 continue to sustain our efforts so as to provide the news 4 to our staff first. It's ever been so often the case in 5 prior years that when a situation arise, staff would hear 6 about it from the inmates who were watching the TV while 7 the officers were working their post, and so our efforts 8 to continue to maintain contact and provide reliable 9 information to staff was really important to us. 10 Does that answer your question, Mr. Branham? 11 MR. BRANHAM: Yes, ma'am. Thank you. 12 MR. WOODS: Can I ask you, was the decision- 13 making, did it -- was the executive branch, other than 14 yourself and DOC, were they involved in this 15 decision-making, during the course of the negotiations? 16 MS. SCHRIRO: No. We provided -- 17 MR. WOODS: In other words, was it just briefing 18 them, or were they actually actively involved in making 19 certain decisions? 20 MS. SCHRIRO: I've always performed the duties 21 of director and have never delegated those duties to any 22 other entity. I endeavor to provide timely updates, 23 particularly when critical decisions had already been Page 63 brp021104 24 made, but never hesitated making a decision and then 25 communicating it after the fact. 76 1 MR. WOODS: And that's what happened here. 2 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes, sir. 3 The briefings were also provided to the press, 4 initially on an ongoing basis, and then after several 5 days, there were briefings that were scheduled at 6 established times through the course of the day so that 7 any updates could be provided on a regular and routine 8 basis. But our PIOs, our public information officers, 9 remained on site and were available to the press 10 throughout the event, so if they -- they needed 11 additional information in between a briefing time, staff 12 would be available to them. Here again, because this was 13 an event that went on for such a long number of days, we 14 drew heavily from other state agencies, who provided 15 support, so as to maintain contact with the public 16 through the media. 17 We also deployed a number of our managers not 18 just to the facilities to manage them throughout but to 19 staff the three command centers that I've just described 20 to you. So there were always several wardens that were 21 dispatched to me on an ongoing rotating basis at the 22 agencywide command center. Likewise, there were 23 additional wardens and deputy wardens on site at Lewis. 24 So in addition to seeing a number of the State's PIOs, 25 one of our wardens, Warden Bartos, was also frequently 77 1 speaking to the press. 2 MR. WOODS: What considerations did you have as Page 64 brp021104 3 far as what to release to the press and what not to? You 4 didn't release some, certain information to the press, 5 then or now, and what were those considerations? 6 MS. SCHRIRO: Thank you for asking. 7 Through the -- through the event, our decisions 8 about the information to release were driven by several 9 different kinds of considerations, all directly related, 10 however, to the singular goal of getting our staff out 11 safely. 12 We had information and guidance from profilers 13 that, given their personalities, that giving them 14 attention in the press, for example, releasing their 15 names, might be detrimental, and indeed, could be used 16 as -- for bargaining purposes, for convincing purposes, 17 should that be required at a later date, and indeed, that 18 did come to pass with the interview that was taped before 19 but played after the release of the last officer. 20 In the instances of our staff, they were 21 involved in a situation where they were not only public 22 employees but victims of felony crimes, and their 23 families first on their behalf while they were in the 24 tower and then the officers after their release asked 25 that we not disclose their names, release their pictures, 78 1 or describe in any detail their medical conditions, as 2 they endeavored to begin their recovery from the 3 situation that they had been facing. 4 In other instances, we did not release certain 5 information because we knew that the inmates were 6 monitoring closely the coverage through the radio that 7 they had in the tower and were in other instances quite Page 65 brp021104 8 concerned that if the inmates in the yard had information 9 that they too would have had access to by listening not 10 only to radios but to TVs and the newspapers, that they 11 could encourage or incite the inmates in the towers. 12 So there were a number of moving parts, and so 13 there were a number of reasons why specific kinds of 14 information was withheld during the event. 15 I guess one of the advantages of jailing as many 16 years as I have is I've also lived through my 17 conversations with other directors the situations and the 18 difficulties that they have experienced during their 19 tenure. While I did not come to the field at the time 20 that Attica occurred, many of my coworkers and colleagues 21 in New York City when I worked in New York City 22 Corrections had been directly involved in the situation 23 at Attica. 24 Likewise, I knew Tom and his boss, the 25 secretary, through my -- through my years as director in 79 1 Missouri, and they had provided a number of debriefs to 2 other directors, as I intend to do as part of our 3 aftermath, and remember quite vividly stories that Reggie 4 and Tom had told about information that was provided to 5 the press and the way in which it was characterized in 6 the press and the untoward, unanticipated consequences 7 that it had with the inmates who were holding staff and 8 other inmates hostage at that situation. 9 And so it was a combination of lessons learned 10 from other situations where the outcomes were not as 11 happy as ours has been in concert with all the other 12 factors that I just described to you that went into those Page 66 brp021104 13 decisions. 14 The second part of your question, and it's on my 15 list of aftermath, is the information that is provided at 16 this point in time. We've had 11 requests, which contain 17 174 questions, none of which is a singular question. 18 Most of them, as you would expect, have many parts and 19 subparts. And we have provided as many responses as 20 quickly as is possible. For actual production purposes, 21 because of the cost limitations that the press has asked 22 us to consider, you know, "If it exceeds $100, let us 23 know," we have -- we have produced and distributed 527 24 pages of documents, and we also have made available an 25 additional 12,000-plus pages of documents for review and 80 1 then for duplication as they direct. 2 We are continuing to review and then redact as 3 necessary other documents that are requested so that they 4 can be made available as quickly as possible. We have a 5 significantly large number of staff dedicated 12 hours a 6 day, seven days a week, to complying with the requests 7 that we have received. We also have received the 8 assistance of four Assistant Attorney Generals who are 9 assisting us in this process. 10 The reasons for redactions are several. There 11 are certain State statutes that require redactions 12 concerning personnel records, for example, or medical 13 records, which are also by statute confidential unless 14 waived. 15 And the only other reason that any information 16 is not being released at this point in time is because we 17 have not yet concluded the criminal investigation, and Page 67 brp021104 18 State statute provides, as you know, that where there is 19 an ongoing criminal investigation, if, in our good faith 20 belief, we believe that releasing certain information 21 will jeopardize the accuracy and completeness and the 22 timeliness of that criminal investigation, that we would 23 withhold it until it's completed. 24 The other thing that we're facing is, there are 25 exceptionally good records of this entire event. Great 81 1 efforts were made to document all of the activity. And 2 as a result, there were logs that were maintained from 3 both Lewis and the command center downtown. There are 4 audiotapes, and there are videotapes. And in order to 5 review all of those things to some extent, even with the 6 number of people we have, it takes almost as many days to 7 review and redact them as it took to create them to begin 8 with. And so we will continue to proceed as quickly as 9 we can with only those -- with only those considerations 10 in mind. 11 MR. BURKE: You should probably put together a 12 package, Director, of those public records for the 13 panelists too, so that they also have an opportunity to 14 review the same documents. 15 MS. SCHRIRO: I'd be very glad to, and at some 16 point welcome you to look at the area that we have 17 dedicated in the Department, we've secured it with its 18 own lock, and have required a sign in/sign out procedure, 19 so it's a restricted access area, because it's really 20 essential that we respond quickly, and as you also know, 21 that we clearly have an obligation to preserve any of the 22 evidence that would be required for prosecution purposes. Page 68 brp021104 23 MR. WOODS: Do you have a time frame, do you 24 have any estimate on when you'll be ready to file 25 criminal charges? 82 1 MS. SCHRIRO: Thank you for asking. 2 The conversations that we've had with the 3 prosecuting attorney's office up to and including today 4 lead us to believe that they are pressing hard to bring 5 charges sometime this month. I think there has been some 6 discussion still, I'm not sure that there is resolution 7 as to the method that they're going to pursue, that is, 8 whether or not they're going to schedule preliminary 9 hearings first or go straight to a grand jury, and then, 10 of course, as you know, charging will follow thereafter. 11 One of the reasons that we are retaining the 12 inmates in state is because we want to make them 13 immediately available if they need to be present for a 14 hearing, and if not, to have them available for the 15 charging. 16 Just to summarize some of which has already been 17 said, in the management of the 15 days and in the 18 management of the aftermath and all of the efforts for 19 continuous improvement that will ensue well beyond the 20 conclusion of any of the reports that are prepared and 21 submitted, we see that there are a number of 22 opportunities for improvement. And I'd like to speak to 23 some of those briefly, not only as it relates to 24 opportunities within the agency, but I think some 25 opportunities, with your further deliberation, that may 83 Page 69 brp021104 1 be available between the agencies, and it goes back to 2 some of the remarks that Mike made earlier. 3 We have begun reviewing a number of the policies 4 and procedures that were in effect and remain in effect 5 at the Department to see what revisions are indicated. 6 And we also anticipate that in the feedback that we have 7 invited staff to provide, that we will derive a lot of 8 benefit from their remarks as well. They are, in their 9 own right, experts. They're the folks who actually 10 implement the policies and procedures and post orders, 11 and I think that they will really inform our review of 12 those activities. 13 As we've touched on briefly throughout this 14 conversation, there are a number of opportunities 15 concerning the physical plant, modifications that need to 16 be made or might be made. And those modifications may be 17 things such as adding or expanding equipment. We talked, 18 for example, about there not being cameras at present. I 19 think we -- I'm sorry, I've had so many conversations, 20 I'm not sure what I've said to this group, but cameras 21 are in relatively short supply at the facilities, and so 22 whereas there are cameras in the dining rooms because 23 that is a place where inmates in a congregate setting 24 frequently will kick off a situation where there's an 25 anticipated need to have good documentation for 84 1 investigation purposes, there were not cameras in the 2 kitchen. And so that's -- that is an example at one end 3 of a modification to the physical plant. 4 At the other end, some of the things that we 5 discussed, for example, is even reconfiguring the towers. Page 70 brp021104 6 There are opportunities to revisit the equipment 7 that is issued to officers and the occasions under which 8 that equipment ought to be utilized, and we touched on 9 several of those, again, in our conversation this 10 afternoon, whether it be the circumstances under which 11 certain kinds of protective vests or protective gear is 12 issued and indeed required of staff to wear, as well as 13 the nature by which they communicate with each other, 14 either for routine communications as well as to signal 15 distress. 16 We talked about equipment for achieving 17 verification of either staff and/or inmates, again, so as 18 to ensure that they cannot overcome the identification 19 systems that are currently in place. 20 We've not touched as much on, but one of the 21 things that we're giving careful review to as well are a 22 number of issues concerning staffing. In the Department, 23 they have a level of staffing that has been referred to 24 as D level staffing. D level staffing has been 25 established as the minimum number of posts that must be 85 1 manned on a particular shift on a given day so as to be 2 able to operate the facility. If the facility was to run 3 below D level staffing, that would then trigger 4 management imposing mandatory overtime on the part of an 5 employee so that you maintained at least that level of 6 staffing. 7 MR. BURKE: Director, is that level of staffing 8 a determination that's been made by this department, or 9 is there some sort of accreditation level that the 10 Department is to meet with regards to staffing? Page 71 brp021104 11 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, since this was in place 12 before me, my best response, and I will provide you with 13 a more accurate reply or verification, is that this is a 14 combination of the actual positions that we have been 15 authorized and then deployed to those -- to those points 16 in the facility which have been determined to be 17 absolutely essential to be manned at any point in time. 18 I don't think there's anyone in the Department who would 19 say that on a given day we need more than D level 20 staffing so as to provide the level of services and to 21 manage the population according to the assumptions of 22 movement that are inherent in the physical layout of any 23 of the institutions. 24 MR. BURKE: Is the Department audited by any 25 outside entity? 86 1 MS. SCHRIRO: No, not as it relates to number of 2 posts, no. 3 Several years ago, the Department did request a 4 staffing study be conducted. And that staffing study was 5 the basis for subsequent years' requests for additional 6 positions. Those positions were not funded in full, and 7 I don't believe were funded even in part, but I will -- I 8 will check on that for you. 9 But, again, I think given the ever changing 10 nature of the population, this, like a classification 11 system, is something that needs to be revisited on a 12 periodic basis so that all of your precautions remain 13 current of the actual population that you're managing, 14 not just in terms of its number but by virtue of its 15 nature. Page 72 brp021104 16 MR. RIVELAND: Regarding that, Director Schriro, 17 when was the last time that the Arizona classification 18 system was -- 19 MS. SCHRIRO: It's -- unfortunately, it's a 20 considerable time ago. It was -- as best as I can tell 21 from the records I've reviewed, it was last validated in 22 1986. So it's considerably overdue for revalidation. 23 And it's something that we spoke about very early in my 24 tenure as something that needs attention as it relates to 25 the female population. This is something that needs to 87 1 be done specific to male and female inmates and to ensure 2 that we are correct in our assessments about what would 3 constitute placement at the appropriate custody level. 4 One of the other -- there are three other 5 staffing issues I'd like to just touch on briefly. 6 In the Department, there is some discussion, 7 or -- through the -- for example, through the special 8 session, there was discussion about vacancy rates. And 9 it is always important to monitor the number of vacancies 10 that there are in the Department at any point in time, 11 but the number of vacancies is indicative, I think, of an 12 underlying issue that requires more attention, and that 13 is, it's not just that a vacancy gets filled and gets 14 filled quickly, but then what the impact of a turnover 15 rate has on longevity of the staff and so its seniority. 16 So it's not just having the correct number of officers 17 deployed in a facility at any point in time but having a 18 sufficient number of officers with sufficient breadth of 19 service that they respond to situations and identify 20 situations as one would expect of more tenured people. Page 73 brp021104 21 And so one of the things that really needs to be 22 given consideration is the relatively large number of 23 junior officers, particularly at a place like Lewis. 24 Indeed, that was the rationale for including in the call 25 of the special session that we retain the partial funding 88 1 of recruitment incentives at Lewis in particular so that 2 we not only found but were able to keep the excellent 3 people that we were hiring. 4 Likewise, Departmentwide, and more pronounced at 5 Lewis, is that one of the ramifications of having a 6 relatively large number of less senior people is that not 7 only does that impact your line staff and their ability 8 to respond, but what then is the available pool of line 9 officers for promotion? And so, at Lewis, you're going 10 to see, in comparison to the rest of the Department, that 11 there's a greater number of sergeants, your first-line 12 supervisor, with less seniority than we would want under 13 ordinary circumstances, but this is something that 14 challenges us at every facility. 15 MR. WOODS: Are you saying that this might have 16 come out differently or been prevented somehow if you 17 would have had either more or more experienced staff? 18 MS. SCHRIRO: Not necessarily. What I'm saying 19 is that I've been asked by the Governor to look at not 20 just what contributed to this situation but what could 21 also contribute to another situation so that we take the 22 biggest look and propose the most comprehensive fix. You 23 know, certainly, in my remarks this afternoon, I have 24 described to you a number of things that went well. 25 There was no loss of life. There was no escape from the Page 74 brp021104 89 1 facility. There was no loss of control of a housing unit 2 or a whole unit or an entire facility. So many things 3 were done well by a staff that is relatively junior in 4 their years of experience, but that there is -- that 5 there is a paucity of senior staff I think also has a 6 part to play in this. I'm not sure that I'm ever going 7 to be able to tell you the extent to which -- 8 MR. WOODS: When you say "in this," you mean 9 this incident? 10 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes, sir. 11 MR. WOODS: Can you think of anything? 12 MS. SCHRIRO: Anything, what? 13 MR. WOODS: Anything that might have been 14 improved had you had more staff or more experienced 15 staff. 16 MS. SCHRIRO: There -- again, this is a 17 hypothetical question. Usually they tell us never to 18 answer a hypothetical, but -- possibly. The -- perhaps 19 more senior staff may have detected in the welfare checks 20 that the officers provided that something was amiss, that 21 the movement perhaps of -- 22 MR. WOODS: Is that in the kitchen? 23 MS. SCHRIRO: I'm sorry? 24 MR. WOODS: In the kitchen? 25 MS. SCHRIRO: Yeah. 90 1 I mean, you know, there are nuances throughout 2 this event that sometimes years of experience will cause 3 the little hairs on the back of your neck to go up that 4 would be missed by people with less experience. For Page 75 brp021104 5 example, I mentioned to you early on, walking into a 6 kitchen and observing that, "Well, why don't I see 7 inmates around and I see food out on counters," but, you 8 know, I mean, just -- just, perhaps, seeing some of those 9 cues, as folks like Chase and Tom and I and Mike in 10 juvenile corrections and the sheriff at his jail, when 11 you walk through a yard or a housing unit, by its sound 12 or lack of sound, you can intuit that there are things 13 that perhaps require further review and fairly quickly. 14 We will certainly be looking at staff training. 15 Arizona is distinguished in that its academy participates 16 in the POST process. Clearly, the POST curricula is 17 different for the correction officer than it is for the 18 peace officer, but that the curricula undergoes the same 19 rigorous review by the POST commission is something that 20 really sets Arizona out in a very positive way, but, 21 again, in the aftermath, we'll look hard at the number of 22 hours in the various subject areas and look at the 23 balance of classroom instruction and then the actual 24 practice during the probationary period and beyond. 25 MR. BURKE: That will include staff training, 91 1 Director, for the tower position itself -- 2 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. And they all go to the 3 fundamental, the core practices and the fundamental 4 assumptions associated with managing a local or a state 5 or a federal corrections system, you know, core 6 assumptions such as redundancies and verification and 7 things of that sort. 8 The field training is where one really acquires 9 practice specific to specific posts at a facility. But Page 76 brp021104 10 understanding the underlying principles is one of the 11 primary responsibilities of the preservice and classroom 12 instruction. 13 MR. BURKE: Are staff now taught to be careful 14 about patterns they develop on shifts that would allow 15 inmates to pick up on that? Because you'd mentioned 16 earlier, going back to Wassenaar getting the uniform, 17 whether it's a coincidence or planning, pattern, that he 18 ended up getting the uniform of an individual of the same 19 size seems to me to indicate that he would be picking up 20 on a pattern. 21 MS. SCHRIRO: The staff is impressed from the 22 beginning through the end of the academy and throughout 23 their tenure about the need to be alert at all times. I 24 think one of the challenges that we all face in a 25 correctional system is that most times things run in a 92 1 routine way. And that's one of the special reasons why 2 the simulations is particularly important, so that people 3 get to practice responses to untoward events that 4 typically don't occur in a correctional setting, but when 5 they do occur, can have catastrophic consequences. 6 So the teaching of being alert at all times to 7 your environment and always being professional in your 8 demeanor speaks to the needs to maintain that kind of 9 vigilance and to detect any changes in patterns in inmate 10 conduct as well. 11 MR. COHEN: Mr. Chairman. 12 MR. BURKE: Mr. Cohen. 13 MR. COHEN: I just have a quick question and 14 follow-up to what you just said. Page 77 brp021104 15 Director, is there any indication on how a 16 prisoner in the kitchen was able to have knowledge of 17 your code 20 process? There's documentation I've seen 18 already that they not only knew that it would take place 19 but also knew what to instruct the correctional officers, 20 how to respond. 21 MS. SCHRIRO: That's an excellent question. 22 I mean, again, it's because the nature of our 23 work is such that it's done out in the presence of the 24 inmate population. And it's just, for all of us who 25 listen to TV programs and listen to the various code 93 1 exchanges that law enforcement makes, it's not much 2 different in a correctional setting. We don't do our 3 work in an office with a door shut. We do our work in 4 the yards and the corridors and the housing units in the 5 presence of the inmate population. 6 MR. BURKE: Will you also, Director, with 7 regards to inmates, look at their rotation with regards 8 to their particular duties? 9 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. That process is already 10 underway. 11 But the last of the staff training issues that 12 we will be giving close review to is in the training that 13 is provided to supervisors, both prepromotional and after 14 they assume their promotional responsibilities, because 15 clearly, the staff in the Department is a team made up of 16 line staff and their supervisors. And our effectiveness 17 is a combination of the efforts of both of those groups. 18 And so if there are areas that require enhancement or 19 improvements, those would be made as well. Page 78 brp021104 20 We've touched previously on classification as an 21 issue that clearly needs to be addressed. It's been a 22 number of years since it has been looked at in a 23 comprehensive manner and validated. And the 24 ramifications of having an accurate classification system 25 are many. It will help us to answer the question, first 94 1 of all, whether or not inmates are correctly classified. 2 For example, Inmates Coy and Wassenaar were both 3 classified at this point in time as level 3. And while 4 that is not necessarily on the face atypical in a 5 correctional system for inmates who come in with serious 6 charges but serve a long period of time with a minimum 7 number of major rule violations, there needs to be 8 additional review about the way in which our 9 classification system is first developed and then how 10 it's utilized. 11 Likewise, the classification system is something 12 that we need to draw upon so that when we make 13 assignments to work, that the work assignments are 14 commensurate with the risks that those inmates present to 15 themselves and to others. 16 You will see when you tour the kitchen tonight 17 that there are a number of security precautions that are 18 built into kitchens. Tool control, which is something 19 we've not spoken about thus far but, again, is 20 fundamental in any correctional system, is ever present 21 in a kitchen as well as other parts of the facility. 22 Where knives are used, they are chained to tables. 23 Wherever it's possible to use a slicer, again, fixed to a 24 table in lieu of a knife, slicers are used. And so Page 79 brp021104 25 there's considerable thought given as to making the 95 1 kitchen as safe a place as it can be, but for all of 2 that, it's still essential that you have inmates who are 3 suitable for placement at any location to be correctly 4 assigned to that specific work assignment. 5 MR. WOODS: Do you think they were suitable, 6 these two? 7 MS. SCHRIRO: Clearly not. 8 I've touched also on the impact of overcrowding 9 and the contribution that it may have had to this 10 particular set of circumstances, and I'd just like to 11 talk that through for a moment so that I can explain what 12 I mean. 13 It is not uncommon for a correctional system to 14 be overcrowded. That is the ordinary course of affairs 15 around the country. But the Arizona Department is very 16 overcrowded, and the ramifications are several. 17 In a perfect world, in which, of course, we do 18 not live, you would operate at something less than 19 100 percent of your capacity. And the reason for that is 20 that you never have equal numbers of levels 1, 2, 3, 4, 21 and 5. And so you need to have some extra space so that 22 you have the right number of spaces for the custody level 23 that the prisoner is -- to which he is assigned. 24 In our system, not only are we operating at 25 greater than 100 percent capacity, but those beds that in 96 1 many systems would be identified as nonrated, that is, 2 available but not included as part of the rated or Page 80 brp021104 3 operational count, are incorporated in our bed count. 4 And so that means, for example, if you're counting your 5 disciplinary beds as rated beds, that means that somebody 6 always has to be bad because there aren't enough beds 7 back in the regular housing units to move an inmate 8 back. That has a direct and negative impact on our 9 ability to respond to and to discipline an inmate when 10 that's necessary, because it means that they sometimes 11 wait to go into a disciplinary bed or are sometimes moved 12 out of a disciplinary bed quicker than was expected. And 13 so overcrowding has a number of ramifications for the 14 day-to-day operation. At this facility, as you will hear 15 in greater detail by the warden, it had some specific 16 impact on overall management at that institution. 17 The other things that affect overcrowding either 18 to the positive or the negative and one of the other 19 areas that I've been charged by the Governor to address 20 in the course of my tenure is the relatively high level 21 of idleness in the Department. When you have a system 22 that is overcrowded and then have a considerable number 23 of inmates in that system that are also idle, the impact 24 of the overcrowding is greater because of the number of 25 hours that the population is piled in on top of one 97 1 another. 2 And so the ultimate combination of overcrowding, 3 as we experience today in the Department, coupled with 4 the current levels of idleness, which are in the process 5 of being addressed but won't be remediated immediately, 6 coupled with the relatively low levels of staffing, some 7 of that staffing being somewhat junior in their tenure, Page 81 brp021104 8 speaks to some of the challenges and indeed some of the 9 opportunities that we face at Lewis in particular and to 10 a certain extent at other complexes in the state. 11 The last of the internal opportunities for 12 improvement, and this will be included in our 13 administrative review and so available for your 14 deliberation as well, is that we will critically 15 evaluate, as will you, the effectiveness of our IMS 16 response system. Clearly, it was a system that was 17 designed for incidents in shorter duration than ours. I 18 think we did a good job of modifying that structure to 19 accommodate a critical event that occurred over a 15-day 20 period of time. But it's an important opportunity that 21 not be lost, so that if there are some additional 22 modifications that should be institutionalized, that we 23 would have this opportunity to do that. 24 MR. STICKRATH: Director, is that system based 25 on any particular model, national model or -- 98 1 MS. SCHRIRO: Yeah, I mean, this is pretty 2 standard stuff, and we'll provide you with the -- 3 MR. STICKRATH: I didn't know if you used a 4 particular model or a consultant had come in and worked 5 with you on that or -- 6 MS. SCHRIRO: I don't know the actual origin of 7 it, but it's been in place for a number of years and has 8 served us well. And I think the modifications that we 9 made to achieve the consistency that was required over 10 the 15 days served us quite well also. 11 There are also some opportunities for us all to 12 review the interagency response. In this state, I was -- Page 82 brp021104 13 I was very impressed when I came and saw the kind of 14 coordination and indeed the collegial relationship that 15 exists amongst all of law enforcement, the kinds of 16 annual meetings that occur, the number of committees, 17 commissions, including POST, that are all approached as 18 an interagency effort, the resources that Mike's 19 commission provides to all of us in the law enforcement 20 and corrections community. So, unlike many other 21 jurisdictions, this state was very well positioned, we 22 knew each other well, not in terms of who our 23 organizations were but who we are as individuals. 24 Where this department -- where this state seems 25 to really excel in also convening its resources for the 99 1 purpose of practicing any number of tactical maneuvers, 2 and indeed those go on on an ongoing basis and I think 3 speak to th
Object Description
TITLE | [Transcripts of Governor's Advisory Blue Ribbon Panel review of Arizona Department of Corrections, Arizona, February 11, 2004 -February 26, 2004] |
CREATOR | Arizona. Governor's Advisory Blue Ribbon Panel. |
SUBJECT | Arizona. bState Dept. of Corrections--Management; Arizona State Prison; Prison administration--Arizona; Hostage negotiations--Arizona; Governmental investigations--Arizona; |
Browse Topic |
Crime and violence |
DESCRIPTION | This title contains one or more publications. |
Language | English |
Publisher | Arizona. Governor's Advisory Blue Ribbon Panel. |
Material Collection |
State Documents |
Source Identifier | GV 108.9:M 56 |
Location | ocm54911513 |
REPOSITORY | Arizona State Library, Archives, and Public Records--Law and Research Library. |
Description
TITLE | The Governor's Advisory Blue Ribbon Panel February 11, 2004 BRP |
DESCRIPTION | 108 pages (PDF version). File size: 152941 Bytes. |
TYPE | Text |
Acquisition Note | Publication or link to publication sent to reports@lib.az.us |
RIGHTS MANAGEMENT | Copyright to this resource is held by the creating agency and is provided here for educational purposes only. It may not be downloaded, reproduced or distributed in any format without written permission of the creating agency. Any attempt to circumvent the access controls placed on this file is a violation of United States and international copyright laws, and is subject to criminal prosecution. |
DATE ORIGINAL | 2004-02-11 |
Time Period |
2000s (2000-2009) |
ORIGINAL FORMAT | Born digital |
DIGITAL IDENTIFIER | brp021104.pdf |
DIGITAL FORMAT |
PDF (Portable Document Format) |
REPOSITORY | Arizona State Library, Archives, and Public Records--Law and Research Library. |
Full Text | brp021104 TRANSCRIPT OF GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY BLUE RIBBON PANEL Phoenix, Arizona February 11, 2004 3:08 p.m. REPORTED BY: PAMELA J. MAYER, RMR-CRR Certified Court Reporter Certificate No. 50207 PREPARED FOR: (Copy) 2 1 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS was 2 taken on February 11, 2004, commencing at 3:08 p.m., at 3 the Governor's Office, 1700 East Washington, Phoenix, 4 Arizona, before PAMELA J. MAYER, a Certified Court Page 1 brp021104 5 Reporter in and for the County of Maricopa, State of 6 Arizona. 7 8 PANEL MEMBERS: 9 Dennis Burke, Co-Chair 10 Herb Guenther, Co-Chair 11 Grant Woods, Co-Chair 12 Roger Vanderpool 13 Tom Stickrath 14 Chase Riveland 15 Mike Branham 16 Leesa Morrison 17 Roberto Villasenor (Telephonically) 18 John Cohen (Telephonically) 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 3 1 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 2 MR. BURKE: Good afternoon. My name is Dennis 3 Burke. I'm the Governor's chief of staff of policy. And 4 this is an advisory ad hoc panel that's been put together 5 under the direction of the Governor in response to the 6 escape attempt and eventual hostage situation that 7 included two officers at the Lewis Correctional Facility 8 that began on January 18th. 9 I have my co-chairs, and I want to thank them 10 Page 2 brp021104 for participating in this, especially on very short 11 notice, former Attorney General of the State of Arizona, 12 Grant Woods, and former senator and current director of 13 the Department of Water Resources, Herb Guenther. And I 14 wanted to go over a couple points at first, and then why 15 don't we go around to the other panelists, and then I 16 know we have some folks on the phone too and make sure 17 that those people who are here and the transcriber who's 18 transcribing this are aware of their presence and their 19 role in this. 20 This -- a couple positive observations about the 21 escape and hostage situation that I'd note first before 22 we kind of get on into the process and the Governor's 23 charge. And our perspective today, I think I can speak 24 for our co-chairs and let them speak at their time, is 25 trying to get organizational today, go through process. 4 1 We've sent out a notice on several meetings that we are 2 having coming up, talking about those for the panelists 3 to make sure that they fit with the schedule, get a sense 4 of their presence on those, and then figure out a game 5 plan. 6 What the Governor noted in her charge to us was 7 that she would like to have a report -- a preliminary 8 report back to her within 30 days of her announcement on 9 it, which would be March 4th. And what she had asked was 10 that we look at the predicates that led to the hostage 11 taking; two, the precise details on how the prisoners 12 were able to take control of the watchtower; and, three, 13 what changes need to take place to ensure this cannot 14 happen again. In other words, the what, the why, and how 15 to prevent. Page 3 brp021104 16 She noted to determine the predicates of the 17 escape attempt and hostage-taking. She further directed 18 us to examine the training and supervision at the 19 Department of Corrections, staffing levels, staff 20 recruitment and retention, security protocol, security 21 capacity, and inmate classification, and, as I indicated, 22 was looking for a preliminary report from this body 23 roughly around March 4th, giving a factual explanation of 24 what happened on the morning of January 18th, how did it 25 happen, and initial recommendations on how to prevent 5 1 such an incident from ever occurring again. 2 Now, we are proceeding on a few different fronts 3 here. First of all, as Director Schriro will discuss in 4 her presentation today, her investigators have already 5 been working with the Maricopa County Attorney's Office. 6 I believe as of today, there was a lengthy meeting, 7 preparing for prosecution of the two inmates involved in 8 this incident. That's the first track. 9 The second track is, with any escape incident at 10 the Department, there's an internal administrative review 11 that's conducted, and that is separate and apart from the 12 criminal referral by the Department, and Director Schriro 13 will also be discussing that, and I believe we'll have an 14 opportunity today to talk to her officials who are 15 working on that. 16 The third front is this, is this ad hoc panel 17 that the Governor has asked us to put together to review 18 not only the administrative report that's being put 19 together -- and let me add that assisting in that 20 administrative review report is assistant police chief Page 4 brp021104 21 from Tucson, Roberto Villasenor, who, I believe -- 22 Roberto, you are on the line? 23 MR. VILLASENOR: Yes, I am. 24 MR. BURKE: There you are. 25 And John Phelps, who's the deputy director for 6 1 the Office of Homeland Security for the State of 2 Arizona. They are assisting in that administrative 3 review and providing independent commentary on that. 4 And the third prong is this entity here, the, 5 for lack of a better term, the blue ribbon panel, who 6 includes experts in the field, indeed from other states, 7 and individuals, respected individuals from this state, 8 who are asked to provide not only review and commentary 9 but their independent analysis of the work being 10 conducted by the Department of Corrections in the post- 11 incident analysis but also with regards to what steps 12 should be taken in the future. 13 Let me just clarify before I let Grant and Herb 14 provide comments on where they'd like to see us proceed 15 on this. We are -- we had initially put out a notice, I 16 think yesterday, on some of the meetings, that had gone 17 out to the press too, the first one, of course, being 18 today, this initial organizational meeting of the blue 19 ribbon panel. 20 We have tomorrow a meeting at the Lewis 21 facility, and the point of that meeting as well as the 22 one on Friday, February 13th, and Wednesday, 23 February 25th, and Thursday, February 26th, those are 24 four separate meetings that we put together for employees 25 of the Department of Corrections to provide feedback to Page 5 brp021104 7 1 us. And those will be open to the media, but for 2 security purposes, those are, since they are on the 3 facility, we're going to have to keep those limited to -- 4 they're not completely open meetings for security 5 reasons. We can, and the panel, we can discuss this, if 6 there's a need to have separate public meetings, but with 7 regards to those four, I don't want anyone to be misled, 8 they'll be open to the media because we can credential 9 them, but since they're on the facility, they're not 10 going to be open to the general public. 11 We are then trying to get this panel back on 12 Monday, March 1st, and Tuesday, March 2nd, to deliberate, 13 review the transcripts from those earlier hearings and 14 the recommendations and input we've had during this 15 process. 16 And I think those are kind of the general 17 housekeeping things I wanted to touch upon at first. 18 I view my role as not only a co-chair but as, 19 since the Governor had directed me to keep directing the 20 entire overall process that we're conducting here, as 21 more of making sure that things are getting done and 22 getting done on time. There's going to be absolutely no 23 limitation by anyone on this panel on their 24 participation, their questioning, what directions they 25 want to go into. Those are absolute independent 8 1 determinations for this panel to be making. But the 2 Governor had asked me to be in charge of this to make 3 sure that we are thorough and we are moving forward and Page 6 brp021104 4 the process is being conducted. 5 So, with that, Grant, do you have any thoughts, 6 or have I thoroughly confused you? 7 MR. WOODS: No, you haven't. I won't go into 8 the discrepancy between the time commitment you told me 9 when you got me to agree to this and what I see on the 10 schedule. Sort of a rope-a-dope strategy you've got 11 there. 12 First, I'd like to -- I want to commend the 13 Governor for the way she's approaching this. I think 14 it's -- it's just the right way to do it. She's got a 15 lot of expertise she's bringing to the table, both within 16 the state and outside of the state, and a few others, 17 like myself, who hopefully are able to take an 18 independent look at what we find. So I think that's -- I 19 think it's great that she's done this, and I commend her 20 for it. 21 I think the questions I've heard over the last 22 24 hours, mainly from the media, I can address a couple 23 of those. First, as far as the independence of this 24 committee, I can just say, you know, I come to this with 25 no preconceived notions about anything relating to our 9 1 task. And I think we all come to it with pretty much the 2 same thought, and that is, we want to find out what 3 happened, look at the policies and procedures that may 4 have affected what happened, and my goal, and I think 5 it's probably mirrored by everyone else, I just don't 6 want to see any other officer ever put into this position 7 here in the state of Arizona. It's not any more 8 complicated than that. Page 7 brp021104 9 As Attorney General, I represented the 10 Department of Corrections for eight years. I argued on 11 their behalf in front of the United States Supreme 12 Court. I have great respect for the men and women who 13 work with the Department of Corrections, and they should 14 not have to have gone through an ordeal like this. But 15 things like this happen, and now we have to examine it 16 closely so that hopefully it doesn't ever happen again. 17 We all share that. 18 So, from my own perspective, that's where I'm 19 coming from. I'm proud the Governor asked me to be 20 involved in this. I think it's very worthwhile. And I'm 21 going to be looking at anything possible to see if there 22 are any improvements that can be made so that no officer 23 ever faces this situation again. For me, it's not any 24 more complicated than that. 25 I was asked several times about whether officers 10 1 could feel free to be candid with us and without fear of 2 retaliation if they were critical of their superiors, and 3 all I can say to that is, we have a whistleblower law in 4 this state, and I'm confident it will be fully enforced, 5 that if there was any retaliation against anybody who 6 made critical statements, that they would -- that 7 situation would be dealt with according to the law. 8 We do have a former Attorney General and former 9 United States Attorney as Governor. We have a former 10 Attorney General as -- former Assistant Attorney General 11 on this panel. You have a very active and capable 12 Attorney General in this state. I think between all of 13 us, we'd see that the whistleblower law is going to be Page 8 brp021104 14 enforced. So I would just say to the men and women who 15 might want to come forward and talk with us, they should 16 come forward and talk to us freely, so that, again, we 17 can all fulfill this goal of making sure this doesn't 18 happen again. 19 So, again, I look forward to it. It's a quick 20 timeline. The Governor is the boss, so if that's the 21 timeline she wants, that's what we'll do. But if it 22 takes more time, then I would imagine that we'd take more 23 time. 24 Lastly, regarding the legislature and some 25 comments about whether they should be doing their own 11 1 thing and their own review of this, my view on that is, 2 sure. I would think they have plenty to do so that 3 they -- it would make sense to me that they would wait 4 and see what we came up with and then review that, and I 5 would expect them to review it. And if they weren't 6 satisfied, they should do their own thing. All of us in 7 this state, all the concerned citizens like myself and 8 all elected officials, should have the same desire here. 9 So it's within the -- completely within the purview of 10 the legislature to take a long, hard look at this. And I 11 hope that they will take our report, and if there are 12 changes, that they would implement them. But I would 13 certainly welcome them to listen closely to what we come 14 up with, and if they feel further action is necessary, to 15 take it. 16 So, Dennis, I thank you for the opportunity. 17 MR. BURKE: Thank you, Grant. I appreciate that 18 very much. Page 9 brp021104 19 Senator? 20 MR. GUENTHER: Well, it's somewhat of a pleasure 21 to be here, I think. Anyway, I'm looking forward to 22 getting as much of the information as possible so that we 23 can try to put together the picture and the scenario that 24 evolved into a rather tense and long hostage situation. 25 I would hope that no one here, either with the 12 1 Department or others involved directly with the 2 Department, would think that we're going -- we're here to 3 probe and punish, because that is not our intent, as I 4 understand it. It is simply to offer constructive 5 criticism if in fact there is constructive criticism 6 warranted so that we make the improvements necessary to 7 prevent a reoccurrence of this type of activity. 8 I think there's many areas that we have to look 9 into. We have, obviously, a large task in a short amount 10 of time. I would hope that we have access to all the 11 information necessary in order to make informed 12 decisions. 13 I know some of the areas of my concern involve, 14 obviously, classification of inmates, release to work 15 assignments, especially involving search and job 16 assignments of inmates relative to classification; access 17 to the tower, including ingress and egress, as well as 18 the need for that access; operation of the tower as far 19 as the standard operational procedure, staffing of 20 obviously the equipment, including firearms and other 21 items of inmate control. And then the accessory use of 22 the tower I think is going to be an important component 23 here, again, the need to access and the need to restrict Page 10 brp021104 24 that access to those who have the need to be there, 25 especially in such a secure environment. 13 1 I think some other areas will be medical 2 assistance and medications, where are those medications 3 stored, and medical assistance after an event like this, 4 where either injured inmates and/or correctional officers 5 need medical assistance. Staff training. I know there's 6 a lot of indication in some of the preliminary reports as 7 to drills, simulations versus reality, and how people 8 would react differently to that, or if they do react 9 differently to that. Access to keys in an emergency 10 situation, especially when inmates have control over a 11 certain portion of the facility and you have guards and 12 other teams coming in to respond. Communications, 13 whether or not there's ways to limit communications when 14 inmates capture, control of communication equipment. And 15 I guess the weapons. I think one of the keys that we 16 have in this whole thing is the inmate weapons, the hand- 17 crafted weapons and how they were made, where they were 18 hidden, were they accessed on the morning of the 19 takeover. I think all of that is relatively important. 20 So, without belaboring that to any larger 21 degree, I think I'm ready to go and put in as much time 22 as necessary to get the factual information out so that 23 we can make recommendations to the Governor to prevent a 24 reoccurrence. 25 MR. BURKE: Thank you, Senator. 14 1 I'm going to allow the other panelists to 2 introduce themselves, get a little bit of background just Page 11 brp021104 3 to see what a diverse board we have here with a lot of 4 experience. 5 But let me just clarify for the panelists that 6 we will be transcribing these meetings, and so if 7 there's -- because I know this will put a crimp, with our 8 tight schedule on this, on their outstanding commitments, 9 like their day jobs, and so those will be transcribed, so 10 if there are not opportunities for panelists to be at 11 those, they will have the opportunity to review that 12 before we meet again to deliberate some of the 13 recommendations and the findings of the administrative 14 review being conducted by the administrative panel. 15 Mike Branham, the acting director of juvenile 16 corrections. 17 Mike. 18 MR. BRANHAM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 19 Hi. Again, I'm Mike Branham, the director of 20 the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission and the interim 21 director at the Arizona Department of Juvenile 22 Corrections. I'm really honored to be here as well and 23 would echo many of the things that you've heard here a 24 moment ago. 25 I'd also like us to look at how this affects the 15 1 entire criminal justice system when an event like this 2 happens. I think there are many lessons that local, 3 county, and state and federal agencies can all learn from 4 this. Although the outcome was the return of the two 5 officers and the return of the facility back into the 6 hands of the Department of Corrections, in many ways we 7 all were held to a point of learning some lessons about Page 12 brp021104 8 how an institution could be held hostage. If we don't 9 learn from this, then I think much of what you heard 10 before will probably happen again and there will probably 11 be the need for other bodies like this to convene. So 12 I'm looking forward to us finding ways to make the entire 13 system better. 14 MR. BURKE: Leesa Morrison, director of 15 Department of Liquor Control but also a former state 16 prosecutor for many years. 17 Lisa. 18 MS. MORRISON: Good afternoon. I'm also honored 19 to be here today. 20 I spent the last 17 years as an Assistant 21 Attorney General, the last 12 of which as a prosecutor. 22 Prior to that, I was part of the administrative unit and 23 the civil unit of the Attorney General's Office. I'm 24 currently the Director of the Liquor Licenses and 25 Control. And I'm looking forward to taking the facts 16 1 that are presented to us, analyzing them, and drawing 2 conclusions that can assist the Governor and the director 3 in understanding exactly what happened and preventing it 4 from happening again. 5 Thank you. 6 MR. BURKE: Thank you, Leesa. 7 We have three individuals from out of state, two 8 that have traveled here and one over the phone, with a 9 wealth of experience not only in the correctional field 10 but in tactical and security consulting. Chase Riveland, 11 who's served as executive director of the Colorado 12 Department of Corrections, secretary of the Washington Page 13 brp021104 13 State Department of Corrections, and deputy director of 14 the Wisconsin Department of Corrections is here today. 15 And I really appreciate your presence here, 16 Chase. Do you have any comments with regards to the 17 panel at this time? 18 MR. RIVELAND: Well, I followed this story 19 primarily in the media, and, of course, having been in 20 corrections for in excess of 30 years, found it quite 21 interesting. And I happen to have one connection with it 22 in that I'm an old colleague of Director Schriro, and I 23 have enormous respect for her, so I felt even more 24 sensitive towards the events as they unfolded. And 25 it's -- I find it very interesting that the Governor has 17 1 chosen to proceed this way. I think it's very helpful to 2 do so, but particularly with a great deal of 3 transparency. And it's a pleasure for me to be a part of 4 that. 5 MR. BURKE: Thank you, Chase 6 Tom Stickrath, who's the deputy director of the 7 Ohio Department of Corrections. I want to thank him also 8 for coming out. 9 MR. STICKRATH: Thanks, Dennis. And I'm also 10 very pleased to be able to assist the panel in any way 11 possible. 12 I've been with the Ohio Department of 13 Corrections since 1979, and for the past 13 years, I've 14 served as assistant director of that system, and as most 15 of you or all of you are aware, Ohio had a very tragic 16 incident at its Lucasville facility about 11 years ago, 17 and I think from that, I have a sense of what the Arizona Page 14 brp021104 18 Department of Corrections and the citizens of Arizona are 19 experiencing and have experienced and will experience in 20 the weeks and months ahead, and I hope I can bring some 21 lessons learned from what happened in Ohio 11 years ago 22 to this panel. 23 MR. BURKE: Excellent. Thank you, Tom. 24 John Cohen, are you on the line? 25 MR. COHEN: Yes, sir, I am. 18 1 MR. BURKE: John is a homeland security 2 consultant and tactical expert, former investigator for 3 the United States House Judiciary Committee and as well 4 as the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Earlier 5 in his career, he had served on SWAT teams himself in 6 L.A. County and for DEA. And we've asked John to also 7 partake in this panel. 8 John, any of your thoughts initially? 9 MR. COHEN: Yeah. I think the other panelists 10 and the three co-chairs sort of have said everything I 11 would say. It's unfortunate that we have to come 12 together under circumstances like this, but I commend the 13 Governor for pulling together this group, and I think the 14 lessons learned can not only benefit the state but other 15 correctional systems throughout the country. So, again, 16 I applaud the fact that the State is pulling this type of 17 review together. 18 MR. BURKE: Thank you, John. 19 Roger Vanderpool, the sheriff of Pinal County, 20 who not only runs his own jail system but does try to 21 work with the State correctional system, with the 22 Florence facility that resides in his county. And Roger Page 15 brp021104 23 has a long history in law enforcement and brings a lot of 24 expertise with regard to his experience at the County. 25 Roger, any of your thoughts. 19 1 MR. VANDERPOOL: Just delighted to be here and 2 honored to be here, but, you know, on behalf of the 3 sheriffs of Arizona, this could have occurred at really 4 any institution. You've got institutions that deal with 5 people, and to deal with those people, you have to have 6 people to deal with them. So you've got the human factor 7 involved all the way around. And hopefully we can learn 8 what happened, why it happened, how can we prevent it, 9 and how can we improve not only within the Department of 10 Corrections but really the detention centers throughout 11 the state ran by the sheriffs' offices, because we really 12 are in this all together. 13 MR. BURKE: Thank you, Sheriff. 14 Roberto Villasenor, who's assistant police chief 15 for Tucson, who's working on the administrative panel 16 with John Phelps. 17 Roberto, do you have any thoughts at this 18 point? 19 MR. VILLASENOR: Well, I do thank you for the 20 opportunity to review this. As a former commander of our 21 hostage negotiation unit as well as our professional 22 standards bureau, I hope to look at this from a viewpoint 23 looking at both the tactical aspect as well as the 24 administrative review aspect, and I'm looking at it from 25 the same viewpoint as Mr. Woods, how do we prevent this 20 Page 16 brp021104 1 from happening to any other officers in the future. 2 MR. BURKE: Thank you both, Roberto and John. 3 Let me just clarify for the panel so we kind of 4 have a common understanding before we let Director 5 Schriro give kind of an overview on the issues at hand. 6 With the Governor's charge to have a preliminary 7 report by March 4th, what our recommendation would be for 8 the panel, especially since the administrative review is 9 under -- being initiated already, is to break this up 10 into two stages. One is to focus on the facts that 11 happened on the morning of January 18th, how they 12 happened, and some initial recommendations with regards 13 to that, and then the 15 days after the two inmates with 14 the hostages entered the tower and the tactical 15 negotiation issues, focus on that afterwards. 16 So we'll complete as much as we can on that 17 period in the morning before they entered the tower and 18 focus on that as the preliminary report to the Governor, 19 one being that those are the questions firsthand that the 20 Governor has asked, how did that happen and why did it 21 happen, and two, those are the questions that are most 22 important to the director and the Department so they can 23 continue to function and whatever changes they need to be 24 making can be implemented sooner. 25 The other reason why the Governor has provided 21 1 such a quick timetable on this is that we need to realize 2 that the director has a 30,000 inmate facility system 3 that she needs to be operating and is operating every 4 day, so -- are there any questions about that format? Is 5 there agreement on that? Page 17 brp021104 6 MR. WOODS: Yes. 7 MR. BURKE: Great. I'd like to at this time now 8 let Director Schriro provide kind of an overview of some 9 of the issues, let her comment on that, and have a 10 dialogue with the panel on that. 11 MS. SCHRIRO: Thank you, Mr. Chair and 12 Mr. Co-chairs, members of the panel. I'm Dora Schriro, 13 the director of the Arizona Department of Corrections. I 14 am very grateful for your time and your attention and all 15 of your efforts that you have put to this endeavor in 16 which we too share a very deep stake. We're very, very 17 grateful to you. 18 I want to pledge that everyone in the Department 19 is going to support your efforts and do our level best to 20 serve you well so that you have access to all of the 21 information, physical plant, anything else that you may 22 require so that you can develop a product that the state 23 richly deserves. 24 What I hope to do for you in a descriptive way 25 as a preamble to my remarks is to provide you with the 22 1 situation with which we grappled for the 15 days, and 2 certainly when we leave this building and then go to 3 Lewis, you'll see firsthand the enormity of the task that 4 we faced. 5 Briefly, as you know, and as many of you have 6 referenced, very early on the morning of Sunday, 7 January 18, two inmates were successful in their efforts 8 to make their way to the tower in the Morey unit. And if 9 I can make -- refer to the materials that I passed out 10 and bring your attention to the first of the slides, this Page 18 brp021104 11 provides you with an overview of the Lewis facility. The 12 Lewis facility is the newest of the State's prison 13 complexes. It consists of six units, the Morey unit 14 being one of those six. And you'll see it on the western 15 side of the facility. 16 The facility confines a significantly diverse 17 population. And by that I mean, there are a number of 18 custody levels contained within the complex, and at some 19 of the units, including the Morey unit, we may have a 20 similar classification of prisoner, in this case, 21 protective segregation, but protective segregation 22 inmates cut across three of the five custody levels, 23 levels 2, 3, and 4. And that also presents some 24 considerable challenges for the Department. 25 When we are at Lewis later this afternoon and I 23 1 have an opportunity to introduce you to the warden, 2 Warden Gaspar, he'll provide you with additional 3 information about the nature and the number of the 4 populations that are confined in each of the specific 5 units and some of the ramifications that it has for its 6 overall operation. As those of you with corrections 7 experience know already in these early remarks, that when 8 a system is overcrowded, as ours is, and you start to mix 9 populations because you don't have the opportunity to 10 provide the separation, you're building in some 11 additional dynamics to the day-to-day operation. 12 The second screen on the lower portion of that 13 first page is a closer up view of the aerial photograph 14 on the upper part of the page, and this is the Morey unit 15 in particular. The Morey unit has four housing units, Page 19 brp021104 16 and they are the four buildings that are shaped like the 17 letter H, and the inmates in question were housed, 18 Wassenaar and Coy, were housed in housing unit 2, and 19 early on the morning of Sunday the 18th were released 20 from their housing unit with a total of 17 other inmates, 21 all assigned to the kitchen, where they reported for 22 their inmate work assignment. 23 The kitchen is located in B building. The B 24 building is a multipurpose building. It serves a number 25 of support functions, including the kitchen and the 24 1 dining area. 2 The other things to point out, at the opposite 3 end of the yard, on the western side, is what's referred 4 to as the A building. That's the administration 5 building. You'll notice that there is what looks like a 6 dark line that connects the A and the B building where -- 7 and in the middle is the tower, which intersects. That 8 dark line is referred to as the spline. And you'll hear 9 that over and over again. The spline is a paved path 10 that is -- that is enclosed inside of a high chain-link 11 fence. And the spline divides the two sides of the yards 12 so that, even within -- even within a unit, the complex 13 can be subdivided and superimpose additional control over 14 inmate movement. And so you'll hear more about the 15 spline. 16 To give you some of the distances so that you 17 can begin to appreciate some of the tactical challenges 18 that all of the agencies who responded to support the 19 Department and the Department faced, from the B building 20 to the tower, that's 54 yards. From the tower to the A Page 20 brp021104 21 building is 100 yards. And so you have a tower that is 22 placed in the center of an area. It is, of course, 23 intended through its design, its construction, and its 24 equipping to be a place that cannot be taken. It is 25 intended to be a secure location from which all inmate 25 1 movement can be monitored. And in this instance, it then 2 became, I think for all who responded to this situation 3 and to all that we reached out for additional technical 4 assistance, the most difficult, the most challenging 5 tactical situation that responders at the state, local, 6 and federal level had ever confronted. And so certainly 7 to understand the situation better is essential by the 8 very nature of its design. 9 If I then direct your attention to the second 10 page, to the photograph at the top, this is a closer 11 picture of the Morey tower. It was taken during the 12 course of the 15 days but prior to the time that Inmate 13 Wassenaar went onto the roof and removed most of the 14 awning material. He did so for two purposes, both of 15 which we surmised correctly. One was to increase his 16 ability to observe our movement, and secondly, to use the 17 material to fashion blackout curtains to further obstruct 18 our view of their activity inside the tower. You can see 19 here more closely the spine in terms of its fencing 20 configuration and the constantine ribbon that's along the 21 top of the fence lines. 22 There are actually four approaches to the 23 tower. Along the spline, there is -- there is a door on 24 either side. You can see one of them in that 25 photograph. It is to the left of what is the air Page 21 brp021104 26 1 conditioning handling unit. And then on the opposite 2 side of the tower, not visible in this photograph, is the 3 other access. You can also see by the additional 4 fencework that there are pass-through doors that are 5 intended for officers' use to pass material back and 6 forth to officers in the yard and those in the tower, and 7 indeed, it references some of Senator Guenther's remarks 8 about assumptions that went -- that were fundamental to 9 the design and construction of the various purposes that 10 this tower was intended to serve when the facility was 11 first constructed. 12 The photograph at the bottom of that second page 13 provides you with a view standing with the tower at your 14 back and looking 54 yards towards the B building, how one 15 experiences the spline from ground level, and again, I 16 think represents the kind of challenges that the tactical 17 teams faced in every consideration and configuration that 18 was developed for strategies to take the tower by 19 tactical force should that become necessary. 20 And then finally, on page 3 is a closer picture 21 of the tower and a clearer view of the door. This is the 22 door through which Inmates Wassenaar and Coy surrendered 23 and our remaining corrections officer was released back 24 to safety. As you may recall, the first of the two 25 officers was released by means of a ladder which was 27 1 placed alongside the tower from which he descended. 2 So that gives you a little bit of a feel as to 3 some of what you will see this afternoon when we -- when 4 we go out to the facility. Page 22 brp021104 5 As you know, it went from early in the morning 6 of January 18 through late in the afternoon on 7 January 26th that two of our corrections officers 8 remained in the tower, held by two inmates, Coy and 9 Wassenaar, both of whom had access to weapons that are 10 typically assigned to the tower given its functions. 11 The tower, as I mentioned before, is intended to 12 be a place from which inmate movement is monitored and a 13 place from which inmate movement can be managed, even by 14 force, indeed lethal force, should the occasion arise. 15 Under ordinary circumstances, it is a two-person post. 16 One officer is assigned to the second level and manages 17 the controls typically from that location, and at any 18 time when there's inmate movement in the yard, the other 19 officer is expected to be on the roof so that they can 20 respond quickly with force, either nonlethal or lethal, 21 should the situation arise. 22 It was almost eight days later that our second 23 officer was released, on February 1st. And what I'd like 24 to do briefly is to summarize for you the strategies that 25 were realized to secure the peaceful surrender of the 28 1 inmates and the successful release of our two staff. 2 In a hostage situation -- 3 MR. WOODS: Director Schriro, can I ask you just 4 a couple things? 5 How did they get to the tower? Were they trying 6 to get -- the only thing I've heard from listening to the 7 radio, I heard a little bit of McKinney's interview with 8 one of the inmates. Were they trying to escape and 9 somehow ended up in the tower, or was their goal to get Page 23 brp021104 10 to the tower? 11 MS. SCHRIRO: As they have described it -- and 12 I'll hasten to add that we have endeavored as part of the 13 criminal investigation to interview both of the inmates. 14 One has refused to cooperate but not invoked his right 15 not to speak. The other inmate, Wassenaar, has invoked 16 his right. And so -- 17 MR. WOODS: So you have no statements from 18 either one? 19 MS. SCHRIRO: The statements we have are the 20 statements that were provided over the course of the 21 negotiations, all of which are captured on tape, as well 22 as the interview that Mr. McKinney conducted with Inmate 23 Wassenaar. What they provided in those statements, in a 24 fairly consistent manner, is that they intended to escape 25 from the facility and that it was their plan to go to the 29 1 tower for the purpose of obtaining weapons from the 2 tower, which they anticipated would assist them in their 3 escape. It was not their intent to remain in the tower, 4 based on the limited information that they have provided 5 in that regard. 6 MR. WOODS: And you mentioned the weapons. What 7 weapons are held there, and where are they? 8 MS. SCHRIRO: There is an AR-15 and a shotgun 9 with ammunition that is considered regular issue in the 10 tower. In addition, there are some nonlethal weapons 11 that have stinger rounds, for example, and also tear gas 12 canisters, those things that are ordinarily utilized to 13 maintain or retain control of the yard, if necessary. 14 MR. WOODS: And how were they stored? Do these Page 24 brp021104 15 inmates, they'd need a key to get them out of a closet, 16 or are they just sitting around? 17 MS. SCHRIRO: I'm not sure I can provide you 18 with a complete answer at this point in time. Some of 19 the weapons were available. There is a locked cabinet, 20 and it is -- there's a secure cabinet, and it is secured 21 with a key. And until there's a full debriefing, I'm not 22 sure that I know yet to tell you today what material was 23 out, but that -- 24 MR. WOODS: What weapons did they have? Once 25 you made contact with them, what weapons did they have? 30 1 MS. SCHRIRO: They had access to all of the 2 weapons that I've just delineated. 3 MR. WOODS: Okay. And they wouldn't have gotten 4 those just off of the officers, necessarily, would they? 5 Or could they have? The officers could have had those in 6 their possession? 7 MS. SCHRIRO: They certainly could have. But I 8 don't have the particulars for you right now. 9 MR. WOODS: So it was either that or they got 10 the key and got them out of something that was locked. 11 MS. SCHRIRO: Yeah. It's my -- it's my belief, 12 but I'm not sure that it's validated, that both of the 13 weapons were in the area, and that's in part because the 14 movement had started on the yard, and so the officer 15 would be either ready to take position or was on position 16 in anticipation of movement. 17 MR. WOODS: Is it common knowledge among the 18 inmates that there are weapons stored in the tower? 19 MS. SCHRIRO: In -- I believe in a general Page 25 brp021104 20 sense, yes, because on occasion, those weapons are 21 utilized. Certainly, they do not know, and so we would 22 be reluctant to describe the number of rounds of 23 ammunition and things of that sort. But I think they are 24 aware that the weapons are there. 25 MR. WOODS: And then one other question before 31 1 you go much further there. 2 On the tower, this dilemma of making it 3 inpenetrable in its daily use but having that work 4 against you in a situation like this, is there any other 5 design that would allow for the inpenetrability of the 6 tower to be lessened if they were in a distressed 7 situation? 8 MS. SCHRIRO: I'm not sure I understand the 9 question. 10 MR. WOODS: You want the tower not to be 11 penetrable. Correct? 12 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. 13 MR. WOODS: Because it's right there in the 14 middle, and inmates are walking around, and you don't 15 want them to have access to it. But once you got into 16 this situation, that worked against you because now it's 17 not penetrable to you as well. 18 MS. SCHRIRO: That's correct. 19 MR. WOODS: Is there some other design where 20 perhaps -- you know, I don't know what it would be, but I 21 could envision maybe you push a button and things 22 collapse, things change, and that would not be within the 23 tower, that would be maybe over in admin or something 24 like that, I don't know, but in other states, have they Page 26 brp021104 25 dealt with this problem? 32 1 MS. SCHRIRO: I don't know that they've dealt 2 with this problem, per se, but we have been in 3 consultation with the architects of this facility from 4 the time that the event first began to unfold. And it's 5 our intent through the review to confer with other 6 architects to determine the varieties of ways in which 7 these towers can be retrofitted as well as future towers 8 be constructed so as to be more user-friendly. I have 9 already a partial list of retrofits that I think are 10 worthy of further review, and a little bit later on, I'd 11 be glad to share some of them with you. 12 MR. WOODS: And the last question, but do we 13 have this same situation in all the other prisons in 14 Arizona, with a tower that's inpenetrable? 15 MS. SCHRIRO: This particular tower is primarily 16 at the Lewis facility, again, this is the most recent of 17 our facilities, but this tower design was also added 18 after the fact at several other locations. And I'll have 19 that list for you. But there are other towers with other 20 configurations but all designed with the same thought in 21 mind, that they be secure locations that inmates would 22 not have access to. 23 MR. WOODS: Do you need a tower? I mean, does 24 everybody have a tower that holds prisoners throughout 25 the United States? 33 1 MS. SCHRIRO: Towers are -- 2 MR. WOODS: Or is there an alternative to a Page 27 brp021104 3 tower? 4 MS. SCHRIRO: Towers are fairly typical as a 5 method of inmate monitoring and inmate management. 6 Depending on the facility and its design and the time of 7 its construction, you're going to see quite a variety. 8 For example, in Missouri, where I served last, the old 9 penitentiary there had some 14 towers around its 10 perimeter. Newer facilities have a tower in a central 11 location, as does Lewis. Lewis actually has six towers, 12 one for each of its units. 13 Some systems have moved away from towers and 14 have used alternative means of monitoring. But that also 15 speaks to the original intent of the facilities in terms 16 of the nature and the number of inmates that are 17 anticipated to be confined at that particular location. 18 MR. WOODS: Are you going to tell us how these 19 guys got in there? 20 MS. SCHRIRO: Yeah, if I get the chance. 21 MR. WOODS: All right. 22 MR. RIVELAND: Do I assume correctly that the 23 glazing on the windows of this tower are bulletproof? 24 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes, they were. 25 MR. RIVELAND: So the snipers were valuable only 34 1 if the people came up to the roof or outside of the 2 tower. 3 MS. SCHRIRO: Actually, the tactical teams that 4 responded, and I haven't had the opportunity yet but will 5 to describe the three parts of the response, the tactical 6 teams were issued weapons with ammunition that could 7 penetrate these windows, but these windows on the towers, Page 28 brp021104 8 as you'll see when you're on site, are positioned at an 9 angle, and so the tactical teams practiced at length, 10 so -- recognizing that if they had a clear shot to the 11 inmates, that they wouldn't have more but the one 12 opportunity to shoot to kill. And so they practiced at 13 length at the Rast unit, which, if you look back to the 14 first of the slides, is the unit that's also on the -- on 15 the western side of the facility but at the northwest 16 corner. 17 In terms of their movement, Mr. Co-chair, from 18 the housing unit to the kitchen to the tower, as I 19 mentioned, these two inmates were two of 17 who were 20 released to report to the kitchen for their inmate work 21 assignment. 22 There in the kitchen, the inmates overcame the 23 one corrections officer and the one civilian contract 24 employee who was in the kitchen at that time. They took 25 the uniform from the officer who was in the kitchen, and 35 1 Inmate Wassenaar put that uniform on. The officer was 2 restrained with his own cuffs, and the other employee was 3 restrained otherwise. 4 In the course of the time that they were in the 5 kitchen, they also took the remaining inmate workers and 6 secured them in a supply room that's inside of the 7 kitchen area, so they were secured there. While they 8 were still in the -- in the kitchen, an officer who was 9 reporting to his post earlier than scheduled and so a 10 surprise to the two inmates, he -- when he radioed, he 11 came into the scene -- I'm sorry. I'm going to have to 12 get my notes. I want to not misspeak at all. Page 29 brp021104 13 MR. WOODS: The other 15 inmates, then, they had 14 nothing to do with this? 15 MS. SCHRIRO: No. In fact, the two inmates said 16 something to the effect, "This can be your lucky day. 17 You know, you're with us or you're not." None of the 18 inmates wanted to participate, and so they were all moved 19 to that storage area, where they were -- 20 MR. WOODS: So they, at least from what you 21 know, they could have joined in. 22 MS. SCHRIRO: They could have joined in. 23 MR. WOODS: You could have had 17. 24 MS. SCHRIRO: And they elected not to. 25 MR. WOODS: And the two who were doing this, 36 1 were they -- had they planned this ahead of time? Do you 2 know? 3 MS. SCHRIRO: They -- that is what they have 4 stated in their limited statements. But I can't speak 5 to -- with any certainty as to the length of time that 6 they planned it or how well they planned it. 7 It -- while they have not proffered this, it 8 strikes me in my review that there are some similarities 9 in their efforts and the efforts that were made in the 10 Texas Department of Corrections where inmates there too 11 overcame a group of officers, moved to the tower, with 12 the purpose of removing weapons from the tower, and then 13 were successful in actually escaping from the facility, 14 where it was a number of days before they were 15 apprehended. 16 MR. WOODS: Can I ask you, if these two were 17 able -- because I don't know what happened next, but if Page 30 brp021104 18 these two were able to make it to the tower and take over 19 the tower, does that mean that if two could do it, 17 20 could have done it? 21 MS. SCHRIRO: I don't know. That is -- that is 22 a question that I cannot answer. Perhaps as I finish to 23 describe -- 24 MR. WOODS: If two could do it, how could 17 not 25 be able to do it? 37 1 MS. SCHRIRO: I don't know that they can or 2 can't. You're asking a hypothetical question. 3 MR. WOODS: Would that complicate things if you 4 had 17 people in the tower? 5 MS. SCHRIRO: 17 inmates? 6 MR. WOODS: Yes. 7 MS. SCHRIRO: It may have. I think it would 8 also depend on how many additional officers, if any, they 9 brought with them. 10 MR. WOODS: It sounds like you could have had 17 11 people in the tower if those 15 would have just gone 12 along. 13 MS. SCHRIRO: The reason that I hesitate in 14 answering a hypothetical question is, if there were that 15 many additional inmates moving across the yard, I think 16 it would have been also more visible to staff, and the 17 response of staff, excellent as it was in this instance, 18 may have been different with a greater number of inmates 19 moving across the yard. And so that's why it's difficult 20 for me to answer that hypothetical for you. 21 MR. GUENTHER: Grant, one thing that's important 22 here is that we had one person acting as a trojan horse, Page 31 brp021104 23 with the uniform on, he got buzzed in, because it just 24 was another corrections officer on a TV camera in the 25 thing. Now, once he took control of the tower, then I 38 1 think it was a matter of who else was going to join him. 2 But the key was that he had to play the role of a 3 corrections officer in order to gain access to the tower. 4 MR. WOODS: And the other guy was doing what 5 while he was getting buzzed in? 6 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, if I can continue with the 7 chronology, I think I can answer those questions. 8 MR. WOODS: Okay. 9 MS. SCHRIRO: Thank you. 10 MR. WOODS: And just so I'm not misunderstood, 11 if one guy was waiting, then, to get buzzed in, after the 12 other guy took it, if there were 16 laying there in 13 wait -- it sounds like -- to me, like that would have 14 been very possible. 15 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, again, I think as we move 16 along, we can discuss that. 17 As I mentioned, an officer reported to the 18 kitchen earlier than the beginning of his post, and he 19 was encountered by Inmate Coy. And Inmate Coy approached 20 him with a shank, which was described previously as an 21 inmate-made weapon, and he directed him to the kitchen 22 office, which is where the first officer had been 23 restrained after his uniform had been removed. And the 24 Inmate Coy, he took the cuffs from this second officer 25 and also restrained him to a fixture in the kitchen 39 1 office. Page 32 brp021104 2 There was then some matter of minutes later, 3 sometime before 5 o'clock, a radio call into the officer 4 in the kitchen, at which point, Coy released that second 5 officer that had come to his post early, and he released 6 him to go to the door because it was an officer standing 7 outside of the dining room asking to be let in. There 8 were actually two officers outside of the dining room who 9 were reporting to their post. Again, after the food 10 service preparation begins in the kitchen, additional 11 officers come to staff the mess hall, where they monitor 12 the inmates during the feeding of the breakfast. 13 When Coy released that second officer to go to 14 the door to let the two officers in, he breaks away from 15 Coy and starts to go across the yard and summon for 16 help. So he acts as quickly as he could to solicit 17 assistance. 18 The two officers who are in the dining room now 19 with Coy confront Coy. And Coy, again brandishing the 20 shank, cuts one of the officers, and so he sustains a 21 facial injury. 22 MR. WOODS: They're unarmed, the officers? 23 MS. SCHRIRO: That's correct. Not armed in 24 terms of lethal -- 25 MR. WOODS: What do they have? 40 1 MS. SCHRIRO: They are typically issued Mace for 2 that kind of a situation. 3 The -- 4 MR. WOODS: They didn't -- did they pull out 5 their Mace? 6 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes, and utilized it with little Page 33 brp021104 7 effect on Coy. 8 MR. WOODS: They did get him, sprayed him? 9 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. 10 MR. WOODS: But he kept going? 11 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. 12 MR. GUENTHER: I think they had a wind situation 13 which was contrary to their accuracy. 14 MS. SCHRIRO: The -- so there are through this 15 course of events a total of four officers, the first 16 officer in the kitchen, the second officer who comes to 17 the kitchen before shift, the two -- the two officers who 18 report to the dining room. Each in their own way attempt 19 to intercede with first Wassenaar, who I've neglected 20 because I jumped ahead to answer the other question, has 21 donned the officer's uniform, he has started to make his 22 way to the tower, not yet detected because, as Senator 23 Guenther indicated, he is wearing an officer's uniform. 24 We know that he -- he rings the bell so as to be 25 let into the tower, and one of the officers buzzes the 41 1 gate first and then the door second, providing him with 2 access to the tower. 3 In anticipation of your question, and it's been 4 asked by others, there is additional debriefing that will 5 ensue with at least one, if not both of the officers, so 6 I can tell you that the officer provided the inmate in 7 the officer's uniform with access to the tower, but I 8 can't speak with what the beliefs of that officer were at 9 that time or the precautions that were taken prior to 10 buzzing in the person who he believed to be the officer, 11 the trojan horse, as the senator referred to him. Page 34 brp021104 12 MR. WOODS: Did the uniform fit him? 13 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. They were -- the officer and 14 the inmate were both of similar size, and actually, they 15 resembled each other in terms of coloring and facial 16 characteristics. So there were some similarities between 17 the two. 18 MR. GUENTHER: That was after the shave. 19 Correct? 20 MS. SCHRIRO: That's correct. The inmate 21 removed his facial hair still in the kitchen prior to 22 moving across the yard dressed in an officer's uniform. 23 MR. WOODS: How did he do that? 24 MS. SCHRIRO: He had a razor, and I don't know 25 how he had access to a razor. 42 1 MR. WOODS: Was there anything about his 2 appearance in retrospect that should have tipped somebody 3 off that he was an inmate in a guard's uniform rather 4 than a guard? 5 MS. SCHRIRO: Corrections officer. 6 Actually, there was an officer who was walking 7 across the yard at the time that Wassenaar was departing 8 the kitchen, and that officer recognized the inmate as an 9 inmate despite the fact that he was wearing the uniform, 10 and he too called for an IMS. 11 An IMS is our -- the process that this 12 department has adopted to respond to any critical 13 incident. It actually stands for inmate management 14 system, but it is the method by which staff organize and 15 respond to any critical incident at a facility. And 16 so -- Page 35 brp021104 17 MR. WOODS: Did he recognize the inmate or that 18 this was -- something didn't look right? 19 MS. SCHRIRO: No, he recognized the inmate by 20 face, and so knew something was amiss, which, again, I 21 think speaks to the value of having staff with some 22 seniority who are familiar with the inmates in a variety 23 of different ways, certainly to recognize them but also 24 to know their characteristics and whatnot. 25 MR. WOODS: Could you have something at the -- 43 1 that anyone wanting to gain access to the tower or other 2 important areas of the prison, that they had to 3 physically show something or put something up against, 4 some sort of security device in order to get in, rather 5 than just being buzzed in? Could that be done? 6 MS. SCHRIRO: It would require additional 7 equipment at this point in time. Given the distance of 8 the observation position on the second floor to the place 9 where the officer is, certainly you have a clear view of 10 the officer and you can ascertain that they're wearing an 11 ID badge, but from that distance, I think anyone would be 12 hard pressed to make a positive identification. 13 MR. WOODS: Have you thought about that? Is 14 that a good idea to have some -- they would actually have 15 to put something -- 16 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, we've given considerable 17 consideration to that, and there are varieties of 18 technologies that are available. There are bar codes, 19 which would not necessarily have worked in this 20 instance. There is the iris scan, for example, where you 21 can provide positive identification by reading the print Page 36 brp021104 22 of the iris of the eye. There are a variety of other 23 strategies. 24 I might hasten to add that one of the additional 25 corrective measures that was taken as we critiqued this 44 1 situation is that -- and again, it goes back to the 2 design of the facility and some of the assumptions about 3 inmate movement and management at the time that the 4 facility was first laid out -- is that there were 5 opportunities to cross yards through different gates, and 6 what we have now superimposed, which helps us to achieve 7 some of that additional verification absent the 8 introduction of additional technology, is that the 9 officers will now only access the tower by either of the 10 two spines. 11 MR. BURKE: That's post February -- that's post 12 January 18th? 13 MS. SCHRIRO: That's correct. 14 But that means that they have to come through a 15 building, and so they pass a check point where that 16 verification occurs, and indeed you'll see that when you 17 go to the facility, as you would see at any facility when 18 you're going through a check point. 19 MR. WOODS: What happens there, at that check 20 point? 21 MS. SCHRIRO: You would provide your ID to the 22 officer. They would make a visual verification at close 23 distance that the person standing before you is the 24 person in the photograph. At a number of junctures, 25 there are also requirements to sign in, and the ID has a Page 37 brp021104 45 1 signature on the back, and so -- 2 MR. WOODS: Is that person armed? 3 MS. SCHRIRO: In that control center, no. 4 MR. WOODS: So he could just overwhelm that 5 person as well since he overwhelmed everybody else. 6 MS. SCHRIRO: No. I think we're having a 7 different conversation. I was describing the retrofit 8 that we added by requiring the employee now to go through 9 the administrative building. 10 MR. WOODS: Let's say he goes through there, 11 this guy has the uniform on, he goes through there, and 12 there's someone asking for his ID. He could just 13 overwhelm that person. 14 MS. SCHRIRO: No, because he's in a control 15 center. He would -- when you come into the control 16 center, as you'll see this afternoon, there's a pass- 17 through, and so, on one side, before you're permitted in, 18 you submit your ID card into the secure room, and the 19 observation of the officer, he's holding your card from 20 inside the safety of that control center. That person is 21 standing outside. 22 MR. GUENTHER: You know, it would really help 23 once we get out there and look at the setup, because I 24 think these pictures are helping already, and now, once 25 we get to see the facility and follow the route that the 46 1 prisoners took in getting both to the B building and 2 taking over the tower, it probably would help. 3 MR. BURKE: For Tom and Chase, in the states 4 you've worked in, do they have any kind of scanners like Page 38 brp021104 5 we're talking about with regards to the tower? 6 MR. RIVELAND: There are a variety of 7 technologies, I think as Dora said. 8 What is a bit unique here in the design is that 9 in probably 80, 90 percent of the prisons, higher 10 security prisons in the country, the recreation yards are 11 towards the perimeter and the towers in the perimeter 12 double as surveillance entities, the armed surveillance 13 entities of the recreation yards and as perimeter 14 security, and they're accessed from outside the security 15 perimeter. 16 These yards -- correct me if I'm wrong, Director 17 Schriro -- are done only for the protection and 18 surveillance of the recreation yards on either side of 19 the spline and possibly some of the interior egress 20 points but nothing that is dealing with the perimeter at 21 all. 22 MS. SCHRIRO: That's correct. And that makes 23 this a unique design. 24 MR. RIVELAND: Very unique. 25 MS. SCHRIRO: And as Chase said, it's just, it's 47 1 different. 2 MR. RIVELAND: The typical prison that I 3 described previously, with the towers on the external 4 perimeter, would normally not have a weapon inside the 5 security perimeter at all unless there were a disturbance 6 and people went in armed, such as a SWAT team or some 7 other entity like that. So this is really quite an 8 unusual design comparatively. 9 MR. BURKE: And this, Director Schriro, has been Page 39 brp021104 10 mimicked in other facilities in Arizona since the 11 building of Lewis, did you say earlier? 12 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, there are placements of 13 towers inside perimeters at a number of locations, but 14 the actual tower as it's designed and constructed at 15 Lewis has been replicated at other sites, yes. 16 MR. STICKRATH: Similar to what Chase said, in 17 Ohio, we don't use this type of design. We are familiar 18 with the technology that you described. We do use one of 19 those technologies, it's more of a fingerprint/handprint 20 technology, at our highest security prison for access and 21 egress. But we don't have that type of inside tower. 22 MS. SCHRIRO: I think, you know, as I mentioned 23 before, the challenge here, because there are mixed 24 custody levels both within the units and between the 25 units, in part because of the overcrowding situation that 48 1 we have, to implement the utilization of that technology 2 successfully means to ensure that those facilities are 3 dedicated to those populations for which they're 4 intended. 5 If I can, I was just going to continue with a 6 little bit of the overview about the strategies that were 7 deployed. 8 MR. BRANHAM: Could I ask one favor, 9 Mr. Chairman and Director, it would probably be helpful 10 for some folks to hear just a minute about what an IMS 11 means for you. 12 MS. SCHRIRO: The IMS is the emergency 13 response. There's a very extensive policy that 14 delineates who the first responders are, what the Page 40 brp021104 15 incident command structure is, and all of the details 16 specific to the ordinary range of incidents to which a 17 correctional system can anticipate it might respond to, 18 everything from fights on the yard up to and including 19 escape attempts and hostage situations. So it tries to 20 contemplate a full range of situations that may occur in 21 a correctional system. More often than not, though, as 22 you know, it's usually the smaller situations that 23 arise. 24 The IMS also contemplates that there will be 25 frequent scenarios, and I think Senator Guenther referred 49 1 to that previously, but that there are not a number of 2 simulations that are called on a regular basis, so that 3 this is a policy that is not only taught in the academy 4 during their preservice instruction but it is practiced 5 through a variety of drills in the units and at each of 6 the prisons. 7 And just building on the Senator's remarks from 8 before, they had a number of drills at the Morey unit, 9 and while staff response was exactly in keeping with the 10 IMS, it was such an unusual set of circumstances that 11 some thought initially in their debriefing statements 12 that this was a simulation. 13 MR. WOODS: Had you simulated the tower being 14 taken over by inmates? 15 MS. SCHRIRO: Actually, at another facility just 16 several weeks before, that simulation had been practiced. 17 Just briefly, the three strategies that are 18 employed in a situation such as this are the tactical, 19 the intelligence, and the negotiation. And we will talk Page 41 brp021104 20 in greater detail about each of them. Suffice it to say 21 that they are three approaches that are pursued always 22 simultaneously. It's never an either/or situation. It's 23 always a combination and coordination of all three 24 efforts. 25 In a situation such as this, where as we've 50 1 begun to discuss, this tower was tactically a virtual 2 impossibility. Now, let me provide a clarification. It 3 was feasible to rush and take the tower. But it was 4 everyone's belief, and continues to be to this day, that 5 had we taken the tower, that it would have been at the 6 loss of the lives of our officers. As much as the 7 tactical teams practiced at the Rast unit and indeed 8 improved their response time over the period of time that 9 they practiced, we could never reduce the time to the 10 small number of seconds that would have been required for 11 us to move clear across the yard from any of the 12 positions that you saw in terms of where the buildings 13 are and then breach the fences, which had already been 14 cut at different points along the 15-day period of time, 15 but run across the yard with ladders and then take the 16 tower, which would have to be done not only from ground 17 level at the doors but by affixing explosive to the 18 windows and then make an assault from both top and 19 bottom. 20 And so tactical was always practiced, but it 21 was -- it was never issued so long as there was 22 reasonable belief that we could bring our officers out 23 safely, as in fact we did do. 24 MR. WOODS: So you had concluded, then, sometime Page 42 brp021104 25 in advance of this incident that if the tower was taken 51 1 by inmates, that you couldn't -- that it would be very 2 difficult, if not impossible, to take control of the 3 situation and resolve it tactically without losing the 4 lives of officers. 5 MS. SCHRIRO: Our assessment from the first day 6 of the situation is that it would not be -- it would not 7 be feasible to rush and take the tower without that 8 occurring. 9 Some people have also asked why, when we saw one 10 inmate on the roof, as occurred on an infrequent but 11 regular basis, why we didn't take the one inmate out. 12 And the answer is very straightforward. It was always 13 our belief and in fact it was the debriefing provided by 14 our officers that whenever one of the inmates was on the 15 roof, the other inmate always had a weapon loaded, 16 cocked, and pointed at one or both of the hostages. 17 MR. WOODS: I just want to -- you would -- if 18 you've come to that -- if you had come to that 19 conclusion, then, you had to have also come to the 20 conclusion that under no circumstances can we ever have a 21 situation where the tower is taken, then, or else we're 22 not going to be able to do anything about it except 23 negotiate. 24 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, this is -- our conclusion 25 and my evaluation I'm just describing to you is from the 52 1 time that the situation -- 2 MR. WOODS: Well, I'm talking about prior to 3 that. You've done training before, you've done Page 43 brp021104 4 simulations and concluded that there's really not much 5 you could do in a scenario -- 6 MS. SCHRIRO: I cannot speak to that. I will 7 confer with the wardens who practice those simulations. 8 The situation at those facilities was different, however, 9 than it is at Lewis. 10 MR. RIVELAND: Just for clarification, did I 11 understand that you did have SWAT teams available for 12 this entire period of time? 13 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. And I was going to continue, 14 as part of the tactical, there were sniper teams 15 reporting in from a number of agencies, including the 16 Department of Corrections, the Sheriff's Department, and 17 others, and they were always positioned 24 hours a day on 18 the roofs of the facilities. There were also tactical 19 teams deployed on the ground as well. And so while some 20 were practicing over at the Rast unit, others were always 21 deployed, ready to respond to command. 22 The intelligence facet of this particular 23 hostage-taking was very difficult, in part because of the 24 design and the construction of the tower. There have 25 been some accounts provided of that already in our 53 1 efforts to utilize a variety of different kinds of 2 listening devices and placing of bugs on the building. 3 We also called upon a number of other agencies that had 4 infrared capability to fly overhead as well as to try to 5 ascertain movement from the ground, and in all of these 6 instances, we were not successful. 7 There was one particular bugging strategy that 8 was utilized that provided us with some limited Page 44 brp021104 9 information, but because of the placement, or the 10 movement of the inmates in the tower, it was -- it didn't 11 provide very much useful intelligence at all. 12 In the end, much of our intelligence came from 13 our collective years of experience in the business in 14 terms of reasonably anticipating what their movements 15 would be, coupled with the extensive debriefing that the 16 first officer provided after the time that he was 17 released, recognizing, of course, that they were likely 18 to change up their movements, knowing that we would be 19 debriefing him. 20 The third facet of this particular situation is 21 negotiation. And the negotiation, as you all know, has 22 really two facets to it. There are the convincing 23 strategies and the pressuring strategies. And this, of 24 course, really speaks to the interaction and the 25 continuous collaboration that has and did occur between 54 1 the tactical, the intelligence, and the negotiating 2 units, so that as information was collected, it was 3 provided to the negotiating teams, and that frequently 4 the pressuring strategies that are part of the 5 negotiation were also the maneuvers that were 6 accomplished by the tactical teams. So when we would 7 approach the tower and place a cut in the fence, for 8 example, that was a pressuring strategy, but it was also 9 executed by the tactical teams. 10 Some of the other pressuring strategies to 11 modify the environment included shutting off the water 12 for a number of days and cutting off electrical power to 13 the tower as well. Page 45 brp021104 14 In order to inform our decision-making through 15 the negotiation and the tactical discussions, another 16 form of intelligence was our utilization of profilers, 17 experts who were asked to profile each of the two inmates 18 as individuals, and every bit as important, to profile 19 the two of them working together in a team, looking not 20 only for the buttons we could push for each of them but 21 where there may be opportunities where they might have 22 common goals that would advance our negotiation process 23 or opportunities to drive wedges between them. 24 As is the case with many negotiations, we also 25 called upon and utilized TPIs, third-party 55 1 intermediaries, identifying from the first day family 2 members who could provide us with both intelligence and 3 then perhaps some assistance as a TPI, and then 4 continuing to cull through family members who would be 5 most effective for direct contact. And TPIs provided 6 both taped statements, some of which were played for the 7 inmates, and in other instances, direct contact under the 8 guidance of negotiators through the course of the 9 negotiations. 10 In all instances, the three teams were staffed, 11 as I've mentioned before, with responders from within the 12 Department of Corrections and other agencies. Again, I 13 think one of the things that speaks to this situation and 14 I think touches on some of Mike's observations, because 15 he was one of the agencies who assisted us with the 16 response as well, is that this is a situation that went 17 on for a considerable length of time, and so, to develop 18 command structures and to maintain the coordination that Page 46 brp021104 19 was necessary, not just over a course of minutes or hours 20 but over a period of days so as to achieve the desired 21 outcome. 22 As a brief summary, in the end, on February 1, 23 the situation which started in the kitchen and moved 24 across a yard was contained to the tower, and neither the 25 rest of the unit nor the complex was ever involved in the 56 1 situation. That also speaks, as a pause, to important 2 modifications that we made to our IMS response. Because 3 of the nature of this critical incident and the duration 4 of this critical incident, we ultimately created two 5 command structures at Lewis, one to manage the focus on 6 the tower and the other activity in the Morey unit, but 7 then the rest to manage the prison complex, which could 8 at a moment's notice have become involved as well. And 9 so we can speak more about that when we're at the 10 facility, that additional information will be provided. 11 And clearly, the escape attempt of these two 12 inmates was thwarted. They never left the Morey unit nor 13 left the Lewis compound. There was no loss of life, 14 certainly not of our staff nor of any responders who were 15 prepared to take the tower, if necessary, and who did 16 indeed approach the tower on a number of occasions, for 17 some of the reasons that I've described to you 18 previously. 19 At this point in time, there appear to be no 20 apparent accomplices that are known to us. And just as 21 two other updates, the investigative team -- and I will 22 be introducing them to you shortly, with permission of 23 the co-chairs -- the investigative team, which is made up Page 47 brp021104 24 of law enforcement personnel from the Departments of 25 Correction and Public Safety and operate under the 57 1 direction of the prosecuting attorney, they have provided 2 the prosecuting attorney's office with a preliminary 3 report, and that preliminary report has been discussed, 4 and a request for some additional information has been 5 directed by Mr. Romley's office, and so they will 6 continue to move with full speed to meet the remaining 7 informational needs that Mr. Romley and his staff has put 8 forward. 9 The two inmates, Coy and Wassenaar, are 10 currently still in the state of Arizona. They are being 11 housed in a Bureau of Prisons facility. And that is 12 accomplished as a result of an interagency agreement 13 between the Department and the Bureau of Prisons. 14 I'd like to go forward briefly and talk about 15 managing the aftermath, because it is indeed every bit as 16 important as our management of the 15-day -- 17 MR. WOODS: Can I just ask you, what concessions 18 were made to the officers -- to the prisoners to secure 19 their surrender? 20 MS. SCHRIRO: In the end, none, in my opinion. 21 From early on, we were interested in transferring them 22 from the state. These are two inmates that had intimate 23 knowledge now of the tower and, in our view, could not 24 remain in the state. We could never be certain that they 25 would not have access to any opportunity to provide 58 1 information to any other inmate. And so it was always Page 48 brp021104 2 our intent to move them. So I'm not sure that there were 3 concessions, per se. 4 MR. WOODS: Is that what they wanted, though? 5 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, you know, part of what made 6 this so difficult was trying to elicit from them what it 7 is that they did want. And a lot of the negotiation 8 process was endeavoring to have them articulate what it 9 is that they expected to accomplish by being in the tower 10 and under what circumstances they would walk out of the 11 tower and let our staff go. 12 In the profiling of these inmates, it suggested 13 that Wassenaar was the leader and had prepared much of 14 the plan, to the extent that there was a plan. Wassenaar 15 was not quick in making decisions, and in my assessment, 16 particularly short on ideas, and so part of the 17 difficulty was introducing -- introducing strategies that 18 he would adopt as his own so as to move it forward. 19 Much of the negotiation process was -- was not 20 only working on a pressuring strategy to push him towards 21 making those final decisions that we had established as 22 our goal from the beginning, but the convincing aspect 23 was to have them believe that we were going to do the 24 thing that we would do in the ordinary course of 25 business. 59 1 As Chase and John know, but others may not, it 2 is routine in state correctional agencies to have 3 interstate compact agreements with other correctional 4 systems because at some point in time every correctional 5 system has some small number of inmates, for -- usually 6 for management reasons and infrequently for protective Page 49 brp021104 7 purposes or for compassionate purposes, will move those 8 inmates to some other location. Arizona has interstate 9 corrections compacts with the majority of the other 10 states in the country, and indeed, we have a hundred 11 inmates today who are serving time for crimes committed 12 in Arizona but they are serving their time in other 13 states. Likewise, Arizona has in its custody a hundred 14 inmates from other jurisdictions, including five now, it 15 used to be six, inmates who were transferred to Arizona 16 from Ohio after the Lucasville disturbance. 17 And so that thing which we would do which is in 18 our department's best interest to do still required 19 efforts on our part for them to believe that this in fact 20 was to be accomplished. 21 MR. WOODS: Is there a downside to that? Could 22 you address -- you know, there is a theory in other 23 situations, anyway, that are analogous that you don't 24 negotiate concessions. And I understand what you're 25 saying is this is what you would have done anyway, but 60 1 creating the appearance amongst prisoners that you did 2 negotiate and that you did concede something flies 3 counter to the idea that we will not under any 4 circumstances negotiate with, in this case, prisoners in 5 this situation. Is that -- could you just comment on 6 that, on whether that's a good idea or a bad idea? 7 MS. SCHRIRO: I appreciate the question. I'd be 8 very happy to comment on it. 9 It is our responsibility to preserve life and to 10 protect our staff, and to secure their release from the 11 tower alive was only in this instance to be accomplished Page 50 brp021104 12 by negotiation. And we were unwavering in our commitment 13 to bring them out alive, and indeed, we succeeded in our 14 goal. 15 That these men will be facing significantly -- a 16 significantly long list each of charges and that that 17 time will be served under the most onerous situations, 18 they will clearly be classified as high custody inmates 19 and will be confined under the most restricted situations 20 that any correctional system can impose is the -- is what 21 they have facing them as a result of the additional 22 felony crimes that they have committed. 23 MR. GUENTHER: Director Schriro, before you go 24 to the aftermath, can I just ask a couple of questions 25 about the facility? 61 1 MS. SCHRIRO: Certainly. 2 MR. GUENTHER: Is the blue to the north and the 3 red to the south, in the -- you've got two different 4 sections within the Morey unit, one being blue, one being 5 red. 6 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. 7 MR. GUENTHER: Blue north, red south. 8 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. 9 MR. BRANHAM: A and B I think is the best way to 10 look at that. 11 MR. GUENTHER: And the other is that, did I 12 misunderstand you that there was an officer crossing the 13 yard when Wassenaar was going down the spline that 14 recognized him? 15 MS. SCHRIRO: I don't -- was that in the yard or 16 in the kitchen? Page 51 brp021104 17 MR. McHUGH: To my knowledge, there was not 18 another officer who recognized Wassenaar. 19 MS. SCHRIRO: I thought I -- let me check. I 20 thought I recalled reading that from -- 21 MR. GUENTHER: Because I thought the only IMS 22 that was issued, or at least the first one, was from 23 Correctional Officer Dubon (phonetic) at about 500 hours. 24 MS. SCHRIRO: I read that somewhere, and that's 25 the problem with reading a lot of preliminary reports. 62 1 I'm not sure what was supposition and what is fact, and 2 that's the purpose of the administrative review. 3 MR. BURKE: We will be able to clarify that 4 during the administrative review. It will be provided to 5 us. Is that correct? 6 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes, sir. 7 MR. GUENTHER: And then just one last question. 8 Currently, there are only two gates to the splines, one 9 on each end, one from the A building, one from the B 10 building, and there's no other access to the doors at the 11 base of the tower. 12 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, there are other gates, but 13 they are now secured and only to be utilized in response 14 to an IMS. 15 MR. GUENTHER: So they're locked. 16 MS. SCHRIRO: That's correct. 17 MR. GUENTHER: Thank you. 18 MR. BURKE: Director, I have a few questions on 19 the design. 20 This -- having -- I understand from what you've 21 stated and what Chase and Tom stated, having this tower Page 52 brp021104 22 in the center of the yard is a unique design for a prison 23 setup like this. 24 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. 25 MR. BURKE: Do you know what year the Morey unit 63 1 was built? 2 MS. SCHRIRO: It was the first of the units that 3 was constructed at Lewis. I think it's been open about 4 five years. I don't know if someone recalls. 5 Mike, if you know. 6 MR. SMARIK: I think it was '97. '97, '98. 7 MR. BURKE: A typical setup, would it be to have 8 more towers on the perimeter as opposed to a tower in the 9 middle? 10 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, in more modern designs, they 11 tried to move away from multiple towers because those are 12 posts that tend to demand a lot of staff time. 13 MR. BURKE: So this was a cost-cutting measure, 14 to stick the tower in the middle? 15 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, perhaps. In some of the 16 facilities that we constructed in Missouri, for example, 17 there would be a building positioned with an observation 18 deck, but it would be considered outside of a secure 19 perimeter. So, I mean, there are different ways to 20 accomplish monitoring of the yard and even the issuance 21 of lethal weapons but not have them available as they're 22 available in this set of circumstances. 23 MR. STICKRATH: I would describe it more as 24 architectural philosophy at the time it was built, more 25 so than cost cutting, per se. Most of the cost cutting 64 Page 53 brp021104 1 comes, as the director indicated, from cutting the 2 perimeter towers that you used to see in many facilities. 3 MR. WOODS: Where would you put -- if you were 4 going to do one tower, though, where could you put it in 5 this design? 6 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, I'm not sure, according to 7 this design, you really could. I mean, you could have -- 8 you could keep the tower where it is but revisit the 9 assumption about deploying weapons to it, and so the 10 response would come from the perimeters either by ground 11 level or by roof. 12 MR. GUENTHER: Are there any other lethal 13 weapons within the perimeter? 14 MS. SCHRIRO: No. Not within the perimeter. 15 MR. BURKE: If the tower were not in the middle 16 and were on the perimeter -- I guess this is asking you 17 how it was set up in other states -- there is less chance 18 of inmate access, I assume, to those particular towers 19 than this setup. 20 MS. SCHRIRO: You know, it really depends on 21 architecturally as well as an inmate management 22 perspective what it is you intend the tower to 23 accomplish. In earlier designs, where towers were 24 constructed around the perimeter, sometimes at the four 25 corners, sometimes at additional points along the way, it 65 1 was as much to monitor contraband movement from the 2 outside in as well as inmate movement withinside of the 3 secure perimeter. So, again, depending on what it is you 4 want the tower to accomplish is where you would place it 5 and how you would equip and staff it. Page 54 brp021104 6 MR. BURKE: Thank you. 7 MR. RIVELAND: Dora, I had a question or two on 8 this also. You said earlier that when you had two 9 officers in the tower, that one would operate the 10 controls and the other one, if the yards were occupied, 11 would have a person on the roof. Do I assume that that 12 person was armed, visibly armed, carrying the AR-15 at 13 that point, on the roof? 14 MS. SCHRIRO: It would be -- it would be readily 15 available to them. I can't -- I don't know that I can -- 16 I'm going to have to ask the warden for you as to whether 17 or not -- the manner in which it was displayed or not. 18 MR. RIVELAND: And the person in control, what 19 other places of egress could they control from that 20 control room? Do we know? Or is that easier to answer 21 out there? 22 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, we can certainly show you 23 when we go to the tower, but you had -- you had control 24 to the gates and the various doors. 25 MR. RIVELAND: On the buildings also? 66 1 MS. SCHRIRO: No. 2 MR. RIVELAND: Just the gates, the internal 3 gates. 4 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. 5 So if where you're going is to what extent does 6 this mirror a control center, it is designed to be 7 different. 8 Now, we did have opportunity from other 9 locations to control a number of things in the tower. 10 For example, we were able to disable phone jacks from the Page 55 brp021104 11 distance. We were able to disable a number of things 12 from other locations. But the reverse is not true. The 13 tower doesn't have the same ability to affect -- 14 MR. BURKE: Did the Huntsville, Texas, incident 15 involve the taking of a tower? 16 MS. SCHRIRO: It involved accessing the tower to 17 obtain weapons that were stored in the tower. But they 18 did not take the tower. 19 MR. BURKE: Was it a similar design to Lewis? 20 MS. SCHRIRO: I don't think so. But, again, 21 similar in its equipment. 22 MR. STICKRATH: I had a question, Director, if I 23 could, back to the security levels. You mentioned at the 24 outset, I think, that there are multiple security 25 levels. Could you just real briefly clarify for me how 67 1 many security levels you have in the Department and which 2 ones you had at the Morey unit? 3 MS. SCHRIRO: Certainly. 4 There are five custody levels in the 5 Department. Level 1 is minimum, level 5 is maximum, 6 level 3 is medium, and then level 2 is low-medium, and 7 level 4 is high-medium. 8 At the -- at the Morey unit, you had a number of 9 different custody levels, 2, 3, and 4. The common 10 denominator is that they were all classified not only by 11 custody level but by additional management requirements 12 as requiring protective segregation. 13 MR. STICKRATH: Thank you. 14 MR. VANDERPOOL: Director, does being buzzed in 15 also require voice identification, like giving a badge Page 56 brp021104 16 number or some identification, like "Jones 123"? 17 MS. SCHRIRO: I don't know at that tower. But 18 I'll get that for you when we get out to that tower. 19 That's going to vary around the Department. 20 I don't know, Mike, if you can answer that now. 21 I don't know that there's an audio -- I don't recall 22 seeing it when I was there. 23 MR. GUENTHER: And the other question would be, 24 you know, "Why do you want in?" I mean, you know, as far 25 as the staff in the tower. You know, "Why do you want in 68 1 my tower?" 2 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, I mean, certainly. And 3 that's the reason that you have the two pass-through 4 windows, so that if materials that are kept in the tower 5 need to be exchanged, there's the opportunity to make 6 that exchange without opening the door. 7 MR. VANDERPOOL: Two follow-ups to that. 8 Do the -- do the officers have stab-resistant 9 vests, and are they -- would they be worn by these 10 officers that were involved in this incident? 11 MS. SCHRIRO: The Department has in its regular 12 issue vests that are resistant to shanks. They are 13 typically issued at certain housing units and certain 14 housing custody levels. For example, if you went to 15 SMU 2, it is required of every officer that protective 16 gear be worn in those situations. That would not be 17 typically required in this particular situation. 18 MR. VANDERPOOL: And then, the officers 19 involved, do they have portables? 20 MS. SCHRIRO: Portable radios. Page 57 brp021104 21 MR. VANDERPOOL: Portable radios. And do they 22 have the alert? 23 MS. SCHRIRO: No. That's one of the things that 24 I mentioned before, that the radios that our department 25 has issued staff do not have a man down button on them, 69 1 nor are they issued a separate man down alarm. 2 MR. WOODS: I missed -- I just missed a little 3 bit of the story. It sounds like a lot of people have 4 examined the details of this already. I have not. 5 The first inmate who had the officer's uniform 6 on gained access, he was buzzed in. 7 MS. SCHRIRO: That's correct. 8 MR. WOODS: What happened next? 9 MS. SCHRIRO: After he made his way to the tower 10 and was permitted access, he overcame one officer first 11 and then the second officer. At that point, he had 12 control of the tower. 13 At the point that Coy, the other inmate, still 14 in the inmate uniform, came across the yard, there were 15 staff who were already in the process of responding. 16 Wassenaar, from the door on the lower level, used one of 17 the weapons and fired into the yard, which made it 18 possible for Coy to reach the tower and enter as well. 19 Okay. If I can just continue, then. I was 20 going to discuss managing the aftermath, which is a 21 matter of great weight and equal importance and a part of 22 which you play a significant role. 23 As Mr. Burke provided in his opening remarks, 24 the critical review has three parts. There is the 25 criminal investigation, and I've described the method by Page 58 brp021104 70 1 which that is proceeding. There's also an administrative 2 review. And the administrative review is an activity 3 that the Department pursues in the ordinary course of 4 business in response to any IMS that is called and 5 activated. 6 In this instance, the administrative review has 7 been substantially expanded in several different ways, 8 and shortly, I'll introduce to you the two gentlemen who 9 are both participating in the criminal investigation as 10 well as the administrative review. 11 The administrative review endeavors to 12 accomplish answers to a number of the questions that the 13 Governor has raised in her charge and that you have all 14 spoken of today. It's to establish the predicates that 15 lead up to the incident in the kitchen, to reconstruct in 16 complete and accurate detail all of the events that 17 occurred in the kitchen, across the yard, and into the 18 tower, as a first step of the inquiry. We're going to 19 then, as Mr. Burke mentioned, then hope to reconstruct 20 the 15 days that the two inmates and the two and then one 21 officer were in the tower. 22 The administrative review in this instance is 23 enhanced by additional subject matter experts who will be 24 working with Mr. Smarik, who I'll introduce to you 25 shortly. Mr. Smarik is the division director in whose 71 1 unit the administrative reviews, the criminal 2 investigations, are conducted. 3 Working with Mr. Smarik is John Phelps, who's Page 59 brp021104 4 the deputy director of the State's Department of Homeland 5 Security, and also our assistant chief, who I think is 6 still on the line, from the Tucson Police Department, and 7 so the three of them will be overseeing the work that is 8 conducted. 9 When I introduce the gentlemen to you, they will 10 provide you with an overview, a template, if you will, of 11 the questions that are ordinarily included in the 12 investigation of an attempted escape, which, amongst many 13 other things, these 15 days were. Clearly, that template 14 is going to be modified so as to incorporate all of the 15 other inquiries that need to be made to provide you with 16 that complete and accurate reconstruction, and so provide 17 you with full and correct information to the questions 18 that you've put forward today. 19 And then finally, the critical incident review 20 is going to involve your work. And as I mentioned as I 21 first addressed you, we are dedicated to meeting all of 22 your informational needs and providing you with access to 23 whatever it is that you require so that you can make your 24 report as excellent as it needs to be. 25 Part of the management of the aftermath as well 72 1 concerns communication, and I'd like to describe just 2 briefly the communication that occurred both during the 3 15-day period of time as well as our efforts for 4 communication since then. 5 During the incident, there were, on my part, 6 e-mail updates that I provided to all of the ADC staff on 7 a daily basis. And I would provide them with these 8 updates at the end of the day, frequently pretty early in Page 60 brp021104 9 the morning, and advise them in general terms as to the 10 status of our efforts and to inform them of welfare 11 checks that were accomplished that day of the staff and 12 to provide other information that could be shared at that 13 point in time. 14 It was also an opportunity for me to present for 15 all of them questions that were bubbling up, indeed, many 16 of the questions that you and the others have asked 17 today, and to provide as complete answers as I could to 18 staff as we went through it. And I think that was a 19 really excellent exercise to have pursued, and it's a 20 process that I'm continuing to -- well, I had done it 21 before with them, but I'm continuing to provide them with 22 periodic updates, so that they knew about the creation of 23 the three-part process, for example, and their 24 opportunity to participate in the four hearings that have 25 been announced. 73 1 Also, during the incident, there were periodic 2 briefings with the legislature. The leadership was 3 contacted when the incident first arose and then 4 briefings were provided periodically to leadership and 5 others that they suggested that we reach out to as well. 6 With the executive, there were briefings that occurred 7 more than once daily so that there was a regular flow of 8 information as well to the executive branch. 9 MR. BRANHAM: May I ask a quick question? 10 Director, just prior to the communications 11 piece, though, was there ever a thought in your mind that 12 this particular incident was a part of anything larger as 13 it related to the prison system itself? Page 61 brp021104 14 MS. SCHRIRO: That is always something that we 15 contemplate, and thank you for asking the question. 16 When any situation kicks off, whether it be a 17 fight in the yard or, in this extreme example, the taking 18 of the tower, we respond to it for what it is, but we 19 also assume that it could mean something else as well. 20 And so, in this particular instance, the command 21 structure that is contemplated in the IMS was 22 particularly useful, because, as I've referenced before, 23 there were not only the two command centers at Lewis, one 24 to manage the incident and the other to manage the rest 25 of the facility, but the agencywide command center, which 74 1 was operated around the clock from central office, and I 2 was its incident commander. And the reason is, we don't 3 know, you know, until an event evolves and indeed as the 4 investigation ensues whether, if this thing is just one 5 of a number of things that are -- were intended to kick 6 off at the same time or that it could trigger a response 7 from the population or, over the course of the days, that 8 there could even be copycat situations. 9 And so, throughout this event, not only were we 10 responsible for coordinating the communication and the 11 activities of the three functions that I was describing 12 to you, but also to have leadership on site in each of 13 the other facilities around the clock, and they provided 14 to us written updates on an hourly basis so that we could 15 ensure that there would be no other situations related to 16 this situation so that, should such a situation arise, we 17 could respond to that quickly. 18 Likewise, as it became clear to us on the Page 62 brp021104 19 Saturday that the first officer was released and the 20 Sunday that the second officer was released, that these 21 events were likely to occur, we were hoping that they 22 were to occur, there was additional coordination with the 23 rest of the facilities so that we could accomplish 24 several things. First, respond instantaneously to any 25 kind of reaction that the inmate population might have in 75 1 response to the news that the first officer and then the 2 second officer were released, but also so that we could 3 continue to sustain our efforts so as to provide the news 4 to our staff first. It's ever been so often the case in 5 prior years that when a situation arise, staff would hear 6 about it from the inmates who were watching the TV while 7 the officers were working their post, and so our efforts 8 to continue to maintain contact and provide reliable 9 information to staff was really important to us. 10 Does that answer your question, Mr. Branham? 11 MR. BRANHAM: Yes, ma'am. Thank you. 12 MR. WOODS: Can I ask you, was the decision- 13 making, did it -- was the executive branch, other than 14 yourself and DOC, were they involved in this 15 decision-making, during the course of the negotiations? 16 MS. SCHRIRO: No. We provided -- 17 MR. WOODS: In other words, was it just briefing 18 them, or were they actually actively involved in making 19 certain decisions? 20 MS. SCHRIRO: I've always performed the duties 21 of director and have never delegated those duties to any 22 other entity. I endeavor to provide timely updates, 23 particularly when critical decisions had already been Page 63 brp021104 24 made, but never hesitated making a decision and then 25 communicating it after the fact. 76 1 MR. WOODS: And that's what happened here. 2 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes, sir. 3 The briefings were also provided to the press, 4 initially on an ongoing basis, and then after several 5 days, there were briefings that were scheduled at 6 established times through the course of the day so that 7 any updates could be provided on a regular and routine 8 basis. But our PIOs, our public information officers, 9 remained on site and were available to the press 10 throughout the event, so if they -- they needed 11 additional information in between a briefing time, staff 12 would be available to them. Here again, because this was 13 an event that went on for such a long number of days, we 14 drew heavily from other state agencies, who provided 15 support, so as to maintain contact with the public 16 through the media. 17 We also deployed a number of our managers not 18 just to the facilities to manage them throughout but to 19 staff the three command centers that I've just described 20 to you. So there were always several wardens that were 21 dispatched to me on an ongoing rotating basis at the 22 agencywide command center. Likewise, there were 23 additional wardens and deputy wardens on site at Lewis. 24 So in addition to seeing a number of the State's PIOs, 25 one of our wardens, Warden Bartos, was also frequently 77 1 speaking to the press. 2 MR. WOODS: What considerations did you have as Page 64 brp021104 3 far as what to release to the press and what not to? You 4 didn't release some, certain information to the press, 5 then or now, and what were those considerations? 6 MS. SCHRIRO: Thank you for asking. 7 Through the -- through the event, our decisions 8 about the information to release were driven by several 9 different kinds of considerations, all directly related, 10 however, to the singular goal of getting our staff out 11 safely. 12 We had information and guidance from profilers 13 that, given their personalities, that giving them 14 attention in the press, for example, releasing their 15 names, might be detrimental, and indeed, could be used 16 as -- for bargaining purposes, for convincing purposes, 17 should that be required at a later date, and indeed, that 18 did come to pass with the interview that was taped before 19 but played after the release of the last officer. 20 In the instances of our staff, they were 21 involved in a situation where they were not only public 22 employees but victims of felony crimes, and their 23 families first on their behalf while they were in the 24 tower and then the officers after their release asked 25 that we not disclose their names, release their pictures, 78 1 or describe in any detail their medical conditions, as 2 they endeavored to begin their recovery from the 3 situation that they had been facing. 4 In other instances, we did not release certain 5 information because we knew that the inmates were 6 monitoring closely the coverage through the radio that 7 they had in the tower and were in other instances quite Page 65 brp021104 8 concerned that if the inmates in the yard had information 9 that they too would have had access to by listening not 10 only to radios but to TVs and the newspapers, that they 11 could encourage or incite the inmates in the towers. 12 So there were a number of moving parts, and so 13 there were a number of reasons why specific kinds of 14 information was withheld during the event. 15 I guess one of the advantages of jailing as many 16 years as I have is I've also lived through my 17 conversations with other directors the situations and the 18 difficulties that they have experienced during their 19 tenure. While I did not come to the field at the time 20 that Attica occurred, many of my coworkers and colleagues 21 in New York City when I worked in New York City 22 Corrections had been directly involved in the situation 23 at Attica. 24 Likewise, I knew Tom and his boss, the 25 secretary, through my -- through my years as director in 79 1 Missouri, and they had provided a number of debriefs to 2 other directors, as I intend to do as part of our 3 aftermath, and remember quite vividly stories that Reggie 4 and Tom had told about information that was provided to 5 the press and the way in which it was characterized in 6 the press and the untoward, unanticipated consequences 7 that it had with the inmates who were holding staff and 8 other inmates hostage at that situation. 9 And so it was a combination of lessons learned 10 from other situations where the outcomes were not as 11 happy as ours has been in concert with all the other 12 factors that I just described to you that went into those Page 66 brp021104 13 decisions. 14 The second part of your question, and it's on my 15 list of aftermath, is the information that is provided at 16 this point in time. We've had 11 requests, which contain 17 174 questions, none of which is a singular question. 18 Most of them, as you would expect, have many parts and 19 subparts. And we have provided as many responses as 20 quickly as is possible. For actual production purposes, 21 because of the cost limitations that the press has asked 22 us to consider, you know, "If it exceeds $100, let us 23 know," we have -- we have produced and distributed 527 24 pages of documents, and we also have made available an 25 additional 12,000-plus pages of documents for review and 80 1 then for duplication as they direct. 2 We are continuing to review and then redact as 3 necessary other documents that are requested so that they 4 can be made available as quickly as possible. We have a 5 significantly large number of staff dedicated 12 hours a 6 day, seven days a week, to complying with the requests 7 that we have received. We also have received the 8 assistance of four Assistant Attorney Generals who are 9 assisting us in this process. 10 The reasons for redactions are several. There 11 are certain State statutes that require redactions 12 concerning personnel records, for example, or medical 13 records, which are also by statute confidential unless 14 waived. 15 And the only other reason that any information 16 is not being released at this point in time is because we 17 have not yet concluded the criminal investigation, and Page 67 brp021104 18 State statute provides, as you know, that where there is 19 an ongoing criminal investigation, if, in our good faith 20 belief, we believe that releasing certain information 21 will jeopardize the accuracy and completeness and the 22 timeliness of that criminal investigation, that we would 23 withhold it until it's completed. 24 The other thing that we're facing is, there are 25 exceptionally good records of this entire event. Great 81 1 efforts were made to document all of the activity. And 2 as a result, there were logs that were maintained from 3 both Lewis and the command center downtown. There are 4 audiotapes, and there are videotapes. And in order to 5 review all of those things to some extent, even with the 6 number of people we have, it takes almost as many days to 7 review and redact them as it took to create them to begin 8 with. And so we will continue to proceed as quickly as 9 we can with only those -- with only those considerations 10 in mind. 11 MR. BURKE: You should probably put together a 12 package, Director, of those public records for the 13 panelists too, so that they also have an opportunity to 14 review the same documents. 15 MS. SCHRIRO: I'd be very glad to, and at some 16 point welcome you to look at the area that we have 17 dedicated in the Department, we've secured it with its 18 own lock, and have required a sign in/sign out procedure, 19 so it's a restricted access area, because it's really 20 essential that we respond quickly, and as you also know, 21 that we clearly have an obligation to preserve any of the 22 evidence that would be required for prosecution purposes. Page 68 brp021104 23 MR. WOODS: Do you have a time frame, do you 24 have any estimate on when you'll be ready to file 25 criminal charges? 82 1 MS. SCHRIRO: Thank you for asking. 2 The conversations that we've had with the 3 prosecuting attorney's office up to and including today 4 lead us to believe that they are pressing hard to bring 5 charges sometime this month. I think there has been some 6 discussion still, I'm not sure that there is resolution 7 as to the method that they're going to pursue, that is, 8 whether or not they're going to schedule preliminary 9 hearings first or go straight to a grand jury, and then, 10 of course, as you know, charging will follow thereafter. 11 One of the reasons that we are retaining the 12 inmates in state is because we want to make them 13 immediately available if they need to be present for a 14 hearing, and if not, to have them available for the 15 charging. 16 Just to summarize some of which has already been 17 said, in the management of the 15 days and in the 18 management of the aftermath and all of the efforts for 19 continuous improvement that will ensue well beyond the 20 conclusion of any of the reports that are prepared and 21 submitted, we see that there are a number of 22 opportunities for improvement. And I'd like to speak to 23 some of those briefly, not only as it relates to 24 opportunities within the agency, but I think some 25 opportunities, with your further deliberation, that may 83 Page 69 brp021104 1 be available between the agencies, and it goes back to 2 some of the remarks that Mike made earlier. 3 We have begun reviewing a number of the policies 4 and procedures that were in effect and remain in effect 5 at the Department to see what revisions are indicated. 6 And we also anticipate that in the feedback that we have 7 invited staff to provide, that we will derive a lot of 8 benefit from their remarks as well. They are, in their 9 own right, experts. They're the folks who actually 10 implement the policies and procedures and post orders, 11 and I think that they will really inform our review of 12 those activities. 13 As we've touched on briefly throughout this 14 conversation, there are a number of opportunities 15 concerning the physical plant, modifications that need to 16 be made or might be made. And those modifications may be 17 things such as adding or expanding equipment. We talked, 18 for example, about there not being cameras at present. I 19 think we -- I'm sorry, I've had so many conversations, 20 I'm not sure what I've said to this group, but cameras 21 are in relatively short supply at the facilities, and so 22 whereas there are cameras in the dining rooms because 23 that is a place where inmates in a congregate setting 24 frequently will kick off a situation where there's an 25 anticipated need to have good documentation for 84 1 investigation purposes, there were not cameras in the 2 kitchen. And so that's -- that is an example at one end 3 of a modification to the physical plant. 4 At the other end, some of the things that we 5 discussed, for example, is even reconfiguring the towers. Page 70 brp021104 6 There are opportunities to revisit the equipment 7 that is issued to officers and the occasions under which 8 that equipment ought to be utilized, and we touched on 9 several of those, again, in our conversation this 10 afternoon, whether it be the circumstances under which 11 certain kinds of protective vests or protective gear is 12 issued and indeed required of staff to wear, as well as 13 the nature by which they communicate with each other, 14 either for routine communications as well as to signal 15 distress. 16 We talked about equipment for achieving 17 verification of either staff and/or inmates, again, so as 18 to ensure that they cannot overcome the identification 19 systems that are currently in place. 20 We've not touched as much on, but one of the 21 things that we're giving careful review to as well are a 22 number of issues concerning staffing. In the Department, 23 they have a level of staffing that has been referred to 24 as D level staffing. D level staffing has been 25 established as the minimum number of posts that must be 85 1 manned on a particular shift on a given day so as to be 2 able to operate the facility. If the facility was to run 3 below D level staffing, that would then trigger 4 management imposing mandatory overtime on the part of an 5 employee so that you maintained at least that level of 6 staffing. 7 MR. BURKE: Director, is that level of staffing 8 a determination that's been made by this department, or 9 is there some sort of accreditation level that the 10 Department is to meet with regards to staffing? Page 71 brp021104 11 MS. SCHRIRO: Well, since this was in place 12 before me, my best response, and I will provide you with 13 a more accurate reply or verification, is that this is a 14 combination of the actual positions that we have been 15 authorized and then deployed to those -- to those points 16 in the facility which have been determined to be 17 absolutely essential to be manned at any point in time. 18 I don't think there's anyone in the Department who would 19 say that on a given day we need more than D level 20 staffing so as to provide the level of services and to 21 manage the population according to the assumptions of 22 movement that are inherent in the physical layout of any 23 of the institutions. 24 MR. BURKE: Is the Department audited by any 25 outside entity? 86 1 MS. SCHRIRO: No, not as it relates to number of 2 posts, no. 3 Several years ago, the Department did request a 4 staffing study be conducted. And that staffing study was 5 the basis for subsequent years' requests for additional 6 positions. Those positions were not funded in full, and 7 I don't believe were funded even in part, but I will -- I 8 will check on that for you. 9 But, again, I think given the ever changing 10 nature of the population, this, like a classification 11 system, is something that needs to be revisited on a 12 periodic basis so that all of your precautions remain 13 current of the actual population that you're managing, 14 not just in terms of its number but by virtue of its 15 nature. Page 72 brp021104 16 MR. RIVELAND: Regarding that, Director Schriro, 17 when was the last time that the Arizona classification 18 system was -- 19 MS. SCHRIRO: It's -- unfortunately, it's a 20 considerable time ago. It was -- as best as I can tell 21 from the records I've reviewed, it was last validated in 22 1986. So it's considerably overdue for revalidation. 23 And it's something that we spoke about very early in my 24 tenure as something that needs attention as it relates to 25 the female population. This is something that needs to 87 1 be done specific to male and female inmates and to ensure 2 that we are correct in our assessments about what would 3 constitute placement at the appropriate custody level. 4 One of the other -- there are three other 5 staffing issues I'd like to just touch on briefly. 6 In the Department, there is some discussion, 7 or -- through the -- for example, through the special 8 session, there was discussion about vacancy rates. And 9 it is always important to monitor the number of vacancies 10 that there are in the Department at any point in time, 11 but the number of vacancies is indicative, I think, of an 12 underlying issue that requires more attention, and that 13 is, it's not just that a vacancy gets filled and gets 14 filled quickly, but then what the impact of a turnover 15 rate has on longevity of the staff and so its seniority. 16 So it's not just having the correct number of officers 17 deployed in a facility at any point in time but having a 18 sufficient number of officers with sufficient breadth of 19 service that they respond to situations and identify 20 situations as one would expect of more tenured people. Page 73 brp021104 21 And so one of the things that really needs to be 22 given consideration is the relatively large number of 23 junior officers, particularly at a place like Lewis. 24 Indeed, that was the rationale for including in the call 25 of the special session that we retain the partial funding 88 1 of recruitment incentives at Lewis in particular so that 2 we not only found but were able to keep the excellent 3 people that we were hiring. 4 Likewise, Departmentwide, and more pronounced at 5 Lewis, is that one of the ramifications of having a 6 relatively large number of less senior people is that not 7 only does that impact your line staff and their ability 8 to respond, but what then is the available pool of line 9 officers for promotion? And so, at Lewis, you're going 10 to see, in comparison to the rest of the Department, that 11 there's a greater number of sergeants, your first-line 12 supervisor, with less seniority than we would want under 13 ordinary circumstances, but this is something that 14 challenges us at every facility. 15 MR. WOODS: Are you saying that this might have 16 come out differently or been prevented somehow if you 17 would have had either more or more experienced staff? 18 MS. SCHRIRO: Not necessarily. What I'm saying 19 is that I've been asked by the Governor to look at not 20 just what contributed to this situation but what could 21 also contribute to another situation so that we take the 22 biggest look and propose the most comprehensive fix. You 23 know, certainly, in my remarks this afternoon, I have 24 described to you a number of things that went well. 25 There was no loss of life. There was no escape from the Page 74 brp021104 89 1 facility. There was no loss of control of a housing unit 2 or a whole unit or an entire facility. So many things 3 were done well by a staff that is relatively junior in 4 their years of experience, but that there is -- that 5 there is a paucity of senior staff I think also has a 6 part to play in this. I'm not sure that I'm ever going 7 to be able to tell you the extent to which -- 8 MR. WOODS: When you say "in this," you mean 9 this incident? 10 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes, sir. 11 MR. WOODS: Can you think of anything? 12 MS. SCHRIRO: Anything, what? 13 MR. WOODS: Anything that might have been 14 improved had you had more staff or more experienced 15 staff. 16 MS. SCHRIRO: There -- again, this is a 17 hypothetical question. Usually they tell us never to 18 answer a hypothetical, but -- possibly. The -- perhaps 19 more senior staff may have detected in the welfare checks 20 that the officers provided that something was amiss, that 21 the movement perhaps of -- 22 MR. WOODS: Is that in the kitchen? 23 MS. SCHRIRO: I'm sorry? 24 MR. WOODS: In the kitchen? 25 MS. SCHRIRO: Yeah. 90 1 I mean, you know, there are nuances throughout 2 this event that sometimes years of experience will cause 3 the little hairs on the back of your neck to go up that 4 would be missed by people with less experience. For Page 75 brp021104 5 example, I mentioned to you early on, walking into a 6 kitchen and observing that, "Well, why don't I see 7 inmates around and I see food out on counters," but, you 8 know, I mean, just -- just, perhaps, seeing some of those 9 cues, as folks like Chase and Tom and I and Mike in 10 juvenile corrections and the sheriff at his jail, when 11 you walk through a yard or a housing unit, by its sound 12 or lack of sound, you can intuit that there are things 13 that perhaps require further review and fairly quickly. 14 We will certainly be looking at staff training. 15 Arizona is distinguished in that its academy participates 16 in the POST process. Clearly, the POST curricula is 17 different for the correction officer than it is for the 18 peace officer, but that the curricula undergoes the same 19 rigorous review by the POST commission is something that 20 really sets Arizona out in a very positive way, but, 21 again, in the aftermath, we'll look hard at the number of 22 hours in the various subject areas and look at the 23 balance of classroom instruction and then the actual 24 practice during the probationary period and beyond. 25 MR. BURKE: That will include staff training, 91 1 Director, for the tower position itself -- 2 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. And they all go to the 3 fundamental, the core practices and the fundamental 4 assumptions associated with managing a local or a state 5 or a federal corrections system, you know, core 6 assumptions such as redundancies and verification and 7 things of that sort. 8 The field training is where one really acquires 9 practice specific to specific posts at a facility. But Page 76 brp021104 10 understanding the underlying principles is one of the 11 primary responsibilities of the preservice and classroom 12 instruction. 13 MR. BURKE: Are staff now taught to be careful 14 about patterns they develop on shifts that would allow 15 inmates to pick up on that? Because you'd mentioned 16 earlier, going back to Wassenaar getting the uniform, 17 whether it's a coincidence or planning, pattern, that he 18 ended up getting the uniform of an individual of the same 19 size seems to me to indicate that he would be picking up 20 on a pattern. 21 MS. SCHRIRO: The staff is impressed from the 22 beginning through the end of the academy and throughout 23 their tenure about the need to be alert at all times. I 24 think one of the challenges that we all face in a 25 correctional system is that most times things run in a 92 1 routine way. And that's one of the special reasons why 2 the simulations is particularly important, so that people 3 get to practice responses to untoward events that 4 typically don't occur in a correctional setting, but when 5 they do occur, can have catastrophic consequences. 6 So the teaching of being alert at all times to 7 your environment and always being professional in your 8 demeanor speaks to the needs to maintain that kind of 9 vigilance and to detect any changes in patterns in inmate 10 conduct as well. 11 MR. COHEN: Mr. Chairman. 12 MR. BURKE: Mr. Cohen. 13 MR. COHEN: I just have a quick question and 14 follow-up to what you just said. Page 77 brp021104 15 Director, is there any indication on how a 16 prisoner in the kitchen was able to have knowledge of 17 your code 20 process? There's documentation I've seen 18 already that they not only knew that it would take place 19 but also knew what to instruct the correctional officers, 20 how to respond. 21 MS. SCHRIRO: That's an excellent question. 22 I mean, again, it's because the nature of our 23 work is such that it's done out in the presence of the 24 inmate population. And it's just, for all of us who 25 listen to TV programs and listen to the various code 93 1 exchanges that law enforcement makes, it's not much 2 different in a correctional setting. We don't do our 3 work in an office with a door shut. We do our work in 4 the yards and the corridors and the housing units in the 5 presence of the inmate population. 6 MR. BURKE: Will you also, Director, with 7 regards to inmates, look at their rotation with regards 8 to their particular duties? 9 MS. SCHRIRO: Yes. That process is already 10 underway. 11 But the last of the staff training issues that 12 we will be giving close review to is in the training that 13 is provided to supervisors, both prepromotional and after 14 they assume their promotional responsibilities, because 15 clearly, the staff in the Department is a team made up of 16 line staff and their supervisors. And our effectiveness 17 is a combination of the efforts of both of those groups. 18 And so if there are areas that require enhancement or 19 improvements, those would be made as well. Page 78 brp021104 20 We've touched previously on classification as an 21 issue that clearly needs to be addressed. It's been a 22 number of years since it has been looked at in a 23 comprehensive manner and validated. And the 24 ramifications of having an accurate classification system 25 are many. It will help us to answer the question, first 94 1 of all, whether or not inmates are correctly classified. 2 For example, Inmates Coy and Wassenaar were both 3 classified at this point in time as level 3. And while 4 that is not necessarily on the face atypical in a 5 correctional system for inmates who come in with serious 6 charges but serve a long period of time with a minimum 7 number of major rule violations, there needs to be 8 additional review about the way in which our 9 classification system is first developed and then how 10 it's utilized. 11 Likewise, the classification system is something 12 that we need to draw upon so that when we make 13 assignments to work, that the work assignments are 14 commensurate with the risks that those inmates present to 15 themselves and to others. 16 You will see when you tour the kitchen tonight 17 that there are a number of security precautions that are 18 built into kitchens. Tool control, which is something 19 we've not spoken about thus far but, again, is 20 fundamental in any correctional system, is ever present 21 in a kitchen as well as other parts of the facility. 22 Where knives are used, they are chained to tables. 23 Wherever it's possible to use a slicer, again, fixed to a 24 table in lieu of a knife, slicers are used. And so Page 79 brp021104 25 there's considerable thought given as to making the 95 1 kitchen as safe a place as it can be, but for all of 2 that, it's still essential that you have inmates who are 3 suitable for placement at any location to be correctly 4 assigned to that specific work assignment. 5 MR. WOODS: Do you think they were suitable, 6 these two? 7 MS. SCHRIRO: Clearly not. 8 I've touched also on the impact of overcrowding 9 and the contribution that it may have had to this 10 particular set of circumstances, and I'd just like to 11 talk that through for a moment so that I can explain what 12 I mean. 13 It is not uncommon for a correctional system to 14 be overcrowded. That is the ordinary course of affairs 15 around the country. But the Arizona Department is very 16 overcrowded, and the ramifications are several. 17 In a perfect world, in which, of course, we do 18 not live, you would operate at something less than 19 100 percent of your capacity. And the reason for that is 20 that you never have equal numbers of levels 1, 2, 3, 4, 21 and 5. And so you need to have some extra space so that 22 you have the right number of spaces for the custody level 23 that the prisoner is -- to which he is assigned. 24 In our system, not only are we operating at 25 greater than 100 percent capacity, but those beds that in 96 1 many systems would be identified as nonrated, that is, 2 available but not included as part of the rated or Page 80 brp021104 3 operational count, are incorporated in our bed count. 4 And so that means, for example, if you're counting your 5 disciplinary beds as rated beds, that means that somebody 6 always has to be bad because there aren't enough beds 7 back in the regular housing units to move an inmate 8 back. That has a direct and negative impact on our 9 ability to respond to and to discipline an inmate when 10 that's necessary, because it means that they sometimes 11 wait to go into a disciplinary bed or are sometimes moved 12 out of a disciplinary bed quicker than was expected. And 13 so overcrowding has a number of ramifications for the 14 day-to-day operation. At this facility, as you will hear 15 in greater detail by the warden, it had some specific 16 impact on overall management at that institution. 17 The other things that affect overcrowding either 18 to the positive or the negative and one of the other 19 areas that I've been charged by the Governor to address 20 in the course of my tenure is the relatively high level 21 of idleness in the Department. When you have a system 22 that is overcrowded and then have a considerable number 23 of inmates in that system that are also idle, the impact 24 of the overcrowding is greater because of the number of 25 hours that the population is piled in on top of one 97 1 another. 2 And so the ultimate combination of overcrowding, 3 as we experience today in the Department, coupled with 4 the current levels of idleness, which are in the process 5 of being addressed but won't be remediated immediately, 6 coupled with the relatively low levels of staffing, some 7 of that staffing being somewhat junior in their tenure, Page 81 brp021104 8 speaks to some of the challenges and indeed some of the 9 opportunities that we face at Lewis in particular and to 10 a certain extent at other complexes in the state. 11 The last of the internal opportunities for 12 improvement, and this will be included in our 13 administrative review and so available for your 14 deliberation as well, is that we will critically 15 evaluate, as will you, the effectiveness of our IMS 16 response system. Clearly, it was a system that was 17 designed for incidents in shorter duration than ours. I 18 think we did a good job of modifying that structure to 19 accommodate a critical event that occurred over a 15-day 20 period of time. But it's an important opportunity that 21 not be lost, so that if there are some additional 22 modifications that should be institutionalized, that we 23 would have this opportunity to do that. 24 MR. STICKRATH: Director, is that system based 25 on any particular model, national model or -- 98 1 MS. SCHRIRO: Yeah, I mean, this is pretty 2 standard stuff, and we'll provide you with the -- 3 MR. STICKRATH: I didn't know if you used a 4 particular model or a consultant had come in and worked 5 with you on that or -- 6 MS. SCHRIRO: I don't know the actual origin of 7 it, but it's been in place for a number of years and has 8 served us well. And I think the modifications that we 9 made to achieve the consistency that was required over 10 the 15 days served us quite well also. 11 There are also some opportunities for us all to 12 review the interagency response. In this state, I was -- Page 82 brp021104 13 I was very impressed when I came and saw the kind of 14 coordination and indeed the collegial relationship that 15 exists amongst all of law enforcement, the kinds of 16 annual meetings that occur, the number of committees, 17 commissions, including POST, that are all approached as 18 an interagency effort, the resources that Mike's 19 commission provides to all of us in the law enforcement 20 and corrections community. So, unlike many other 21 jurisdictions, this state was very well positioned, we 22 knew each other well, not in terms of who our 23 organizations were but who we are as individuals. 24 Where this department -- where this state seems 25 to really excel in also convening its resources for the 99 1 purpose of practicing any number of tactical maneuvers, 2 and indeed those go on on an ongoing basis and I think 3 speak to th |