GOVERNi1ENT OF AtUZONA
REORGANIZATICN OF TrIS EXE1JCT: rVl~ BRANCH OF THS
( ) ciarl) · "' I' lOo'- 7 v '-' , •._,,/ (
:' lfllS OOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY N UMB E R
\. OF THE III DEPARTMENT OF
i" UBRARYAtiDARCHtVES RECEIVEDIUtl 8
' I _ ARIZO. NA _ . J I~ 1970
Introduction: The Changing Roles of State Government
When Governor George W. P. Hunt led an informal parade from the
Phoenix tele graph office to the s ta. te capi tol a.( ter receiving
confjr, na t iOD from \' lashing ton of Ari zona's s ta tehood, " he could
hardly hava anticipated what the government of Arizona would
be like in the year 1968. Even today, few citizens of Arizona,
. even with the benefit of hindsight, are fully aware of the almost
total transformation in the social, ecoriomic, and political roles
of the state government.
Comparing the government of Arizona in 1912 with that of 1967
is like comparing the conte~ porary governments of lichtenstein
and thE~ Uni ted States, in the sense that v, le are a t tempting to
compare an almost quaintly simple governMental organization with
a massive and hi ghly convold. tecl po Ii ti cal and admi. ni s tr a tive
stru. cture.
The best iJlustration we can give of the transformation of
Ari. zona government is the fact that in 1968, the government cif
Ari~ ona will spend more money than was spent by all forty- eight
1
state SOVern'Tl3nts in J913, 0: 11' first full year of statehood.
Indeed, Arizona's current budget is well over half that spent by
the gCVf: lrnm'.: mt of the United States in 1913. Lest these cOf: lparisoLs
be L< sed to argu, e that Arizona has been g: dlty of u. nequaled
profJigacj in the spending of public monies, we must add that
the stuggering increase in state government spending is very much
a nati, Dna] phenomenon, a: 1d, comrar: Lsons simi 1a::- to the one jdst
mentioned co~ ld be made for al~ ost any state.
t · r [ 1'-- 1 · (:; -:- L · ~- · · · ~._,] · · · · f · o · · · :::- t · :/' · . e . J' c' ' n ok ~ f"' n .... ., n '"' Y 0 t' t t ] 0 I~ :- 3r7 0 n l' ' 1 1 ]' 0 n . l , I .. .), Q ... 1 . ~ •.• ". <:' 0 , I. '" c'. L -:.. J . J jJ.~ ... 1. 0 t8 u' U,.., , ••
( SOUCC' 3: B':~ QLgafli. ziDl~_ l- i! o~~ tg._ QQ · ~ LlLr:~ G1Q. r. Lt: t ChiCcJ~: o: Co'mcl1 of
StaL; GOV2I'Dnents, 1950 '], J1.1.) In 19- 06, Ar'izona state 8xpc~ n · ·
dituI'cS reached .~~ 353,21Lt~ 69(), a~ ld ',' 1' 111 c. lea::' l./ s! u'pass tho tot. al
19J · 3 c~ ",...., l'n 19 · 0"' 7 _. ' , . l.. !: "_{ .. ,,,-, ( •
2
T'o give just one more example, our neighboring state of
California is now spending more every year than was raised by
t axa t . · 10G. hI... y t'n2 f edera. 1. governmen t 0_ f t. r18U · : n. t · , ee,. UCt'Ja t e s d,. urJ. ng t1. d- e
1J
palmy days of the New Deal, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt
w~ s being accused of merciless and unjustified assaults on the
taxpayer's pocketbook.
State governrrlsnt in Arizona has today responsibUities and
programs that could not even have been conceived of in 1912 or
1913. In that day, the few young men who aspired to beco~ e
physicians expected and ~ ot their clinica] training by helping
to deliver a fe0 babies and possibly by helping to treat an
occasional gunshot wound. Today, the state of Arizona must spend
five million dollars to erect one building to provide clinical
training for the stu. dents of the nmv medica}. college of the TJnlversi ty
of Arizona. Teo, in that more innocent age, it made sense for the
fjr- st leg. islature to estabJish a three member Tax CO' 11: Ttission,
equip it with a total staff of one secretary, one clerk, and
' s;), ch oth:"~ r persons!! as could be hired for not more than a toted of
$ 3,000 per annu8, and then expect the Commission to carry out its
legislative manc1at2 to exercise flgnneral sl) per\-':~ sion of th(~ s:' l. ste~ 1
of taxation ... to tho end that all assessments of property of
every class, kInd and character .. be made relatively just and ~ niform,
and a~ J i. ts fuJI cash va1 '] 8 ... so that eqt1ality of taxation shall b~~
seCLlred according to the
1
provisJ. ons of .1 a'fT. fI The achiev8~ ent of
tax el1uj ty is a sc: ncvrhat : 1101' e cocnplicated ( and n~] cf'. f; lore e{ pensiv':'~)
l~; e~; sion La'; is, Fiest Lectslature.
3
today, as the recent struggles for tax Teform in Arizona indic& te.
A good recent summary statement of the present role of state
governments is fo~ md in the report of the C9mmitte- e for Economic
Many vital matters are within state jurisdiction. States
have broad regulatory powers over persons and property.
They cha- rter corporations, control the terms of business
contracts, License trades and professions, grant la!' id t.! t12 s,
protect private and civ. il rights, reg111ate utilities, and set
the legal framowork of family organization through marriage,
divorce, support, and adoption legislation .•.. ln the daily
c'"'> xt; r. , rcl's::> t.. a. t,'. Ltllh~ e"" i.~ L s" 1e · C · ~ lpj- n. J,. br a ,- L+-; n, o.,,_ · ~. Jl.-- L. y.. , ~~ t~ at+ e~, 8' 10; "..... 0 · C'"' a1" L cU.> O. '" l'r,:;', 1""". n-ments
manage the bulk of civil gov2~ nment operations in the
United States. Universal p:. lblic:; J'lcation is mandated,
re gu. 1 a ted, and ] ar gely financed by them. Hi gh\~ r ed'J. c a ti on
is also he3. vi 1y state support. ed. High.'! ays are constructed
mostly by the states. Vast ho~ pitals and institutional
networks, including those for mental health and corrections,
are under state management. The administration of criminal
justice depends primarily on state courts and in increasing
measure on state poJice. About half the states manage
p u b, lic i,{ elfare progra~ s direct ly, the other half thro.. lgh
th~ ir local units. These and other functions illustrate th3
importance of c? mpetent, imaginative, and vigorous state
adm. inistration.
It mU. st be on,; of the [ lost curious facts aoo: lt A' 1l0rj. cEl! 1
gov3rnrnEmt that despi te the oV3r1, · ' helmingavie. 1c; nce of the graat and
increasing importa~ ce 9f state government in the lives of our
ciUzens, there . is a pCHerful mjth to the effect triat s+~~) te gov2rn-ment
is really not very important anymore, that the decisions
that count are a12 taken in Washington, and that we can safely
.'; x ac c: r bel. ted
in a state like ArlzonB by the_ fact that a high percentage of our
.1 n the state a, nd kt10W next. to
nothj,'!~ E aboLlt the go!! ern~ 1ental pr() ble~ s of t~ e sta, te.
1± Yl£ lr.!{ z, L~ J.; T~-:;' t.:"-':'.£:~- C(;~ f'- r.:.:;:::-; l~; l '". ( r : 81,"!.. 0 [' L : C() : 11 n j t t, ~ i,' f c; ?' Ec ) n() r") i c
D~ vclop~ 8nt, 1967), p. 12.
Gur difficulties are further complicated by the fact that
these h'J. ndreds of thousands of TIm · ! residents ay'e them. selv9s
pa: rt atc> t'ne problem of Arizona
have had to expand
state
tn8. l. r
government~ . All state
taxing ami spending programs
very rapidly in recer: t yr:? ars, bu t the gro" vrth in ]\. r i zona has been
explosj, je. governmental responsibilities that
in other states took haJf a century or longer have been com-pressed
into less than a decade in Arizona.
If the ad~: linistrativ2 str) ct~ re of American state Eovernrrlect
., ,. .. , l' b a~ reaay oeco8lng 08soLescen~ y the year 1900, as S'Jgges tSQ
and has gotten progresslveLy more so since
that tiT: e~ it wonId be
f b ~ o ~ SOlescence I. n. l; tS
surprising if Arizona did not have a probles
state administrative ~ tructure.
Governmental rleorganization: VInat is
State administrative organization tended to grew in a plan-less
and 1_ lt1c() ordtnat. ed " ray. Legislatures \ Ofo:" lld from t. ime to time
set lp a n2~ agency, bureau, office or department in order to
meet some new or changin; problem of state government. The
relationship of the new administrative unit to older operations
c() ( 13 .. l : 1.. ..-; r' EL t, · 1 () n • On other occasions, legislatures which W2P 8
hostile to a Governor for one reason or the other would de] jb~ rat9] Y
in slch a way that the
5
But whether the action was by oversights or design, the effect
was that in time the executive branch of many state governments
became a tangled mass of overlapping, uncoordinated, uncontrolled
and uncontrollable units~ The cost to the state in the waste of
tax funds and in the loss of efficiency was difficult to calculate,
but was obviously serious.
Over fifty years ago, the first major attempt by a state to
put its administrative house in order took place in Illinois,
which adopted a comprehensive reorganization plan in 1917. 1
Thf~ effort to secure better state administrative organizati. on
assumed the characteristics of a national movement, with simllar
goals and similar techniques used throughout the c01lntry. The
basic approach owed much toa parallel attempt to secure adminis-tratlve
reorganization of the administration of the national
government. In 1911, Fresident Taft appointed a Commission on
Economy and Efficiency to survey the operations of the executive
braner: and reco[: lmend changes. By the ti me the Uni ted Sta tes
entered World War I, 1. n 1~.. 9.' L7, some fifteen statps had ":...~. , r: n. l · ..''- .' 1.... c~.. +\,., · ,.. 0..... · - u1
the L2' d,~ Y" aJ govern~: lent bJ setting up reorganizati. on commissions or
2
~.: 1 ~-~:.~ i. l.!~~,~~_,!. ....__._~__~__." ~_ w_ w,_ .._,.._~
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Reorganization: A Mixed Record
,
On the basis of the experienc~ pf ot~ er sta~ 8s, how could
,
Arizona go a1c. ut achieving executive reorganization? '. There havr:,;
~;
been more failures than successes in the long history of
reorganization efforts •.. Arizona itself has seen the failure of
any canst. I. LLJ. U0nal. system to provide for reorganizati. on, other than
the normal channels of constitutional and statntory change
appliea. bIe to all conceivable aspects of staL~ governrri? nt. The
question which must be considered by the legislature a~ the
poop1 e of the $ te is vi[" 8 the r or no t the s to. t e needs a neVI and
. perman ent sy s te~ n ' Ililereby the Governor, as chief exeCll ti ' Ie, Cart
take the initiative and accept the primary responsibility for the
efficient organization of the state adMinistratio~.
T t .
. J." J. S that question \\' hich shoJ) 1d be ansi · rared fjrst, D2.1 the
SUbsidiary question of precisely what admiristrative changes shouJd
b, q rraclJ:;. If' a reorgan5 za. tion system and a reorganization p. l2.: 1
.~...". ", P"-~ . tr.' I'' D--'~ c- ;..;..:~,'..,... t.. p- Q' f. c) r . rr;-"' " l~ lt).: l-_ i. C ,,- 1lp_'. O~-- lt'-"-"-' si,.:.... T, •;. '' l.. lt'-' J~".!". '... F.. ' O" I.~~'~, l': r it · ; 8 ~.!."' lr)~ t •• ~, -,-. J •.. l... ........_ .~_ "'"
inevi. ta. ble that the details of the proposc; d plar:. ~ tliJl Get ! nost
of the attention. The proposed system will stand or fall, not
on its O"'!; l r. 1dr. l. Ls b: J. t. on thC1' 3e of the initicJ. 1 reorganizati. on
plari.
incidentally, exp2nsivc and time · - ·
consTni ng) appI'oac~ l Y10uld be to propo~~,; a compr,:.' hensive and detal led
7
organization plan without any provision for the method of
~ ffectuating the plan. To do this would- be to recapitulate
.
the unfor tuna te experience Ari zona had l, oJ1 th the Gr iffenhagen
report. This is not to denigrate the Griffenhagenreport. It was
a competent and professional piece of work, and should the state
Eovernment today c02mission a similar reorganization study by an
outside consulting firm or team of experts it is very likely that
its report would resemble the Griffenhagen report rather closely.
The conclusions and specific recommendations of the Griffenhag~ n
report emerge quite clearly fro~ the body of administrative doc-trine
that has been developed over the years by p~ blic a1~ inistration
and ma~ age~ ent experts. But no two states are alike, and admin-istrative
reorganization does not take place in a political vac~ u~.
The Dristlne recomm' 2ndations of the eZDi3rts rrust " os modified at: d ~ , . .
perhaps compro~ ised to fit the political and historical
of a given state government.
Perhaps the central question involved in the reorganizqtion
can tr'ov,::. r sy is whe thsr the Governor should ha'ie the power to
initia~ e adGi~ istrative reorganizations which will take effect
unless vetoed by the legislature.
Thi s Pr' i nc iple :: seer tainly no thin g rww. I t has long been
has bean incorporated
into the ne'N' 8st state constit'JtLons. If the Gov::; rDor is to be L:= Jd
aCCOJn table as thi~ chic f e .{ eC~, l ti v 2 he sho IJd have fr. e oPPoY'tdrd ty
the aJlocation of functions as he rna;
It is cer tain tnat no conc(: i,' v'abJ c:
administrative oC'Eanizatiorl C2. D be pc! rmanently effective.
8
solesence is inevitable, and it has not been well handled in
ur state governrnents. The alternative to G1lbernatorial authority
is to expect the legislature to deal 1, d. th administrative organtzation.
This has never worked, and there is no reason to believe it will
start to do so noVl. If the ordinary processes of legislation ' dere
suitable to keep state ad~ inistrative organization up to date, state
goverm!'} en t
oper'ation.
wo~ ld not today be so widely criticized .. t:" . • . +' +"' ~. +--
1 or lne.:. 1. . l. Clen v
Assuming that some form of executive initiation is d~ sired,
what should be the scope of it? T'oe m. In. l mum anS'- 1' 2r to this q, L? S tior!
is to provide by statute for a procedure whereby the 8overnor ~ ith
or 1tlithou. t the advice and assistance of a sp2cial board or commissior:,
ca~ place reorganization plans before the legislature, which then
must accept the proposed reorganization before it can go into
' effec t.
This approach has been attempted by several states with very
poor success. South Carolina adopted a plan in 1948 whereby a
State Reorganization Commission of ten legislators and three mem-bel'S
appointed by tne Governor could submit reorganization plans
to the legislature through the Governor. The role of the Governor
in thi s pla: 1 ', vas particularly ' ileaL: sirlC':~ he could only reCQ11: Yi2nd
reorganization plans to the Co~ missjon which mayor may Dot accept
the: n and on the other hand the 80vernor ' 1' 135 recluirc,; d to S · ; br. li t to
the. legis] at~ re all plans approved by the Commission. Any pla~ s
sl. o: nitted to the legislature had to be approved. ' oj joint resol'ltion
o t' ' 00 t ' n .... V), · ~ · . C' __~.__._~~~.:'~_". L:.:..-:~_.:::.:..-: co~_. _ 0 lt_:' _~.:+.-. r:- J."."~__. lJ.. e,,[ f) eJ''.;.. . c.: o; J1.1- ca- t... · t, t,_~. ~'-"'" • 1
9
In 1952, nine proposals \- Jere submI tted by the Sou th Carolina
Co: nmiss ior:. ; f.\.. reS..-)):'' tl · , e lo~ ao" l. S~ lo~. ti,.'~ v · 0~ dom.'..;-'. n.. s.~ U · v'. l on of't' => CO,.,.,~ i ci,' . l. ! 1~ .. ,,,. u.~ S ....... " ln,
six of the nine were rejected. One of the - remaining three was put
into operati. on by ordinary statute, circa in onIy bro cases did thi'J
1 J '
S1 ~ t- " y>.~ arl o' . e g. _ a V'.. l,.. L c: C '.... 4. :' n-' ' Lthe
rewlired conC~ lrl'en t re sol!) tion all thor: i zins an
e X" tC.. 1,.".. '',-, l,- t\"-..~ l..- VC~' c..\. r",. l.... · '"-::-. i~ +~.. 0 . p-" _ f. f. J..' ect"',.... La" Le + I- f' 1,- 0- lD.... p.. \" r) pO.::" J a. 1..... c..:..... This rather dismal
eXperl. enr; e S~ 38mS t, 0 ' nave killed the system for all practical purposes.
No further proposals were submitted.'
In Pennsylvania, the legIslature adopted a SlmJlarly weak
plan in 1955. The Governor was at least given authority to make
propos8_' 1 S Q" " lreCL. 1Y to the legislature, but very serious limitations
Here imposed on 1, rhat he could recommend. He co'~ ld propose reorganiza' · -
tion only of bureaus and agencies be. lm,! the ~ evel of ! lexec: l tive or
and ttlree designated departmet1ts were
ex. empted altogethc~ r as Here independent administrative boards
and COrmEJSS10DS. S~ lbject to these rather debilitating gro'mc1 r: l. les,
the Governor could propose reorganization measures to the legislat~ re.
daiS, th8 pr'oposa} s v! oqld be defeated. In the first year of op::: r-th.
ree d, 2ft:~ at~ 3d. Sine -'.) then,
the JegislatLlre has indi, cated l. ts prefer~ nce for ordinary legjs-'
lative proced~ re ir considering reorganization, and the 1955 system
In 1960 Kentucky adopted a system which sae~ s to have the
1_ I_ b~-': lQ. liP .20-- 21
leEisl~ lt: i. ve proc8dtlre. Cel-- ta 1., n EigarlC~ l
10
department heads are authorized to suggest reorganizations to
the Governor, through the Commissioner of Finance. The 1960
legi slation vlas te; r'tporary, arld did no t prodace a..,.' 1. y propo sals.
The sys tem \-, as nade permanent in 1962. No proposals \-, ere approved
un + vI' 11.°/" 0.0/ ,
enact. men t>. 1
when six relatively ~ inor ones teceived statutory
The essentially 1egJslaUve character of the Kentucky
system was accentuated in 1964 when the legislature established a
Commission on Economy and Efficiency presumably to generate
further proposals.
nor moribund, but
rather sparse.
2 The Kentucky system is neither extinct
results in seven years of operation were
In 1960, Georgia adopted a permanent system under )..,' ,
\ 01.1.1 C n the
Governor is to S~ lbmi t reor gani zaU on propo sals ....' hich b(; ccJ" 1e 1 a~!!
unless disapprov8d by concurrent resol'ltion of the legislature, but
. this applies only to relatively minor changes transferring state
ins ti. tu ti. cns fro:; 1 one c1s'pa~ tmen t or ar; ency to ana ther. In a: v
case, no such p~ ans were prop6sed through 1966. 3 But in 1963,
the legjslature adopted a te~ po~ ary system under which a Governorls
COITl; niss5.. on for EfficiencJ and 2concmy "' las established to reco'n'i:::: nd
reoq; an I z, a t 50: 1 pI ans ' tlh5 ch Hould then be ac10p ted bJ re so 1u tioD i. n
1' h lS, a l! oD-~~ · - shotl! legislative plan esserd~ i. ally I- t; pls. ced a iTlorH)' J.! Fl
and so far :_ it11.1sed sjstem of execut, ive proposal..
Experience in. tlles~; fo~ n- states seems to i. ndicate that r; larjs
reqJ. i, · jng norrnal stRf; JtorY · .: mactment 0 0 something close to i. t add
11
After all, any legislat~ re can at any time adopt a statute
embodying some sort of administrative reorganization. Plans
Which simply generate propos:: J. Is vrh. ich can 1: Ie placed in th e legis-
;:',,<
lative hopper are of little help. There is not and never has been
any lack of ideas abo:.. lt reorganization. The problem is how to get
them into action.
Reversing Executive and Legislative Roles by Statute
If the limited time aV:: J. ilable to state legislators plus
the normal effects of inertia tend to prevent timely affirmativ0
actiop on reorganization proposals, the obvious alternative is to
allow gubernatorial propasals to stand unless vetoed by the legis-
& J& 2
la ture. Thi, s is the basic approach to a, dmi. nist" rative . ., reorgao"!.. zat} on
that. has b8en descr'ibed as an " attempt to put inerti. B and : Lnd'jcision
on the s: ide of change." 1
The two major proble~ s associated with this approach are whether
such a system should have a statutory or constitutional basis,
/
and wha f should be the nat~ re of the legislative vato. Di5-
agressgnt and doubt about ' these questions has greatly retarded tne
adoption of s~ ch systems.
to ') 5e statutory a)" thori ty '. o. JCiS '.. mquestio.' 1ably
influenced by the experience of the federal government. As far
President ! ioover ~;' as given temporary reorgar1izaticlD
3J. L.{:. orjtj i. n an apPl'opda. tions , Ol". · . L1_, a: ld
12
rrlittle Hoover Commi. ss1 ons ! l in various states. In fact, by the
end of 1- 95.1, no less than thirty-- three s ta tes and t\> lO terri tOl'ies had
spa1fmed such comm5. ssions.
-:>-
Another factor favoring statutory rather than constitutional
au thori t;;. r I, ras the reluctance of leg. is} ators to be bound by a con · ·
stitutional amendment. A statute can always be repealed. Again,
the statutory route was appealing to those legislatures contemplating
a temporary grant of au thori ty to the Gov8lmr. _ fi''~; nCl~. ll y, i_. t, · 1. S, of
co~ rse, easier to enact a statute than to amend a constitution.
Unfortu. na tely for the s ta tu tory appro ach, its use at the s ta tiC;
level presents questions of constitutional 1m" not raised by
federal reorganization statilU~ s~ The United States constit11tion
un6quivocally vests the executive power in the President,
and the Pres L'!€: rl t ' s cabine t dO; 3 s not enj oJ con. s +:. i t,' J tional s ta t~ lS.
Obviousl/, the same situation does not prevail where the state
cor: stit~ lti. on creates a pl.' J. ral ex: ecutJve, ' tiith po\ tIer distrlbu. to:: J
among a ~ ong lis t of elected dapa:!' tment heads. To be sure, ana ther
constitutional question, that of delegation of legislative
a'). thority, has been ra. 1.. secl at the federal level as an objection to
th2~ r t. heMselves have enact, ed int. o l~~ r.
The statutor'./ plan adopted by ;- LichlgEin in 195" 8 si!. ffer,,: d
13
latter fate. Governors Willia~ s and Swainson s~ b~ itted a n~ mber
of proposals to the legislature, most of which were substantively
unobjectionable to the lm. rmakers, but " ritn one Jhinor e>: ception,
the legislators decided to veto the proposals and then enact the~
procedu. re, on the groJ. nd s of the dO'J. btfal
constitutionality of the procedure providad in the reorganization
statute. The legislative veto allowed was that either house could
veto the Governor's proposals by resolution within sixty legislative
days after submission. There was no court test of the constitutional
questions raised in ~[ ichigan. In Nevl HaTlpshire, however, a stat-utory
sys tern for g~-<. bernator. i a1 ini tia ti ve and 1e g: s1aU VB va to did GO- t,;
to g- rief i. rl the state co:~ rts. Gubernatorial proposals cO'lld be vetoad
by- the 191. t9 reorganization StCitUt" 3. H().... lever, the state supr'eme cour+-,
held the procedure unconstitutional in an advisory opinion. 1
In general, the statutory plans e~ bodying gubernatorial initiative
and legislative veto have not had a rnoreimpI'ess5. v8 record of suc-cess
than the statutory plans fequiring normal legislative enactment .
.' l. s Profe S S( JI' Eley poin ts ou t, " i t may be ques tioned \ o.! he ther in a maj- ·
ori tf of the states 1tlhich have had the stat'ltory plan, the ca~ tse oC
e~ ecutjve reorganization has been helped or hindered .•.. it appears
thC1 t s ta te s · ,., i trw'] t the p} an h ave done as ' lI: el1 as these' th(~ t helVe
2
it. II
Exec!.;. ti ' Ie nco:-' g~~ ni za Lion bJ Cons t, i tJ tional Au thor i ty
c i te:' l
14
Governor to issue executive ordarsto
••.• make from time to time su. ch changes in the administrative
structure or in the assignment of functions as may,
in his jadgment, be necessary for efficient c... dmirdst:, aUon.
Such changes srwJ 1 be set for th in execu ti ve orders vrhich
shall beco~ e effective at the close of the next quarterly
session of the legislature unless specifically modified
or d l · sappI'OVeo'. by a" 1 1' e30.11.1. t," Ion conc~. trre, Q I' n by a ma" JotrlY
of all the members.
This reorganizatIon system was accompanied by other provisions
which made the Governor the only elected executive officer, and
limited the number of executive departments to twenty, the ~ ead
of each to be appointed by tne Governor.
When Alaska wrote its first state constitution in 1956, it
adopted subs tan tielly the reor gani zation provisions of the .21Q1£.; 1.
modification of the Governor's proposals-- they would presumably be
HO\> lever, the legislaLu'e in the
any proposal by the GQvernor ~ nd then enact it by statute with s~ ch
amendsents as it ~ ight choose.
Alaska had the great advantage of not having to consider the
vested int~ 3I'ests wtlich might exist in an old constiti~ tticrl and
i, r1 t. rlC; i,( lst, i. t~ lt, i() rlal ( irrEt~! Ge';""~ 2t1ts ,/ Jr1J. C( l . it · · '". lQ, J.. ld ha\ T~ cC) l1ta.. i~ 11,:~, j.
~, t C?_ t:. c" L_~,(~~,.~~. f~ dQJ~_ R~~. Q.~ iS, t j t,} t. i. cflal p J_ an, }. S ~ erhap s r:~ OT'e s i. gr~ i. f IC(~ 11 t
J.:,.. r... · ), · :;,:::\ l ~ · ~ t · :_ l C'~ nr~~ t-' r"_ i(' n r:,[ l- ifth r~ l-{ t~"'''\ l'l~ l'Cl't P ~ 10r" l.."'. · ( 1 T.-.; r;(")¥ j ....\ · l
~, t"~- f~ 7~~~~. · ~~ T"~~:":"-~~\.~ ~.,~ ~'~:_- ;, ,;~~"~~'~:-~~ ,,~- .; ;-, '~"- 1-'~ _ l -~_ U 4 ~ ~.. • .... :;~! . j. .~ J. _ - \. • , _," ,~'~' 4 ~_: ./ '~~ ~ • - ",~~" ~~ •. ": l ~
L. C-'} HAC- L::: C'(,_ « CC . L9) I.-) , ~ · l). 9-. LV ..! I. fl. : JO c'}: • . it sn~)~. J.. U ~,', :,\.),_,.:,,]. th, t
the > lo::. 1. r:~ l Sta,:'. J~~ CorlstJt:,) tl\') n at tJ1at tI: r:, e cc.."") rlt;?~ plat. ed a ' tr1- LC.' 8Y~~ r2.1
l(~ LjSJ. c · ,., t.,\, lr · E::, ~" J~ iC( l aCC() U~ lts fc) r tl1c: 12. rlZ; J': i6Grt:: ferei~ 1_ g to a, " l:~ 10. j-'
clrlt~ r 0(" :- lJJ the r:~,~.~ · b(~ · -~ rs'l. ' Th~ ~) ixt'h ~~ cliti, o: l. C() rlt8. t! iS ci ! fb. Lc~ i.": 1;':) T · c .. : J_
a] ternCJ. t.. I,~ lf: f' '" Jh'~ C~~ 1 spt~ c. i, fi8S [ 1 , r"": 12, jo~{> j tJ~\! 01---- E:.. ll. thrj ~~~! e: nb~.:: r · . s cli' ~:~<~ C1- 1
~;,~ ; t~) 3 1,! : .. , 1 .~ i~~ L~~,~~ I~}, ~ - s" C;~~'~~, .. L. t:- Hcl9.-;; (' ~ Six ~: 1 '\ ~~\ i t ion) ( ;; eItT Y() ;' k; : 0,7 i O~ · c; 1
• I ~. l " C 1 ,' d. l -'- ,_; .. \ C. ,~,_ 1 .1 / ::) ) ), t... (_, . j ,_ c. "). , J ...}! •
~: t " I 0"'" '. r:' . r. n :',"" ;.. ~ ,.. I t · ~ " ' 1 -. -\;-. _ . .-.. ... 1. d.. J~ .. , t '-' 0 ....) 1.1 <, .. (". 1O£', H. c,. _ T .]. ' J~ , 0c~ · c-']. I,....•." • r:::, c!.
15
state to adopt. a constitutional plan, is perhaps r: 1ore significant
fro; Q the poin t of vie"" T of Arizona. As Vie have seen, Hichigan had
had the experience of a statutory plan which was not notably effec-tive.
T:: le delegates to the const. itutional · co. nvention of 1961- 62
wanted to establish a system that would avoid the problems that had
caused the 1958 s ta t'. J. tory plan to founder. B'J. t the conven ti.()' 1 1-:& S
sharply divided on the elimination of elective state offices, and
in the end ha: i to compro:! lise on retaining as eJected officers the
Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and a Lieutenant
Governor ( a1 thouZh the 1atter \' las required to run in tande: n 1,: 1 th
the Governor). r! oreover, the convention, \ · , rhich was do:- nir. a ted by
Republicans, had some doubts about turning over to the Governor,
~...~ rho ' rl:-:~:. d be_ er-_ l a De_."~'.. I~) C_'. Y', at~ E.'• vc_: r. "., i... r~ tC_' e .,, 9-)..,< 8 , cc\• m''' ln-'. 11. o'-' te a'. Jl.. , tJ. h_ ol-''-.:~.. t'v" t.. o
reorganize the ex~ c~ tj_ ve branch.
The compro~ ise effected here was to provide for a reorganiza-tion
into not more than twenty depart~ ents, with the • .... · 1
Inll~ l a_
reorganization to be accoMp~ i~ hed by the legislature within two
years of the effective date of the new constitution. Should the
legislature fajl tp act Hithin the prescribed period, the I! Scr~ ed'Jl,::;
and Tempora.~ · y Provjsicns!! of the nSi; 1 ccns ti t~ J. tion provided that the
authority to conduct the initial allocation of functions would
devolve upon the Governor. 1 In any case, once the initial
~ llo(~~ L' · ~() n ~ la~ b~~ r: ~~~~ 4 .. '[]~
C1. .. 1 . ,:< ~' ... L. '-' "-. tj, " I chl':" C · ! : • Governor would have the power to ~ ake
eXi: Jc" tiv o or- de:::> r S" bl(:> C~ to ve"" LJ" by a vloi. nt re~~ o. · ' l · iJ. tion ... -.. u" ,~,-" ....-""', ........ lJ ....... V .. J '. J _ -.. • _
corcurred in bj a ~ ajority of the members- elect of each
e) ho,) so;. t:.
The supposition w~ s that the legislature, confronted by the
SthedLlle and Ts~ porarf Provisions,
16
two- year deadline, would certainly act to reorg~ nize the state
adr. 1inistration. This proved to be correct. The legislat! lre
reorgani~ ed 128 agencies into nineteen depart~ ents, one less than
the con s ti tu ti onal maxim'lm.
1
,;
-'-.._.._,---_..~_.,...-,~~~-_.-~~"~~----~~~--"----"---~.~-" ..--'--'
and 2' lanageJ966-
67
p. 127 ·
the result of all this effort has been modest in the extreme.
Administrative Reorganization for Arizona?
It is
problem. It i sal::; o s t as easy tr..; enac t
the interests of preserving our ancient liberties.
The first question before the people of Arizona is w~ 8th0r they
reorganization, Arizona is hardly venturing into uncharted waters.
liS trea: nl ini ng!! of s ta te govel'nmen t. It is easy enoJ. gh to appoin t
17
It is clear that in considering the q~ estion of executive
1. Do We Really Want it?
1 1 • a. J-~ J. n
to be hope: l th. at Arizona ~. ri. l1 D2 spar'ic: d such hypocr.: Ltical charades.
future 0f state ad"; jni- straUon. . It ! n:. lst be adiliittF: d at once that
reject gravely s: J. ch trifling proposals as t: 1ay be timidly mad · :',
centralized today thar, j, t, ~., ias -" rhen the first IlLittle Hoover
a st. attlt. e that ~ ri11. allm~' minor changes to be : nade, and then to
~ fg Inspector, or a recalcitrant Sheep Sanitary Commissio~.
Ex-+: cU lV(> in rae t , or art~ they CO;" tent 1'" i tr: a Governor '/ i'ho ind,.: 3d
partakes of the honors reserved for the kings of old-- artiJlery
Com: r, iss, ion" ~,{ as appc: inted. It has becor18 fashionable to favor'
salu. tcs,
State ad:: lin. istration is probably mor'e convoluted and ::; ore de · · ,
admi~ jstratlor!. Do they want a Governor who will be the Chief
but who might find it impossible to cope with an inco~ petent State
18
first created the
desr~ rt to govern the tr'Jc: 1} ent
revolutionary legislators who
the Governor ship l, las f:. tr thar vleaken ed by tIl eat ten ti ons of the
posturings of the royal governors, and the last thing they wanted
American state governorship is not a degenerated version of the
It is by no means certain that the people of Arizona \- lant
centralized author. ity over the state admi. nlstration. Those who
the Territory of Arizona had been widely regarded as a wild
do not have a long and honorable tradition · behind · tnem. The
Governorship "},' ere still s: nar t. ing under the US: J. rpaUons and
T'lCSO: l in raising the rebel £' lag over the Old PU. 8bl0 at t" 1 e ou. tbT~; cl: c
office.
is older than the Presidency, and from the start 1 · 1as 8. much vJeaker
Presidency, as SODe citizens ignorantly think. The Governorship
and savage place, probably incapable of self government.
election of p: lblic officers from dog catcher to fence vie\,! er.
was a strong Governor. Ha~ ng gotten off to such a feeble start,
state pcd. d. dear-}. y for the precipi. tate action of the resid:= mts of
Jacksonians, with their belief in the magical powers of popular
ai' the Cl, vJl War. After t~ le war, a s~ ccession of defeated ~~ ep! lb'ic8~
vrith the office of the Chief Magistrate. For most of its history,
~~: 3., S d011. i", ri.~ lr1t lr1 t. h. e C() ri ..../(; Il t j,() ft. 11 r18 dele gates pro:" np t IjT. e s La b. li shed
De~ locrats of ~ r: LzG~ a. It is not at a, 11 s~ rpris. ing thQt when the
i. t
~ iore impor tan t
In a. pe. rcep t. i.\ ie
exeC~ Jti, ve ~ real{ Dess has de,? p roots. . dO. 0 ~ the tra. ltlcn or
Contrary to tte ~ c~' e advanced political thought in this
COJ ' lr"" rtj.. o ''''' izon" ('(, nctl°- t" di( ln'; tc'-(" jX1 ~ ct · ,,,, p " haC'l.,,~ y>-- i in ~ ~.; j, ,~, lJ ric _ •• 0 v .,~, c,< v~ •• y ~ .• q. ..;) VJ U <\. AO. L'- L ~._
d 1 > ° t' ec: e,'~ tra~,,- 2. Z. l.. rLg n. s s . cL- .2 ti~ e gC1vern: 21erl.( ' O~ f ~ 1J.°. t h'" 1" n • , I" J. 10. l. Qlng : rC} r! l tne
gover: nor t!"'. cse r:" II:>:' 3 Of' control essential to der: ocrat5. c
governrr; en t, for by de p riving the chie f ex. eC~ 1 t iva of the s a
and by placing them in the hands of boards, commissjo~ s, and
many quite independent officials, responsibility became so
diffused as to ffi2ke it im~ ossib} e for the peoDle real] v to 1 ... .. '" rule.
19
today than Arizona's colorful early history are those national
to the prescriptions of the eX1' 2C'ts for a concentration of ai) thori ly
preSS~ Jres for adr:: inistrC'.. t. iv.:: separat, is; r, tha 1 run di:, ectl J" C' 0' JEt2T'
and a Eer'):-)} lcan Governor sits . in tLe capi tol by vote of the people,
a plural executive, which persists to this day. They were not the
Territorial Governor, ~ ho said:
say that. r;; orgar: izatio~ l E~. nd gu 1Y:; rnator. ial control is a good thing
least abashed by the criticisns of Richard S. Sloan, the last
is not the or, l; one. The im~ v. Ltab 18 dI'. i ' h"; for agency au. tonorrv 5s
and responsibility in the office of Governor.
Governors has faded from the ~ ird s of all but the oldest settlers,
P itl° f'L, l "- Y'~"' 1t'O"" of' e,- oc"- I-,,,-, · , · - · .... '- 0055 1st\--~ ""' os+- l-"' l" onl- r- nt h, · ... ' J.. . ... l.. . t .•~_ ~ ... c.. v . .. 4.. v ..!.. J- L . i .~ Ci ;... l :... J I ~~ ';,~. ::'::" O., l\.. l v ' ......... . JiLt;:; !, il. .. v ,1., l' ~ ,.:. ~~ Gt 1 .." l,/,-,.. t L
outJin3d sone af these pressures. Perhaps the long and somewhat
20
.,. . L' ~ 1 . L' ~. f t' h'" t · · . '-'" .1 L. D.. i- nl{ ! JO.. i- S . is one 0 08 very .; es l; , n':. ngs ;~ na t nas ever
been done I. n t'ne. SoloLa'"'~ e cf.: ll, S,. Sl. S, SlP. IH.'. anQ., T~.. ' neve long been
of the opinion that th~ work should have been acco~; ljshed
. in the pas t. Bu. · ; eve:: c, my depar tmen t is of a type, character
and kind that cannot be consolidated ~ t! ith any other
agency, as its duties and fune tions are unHlue, and a
reduction of personnel or a transfer of any duties of this
det) a... · t"' io ' · 1t ,. · '),,' jd " orl, a haY'dc; l- dn " nd "' rpFen+- ce,;' I'''' a~'' ..... , L~ L,,' w,- · ..~ .. ' N .. " •.•• l ..... } C, l. L.} J~. Jol.~ '. J 1,. 1
ci ti zen s ft'om receivi. ng beneri ts to l}~ h ic h they are en ti tIe d.
One may be sure that such an agency head will not stand alone
in hi s ba t tIe for au tonomy. He wi. ll have fr iends a'TIong those
who fear that they may i. Deleed be depr1ved of " beneLi. ts to wh5 C! l
they are en ti tIc,; d ~ I •
Another pressure frOG separatism is closely related to this
one. M3. ny aEency heads see themselves alld are seen as th' 3
representatives of clientele and interest groups. As Willbern
po. in ts au t:
The Farm Bureau wants the Extension Service subject to its
control, not subject to general control by the governor and
legislature. The Parent- Teachers Association feels that
the Sducation Department should be sacrosanct an~ untouchable
by IJ po litica. l" hands. If a reorgan5. zation conm. issio Y} +> des
to tar.-; p::; r ' p/ ith a :' 25(; and ga': 12 '::)') TeaU, the organized sports-mE'rl
aT"-., j ' 1'~~ re1" r tn r~~ s"~ (:) n""' I11~ t-"' +- ur'OT'C) t · o malre- -+- 1- 1 0 c() rl""' Yl--:":~ r''';( ll'l
d . • "'" ,; ~. L'.. , ..' J ~ c: l. J '. '-' ~ 1. i.' · · · · 2: b1;' 1. .. .. c.. .' ".;\. ;, u~ _ ":',,. L~ . J.,. J
wonder what happened to it.
Defenders of states rights ~ ight ( although they seldom do)
POi~ lt rY); J that the 11nJ tifariou. s federal grant- in- · aid p!' ogra: t'. s
are oft", en a nlDdr'aGc~ to state executi. ve I' 2organi33tion. As
~ r'rl (.; c o!" l~ l.: Lt i ():- 1 S clC CG ~ C1I;' 2.~-' i~ T 511 g tt'le f; r cir"} t s t'F~ rid t() ( 1 ~ s t f'C) :/'
cent, ral pnliticaJ controJ a, t- t! 18 stJa1:, e J, ev~~. The prQ~ na~
~ ~ <~'~ i t- - ~~., Tic:- S Y\' J C.; f' l p ri. C" Y~ n ~.!. ) I nf~ ~ l' Yl PC:""': p ~ ~ ~ n r-.. t ~ ( n ~-.
C ', G J.., ,_: Jc;. J..~. _. 0 ,}-,._. J... .. " __, , ~~,',. t..: l -'.:) ~ 1.0, , :", c ..,...;, ,,)... L: J
rai.)" ler rl[ lr · !_"~.,~: · :.!) J. C,:- i.\' i1' 1E: : 10 rCj() r: l Cor t>~ litj, caJ Cr'l(). lCe at th:~
~ ~- ~~. l;) 1, n ~, ~':> ., T Yl C' { j ' T' -:::. 1- Y" 1 r: o t- :: r.... (~;:::., C' .... h ;: J t' ': J r :' 7'; co Of" t- " n '.~) n r) 1" .~ n q ':; 1 , y' .... •-- r-' t
" oJ ,._ L1. .., · ~.. ~ ....:"'" ', ...:. __ • :_~' .... l,......... f.... " 1.., J"" J_ i4.- 1-__, ...,.. J?, : l;: ,... <_. '.,. c: .., ,'~. 1"__. ta, Jl\.- · ., 1c..,. ...:.... i::.~:" :. t~!~-,
S r (; C 2.1 ~ r ~ Cc~~ · tlcul. a.~"' t:: rpes of artmJ.,:}' l. S L! · cit"~ l\ l'.:~ al~ rclrlEe: .1~:~; r1t' 3 () J'
a~ encjQs, .. In alJ, irlstanCGs, the procedures ~ Dd ~ arlnE,' r of
a{ 1~.- 1i! 1: istra. tl.();' 1 cI. f t..[ if~ ~ raDt progra1~::'~ are s!, lbj,~~ ct. to SCln::~
_ de 0' r :~~ .:~ c~ f C ( I r~ t- i.~ 0 .~, . f r () :.~ \., 1' a. S f} ::: t- ( j f1 • . J '"",!,,"._,_.•--~..__......----~~_._-,"------,,~-".-.,-_. __.•-._.,",-'-,".- {.--
. L;'\': jr", J, J'"'.: Jr-] in · \. r(\~~ l.; i.;]: ~ I,:: j"' n ffl\(~ liY'l'i ~"'+ pr,~ - i" na lr-{(.... n-- r;- ...~ r. i ?~' t · , ' i0n" - 1Y1 (~.>:.~ f. · l._~.. ~'~
\..-'_~.-, L-'/ ...... _. t. i -".. ~., ... ,~ •. __ , .. l .... '-..-' ... ~.) .. 1.. 1,,:._......'_, 0 l ... ctv.!.. V\. ~ ... ~'." '" uc",:,~. #_ J.: l . .4..\ J~~ .! tl ~__' _ .......
F' r~~; S S ( 1 t1d C · 1 :,~ · v ;~ r~ !;. ~,\:. 1 1. } i a: its ((-!. i~::;.), IJ ~~,;"': Q.. Qr ~~ ~~.._}: ll__._ tb' 3 ~ Ei[_ L,(.",_ 0 t. l ~.~~~, E~_~~
£ , r....~.,.} l- i.,.. r\ · ._ r c.. n_...• I:\-.).;.~.; 4! y"~. rli ~?/.. r, ..'...\..." C\ JT. .~.''. 11FI ' ,; 1".,. C~' O .. 1 ( L..... ;::\) ,..... LL1' J ,. l.. ,, 1),__ , i., l. r_.. I •
T' ~ ,1 ~ n !' ' J C v ,
'" ..=:." 0 .!.:..::.:,..~... 1.1. - y- ~- J •
) r} : r' ' , ) l. ' f" l .~ .=.;...: 2l:_ 1_!....~_, 1, · · T '- I •
21
deserve. 11
c anno t be
Finally, and very importantly, any effort to centralize
administrative authority runs ~ p against the widespread feeling
.
tha t those rnnn. ing the s ta te govern. J1ent are no more hnnes t than
by garbage men, or to provide His Excellency with an official
the theme that fitness bums are already getting more than they
should reflect on the inevitable response to any proposal to
raise the salaries of legislators up to the level of that received
they ought to be and rather less cOJ1petent than they should be.
Any state legislator who doubts the existence of this feeling
· · It ~ ight be s~ lgg8sted that those desir, ing r2o~ ganizatio~
residence. The next day after the public advocacy of any such
change is likely to see letters to the editor centering around
to the lust for power that presumably resides in tile breast of
- ignored. Added to the feelihgs about incoJ1petence we have
every Goverf1or. I t may be gro te sq'w to believe that con sol 1. ds ti on
llr; de~ co~ s, i, d8ration. There is no cJnsti, t~ ltionaJ, requ, irem2~ 1~ that
inevi~ ably the charge that executive reorganization will pander
of executive agencies will turn a previously mild- mannered Governor
po}_ j. t~ i, cal attitlJdes be r- ealistic or everl rati, onaJ., and politiciAns
might take advantage of modern mathods of opinion research to
who ove~ look this fact rna,! become ox- officehoJders.
: into a : ack · - booted c § ;:') oil19-. D'J. t the ~ t! or~ 1 lIdictatorship" has bee~
Il~ thi. s
syste:! J.
In any even t,
c() ntrar~ l
a reorganization
." ~'",
l) ... J.
be 11elpful i~ what ~ rould
, , se 1.1
sys te~. Ir~ addl Lion, a cons ti t: J-
, .
to indica. te q'li te cleacly tha t any reor gani zaUon
3 ·
AssumIng we want executive reorganization, the experience of
It cannot he answered by the experts.
toward state government and administration in Arizona today.
2. Do We Need A Constitutional A~ endcent?
the CfJ8stion ! rDo yTe want it?!! is pre- · erninently a poli tical. question.
l Idne k nm · r- leO,- ge ga-.:. nea-"'- t-. Dereb'j ' vIOU - jQ,
tiOfl& J. a~ enj~ e!-~ t wi]} Eive tbe voter~ a cha~ ce to say derinit~ y
likely be a difficult campaign to
face of' the separati. st tendencies \ · re 110:; 8 examined.
be a constant threat. fven jf the system is not killed outright by
...
CO~ lrt decree, the constant dOLlbt abo 1J. t cOYlst. it'ttioDn: Jity '~' ill be
other states
is lac;{ ing, litigaticn over the constitntionaJjty of the system 1d=. 1
a ~' ote, npp:) nents ~ an always say that reorganizatiorl has b2e~
sed~: lo',- Jsll c ! ltivated by
is only a statute behind
tt!~' l8ther or not they favor rcorgsn5. zaUon.
that
and is not likely
reorganization pla, ns, we
past,
h~.! C.~ t ,"' t'.; c, 11.~ .. 1l,.., l.-~.. . V.. -'' e . no pOw~ . r._".:.) c- r.
l.[ L t'ne
. A r t. V, Se c. 2.
six t.. y · dtljl ru, le.
Co11 , s t: i. L11 t t () rJ. ,
( llso '. 1SCS th~?
23
Voto to +' or"' t'Jld.,-, r'o ~ Yi.,' Cl'. OT'dt-~ r in" v l
~ " , . L., ,.. _ ~ ~ _. _ _ ~-. "'()_,. P._'. T. . T~ P. C-'- L ·
Grarlti~ g the veto pow? r to each house sep~ ratel.:,~ is equ, ivalent
A more di. ff5cJJt Clues U. OD is io! hether a legislaU. v8 veto sho'lld
the constitutions o~ Alaska and Michigan is clearly indicated.
to do so in the future. Consequently, a grant of authority
4. What Should bf:: the IJature of the Leg. i. slativ(; Veto'?
if of shorter duration ,
! l seems quite reasonable, and is used also
There ;. rill perhaps be little disagreement that there [:' lLlst be
prod0ced executive reorganization
always had the po~ er to recommend legislation. This power has not
provisi. on of !! s5xty da.', rs of a regular session, or a [') 11 sessiGrl
really do not want a reorganization system. If the Governor can
similar to that cO! 1tcdned : i. n the L'Iodel State Constit. ltion or in
do no more than to propose legislation,
he does not already possess. Governoc's i. n a~ l states have
that 1: 8 miEht propose.
a reasonable time limit within which the legislature must act,
the Gov8~ or's power lD the li~ ited area of reorganization. As W2
2
in the Mlchigan constitution.
if it wishes to disaJlow a gubernatorial proposal. The Alaska
reepirs conc: J. rrc: n" c~ of bot, h ! 10US;:~ S of the state legislat'Jr", or' only
t · ----..- · --- · · · .... · - · · - · --- · · .. · · - · -- · .., · · - · · --- · -- · · ,--._--.
A. 1 a s ~: a Carl s tit ;, tj 0 n, r\ r t.. I I I, SC'. c. 23.
rlot~ d befo~ e, the moveU12nt fell exec~} tive reorg~ irlization j. s an
2 ... }'
1' 11 C. Il fan
.3 t.~._ LLtI2.' l
1 Cn
. .
:- 10 !'(;, E) gl. C : 1)~~, D8e.
and
that ~ here ' is
administrative arencies. and that as '-' i
-, Executive A~ encies Be Limited? Numbqr or
Tta e~~ barrassi~ g fact is
there are too many
1 i. ~ Ylj .. t a tL O~ 1 s .
ShOlld the
t(; a. t
It is one of the articles of faith of the reorganization move-
5.
the posi Lion ta. ken in the Model Sta te COrlS ti. tution and the ~ 11ch- .
trol of the ad.' linistration ", IiJI be impossible. ~ O\ v msn~ r aTe too
24
ment
Model State Constitution in 19i+ 8 adopted a provision of tilG ; Ie't!
a majority of all members in a joint session of the legislature in
maH/;' I t may be agreed thai the one hundreel pLIS C0JiTtOn to mos t
Governor's proposals, they should be allowed to stand, and this 15
igan Constitution. The Alaska Const. it~ ti. on requires conC. lrrence of
order to nullify the Governor's proposals.
agenc. i!:, s.
long as this continues to be true, effective gubernatorial con-states
is too ' nani, but ho"" far s:-- lo: lld the red · . lcEol' co? The
This
York cons T, 1tiJ. tion lim! tL. ng the ~ 1'): T! ber' of state agenci2s to bi,:; nt/.
Fro '" t-;"' at pOl" nt of" "~ e'l '.. In- 1. e<::<:: bo- t'[ 1 '. 10' 1<:;':> S aT'~ OPT) OSP~ t() the ,11 "" .- _ L .~.". 1.. ,', - ~ ~ • - ~ ~ -- - - J:' ~ - -
vaU di t ~ • 11 2
well as so~ e other states lacking a reorganization system.
that a
l\."!' t . III, Sr? c. 22.
proposals.
C ~ l · Jl · r~ " l'S l'mpo~~ d 0' 1 0 conSl'Q~~~~+' l'orl ~~~ t ~~ g'n~ ' O~
':; .•.. -. 1 0 _. dl'::> C-.) , c:; d ... \ ~'::" d." J. l.-•• r. l. u " t.. to c::
6. Who Should Make the Initial Allocation?
be as eas/ for Arizona to pare its agencies dOi- m to t;',. lentJ as
the advantage ( if i~ corporated into the constitution) of giving
the Gov'~ rnor a target at \- Thich to shoot, anJ. the necessity of
making the ad~ inistrative structure co~ form to the ceiling is
more likely to produce a thorough going reorganization.
As noted above, th~ J n8\ · 7 ~ 1jchigan C~) ristitution ga~ le the
taken into account is that if the number of constitutionally
lat~~ re cOilld 10t reaLly be tcrrn8d t8o: · ganization.
If a
, ~ • t- nl: Jean u
. legislature t ....: o years in vlhJc" 1 to effect an i.. TIi tial reorgan' zation,
reorganizat5on am8'- ldment might result only in minor and 1nsig-or'd';;
r. Tn effect" the Ala. ska Cor-, sttti] tion d5.. d the same thing bj
Without such a ceiling) there is always
afte~' '. · [[: ich th~ Gover'rior 1, 10:;. 1( i have the pm · fer to do so by exec. lt. i ve
specifying that the departments and agencies should be allocated
it was for Alaska or Michigan.
by Jd. ~.., 1 and confining the Governor to making changes in the
I
It is lmlikely
that the re0~ g2nizatio~
Assuming that there aI'S
seeD,
\': Olllcl
rte0r ga, n ' 5 za til ) r1 .. 4.~:::~ rHlr[~ en t 33 CC)( lpJed t".! i trio
in the N'lmber of Elected Adr' 1inis trators?
3~ t if this is done, it is certain
r . id
7. Sho ' J. l- ~ 1 the
a Red~ IC ti on
su. bin. it his first reorganization plan at any- time.
t : iO. , n. rJc;~ J P-, i~" cC, F-' tld ' 0- 8- incre- as- p- n- oD're-;:_,.~.~ l_ y l · r ~ i + L '" · Jt., · . · ~ re"" ae0"",', mpa. n~.;..~ t;, Q ], r.-,;. dr
after the ird. tial reorganization ;, jas accor:: plished.
26
with the grant of additional powers to the Governor. Of co~ rse,
A case can certainly be made that the potential or a reorganiza-that
a Governor "" ould find himself in such profou. nd disagreeD? f'. t
once the legislature has acted, the Governor would be free to
initial reorga: 5zation plan of the leg5s1atur i::';, bl 1. t he wou. ld be
in a position to correct any deficiencies which might appear soon
wi th the legi.. s1atnre that he ~ t! o1) lj vlis..~ to junk al together the
to ~~_ et
i. SS'J8 of
, .,., .1-
0a..~ JOv.
propos? d e]. ir15n, atio~ of elective o: fices.
si~ Llltaneous ~ 9dLlcti, on in the n11mber of el, ectad administrat. ol · s.
If the aim is to stren~ then the hand of
system wi] l b~ at- tacko1 ~ rtgoro~ s] y b~ T those w~ o do not~ fa, vo~ the
him the Chief Executive in fact as well as in na~ e, perhaps the
,
.: 1() r e
\ om.. 1 cn, G" O
,. 11 • 1 wrJ. 2. cn
() ri8 rr, a, y
some eighteen states
There An! ether Constitutional Changes
Should Acc0mpany Reorganization?
Arizona is one of the
In any case, it would be foolish to argue t~ at reorganization
27
this is a ques ti on of po1. l tical s tra tegy, not of adminis tra ti. V8
Al tho, J gh i. t : nay seem inconsi s ten t to ar g:. lS for caJ. Uon i. n
theory.
all of them should be retained forever', It is only to say that
eliminate an elective Attorney General and an elective SecretarJ
merit basis, only about a fourth or less of Arizona's state
emp] oyeos are ~! ld9r the jtlrisdictio~ of the ~'~ rit Syste~ Joa, rd
coup led, the que s ti() fl 0 f s ta te ci. v. i 1 service reform m:. s t bl::
eliminating a single elected official. That is not to say that
of State even in a constitutional convention~
changes in Arizona ad~ inistration could be effected without
r- a" Lsed.
without ballot shortening is useless. Significant and far- reaching
emp] oY~ 8S of educational institutions, who ape effectively on a
coupling other' constitu. tional c~!. ange \- lith a reorga~ 1iza~, ion
have a general merit system for its employees.
kno',' J:. that th::~:;,(' is riO ne,~ j to repeat
/ ( gr an t - 5;\.- a j de::: p lo. l e3::> 0,' the n, s r itSj s t e tTl COJ neLl [ H i g~ N elJ Pat r 0.11 ) . 1
28
that Arizona will not be the last state to him and fire its
employees on the basis of an impersonal and fair merit system.
But our concern here is only with the effect of. the state prsonnel
sys tem on an~ r rear gani zatian efror ts " rhi cll may be under taken.
If broad executive reorganization authority is granted, and no
provision is mad. e for a meri t system, it is prooable that some
citizens and many state employees will vievl the entire reorganization
scheme as a giant pa tron2. ge grab. Tl' ~
,. j.., l. et state employee's job de-pends
on the favor of his agency chief, and his job is transfer- red '"
to ano the~' agency, he 11i gh t \- 7811 , , De concer'neo. Consecpen tl y, tr18
qu~ st. i( in of a IT:. erit system : 1.11endment m' 1. st be raised. Such a' 1
arnendrnent s1' 101.. 1 1< 1 oe brief, and S: 10111d certainly not attempt to
reorganizatio~ amendment, excessive d0tail
Sec~-, i. c) n 10. O'}" 2Le~~;~, t~._"~' i7- f.~:=~ J}.:... T: 1E: j . It? gisla, t1lr, s S} · . 13.~ 1 p:"" C) · v. i. d i3
I~ O~ tl' 19 es" t, a,:;. J_ i, sL · lr~(? r1t. a, tl~ l 30., n .. 1i~, i. st, r2.. t~ tor" l of a sy · st~ t~ rn of person:
nAl adrn5,,! 11st:~( 1+~. Lon ift trl2 c, i\ til sCr\ riC0 cf th~ 2 statc~ arl-: l.
its cl'ril ~ ivisions. ApP0i~ tments and pr;' o~ oti, Qr~ s shalJ_ b0
',.. ' 3 5 · - 1 c.. l n. :' 1..; c..,. r'i. t. ' ' rl .~., t ' j t" . t' r () yo lJc t-:;- t. ~ __ ~ dr2.~ L 1.., l,-,: 1eSS, C1." rr'i().~ 1sl- ra, 2cl D~! ex.~ LJJrla'l. OJ. .. i. by.,
other evid~ nce of competencG.
gen3ra} pl'inc5. r: 1e invo1vad.
It ~ 2~ QS as fo: Jows:
estab} is~ l all the details of a meri t systerrl. Any atte: npt to do so
\- 7ould 9. J'O. Lse opposi tion to specifics of polley rather- than to the
v. rOJld if'rICS'? fi: l :.. 1.. r~( lesirabl~ ri[~ i. rl5. t~ y on tll. 2 state persoDn8l sj~ steri,
pr0t: 10L... eG.
reorganization
trative theory. Assuming efficiency would be
by reorganization, the fact remains that efficiency has
and their representatives, and not by experts on ad~ inis-they
regard more highly are threatened by reorganization,
political question, which must be answered by the people
hands of the Governor is desirable or not is a profoundly
they will reject reorganization.
VIhether consolidation of adl1inistrative a;. l, thority in
this country, its accomplishments have been modest ind~ Gd.
29
I, l' Co J " " c;:;" 0.... f.. c....>.... C + Iv" I' v.' O_>, ~ 0 T_ ' i.., . r. 1c.. o" a. i...."..) c'>-' r\.< 1 :_ I"" e" Jn,.. l + u ~..,_ c:: J.. 1, J,.. •
clearly not been the supreme value involved in our syst8m
of governl1ent. If the people feel that values which
the real shift in political power e~ bodied in the kind of
but in few states has the~ e been a willing~ ess to
In fact, ~ ost of the sjstems adopted have been abortive,
raorganization favored by the eXp2rts.
: nade . i. t fashionable to pay lip s8rv1ce to n:~ o: ngan: z5ticn,
2. Although the reorganization movement nas a long history in
~. St2tutorj plans :: ave co. generally very djs~ ia] I'eCO!' j, ar: d
Conclusions
' T'h'" r p('\ rt nac revl · c>': · r" r1 t n6 l",.,., o1') le- r · · of ex:"' c" t; vo .. l.. J. ...... S e...... i. l"'" -- IV. r:;; J. ~ t'V l:'-'. 1. l...... ul . . J....,. __ to v - '-"
1.
tered in Arizona. The following conclusions seem to emerge:
in Arizona in the ljght of previous experience in other states, as
well as the peculiar historical and co~ stitutiona] problems encoun-
30
trativ8 reorganization.
the best examples of the COrlS t i tu tional
Se, 2: r1S to be recl'li red for any s8rlols effor t at adT: inis-adoption
of such plans is worth the effort.
positive approval of reorganization proposals by concurrent
legislative majorities. It is very doubtful that the
reorganization amendment.
ldhich me) S t be:; considered along 1,015 then; proposals for a
for state employees seems to present a special problem
5. In Arizona, the non- existence of a general merit system
4. The relatively recent systems of Alaska and Hichigan offer
31
APF~ NDIX I: Exec~ tive Reo~ ganization in
the Model State Constitution
S4'~ T F) )\ T . ~ v __ ~. d . C)' 0.")'-( 1P1' C a .' l.' 1ltC:: o r a ...., l A" 1 tc>.~ r n c~ t + L. ~ i V p~)~ . i'; 1\ . d_ ' · J' 1. iIl~ t. 1:'> :. t. i~..' Y".:=.
DeraL. tr!;..:~ n. t:~. All e.<, scl1tiv2 end administrative offices, agencies
and instrl~ entalities of the state government, and their respective
fJLctioDs, pOi" ers and duti.. es, sflall be allocated ' oj la" J ar:'. ong
and within not ~ or2 than twenty principal depart~ ents so as to gro. lp
t hP~ 1 ~ c: +' a n a- ~ p~ c'tiC'' 1' Oi", QCC() T'- 4i"", "" 0 ; Tl~ io'(> T" lrDO"',"" S P!"",')' ,1 "''' oY''': 1 ... ....; l. 1 C1-.' J". ,,~. ~ J:' ..... 0. oL - 4- " r..... -'- - ':)..." ",.. l. \. 4 ...... · 1.._ C L.. : l~<: lV ~ ~ - ... J.'. 1 ,';;"-, , • ... .. "-' 0.(-- 0.;.. .•" ..", ,
•••• " '+ • +-".,~, 1 ' t" qUBSI- Jua: c~ al ana Gsmporary agencl8s es~ aD~ lsne~ oy _ aw ~ 8Y, cu,
need not, be allocated ~ I, i trlin a pr. incipal depart'TIe: lt. T': 1e legis-'
la+') 7"'''' S''':: 1 1 ' r-) J ia' · ' pY'e~ c · "' ib<::> the f") l" C+' iOh<' '"' O'JC> PC' a" n rhl. ... ' C> s 01" __ , - .' ~ ~ '- I .: ... L. l.~ .. L J... ~.' v: __. - N .,;,. ~. _ ......, ~ v l...: __ ..;,. , __ J, L , J.. .... L L.), }- "'--: .... .:> l~ -.... l .~ '. v 1. ' y . i. _ ,
tne prl, nClpa,~ Qef~~ rtmel: ts ana or a: l ot~ er agencl8s or tne stat8 ana
mfl~ l frcr. 1 + 5~ e to ti~! 1e :" e- · al. l. ocate offi.. ces, a[ erlci.~ s and i, nst:-: · ~. lm~
n~ a~ l~ j_ es a~ o~ g t~? ? rincipa~ departmnts, ~ ay i~ creas~, ~ odi~ y,
dlmlrils: l or cnan~ e t~ e~ r fU, nctlons, powers ana du, t1., es ana ~ ay
assign new fl~ ctio~ s, pcwers and duties to them; b~ t the governor
ma'l ,~~: l"', J "",,- · h c~"~ n,::'-: O~ orl i'n"' allo'~ at'on o",' n+'"' lC<=> S rC'.:> nc' · ;::,~ ~ nd 4.~ ~ "" ~ ...._ J_.,.~, .::>-,_-\, l.,.;_._. I . .:.. L .....\' · ~ · · bt;;;: j :... '-','" e .............. V:~. _ ~ ..." J. 1. --'-. " '-' .... , c,~ ........ _ ~ '-".::> 0-- 1. • .:.\
' nst""" m~'> IJr.,,+,.~~ " ne' 1>. "''' p a' loc"' t · , 0' 1 11' ""'. lC'" f" J' 1r-+' OY1S T'oooo"" s ..:...., .. v~ '. J., ... "",~. l, C"".. l...":', '. J ....... ~... ,:::> G. ... J. J ... 1-. 1.,_ L ... J.~. J ... , Ct ,. J.... "" ...... 1. '::" .. , L. ' .• t_ ......... L- l. .. , ~ r ;,'/::-_''':'''
" Del r~:'+ · '; -:: OQ r-,~ h;:) c'''')''',,: s~ do- Y'"'~ '("'~ c~ S~""'"" I'- · J · ;' op o ........ ..(''' CJ · ,.:) i' 1i r< r4r'r. · ~' r'""\,':''''''+-- rr4--': 0' 1 ::-':... .). · A '..':"" 0..,_' c,;:, ".~ ~'_~" . J. ~~.::> '.'~ ~ ::' c:'). · .1. _ ~.~"-. L. ."'~_ ~ o."", .. l..,-_ lL · :;;", ,:, L__ , .•
.. I'T-,.,. ,";:," 1-.. l..'(;'_(;_ cr_ ' I d~.. n_ eGQ'.... CJ' ..'..-.. ;~,...., J,. r... " l.'"~" Ci '" p.. , c;+- ln", 1 "".' they ", I'all bo sot fopth ' n l, ,..; .:\. ...... --.. u ........ Q .. L. CJ..\ J, ....... ,,:) . i. J. _, ._.~ ._ __ ._ .... ... .......... J.
eA8c'ltive ord8rs, \ o, hi. ch s~ aJ: l. be submitted to the legislature
while it is in session, and shall become effective, and shall
~ a've ti1e fc) rce of 12"\, 1, sixtj~ da, js a, fter s~ lbmissi. on, or at the close
O ~.... + hf-~ C'~ ro~ if") r: 1.,.';......; 0h.~' t,.:_~~ is scc, n.:::...... Yl ' 1"'- 1° 33 ~ r'ln~.... it"' i0r'\ ll'l ""' O, j{ f'~':~. r~
• ~ ." ••, .. J '.~ •., .;:> .._ ,. __ , • J ,1 .... '._ ~ _~ , '.~ ,.... , , d ~ '., I,. .~ ~ ;:, , t-' _' c .... C.._ '" ct.). -'- ~ ." __ -'-. _ "',
or disaprroved hj a resolution conc~ rred in by a majoritj of all
the ~ ambe~ s of each house.
32
APPENJIX II: Executive Reorganization in the Al~ ska Constitution
( Art. I I I)
S~ CTIC~ 22. All e~ ec~ tive and administrative o: I: ces,
d ';) r'~ 77tm""' c~' C' ~", rl "''''", nC'i", t'' oF' the S+~+- 2 iJ'O""~ Y' · ; n"'''' t ana' + heir ~ t-'(" J."'. -. i':..... L_; l~,~ J = t': i\ w'" "' · 60::-_ 1. .. .:..: ..... .,:) .. 1. v._ Lv.\ o., .... 0 \ Jr..... l. Ll. •• ~ __ .:....:. :.. J. A VJ. ... - 4..,_
respective functions, powers, and duties shall be allocated by
lw~ among and wi~ hin no~ more than ~ we~ tj ~ rinci? al depar! ments,
so as to gro lp tnem as : ar as practlcaole accordlng to maJor
pur · poses. Rf:; g'l2 cHar!, quasi · - judi. cial, and temporary agencies
may be estabUsh::: d bi 18\.; aDd need not be allocatej 1;; 5 thi. n a
principal derart~ ent.
LfM: LG',('. rr.:~. IJ · · · ~..] 1IT 23 • T], d., e~ , a,'~,; ve rn:. o" 1" L~ i: ajr mal1ee c'na. nges _ l' D t'. n e 0l' ' 6~ an1. L~ a.- ·
tion of the exec~ tiv0 branch or in the assign~ ent of fUTIctions among
its ' tnits wh i dl he considers necessary for eff: i. cier~ t aclministrotto! 1.
Where these cha~ g9s req~ ire the force of law, thAj stall be set
fort~ · : in 2X: 8cltive orders. The legi. slature shall ha';: e sixt:, r
days of a regdlar session, or a full session if of shorter dcc'ation,
to disapprove these executive orders. Unless disapproved
by resoLltion cO~ lcnrred in bJ a majori ty of the members iTl jo. i. nt
S p...... ~.:.:> s~..... \ o~:~., + I."... t. hcsp.... O~- l.~.,-_ t",~,, j. ns hUe-' c.' o~. uo~ o...... r~ I... " · '-- O"\,..." v~.,._ iv. p..; a, t a, dQc,~,~ O..... tihl. P_ I · . p, a1~ tp'-'.~ J. t- o..) ll.,) p....
designated by the governor.
.,
!
33
APPENDIX III: Executj_ ve Reorganization in the
Michigan Constitution
( Art. V)
Sec. 2. All exes'J. tive and administrative offices, agencies
and instrl~ entalities of the e~ ecutive branch of state government
and their respective f~ nctions, powers and duties, except for
the office of governor and lieu. tenant governor and the governing
bodies of 5.. nsti tntions of higher educ8.. tion provided for in this
constitution, shall be allocated by 1a"\>! among and within not more
thar' 20 principal departments. They shall be grouped as far
as practicable according to major purposes.
S~ bseq~ ent to the initial allocation, the governor may ~ ake
chr: irlges i, n. tIle c) r- gan. iza+¥ i() D of trie ex: ecu~ ti~, e bra.! l.. cl1 or . irl the
£ iss_ · Ig[ j. rr:_ 8: n~, Ol.... : f~ Jncti. orls a.! Eor: g it.~ s lJ. rli. ts vrh~ ch:: e cOfls5' i0rs
necessary for sfPicient aj~ inistration. Where these changes
rea l] i~'. o> fc-; p Po"",">"" f' " 1...,~. r t'n o " 5h3.11 bp "' 0'" f'or th iYl pX.""(~ 1l" · . iup
. ~ '.'" .4...... t; '.... L i _.'.... .;" '--_~ J ...., ...... a. f' '... \... fII .:. . L. '-- ..,.;._...... ....... ~.~ \.... .., .... ,-,..;. 1 ....... J.... _ ... t::::;; '... _ l ....' " -'
orders and s'lb~ itted to the legislature. Ther~ eafter the legis-
1~, a' · L · 1U."'"-, -':--' . S...:. h. ;. cri1.:-. J." 1.. .1:. - l -~"'" I1t".".... si_." I\ · . · 1~: cJr c~ ~ c;"'.. Ler... r. J. i1, J.~. c: y:...... ' r- i4a.,, · ~ · . l. e..)' a+..." a~. ... L,... eb , L.~... · ...", a".. r.". S,- · ::-.-.. >,:,:).,..:. l · J..~.. ioy.: · . 1 , 0 · "!-"-
a f~ lll regLllar session i., f of sho~ t: er d~ rat~ on, to ~ isapprove
each exec J. tive orG,:;:,. Unless dis& PI;:;,' oved in both rWDs93 by 8.
res01ution conc!, l~ r:? d in by a majority of the members elected
+ v · 0 ~"''~' 1.. a. ~"' . C.".>... t.:."...:.",,'..~. l. · .~ TIt~..' _ in.... l c~ o ~.... \ C.~~! n... .; r.. · ) i. i., 2... 1. : a:..., o · ~" O"_"\ l"".."-' lh..... f.. lll~,.",).~._ D · r ,.;':, r"" dl" 1w_ i> ' QP.__('_, r.\~ T~_"."_'~ p~~ f_._ fR,(-,~_- Ir... 1_.,._ r~
at a dat~ ther~ eafter to be desi, gnated by the g0ve~ nor.
....
