FILE curf
and
R£ CEIVED JUM 8 197Q
NUMBER
Heinz R. Hink
by
REP0RT
to
• U$ ilOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY
~ OF THE
; 111 DEPARTM ENT OF
,. UBRARYANOARCHIVES
k _ ARIZONA _
October, 196' 1
B. Consideration of four- year terms of office•
A. Pmrers and duties of constitutional offices.
Council on Organl zat: ion of Ad zona State Governnwnt
2.
1. A report on the work of the Joint Legislative
S~ dget Committee.
SUNHARY OF REPOR'I'
1. ' rhe Joint Legislative Budget GommltteeiIl the field or
aud: i t. ing, taking : into account the Rocommendationsof the Citizens
Committee on AUditing, is getting ready to act on draft proposals
to amend Articles 5 and 18 of the Constitution of Arizona,
el'imln3. ting the off: i. ces of State Auditor and state Exarniner, to
esta. blish the office of Auditor General and to t. ransfer the
rune tions of the State Auditor to the DepartltJent of I" i. nance, and
the functions of' the Post Auditor and State EX<: Jm. iner to the
Auditor General. 1' heJoint Legislative Budget Comm. i ttce is not
yet ready to make recommendations in the field of personnel services.
2•. A. The problem of changing the powers and duties of the
? onsti~~ tion~ l 0rf~ ces, in terms of whethBr th~ se. offi? es shou~ d
De retslned lD tnelr. present ror~ ~ r mad~ apPolntlv~, l~ only In
part related to the lssue of admlDlstratlve reorganlzation.
Reol'ganizat: ion authority may be obta. ined, and a restructuring or
the~ ., n,~ o.. B. ,] e~'~. · h « "'~ l~, i,~ n, DD' c" dt.",", n: LiJ".'~ kt> 1"~.•, fo'. Jv'n."""'," 85<: 8: 1.:,')_') 0" 1. e'" 5, ' D · v, Pi; e; oi.~.".". d.<.,- an\ d C~"))~,,",-,,,,-, i._~- S•,.,,' l( · J · .. n~~
: into fm,; er and more manageable depC1. rtments may be accompl. Lshed,
independent of any change in the pO\' H? rs ;.::. nd duties of the cons titutional
offices.
The Governor and Secretary of St: a. te perform functions of state
governlt1ent \' lhich i. n all but three of t: he 50 states are performed
by el(~ ctive constitutional officers. ' rhe Attorney General as head
of the Department of Lalor and the Superintendent of Public Instruction
a"<,.' . n'ol; rJo · , Q' 01" th. · .'<" t:. n!_" Jt,~~) a•.\.... t" · nJ'O. l:":,-.' lt 0f., P1' 1 b · ll'. c. nI.:>"' t, · ru'. ef, · , · ,~. · vn"', ad. rl. L.• 1., L.. ll~; j. t8.,... {~;,'" c" r,:. o.:;;. n~ Ol , n,,. e~.
Whlch \' lould have to be: provlded und. er any SUI tabLe plan of orgarnzatLon,
1tlhether those t'. iO off: i. ces be elective or appointi ve positions.
'] 1h8 State Auditor, State Treasurer, State Examiner and Hine Inspector
perform duties '.' lhich in terrns of an efficient organization of state
government could be reass5gned to other government departments
headed by a. ppoi. ntiv8 officials.
B. In 1895, only 19 states elected their Governor for a
four- year term. Today, ltO states make prov. 1. si. on for a four~ yea. r
term for the Governor and for most other constitutJonal exeClJ. Uve
offices. Twenty- four states restr. ict the Governor in the right to
succeed himself. In 11 states he may h~ ve only one term, in 13
states ho may not succeed himself beyond a second terrri. The
national trend is toward lengthening the term of the Governor and
other executive officers.
Retention of the plural executive is not incompatible with
proposing a cbnstitutional amendment to extend the terms of some
executive officers, like the Governor and the Secretary of State.
Twelve states now either have provisions for the joint election of
the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor or the Secretary of State,
or aI'e considering constitut. ional changes to thnt effect.
1. Report on the work of the Joint Legislative Budget Com_ mittee in the
fields of auditing and personnel and its prel iminary data report.
The Joint Legislative Budget Committee was appointed by the Twentyeight
Legislature in accordance with Laws of 1966~ Ch. 28. The Committee is
chaired by Representative John C. Pritzlaff, Jr., with Senator Thomas M.
Knowles serving as vice- chairman. The Joint Legislative Budget Committee
has received the Recommendations of the Citizens Committee on Auditing,
dated February, 1967, of which copies have been distributed to all members
of the Council on Arizona State Government Organization. The Citizens
Committee was headed by Mr. Lyman Davidson. The Recommendation of the
Citizens Committee have been studied by the Joint Legislative Budget Committee
and by a sub- committee on auditing headed by Senator Will iam Huso
and Representative Albert C. Will iams. The sub- committee has asked the
research staff of the Arizona Legislative Council for draft legislation to
provide the necessary constitutional and statutory changes required to implement
the recommendations contained in the Davidson Report. The sub- committee
has made a pre1 iminary report to the Joint Legislative Budget Committee on
August 10, 1967, and is expected to report the draft bills in their final
to the Budget Committee at its October 19, 1967, meeting.
A second sub- committee, consisting of Senator Will iam C. Jacquin and
Representative Ruth Adams has been working on proposals for a state personnel
system. The sub- committee has discardedH. B. 5, introduced during the first
regular sessi. on of the Twenty- eight legislature, and is now looking at proposals
which would result in the creation of a Department of Personnel rather
th~ n a Personnel Committee or Commission. A rough draft prepared by the
research staff of the Arizona Legislative Council is still very much in the
2
discussion stage, and the sub- committee has as yet not reported to the Joint
Legislative Budget Committee.
In view of the repeated interest shown by members of the Council on
Organization of Arizona State Government in the Audit Committee Report as
a possible first step towards strengthening the executive branch, I have analyzed
the Report of the Citizens Committee on Auditing, the draft Concurrent
Resolution proposing an amendment of the Constititution of Arizona abol ishing
the offices of State Auditor and State Examiner, and the draft bill implementing
statutory legislation prepared for the Joint Legislative Budget Committee.
Copies of the draft legislation are attached to this report.
The purpose of the Davidson Report and of the draft legislation is
to establ ish a new office of Auditor General, appointed by the Joint Legislative
Budget Committee and responsible to the legislative branch of government,
to perform the post auditing function. This is accompanied with a
proposal to el iminate the statutory office of Post Auditor as it now exists,
giving consideration to the transfer of qual ified personnel to the office of
Auditor General. Both of these changes may be accompl ished by statute and are
incorporated in the draft bill. The Davidson Report furthe~ recommends el imination
of the constitutional offices of State Auditor and State Examiner, to
be accompl ished by constitutional amendments. The funytions of the State
Auditor ( pre- audit and general acc~ untant of the State) would be transferred to
the Department of Finance in the executive branch, and the post auditing duties
of the State Examiner would be transferred to the new Auditor General. Both of
the transfers are provided for in the draft bill.
3
The establ ishment of the new office of Auditor General together
with the el imination of the Post Auditor may be accompl ished by statute. It
is, therefore, not dependent on passage of constitutional amendments abolishing
the State Auditor and State Examiner. The St? te Auditor has already
been stripped of all post auditing functions by the Laws of 1951, Chaps. 17
and 20, which have vested the post- auditing function in the Post Auditor,
a legislative office estab1 ished by Laws of 1950, Ch. 28. The main thrust
behind the creation of the new office of Auditor General is essentially an
upgrading of the position now held by the Post Auditor. Both are legislative
offices. Another reason for the creation of an Auditor General is the
consol idation of the post auditing function in one official. Such consolidation
requires the e1 imination of the State Examiner, a constitutional officer,
whose principal function is that of conducting post audits of all school districts
in the state. The financing of public education presents one of the
largest costs to the taxpayer, and, since the function of the State Examiner
is similar to that of the Auditor General, the elimination of the State
Examiner's office and the transfer of his functions to the new Auditor General
seem logical. The State Examiner was established as a constitutional office,
filled by gubernatorial appointment; therefore, a constitutional amendment is
required to bring about the recommended change.
A legislative auditor is now in'existence in 25 of the 50 states, with
most such positions having been created during the past ten years. ( Davidson
Report, p. 23). Provision for a legislative auditor to conduct post- audits
is made in Section 4.17 of the Model State Constitution ( 6th ed., 1963).
Alaska, Michigan and Nevada not only have created a legislative auditor but
make him perform the functions of the ~ tate auditor as well. In these states,
4
as well as in Hawaii, New Jersey and Virginia, the auditor is a constitutional
office, with the incumbent elected by ~ he Legislature;. but the function performed
by the office of auditor in these states is, in fact, the legislative
post- audi~ ing function. ( Book of the States, 1966- 67, pp 151- 54). Among
other states with recent experience in constitutional revision and reorganization,
Wisconsin - which this summer completed functional reorganization of
the executive branch by statutory reorganization ( Chapter 75, Laws of 1967,)
State of Wisconsin [ Senate Bill 5z1 is now in the process of legislative
reorganization. The second draft of LRB- 5506, dated September 18, 1967, provides
for an audit bureau headed by a legislative State Auditor in the Division
of Services of the Department of the Legislature. In Maryland, the Comptroller,
a constitutional and elective officer, at present supervises the post- audit
review conducted by the State Auditor, who is an official appointed by the
Governor. The Interim Report of the Constitutional Convention Commission of
Maryland, issued May 26, 1967, has expressed itself strongly in favor of having
the post- audit function performed by an official who is completely independent
of the executive branch and responsible to the Legislature ( P. 77).
Actually, in Arizona the principle of a legislatively appointed post
auditor is not at all a new one, but one which has been accepted following
the recommendations of the Griffenhagen Report of 1949, and the creation of the
present Post Auditor in 1950. In proposing the creation of an Auditor General
and the transfer of the functions of the Post Auditor and State Examiner to the
Auditor General, tre Davidson Report and the proposed legislation simply reaffirm
an existing principle of state government organization in Arizona, extending it
logically to a uniform system for state departments, school districts, etc., by
eliminating the State Examiner.
The recommendation to eliminate the office of State Auditor and to
5
transfer his functions to the Department of Finance is based on different
considerations. There is no absolutely binding connection between the creation
of an Auditor General and the el imination of the State Auditor. The
legislative Auditor General could be authorized by law to audit the general
accounting functions of the State Auditor's office even if the latter should
continue to be an elective constitutional office. In fact, though 25 states
now have a legislative auditor, 29 states also continue to have the constitutional
office of state auditor elected by the people ( Book of the States,
1966- 67. p. 138). It is difficult to determine, however, what functions in
each case are performed by the state auditor, without looking in detail at the
statutes of each state. The situation is further complicated by the fact that
26 states also have an official called the controller, with California, New
Hampshire and New York and Tennessee each having a controller but no auditor,
while in Rhode Island the functions of both offices are performed by other
officials ( ibid., pp. 138- 9 and 150- 51).
In Arizona, the State Auditor today performs primarily a pre- audit
and general accounting fUQction. The recommendation to el iminate the office
as a separate constitutional and elective office, and to transfer the functions
of the State Auditor to the Department of FJnance in the executive
branch are based on the belief that it is Ilan anachronism in today's world"
to have an elected official perform the pre- audit and general accounting
functions of a state and that these activities may better be performed by
an official located in an administrative department within the executive
branch of state government ( Davidson Report, p. 26). This recommendation is
in 1ine with modern thinking about state government organization, as perhaps
best expressed in the following statement: liAs an aid in providing administrative
leadership, the governor should be served by a department of administration
6
headed by a chief director and composed of such divisions as budget, personnel,
planning, purchasing, accounting, and pre- auditing, each headed by a director"
( Louis E. Lambert, " The ~ xecutive Article, 1I in Major Problems in Constitution
Revisio~, W. Brook Graves, ed., Chicago: Publ ic Administration Service, 1960, p. 195).
The Model State Constitution clearly recognizes the distinction between
the post- auditing function entrusted to the legislative auditor, and general
accounting and pre- auditing, which belong in an executive department. In
states 1ike Michigan ( Constitution, Art. 5, Sect. 2) and Wisconsin ( Senate
Bill 504, September 20, 1967) these functions are entrusted to a department
of administration. Hawaii has taken a somewhat different approach, by separating
the various activities that are lumped together into one department of administration
in Alaska, Michigan, Wisconsin and other states. Hawaii has provided
for separate departments of personnel services ( Section 14A- IO Statutes of
Hawaii), of accounting and general services ( Section 14A- ll), and of budget
and finance ( Section 14A- 13). In Delaware, the Budget Director has taken
over the pre- audit functions from the Auditor, who now performs the post-audit
function formerly exercised by a budget commission. The Maryland Constitutional
Convention Commission has gone on record as saying that the keeping
of accounts and of purely administrative functions with respect to the management
of the revenue should be " exercised under the direct authority of the chief
executive." ( Interim Report, pp 76- 7).
Arizona, somewhat along the 1ines of Hawaii rather than Alaska, Michigan
Wisconsin, has taken the first step toward the development of such a struc-by
establ ishing the Department of Finance. At present, this Department
four divisions: budget division, planning division, purchasing division,
accounts and controls. The transfer of the pre- auditing and general accountfunctions
of the present office of State Auditor to the Department of Finance,
7
where there might be created a new division of auditing and accounts, would
be the next logical step in the direction of providing the State of Arizona
with a modern structure of state administrative organization.
Summary: The Joint l. egislative Budget Committee in the field of auditing,
taking into account the Recommendations of the Citizens Committee on Auditing,
is getting ready to act on draft proposals . to amend Articles 5 and 18 of the
Constitution of Arizona, eliminating the offices of State Auditor and State
Examiner, to establish the office of Auditor General and to transfer the
functions of the State Auditor, Post Auditor and state Examiner to the Department
of Finance and the Auditor General respectively. The Joint Legislative
Budget Committee is not yet ready to make recommendations in the field of
personnel services.
8
a] so to include the consideration of four-' vear terms of ofCice. "'--:"-'~-""--~"".'--""---. _.,--..._.,....."""'_.__._,...._--"~"'~_ .._-,-,..-..""".......,-_.-..,._-...~'''-~.-...~ --_.__._....,.--_.._-----
of Arizona in Article 5 specifically prescribes the fol1o\ fJing offices:
Governor, Secretary of State, State Auditor, State Treasurer, Attorney
General, and Superintendent of Publ. ic Instruction. All of these
offices are filled by elect. ion to a two- year term, as is the office
of Mine Inspector, created by Article 19. Anot'ner constitutional
officer, the State Examiner, is appointed by the Governor, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to a two- year term ( Article 22,
Section 18). Another article of the Const. ituLion of Arizona specifically
provides for an elected Corporation Commission ( Article 15), a State
Board of Educati. on ( Arti. cle 11, Section 3), and the Art zona Board of
Regents ( Article 11, Section 5). The last mentioned three offices
are not part of the present study.
Title 4- 1 of the f., Ii. z9ra He~' § Q . § tatut~: 2. sets forth the pm," ers
and duties of the Governor ( Section lQ- IOI), Secretary of State ( 4- 1- 121),
State lmdi tor ( It 1- ILtI), State Treasurer ( 4- 1- 171), and At torney
General ( 1+ 1- 191). The pO\" ers a'nd d1J. ti. es of the Superintendent of
Public Instru. ction are prescribed in the Education Code, A:~ S 15- 121- 3.
The pO'~ 18rs and duties of the State ExamIner are found in ARS 111- 333,
and of the Mine Inspector : in ARS 27- 121.
Should the Legislature decide to follow the
. thE;. - C_ j__. t.. izens Co. m. mittE._:... e..... on Auditi. I... H-_.~.! o. and eLiminate the offices oC Sta. te
9
Auditor and State Examiner, Ar. izona ",[ ould be left \.; ith only c: , "".
0 .... L. ..-~
year~; by the
people of the state: the Governor, Secretary of State, State
Treasurer, At torn,? y General, Superintendent of Pu bl. i c Ins tructi on
and Mine In£: 5pector.
Anyone concerned . wi th adrninistrati ve reorganization in Arizona
should bE~ mindful of the observation made in the grif[ erl.. 0.. § '.&. QnRfl, JlO1;: 1:
The point should be made strongly that administrative reorganization
and the elimination of certain constitutionaJ and elective offices
are interrelated - but, also, that they are not the same. Itis
easiest to reorganize the executive branch of state government by
eliminating all constitutional officers save the Governor and a
Lieutenant Governor or, as in Arizona, a Secretary of State. However,
should the political environment require to go about administrative
reorganization at a different pace, it is perfectly possible to
leave the E~ xisting executive offices as elective consti tutional
offices and yet go ahead and regroup the existing administrative
agencies, boards and commissions into fewer and more manageable
departments.
The II idealtt solution to s trengtheni. ng the role of the Governor
as chief executive is to eliminate as many elective and constitl1tlonal
offices as possible and put the Governor, as a single executive, in
charge of the executive branch. This solution was adopted in Alaska,
10
where only the Governor and Secretary of State are elected, in
Hawaii, where only the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor are
elected, and in NeVI Jersey where the Governor is the only official
elected by the people. It is a solution also proposed by the Con-stitutional
Convention Commission of Maryland ( Interim Report, p. 78),
and in the Model State Constitution ( comment to Section 5. ot+-, 6th
1963, pp. 68, 69). But poll tical considerations and govE) rnmental
needs vary from state to state in our federal system. Michigan,
which \ Vent throu. gh a constitutional convention in 1963, provided
, ' 80.. ,
for the election not only of a Governor and Lieutenant Governor on
the same ticket, but also retained the constitutional and elective
offices of Secretary of St. ate and Attorney General, plus the consti-tutional
office of the Auditor, to be elected by the Legislature.
Hisconsin, just this year, has ratified a constitutional arnendment
increasing the terms of Governor and Lieutenant Governor from t', ro
to four years, \ ori th the provision that they be elected on the same
ticket, but has reta. ined the other const. i. tut. ional offices and
increased their term to four years as well. Yet, without waiting
for a constitutional amendment to specifically authorize reorgani-zation,
the Wisconsin Legislature also has gone ahead and exercised
the authority it already possesses \ lnder the constitution of that
state, and has reorganized the executive branch ( Laws of 1967, Ch. 75,
Laws of vHsconsln). Ninety- one separate agenc. ies have been reduced
to 32 reorganized departments and agenc18s.
CJO1. orad0, , na. vlng StUdI' ed t. \ De prob_ lem OL~ reo. rganl. z. a. 0. l. 0n contl'nu-ously
since 1961, in the 1966 general elec: tion over.....! helmingly ( by a
vote of 369,. 366 to 162,0.38) adopted a reorganization amendment,
11
add'l'. nn · th- e Ifol: lo'., ri" ng Section to Article It of the Colorado. C" cJllsti tut, i() n~
Cpt" t l or" 2" PI"; Y''' l' '\~ li (~<-:>~ 1'~"""" Cl1" 1I" ~" 11 ex .•' ~ .,' ,. " d w ~ \,~ .. 1_' _ 1 ... c. lSI _*<.;~,.~~~,, l;;:":' i::~!;,"--.~:~,. 2J;;;~,~.~,;~;:~ 2:~,.,~" « 2I. ..,~\ ,',." ~;.. e c t, 1 L, . i.- V l.-~ ,1! .1"
administrative ofi'ice5~ ag(;: mejes~ and instrumentaJities
of the executive department of state government and
t'rl8. l....,... .' ren.'," p'nJ'"- t''. l'Ve" .- tt" tl'. flC' t,". j~ .0..> n" 1<.:.". , p · '' I''." J,~,~,,',_,.'., L~ 5, a" nrui Q' Uvt' 1- c. o. r:->< , e,_ i\ rC, E.: p+"
for~ he ofFice of governor and lieute~ a~~ gov~ rnor,
shall bt;, a. l1oeated by l< 3. w among aJid \> 11 trun not more
than bfenty departments by no later the. n . June 30~ 1968.
Subsequently, all new powers or functions shall be
~ f:~ · l-\ lo.~'.:\ d to. d":', l;-'~~-~~ t-"-; nr~ e dl~ l- 1sioni::'" eo, t · ,~ · <'" ... .;:~ ~~..:>" gll,,~ ", 0 elHh , t'L. l~:' 1 ~"'~" 4.'''~ .}~ C Ion.:>, 01 un. u. s
In such a manner as WI, Ll tonG. to prOVI de < 3, n orderly
arrangement in the administrative organization of state
govermnent. Temporary commissions may be established
by l;. n~ r and need not be allocated \>; lthin a princIpe]
departmont $ Nothing j n thi. s sectj on shcJ11 supersede
the provisions of section 13, article XII, of this
con <::~ · l · t': l~~"' rl ( Col"' r~' d'"' It::> CY'l' C"! l Qt";," D Cr'l) n('~' l ("' t'r,"" - _....,. l. t ' "" L ,1... \".'" _.. _~ .• ,", l jl_ { j.. \ .. "~ j _ ;'.:.~ - 6 - "'"' J: J.~....,. v , J". oJ ,;, \" i,... ..;, .'" .1" . 0. a. J .1. ,
' ll',"' Cf" O'Ul<]," oJ."(".>',''' n, d, l.'. r, t; lj 1' J~ o • .1... , 1~''< 1-' 0:.' Y 1.. 2' , 1,.~ 9. {'. J.' I7) ~
' rhe reef renes I. n to'ne last sentence of this constitutional provision
is to the civil service system which is very strong in Colorado.
Tha existing plural executive offices have been brought under the
span of control tb. rough integration into the reorganized frome\>; ork
' of not more than tvlenty government departments, though the exist Ing
consUtutional offices as such have been preserved. In essence, the
Colorado solution simply by- passed the - issue of rev1sing the executive
article through constitutional amendments eliminating the established
constitutional offices, and concentrated on reorganization authority
instea. d. The reorganization au thori ty obtained, ho\,; evcr , , i s of a
limited nature, since it requires Jegislative action and does not
gi ve the governor 3uthori ty to reorganize by execu, t.. Lve order, as
provlded for in the Modn1 State Constitution ( Section 5.06), the
Constitution of Alaska of 1956 ( Article 3, Seetion 2.3), {) nd the
Constitution of Michigan of 1963 ( Schedule and Tempcirary Provisions,
Sf-~' c t · lon 1,2_) •
12
The point cannot be made too strongly: the constitutiona]
a, eS1,,' t-; I1o~,, l- t<- ." 1' 0" lJ, oJ1:> an executive officer does not necessarily determine
the location of the functions he p~ rformS withih the administrative
structure of state government organization. An analysis of the
eight constitutional offices i. n Arizona \ vhlch are su. bject of the
present study 51' 101-. 11< 1 proceed \ 11 tll that in mind. Four of the officers
are given functions which not only are essential,
I ncrl'~~'] lv s~ rqct'] rea'-
. " •• I.,,' ~ " •. "'--. 1 "" - L. .. -
also arE'.:
there has to be a Governor and a possible successor to that office,
in Ari zona the Secretary of State. If hit; tory, trad! tion and custom
in other states is any indication, it is only fit and proper that
thesr; blO off: icers be elected by the people of the state. In all
states the Governor is elected. In addition, 38 states provide for
' an elected Lieutenant Governor, and one, Tennessee, provides for the
election of the Lieutenant Governor by the state Senate. All s tat(~ s
but Hawaii (\> Jhich, hm · tever, has an elective Li€! utenant Governor)
also have a Secretary of State, and in 39 of the 50 states he is
elected. - Only three states do not have eithor a popularly- elected
Lieutenant Governor or Secretary of State: Maine, which has no
Lieutenant Governor and elects its constitutional Secretary of State
by the Legislature; New < Tersey, vlhich has adopted the most radical
and consistent system of reorganization, has no Lieutenant Governor
and provides for the appointment of a Seeretar- y of state by the
Governor \ vit. b the consent of the Senate; and Tennessee, HhE? re the
Ljp u+ eYl::< nt G. Jr" J'rnrnor i q p1 (" c" ted ' o'v' t, l)~" ~ f"' r. lat8, and "': here the' consti- - v .............. .... ..., .... , ....., _ .. _ .~ ....." .6 V vi.......... "-' - - -
tutional office of Sec: retary of State is filled by electio~] through
13
of the office of Secretary of St e as an
office, the experience of other st~ tes
a step. It is my belief that it is best in keeping with tr3dition
to al10\{ the people to 01 sct at Jeas t the chief cxeeut i VI) and hi s
successor, as we do OIl the na'tiOYlal level by elect1. ng ' the Presiderlt
and Vice Prosidcnt. The only question \' lOuld be \' fhethcl' ' NO should
rename the Secretary of State !! I~ ' i el: Lt erlB. rl't (} o" il~}: rr1() r ~?: al1d, th~ l t ' v! C)'.. J,], d , ,
bring a t complj. cati. ons, because i. n most sta. tes that have a
Lieutenant Governor he also is the officer vlho pres ides over the
Senate. There is little likelihood that Arizona is in tho mood
and Secretary of state should be retajnedas elective eonstitutlonal
other t.\ · 1' 0 orf leers \ i11O perform functions Wh. i. CIl not on] y CH'l:~ CS ~) cn ti al
but also are 1, ogleal1y structured are th,? A. tt() rrH~ Y General and the
Superintendent of Pu bI. ie Ins true tion. Fol1m · ; jng the recom1icnda t j ons
the llJ'izona Re\ rLsed Statutes p. rovi. de that
t' } . t t Lie ll.- orney ru; 8rwral". 1811t11':') h · c:'! a d 0f' t'ne n. epa.!'\~, IiFml~: 0i" 1. ct\ i l/. l" U" l( u' ,' U. - J, 92 ) ~
Instruction is
the head of the Department of Public Instruction. Lalrr and educat. ion
81" e vita:! functions of state governmEmt, and nobody \., rQulcl arglw
seriously against the need for a Department of Law and a Depart~ cnt
of Public Inf.; trll. Gtion. ml.'' ne () r',}., :.? q'L'. "" C' t · 1'. {" T, ,... e ct'-" 1. V · }' "'. '"'" c'" t n' {' Y' f' r10 ~ ","",' of ~ ...... +.-'" u., . ILl .....< l.,, t'v'" _~ ~ nlll.,~ ,-'" , ... ~ '--,
At t. arnay General as hE: ad of the D~: DaT'tm · :! nt of L:: n · '!, and the Super jntcm-dont
as head of the Department of . Pu blic Inst!' ll. eti on should be cons t: L-tutional
officers elected by the people, or ' dhether thi; y should be
III
officjals appoi. nted by the Governor, probably with the edviee and
consent of the Senate? That is a question which must take into
account purely politi. cal considerat, ions. Is the aboLi. tion by
constItutional amendment of the offiees possibl e? Is it desirable?
\ 1ould it make easier completion of adm: inistrati. ve reorganization in
other areas and, therefore, shou. ld ' lOt T'Of lV''' · tOr:''''' 1' 1 · .,...."' · t rj-,,, · )? ", J. y .'-' ........ __ . J..,- lv 0'- iV}.• ' I'he~; e
are questions for you to answer. As I have pointed out, differ~ nt
states with recent experience in administrative reorganization have
found different answers.
considerations undoubtedly prevail with regard to the remaining four
constitut " lonal offi. ces, the needs of' the state are perha. ps di fferent
in th. ese areas. I am referr. ing to the State Au. ditor., state Treesurer,
State Exam. iner and Nine Inspector. Each of these offiecrs performs
functions necessary within the context of Arizona government. But
from the vantage point of mod~ rn public administration the question
arises not only whether these functions should be performed by
constitutional offices all of whom ( with the exception of the State
elected by the people, but also i'i" hethcr these fUDctior1S
should be performed at 0.11 by separate executi ve and administrati va
offices~ Should these functIons not rather bE: reass. igned to other
government departmonts?
As discussed under Item 1,
above, the D3Vid § . Q.! 1 Bg, p. Q. Et a. nd the draft legislation prepared for
the ~ Joint LegIslative Budget Committee propose the aboli Lion of the
offices of State Auditor and state Examiner by consti tu tiona] [,; r: end-mente
The pre- audit and general accounting functions of th~ State
jl, ud'i tor \ iQuId be transferred to the Dop
post- aucntulg functions of the State Examine. I" Hnd of the statutory
15
offlce of Post Auditor " JOuld be transf<: H'red to the ne'w llJldi tor
General, appo: intE"; d by the lE! gislative branch* Such a move would
same t. i mE.~ it '>' lOulct preserve the ne(~ essa: ry checks and. balDnc8::, bf
§ J~£: t~ L.. Ir. s. f&; su. rer. The Eleventh Arizona Tovm HalJ a] so has
Hall have gone on record as favoring such change ( E: I:' I~ Q. t. t .. S2, L. JJ!. Q
strengthen the control of the Governor over fiscal matters, which
gi ving the Legislature clear authority in tht? a. re& 4 of the po~, t~ a\ J. diting
the Ijeld of state government organization~ and from that polnt of
view, one vIi th \. fhieh it is difficult to quarrel, ( see! for ins tance,
was started with the creation of a Department of
especially pp. 65'- 72). ' I'he participants of the Eleventh Arizona ' I'm · m
Heport to the Eleventh Arizona TOvm Hall, Phoenix, Arizona Academy, 1967,
of political feasibility and of a tactics nature could speak against
in the constitut. ion and elected by the people •. In Maine, :'! arY}. and,
carpenter and Elias,
his functions be transferred to a new division of revenue in the
in the other states, this proposal \ iould appear to be much more
the implementation . of these proposals. There is no functional need
for the state Auditor and State Exa: m: iner in the form in vrhich these
functlon. It j s a solution vihich is in LIne "' lith modern thi nking . in
Dep~ rtment of Finance. Viewed against the constitutional arrangement
offices are constituted at the present.
recommended that the office of the State Treasurer be abolished, and
controversi. al.
16
Ne'" j Hampsh5. re and Tennessee the Treasurer is c,. const.: L t. ut j onal
officer elected by the Legislature~ In Virginla the Treasurer is
appoInted by the Governor, \;/ i th the approval of b6th houses of t. he
legislature, and In Hichigan and New Jersey he is appointed by the
Governor subject to the advice and consent 6f the Senate. Only
Alaska $ EawaLL, No\'! York and the ComrrKmv: ealth of Puerto Hieo have
abolished the office of Treasurer altogether~
In the 1t' 7 stati'? s that have a 1.' reaSUI" f': l', hlS pr, inc: ipa] function
is that of custodian of public m( m. jes~ This is true ",! Iso j n i:'. l.~ izona
( ARC i" j .1( 72) '''." u'tJ..., · =; I_~ - e
aetual payment
Part of thIs
of war: rants~
eustodJanshlp function is to make the
In A, Taska tht s i. s done by tfHc: I);; par'tmcnt
by · thl'C Ii, l.""",." t'o, l' ot" H"~ r, rlnj~ e · ' j r" He, · , vo"''!.'' "' __" _... a...& ' 10.. ..._ - __ ~... J, """. 1 J.. c.: A ... ;".... _,; I, _.~ l'~ ' N .1. . I-,... ~
by the CommIssioner of Taxation and F'inance; and in the CommonHEHtlth
of Puerto Hico by the Bureau of the Treasury in the TreaSL1. ry Department,.
Fol1m'ilng the example of, the short ballot o( h"' oeated in the 1: 1.2.921.
Alaska . and Ha", raii, the Maryland Constitutional CO! 1\~(: ntion Con: mission
and implemented most consistently in
also vlould abolish all elective COTJstJtntionaJ office;') save the
PP* 78, 79, 98). The elimination of the constitutional and elective
office o. r Treasurer 1n firi zona. was recommended by the . Qr i [ J. en})~: 3. n
E~ 1?.': i1:' t.~ vlhich would have transferred to a Department of Revenue the
functions of the Treasurer together with those of the Tax Commission,
the Estate T~ x Commissioner and the Department of Liquor Ljcenses and
Control ( pp. 61~ 62)~ This recommendation had the support of the
special l, egislative committee which re~ ie~ ed the Gr~ iffenhagen
17
proposals an appointive state treasurer would have headed a division
of the tre[~ sury i. n the Department of Revenue Clbj.,; i., p. 63).
The reasons for eliminating the Treasurer hs a constitutional
office are the sarna as those g: iven by the advocates of strong
executive tlo'weI:' for mal{ ing all officials but the Governor and the
Lleut. enant Govern. or or Secretary of State appointive positions.
These ri::: 3. S0ns are vlel1 stated in the comment to Section 5.0' 7 of the
Modol State Constitution:
' I'he gov(~ rnor as respons. i. hie hea. d of the Ei. dmin. i str at lorl
should have the unencumbered power to select and, when
n (,~. · . lcoC~ l-. c:"-"':!-''''' t'' t'r'.".'' Jf'' 1 ~.,. ei~ 1l"'''' 10\' 1' ii_' 0 tt1•~ e•'[ If':~ Jl,.. a... .. U.: t, t~''"' , o. f' -. i~, dr'. MU!~;...'- f\..," YJ','_,• l". c,' drt~'~ l,:.. \'" · ~'-)
departments. Pu bl. i c effie lais at the of depart-ment
head are not only adlninJ str s bu t also pCl. 1! cy
m...,'_ 0-- y;. ~ ..... h d- t":! ' nl''' V~"' 1 1 ~ b'Y: l Q" l.,}"..".,... '~ c !. ia. I\~. t.. p o. j , .;> ... v .... u c ._. f;;;: it. A.~', · y' ,~,.; l. yL~ ld " Ff'" 1t'~''' '~,." t "~" e. l) i'"- t..":::" 1 .' 1...'. 1!. Tjy "_ l'" U'~~ .'",,", " l"') C'). r- h\ t:>"' 1, · } d.....,.~ t":.:" J;
to the governor ( 6th ad., 1963, p. 72).
The question of retaining or eliminating the constitutional
office of State Treasurer, like that of recommending the abolition
of any constitutional office, again is a policy questiorl which only
the Council on Organizatiofl of Arizona stat, e Government and not its
consultant can resolve. The function of being custodian of public
monies and issu. ing \<: arrants for the. ir dlsblu'sement obv. i. ously neE:: ds
to be perforrned withIn the frame',.{(). rk of state govermiFmt. In 110
sta, tes thi s . i s donc-: by an offjc inl directl. y elee ted by the people.
However', the other ten states show that it nOl'.? G nf; t necess~~ ri1y bo
done that way~ and ~ n. la5ka, Hawaii and Ne; · [ York have shO\ Jln
state can do without the office of treasurer altogether. Even in
Arizona today, the State Treaslrrer is not the custodi an of all s te te
Commission, the A. rizclni'l PO" Jfer Attthority~ and the Industri; l
funds. The t. hree state .. .. .. urn vel'S 1. tl 5S, the Employment Securlty
. .
~" S S . lOrl
are custodi ans of theIr o..... m funds ( Carpenter and EJ ias, . QQ- ~~_ Lt. · ~ p.
18
C() I1S() 1 : 1.. cia., tt () rl
admintstrative functions in Arizona is possi e EYVCn if tIw existing
consti tut10nBl offices are not a bol ished. As head of a. I} 2par trnent
of ReVentl8, the state Treasurer could be made to fJt . in the scher! 1e~
though perhaps not as easi- l. y and not as log1. cally as il~ his offjc~ e
were abolished and the functions transferred to a division in the.
Department of Finance.
in
-
the Constitution of Arizona the .. c. p. - .£.... li~ · OJ.. ll, ce () J lv}, lr10 its
roots in the history and economy of the state. That fact alone
requires that this office be treated with a great deal of respect
preSE · :[} t S J; Et. r t lC1Jl. ar I; o. l, i tl(; aI. I) ro t) 1 ern3 ~ j\ r. 1- L~(} rlft !) r~ Od'iJ. C es nl() r- c: thal'l
half of the copper mined in the United States, and mining contirn12S
to be one of the m,::' l nstays of}!>. rtzona! s indUS t: ry. One W01J] d 1001\
in vain for a. simil[ i, r constitutiorwl of'f'l. ce i. n states in \> Jhleh coal
or ore mining is not as essential an industry, or in which the people
working the mines did not have as significant a voice in the Consti-tutional
Convention as they did : in Ar- izona . in 1910.
At present, at least fj~ e agencies are concerned with mlDlng
.: in Arizona: the Arizona Resources ? oard, the Depart'; ent of Hinc: ral
Resources, the Bc. 1aTd of Governors of the Depar tment of' Mj ner
Resources, the Copper Tariff Board, and the Mine Inspector.
and that the duties of the Mine Inspector be exercised by a division
19
approaches in dea. l: lng vlith this problem. The Ut!: l. ll . QQ. ds of' 1953 lS
silent on the tOp. LC of a copper mine inspector$ but provides tn
Section ~+ O~' 2- 1:
For the purpose of securing an efficient and thorough
inspection of all coal and hydrocarc'On mines , tfi tJ: lin
the state, coal mine inspection and all matters
relating the~ eto shall be under the control of the
industrial commission.
' In. h. p~ . T;;;~;;~;:; h;:' n;~ ~'. r.~ PW~~ () Of. 1.!- o. 7k' 7 y"~• O, v..~..(, l't~ v~ ~ 1o!- t'[' tP. p o0! P..' ~. J~'- e.. '~ 01r h~..'. LY1\. D:- ~ JL~~.. pe3,. n- t · ' o. ~,.
by statute, b: lt m~. kes him an elective official ( Section 1+' 7- 101.).
Attempts to abol. ish thi. s office by statute have failed 5n recent
sessions of the Idaho Leg. 1s1ature.
Tht~ HflY. L? 81:! . QQge of r. lontana provides for a coal mine inspec: tor,
his term of office and his compensa. tion ( S(:; ctlon 50- 1t( 2). Eowevc-;!',
1
for sel! Gl'
the Industria. l Ace Ldents Board simply has not appointed one.
Montana Legislattve CouncLl points out:
.,."
1 ne
The statutory qualifications for an inspector are high,
and his vwrk would only be part- t1me. TI~ erefoJ'e, a man
would havG to be hired '", lith high ql1 jfiea. tions, but only
lO: t of hIs time wou. ld be needed for inspecting. Th,:;
Industrial A(; cidEmLs Board also has incli c<: tted that
federal law provides for a Federal Mining Inspector.
According to the Board, he dOGS most of the lnspecting,
and a state inspector would merely be duplicating this
work. ( Letter of Octo ber 2, 196' 7).
The question of whether A'- rizona needs a const: itutional office
of MIne Inspector! elected by the people of the state, CHn only be
resolved on the policy- making level. The question is whether there
has been a substantial change in conditlons B. nd attitudes sir!'~(, 1910.
t6 be cha, t- ged wJ. th tllC inspectIon
of our mines. \- lhether he ought to be a constitutional and el(~ ctive
20
related to the lssue of administrati "\ f8 reorganization. Reorganization
adm: inistrative agehcies~ boards and cmnmissions j. nto fC '. oJer and more
ing of the many existing
be transferred to an appointed offici in the D8pc;, rtment of Iii fH:; Y'al
authority may be obtained, and a restruc
manageable departments may be accompl1~:; h{~ d, independent of Hny change
Resources, or i. n the Department of Eea. 1th, or to the State Inc1\.: strla]
h01! IOVer, is one of POlICY, and ought to be made by the Counci. L
Summ, ill'. x.. The problem of' ehanging the P01,;{(:= I'S and d'uties of the
consti tutional officl.?: s, in terms of '!'> lhethel" thE; se off. i ces sbould be
Commlssl0n, or to a. nov! Department of Natural Resourees. The dec I si() n~
officer is highly doubtful. The function of inspecting could well
retained in their present form or made appointive} is only in part
In .. the PO\'! dl'S c: md dut: ies of the constitut1onal offices.
The Governor and Secretary of State perform functions of state
. government ',.; hlch in all but three of the 50 s tes ape per formed by
elective constitutional officers. The Attorney General as head of
the Department of Law and the Superintendent of Public Instruction
as head of the Department of Public Instruction, administer agoDcies
which \' lOuld have to be provided under any sui ta hIe pI an of organjz[, ttOlJ,
' vhether these two offices be electiv- e 01" appoi ntJ. ve posi t ions.
The state Auditor, State Treasurer, State Examino::: and Hi ne Inspector
perform duties which in te!: ms of an err: icient organization of sta. te
government could 1" 0 rt1assigned to othc? r government departments headed
by ~ ppolntive officials.
21
B..
There was little discussion of a four- year terili for executive
officers i. n the Jl. rizona Constttutlonal Convention of 1910. The
pre u"' l'l~: ng "' e · nt~" n · "" nt' "'- 8 - POi'" snO'l"' oi- p" f' ' t" e: r'lri '" r'Ild th~ ~ · l~' · a' · ' t · · l · "' n' · ' - yo.. -. l-. A.."'" ..,;;, ', 1 . Li.- i. v. 1 wet ,1 ~ ioo- .... ! J.,. V_ L ,. i._~~")" ct l. · .., J' ... l.":: v ct " L ...... J ! c1..,, 1..
doetrine vJaS ,,{ ell expressed by Hr. M. G. Cunniff, delegate from
Yavapai County:
One of the guarantees of democratic government is
short terms wtth frequent roference to the people,
(,: lnd : it seems to be the best.: form of government In
any sta. te is to have the governor elected for tvIO
years•• " " In the state in which I was bo: t'n we
h-,~ a''~' e t" 118... g. o) v, · ","-"+} · ", n_ o", · ,~'~ t. ,6.~....) · l/ Ir\,. c...:..> o\ to'. U.! U, o. nA."',"~ y.. e · Q~ k;, r; cl~. tn~' d <" J~ \.,....;.. ("." n'. k~_ · sl1J.;. A-:.'". l,~_ fV, · J. · (,.; w,....'\ al.
amendment changing It to tyro years \ 1aS vot(;; d dov/ n
over1; lhelmingly. ( Quoted in Riggs, QI!,. fjJ~.• , ppe 17,18).
The argmnent in favor of four- year terms has been equally well
put by the Statement on Na. tional Policy by the Research and PoLicy
Commit tee of the Corumittee for Econom: ic; Development ~ 1' IS2. gel: rlt~.: tng,
The two year term and constitutional barriers to selfsuccession
disregard the need for continuous long- .
range pIa. nning. The value of experll;-:; need ITwnager. ia. l
. leadershIp is also dlsccmnted. States fortunate
enough to have outstancLing governors are deni ed the
benefits of continuing service. We believe that all
governors should have four- year terms, with the right
to seek re- elect. lm1 1Jlithout restriction as to number
of terms ( p. 47).
ArIzona's efforts to extend the terms - of pub. lic offie. ials from
t". ro to four years have been notlcea bIy unsuccessful over the yea:!':::,
i r' ' 1 022 (,.- t "' t · e ,~ , _ .. J.",. \..:> '.< ,
and leg: i sl ati ve
amendments referred by the Legislature to the people
whether directed at the execut5ve or at the legislative braneh. It
constitutional amendment :. initiated by petition to extend the tenure
of state officers was defeated in 1926; as were constitutional
22
and
i. n 1950 ( terms of state executive officers and eou. nty offic: jcds).
( F'or a tabulatj. on see JUnk,
of the state
has changed much since 1950, the last year in 1j./ hLch such an Ei. mendment
was referred, and the Qegative evidence of the experience of the
pas t is rendered inconclus: i. ve by the fact th~~ t in 1961+ the peDple
p": titton
to extend the terms of county off'. i. ces from t1tm to four Y8: JJ'S. The
substantial majority of the vote in favor, 219,329 against 131,604,
may be an indj" cation that the Arizona eleetcn'ate might Dm'l lc) uk upon
a four- year term for state offices more approvingly than in the past.
N' 7. ltlonal1Y1 without . any dou. bt, the trend has bElen tal/ lords a
four- year term for the governor, which office will be used in the
fol1o~ ilng to survey developments : in the states of the Union. In 1895,
office,
states, bro years, and in Rhode: Island,
one year." ed., Vol. I) 1
Today, the desirability of a four- year term is generaLly accepted, and
constltutjonal changes ie the various states have been from a shorter
term to the four- year term of office ( Louis E. Lambert, " The F: xccut: j ve
Chicago, 1960, p. 191).
At the preser. it ttme, 40 states prov: ide for a rour · ~ year gu [ Y: rna-torial
term; with only the follow. i. ng states retaining a two- y ar term:
tbe Governor
' l'~ bl e · 1" p ~ A "'>-." , $
Also,
states provide for
which will begin to
South
0,
n". 1Jy -- 18
~ unlike 26 other ... ~ l. lTu8,
vlitl1
In t\ · ! O states, New i4exleo and South Dakota, the Governor' is
In th~: 110 states "" lith a four~ yeB: r term, the Governor j_:; not
Ariz. ona is one of the ten states \- lhere the foret:' of p. toCY'cssi vism
23
Limitations of this kind restrict the right of the
people to pass judgment upon tlH~ quaI. i ty of the
gUber~ atori service performed for them and thus
eliminate from the field the one candidate about
whom the voters usually know the most. From a
program policy point of view, a restriction on
service in office affects the governbr's ability
to develop and implement a long range plan ( Comrn2nt
to SecUon 5.02, Q.£. cit., p. 66).
is Limited by the state consti tutJon to two succossivo four- · year
to a two- year term.
elected for a tVlo- year term, ,,, 1 th a cons t i tutional barrier agai ns t
Kentucky,
a four- year term of office
tion31 offic: ers
Tennessee,
do so in 1970) and have no cotistitutional limitations against a third
terms in 11 more states: Alaska, Delaware, Loulslana, Maine,
hs. s been strong enough to limi t the GOVl:} T'DOr ( ari. d th( 3 othE: r con~~ titl. 1-
successive term. The Medel state Constitution . is . in favor of a four-on
the number of terms:
year gubernatorial term and is strongly opposed to any restriction
the OIlly elective constitll~
as lorlg as
and to extend the term of the remaining
the Attorn(; y General be
succeeding himself for
Arizona Constitution creates no C: OY1SU
]}. t tornc~ y GenDral and S1., tpm'intendent of Puoj i. c Instrueti on, independent
and the Secretary of State; or the Governor, Secretary of State,
Governor
Ar.- iZ() i' 1ft Statf~ (; o" l/ er" r1m(~ r1t. YC)' ll fficty" decide to 1,(~( lVE: tt12 tC~ i'rns () C
the I, l: nt tat: ion th,;, t the Govo. rnor be li. mi ted to tvm success ive terms
tional officers, each to be elected to a four- year term, but with
shorten the ballot, which : is another 1rlay of saying l1nether to eliminate
t,.' ne Governor ana'
the Governor to four years ( p. 45), and the special legislative
stB. tes.
the Governors, is one of policyconside~ ation. To reduce the number
office as they are. Or you may decide to recommend four~ Y8~ r terms
of the solutIon you may \,, rish to adopt eoncerningreten t ion or 3bo11 t. ion
comrrdttee consider'j_ ng the Griffenhagen recorrilnendc~ tions pI'c, poscd that
to recommend four- year terms only for the Governor; or the Governor
the plural executive jn order to strengthen the powers and duties of
\
constitutionaJ officer from t · wo to four years would be j n keepi. ng
would al. so be in line , vi th the more pJ'ogressive dcveJopmentsin otbt":! r
with modern thinking among experts in state govermlent. Such solution
of the other constitutional offices. The question of whether to
for executive offices under consjderati() n~ Or YOIl may decide
$' 7 1
RJlOde Island, Kansas, Massachuset ts and 1' 1aryland In $
d 1 ~" t'~ f'- f' • • '. b]" .. t ~, assume' Jy an 8. L€ 5CeCl o~ - tlCl2. J e . onglng 0 ale
P
., .
- ennsYJ, vanla,
to becom~~ effective in 1970), and by statlltQry provi. s: ion j n Connecticut
Since in Arizona the duties of the Governor fall upon tho Secretary
CO" lC' ~" ' 1' !-" 11+ 1' 01" 1 0 f h ' 1 ~' Sk~, ,\ '" I- i ~., "" ' 1" ' I ' I' Sc> n~' i on Q ' T' h,(.> ,.. L. .....) l,.. \.. t _"~'..... . r\.. j.~ O ",,\ G.~ ", 1,1, ...,.~, __ j ...._ ."., ,., t::'... \.", t~_. J.,,' ... . t. .... J~ J.. . L. t. ......
secretary of state shall be nominated in the manner
provided by 1 En,,- for nomlnati, ng candidates for other
elective offices. In the general election the votes
cast for governor shall be considered also cast for
the candidate ror secretary of state running joi. ntly
wi. th him. The candidate.: whose name appe< 3!' s on the ba' 11ot
jointly wi. th that of the successful candidate for governor
shall be elected secr~ tary of state.
25
and Legisl<-) ture of Arizona to submit to the ehoctorate of tho state
Alaska 1 y, thich like Arizona has no Lieutenant Gov'arnor, the 1956
a constitutional amendment calLing for basic changes in the exceuLj va
article of the Constitution of Arizona, you may also wish to consider
Shou. 1 d you decide tha t j t is your recornmendation to the Governor
and thus, prcsu; nably, would guarantee SOlliE! contlnuJ ty in poIiej. es &
the joi. nt el. ection, of the Governor and of the Secretary of State ..." ould
has been effected by constitutSonal prcndsion i. n NeVI Yorl\ ( 19,53),
to the aleetJon of the President and Viee Pl'i:? sident under irrtle1. e ;[ 1,
See tieD 1 and the XlIth . uJDendment of the Canst: i tu tion of the United
assure the people of Arizona that the of rice of thE; GO'\ tf3I': lOl' ~.; ould be
Consti t,- ttion provides for the joint election of the Governor and of
States c The j oint election of the Governor:' and Lteutenant Gow~ rnoI'
the joint election of the Governor and the Secretary of State, similar
disabU, ity, or rernoval from office of the Governor ( A: rticle ), S~ Jet.. ion 6),
the Secretary of state:
of State in the case of the death, resignation from office, permanent
( 1962)~ Similar proposals for joint electJon have been introdnc: ed 1n
26
. § urrgrrtlrL:'-' In 1895, only 19 states elected their Governor for
a four- yea: r term. Today, 40 states make provj sion for a four- yC': ar
term for the Governo. I' and for most other canst! tutiona. l eXf,): cut: i. ve
offices. Tt, renty= four states restr5 ct the Governor . in the right to
succeed himself. In 11 states he may have only one term, I" n ._ 3
he may not succeed hims~ lf beyond a second term. The national trend
is toward lengthening the term of tile Governor and other executive
officers.
Retention of the plural executive is not incompatible with
proposing a constitutional amendmeht to extend the terms of some
ex(,;: cutlVfJ officers, 11ke the Governor and the Secretary of St8te~
Twelve states now either have provisions for the joint election of
the Governor and the Lieutenant GovHrnor or the Secretary of State,
or are considering constitutional changes to that effect.
