Performance audit, Department of Corrections, adult insititutions security

              DOUGLAS R. NORTON. CPA
AUDITOR GENERAL
STATE OF ARIZONA
OFFICE OF THE
AUDITOR GENERAL
November 21 , 1985
Members of the Arizona Legislature
The Honorable Bruce Babbitt, Governor
Samuel A. Lewis, Director
Department of Corrections
Transmitted herewith i s a report of the Auditor General , A Performance
Audit of the Department of Corrections, Adult Institutions Security. This
report i s i n response to the January 30, 1985 resolution of the Joint
Legislative Oversight Committee.
The report addresses deficiencies in perimeter and internal security at
the adult institutions, and problems i n control 1 ing contraband. We found
the security risks arising from these conditions are compounded by
misclassification of inmates which results i n higher risk inmates being
placed i n lower security f a c i l i t i e s . Finally, we found the Department's
current construction program will not provide enough maximum custody beds
to meet current or future needs.
My staff and I will be pleased to discuss or clarify items in the report.
Respectfully submitted,
~ ougws R. Norton
Auditor General
Staff: Mil 1 iam Thomson
Mark S. Fleming
Arthur E. Heikkila
Stuart Go1 dstein
Kimberly S. Hi1 debrand
Jerome E. K i 11 er
Dennis B. Murphy
Cindy 6. Whi taker
Enclosure
2700 NORTH CENTRAL AVE. SUITE 700 PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85004 ( 602) 255- 4385
SUMMARY
The Office o f the Auditor General has conducted a performance audit of the
Arizona Department of Corrections ( DOC) security function. This audit was
conducted i n response to a January 30, 1985, resolution o f the J o i n t
Legislative Oversight Committee which requires a performance audit o f DOC,
and i s one i n a series of audits o f the Department.
The findings discussed be1 ow summarize serious problems i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l
security. The report does not di scl ose s p e c i f i c d e t a i l s because such
d e t a i l s could be used as a " blueprint" f o r further security breaches.
However, the Department has been f u l l y informed o f a l l i d e n t i f i e d problems
t o a1 low it to take necessary corrective action. Some o f these corrective
actions may take time t o implement. According t o the security consultants
retained by the Auditor General, many of DOC's security deficiencies
developed over a long period o f time, and are the r e s u l t o f inadequate
resources or inadequate management o f these resources. I n addition,
changes affecting inmate a c t i v i t i e s and p r i v i 1 eges should be made
gradually to minimize inmate tension and h o s t i l i t y which could lead to
additional security probl ems.
Security A t Various Adult Prisons I s Inadequate
( see Finding I , pages 5 through 18)
DOC does not provide adequate security a t some o f i t s adult correctional
faci 1 i t i e s . N. R. Cox and Associates, a corrections consulting firm
retained by the Auditor General to assist i n analyzing security a t DOC's
a d u l t i n s t i t u t i o n s , i d e n t i f i e d security deficiencies a t many o f the adult
f a c i l i t i e s . A t some i n s t i t u t i o n s these security deficiencies r e s u l t i n
securi ty 1 eve1 s be1 ow t h a t necessary f o r the resident popul ation.
Perimeter security deficiencies currently e x i s t i n fences, electronic
detection systems, use of guard towers and v i s i b i l i t y a t many o f the adult
f a c i l i t i e s . For example, a l l but two o f the f a c i l i t i e s v i s i t e d by Auditor
General security consul tants lacked inner fences secured i n cement, and
s u f f i c i e n t razor wire and razor tape to discourage escape o r i n t r u s i o n
attempts. I n addition, the electronic detection systems a t Arizona State
Prison Complex ( ASPC )- Tucson and ASPC- Perryvi 11 e have been extremely s l ow
i n a c t i v a t i n g alarms and have f a i l e d t o a c t i v a t e i n t r u s i o n alarms on some
occasions. These perimeter security inadequacies have created
opportunities f o r escapes. Between January 1984 and May 1985 a t o t a l of
56 inmates escaped through the perimeters of the various adult
i n s t i t u t i o n s .
Security deficiencies within the various f a c i l i t i e s have created
unnecessary r i s k s f o r both inmates and s t a f f . For example, a t
ASPC- Fl orence Central Uni t the 1 ocking mechanism t o c e l l bl ock 1 has
shorted out and rusted due t o the leaky showers. Consequently, c e l l doors
do not function e l e c t r o n i c a l l y and must be opened manually. As a r e s u l t
correctional service o f f i c e r s must carry keys t o open individual c e l l s and
keys t h a t open the f r o n t door t o the f a c i l i t y . I n addition, i n the
Central Unit cellblock 2, the f a c i l i t y ' s locking system does not work
properly. I n order t o open one c e l l door on a t i e r , a l l o f the 26 c e l l s
must be opened a t once.
A1 though DOC has made e f f o r t s to i d e n t i f y and remedy security
deficiencies, additional work i s necessary. To improve security , DOC
should take an inventory of perimeter and i n t e r n a l security needs and
deficiencies, correct those t h a t can be addressed immediately and request
adequate funding from the Legislature t o correct the remaining
deficiencies.
The Department O f Corrections Does Not Adequately
Control Contraband ( see Finding 11, pages 19 thorough 35)
DOC has not effectively prevented the introduction of contraband i n t o
correctional f a c i l i t i e s or adequately control led internal sources of
contraband. Lack of s u f f i c i e n t DOC staff or inadequate s t a f f observation
during v i s i t a t i o n s has resulted i n v i o l a t i o n s of DOC'S p o l i c i e s forbidding
pro1 onged embracing, kissing and petting between inmates and v i s i t o r s .
Such contact i s not only forbidden by Department policy, but provides
extreme potential for transferring contraband. Current food and open yard
practices, inoperable metal detectors, and inadequate searches a1 so a1 1 ow
contraband t o enter correctional faci 1 i t i e s undetected.
Internal sources o f contraband are also improperly controlled by DOC. For
exampl e :
e Tools were unsecured a t the ARCOR building a t ASPC- Perryville.
Wire cutters, long shears, f i l e s , etc. were observed i n an
unlocked cabinet. There was no supervision i n the area. Our
consultants took several o f these items and l e f t the grounds with
them. Ten days l a t e r the tools had not been reported missing.
e An open box o f syringes was observed i n a supply room a t Alhambra
where an unsupervised inmate was working.
An unsecured portable acetylene welding torch was observed i n the
ASPC- Fl orence Central Unit maintenance shop by the consul tants.
The Department O f Corrections M i s c l assi f ies
Adult Inmates, Which Increases Security Risks
( see Finding 111, pages 3/ through 44)
DOC's inmate c l a s s i f i c a t i o n system does not properly c l a s s i f y adul t ma1 e
inmates. Results of an evaluation by Correctional Services Group, Inc., a
correctional consul ti ng f i r m retained by the Auditor General ' s Office,
indicates t h a t the Department i s underclassifying inmates. More than
6 percent of the inmates sampled currently c l a s s i f i e d as minimum custody
or lower would be assigned t o maximum custody by the Federal Prison
System's ( FPS) Custody Determination Instrument. Overall, the evaluation
found t h a t DOC r e c l a s s i f i e s only 18 percent of i t s inmate population as
maximum custody, while the FPS instrument indicates t h a t 31 percent should
be r e c l a s s i f i e d as maximum custody. Although the FPS model has not been
val idated f o r the Arizona inmate population, the 1 arge difference i n
r e s u l t s indicates s i g n i f i c a n t miscl assi f i c a t i o n .
M i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n increases security r i s k s because higher custody inmates
are placed i n lower custody f a c i l i t i e s . These security r i s k s are further
increased by DOC's inadequate f a c i l i ty security. Two medium f a c i l i t i e s
were rated as only minimum f a c i l i t i e s by the security consultants. Thus,
maximum custody inmates who are miscl a s s i f ied as medi um rnay actual l y be
housed i n minimum custody f a c i l i ties.
The Current Construction Program W i l l Not Provide
' The Department With Enough Maximum Custody
Beds ( see Finding I V , pages 45 through 52)
According t o analysis conducted by the Auditor General's c l a s s i f i c a t i o n
consul tants, DOC'S current prison construction program w i l l not provide
enough maximum and minimum custody beds t o meet projected needs. Although
DOC w i l l have an excess of medium custody beds, the analysis indicates
t h a t DOC could be short as many as 1,000 naximum custody beds a t the
completion o f the current construction program i n March 1987. The
consultants used the objective, val idated Federal Bureau of Prisons
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n model. A1 though t h i s model may not be completely v a l i d for
the Arizona inmate population, the large difference i n results from
Arizona's present system indicates t h a t the Department lacks s u f f i c i e n t
maximum custody beds. Using the Department's conservative estimate of
$ 45,000 per bed t o construct maximum custody f a c i l i t i e s , as much as $ 45
m i l l i o n o f construction may be required t o b u i l d enough additional maximum
security beds t o meet custody requirements by March 1987.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
FINDING I: SECURITY AT VARIOUS ADULT PRISOfiS IS INADEQUATE . . . . . 5
Perimeter Security Deficiencies Lead To Escapes . . . . . . . . . 5
Internal Security Probl ems Pose
Risks To Both Inmates And Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Security Ratings A t Several F a c i l i t i e s Are Too High . . . . . . . 13
Further Action Required To Improve Security . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
FINDING 11: THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS DOES NOT ADEQUATELY CONTROL CONTRABAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
DOC Does Not Adequately Restrict
Contraband From Entering The Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
DOC Lacks Sufficient Controls On Sources
Of Contraband Within The Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Efforts To Control Contraband Are Limited . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
FINDING 111: THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS MISCLASSIFIES
ADULT INMATES. WHICH INCREASES SECURITY RISKS . . . . . . . . . . 37
DOC Miscl assi fication Increases Security
Risks And Causes Other Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Subjective Classification Process. Overcrowded
Faci 1 i t i e s And Inaccessible Prison Gang Information Cause Misclassification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Page
FINDING I V : THE CURRENT CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM WILL NOT PROVIDE
THE DEPARTMENT WITH ENOUGH MAXIMUM CUSTODY BEDS . . . . . . . . . 45
The Department Lacks Maximum Custody Beds . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Current Construction Program W i l l Not
Provide Enough Maximum Beds When Completed . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Advance Planning Required t o A l l e v i a t e Shortage . . . . . . . . . 49
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
OTHERPERTINENTINFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Early Re1 ease To A1 1 evi a te Overcrowding . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
I s o l a t i o n Cells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Alhambra Reception and Treatment Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
AREAS FOR FURTHER AUDIT WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
AGENCY RESPONSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
APPENDICES
I . Security Audit. Arizona Department o f Corrections;
N. R. Cox Associates. Inc., July 1985
I1 . Report t o the Auditor General. Analysis o f the Arizona DOC
Offender C l a s s i f i c a t i o n System . Executive Summary.
Correctional Services Group. Inc., August 1985
LIST OF TABLES
- Page
TABLE 1 - Escape A c t i v i t y , 1980 Through May 1985 . . . . . . . . . . 2
TABLE 2 - DOC Expenditures, Division of Adult I n s t i t u t i o n s , Fiscal Years 1983 Through 1986 . . . . . . . 3
TABLE 3 - Tool Contraband Confiscated I n ASPC- Florence I n 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
TABLE 4 - Current Adul t Ma1 e Inmate Bed Space Requi~ ements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
TABLE 5 - Permanent Beds Required For Adult Male Inmates After
Construction Program Completion I n March 1987. . . . . . . 48
TABLE 6 - Resul t s O f Early Re1 ease Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
TABLE 7 - F a c i l i t y Bed Capacity And I s o l a t i o n Capacity . . . . . . . 56
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE 1 - Comparison o f DOC and FPS C l a s s i f i c a t i o n Systems
On Adult Male Inmates During Reclassification. . . . . . . 39
FIGURE 2 - Comparison o f DOC and FPS C l a s s i f i c a t i o n Systems On
Adult Male Inmates During I n i t i a l C l a s s i f i c a t i o n . . . . . 41
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
ILLUSTRATION 1 - Contraband Discovered I n The ASPC-Florence
Central Unit ( Maximum Security) . . . . . . 25
ILLUSTRATION 2 - Contraband Discovered I n The ASPC-Tucson
Santa Rita Unit ( Medium Security) . . . . . . 25
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance audit o f the
Arizona Department of Corrections ( DOC) security function. This audit was
conducted i n response t o a January 30, 1985, resolution of the J o i n t
Legislative Oversight Committee which requires a performance audit o f DOC,
and i s one i n a series o f audits on the Department.
DOC'S r o l e i s t o protect the pub1 i c by safely and securely confining those
i n d i v i d u a l s entrusted t o i t s care. I n addition t o protecting society from
the sentenced offenders, the Department should ensure t h a t i t s f a c i l i t i e s
provide a safe, j u s t and humane environment. The Department maintains
f a c i l i t i e s o f various custody l e v e l s and c l a s s i f i e s offenders among these
1 eve1 s.
Facil i t i e s And Inmate Population
Through i t s Division of Adult I n s t i t u t i o n s and Division o f
Juveni 1 e/ Communi ty Services, the Department maintains 25 f a c i l i t i e s
Statewide ranging from maximum custody u n i t s to correctional re1 ease
centers, to house approximately 8,000 inmates. Perimeter and i n t e r n a l
security features determine a u n i t ' s custody level. The Arizona State
Prison Complex ( ASPC) i n F1 orence, constructed i n 191 2, houses
approximately 2,800 inmates i n seven units. Two o f the seven units house
the inmates c l a s s i f i e d most dangerous by the Department. ASPC- Tucson and
ASPC- Perryville Training Centers, opened i n the l a t e 1970s and early
1980s, house the majority o f the remaining medium and minimum custody
adult population. Future prison construction programs w i l l add
approximately 4,540 beds to the e x i s t i n g 7,768 beds f o r adult male
inmates. The rnajori ty of these beds w i l l be added t o the Florence and
Tucson f a c i l i t i e s , and new f a c i l i t i e s being constructed a t Douglas,
Winslow and Yuma.
The Department currently houses approximately 8,000 adult male inmates.
Inmate population has increased a t a r a t e o f approximately 75 inmates per
month since January 1981. The Department's current forecast predicts an
increase of approximately 55 inmates per month over the n e x t t h r e e years.
Esca~ e S t a t i s t i c s
Security deficiencies can and have resulted i n escapes a t Arizona
Correctional f a c i l i t i e s . As o f May 1985 DOC had 65 outstanding escapees
from i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s . Fifty- two of these escapees are outstanding since
January 1, 1980. Fourteen remain outstanding p r i o r to January 1, 1980.
Escape a c t i v i t y f o r the past s i x years i s l i s t e d i n Table 1.
TABLE 1
ESCAPE ACTIVITY
1980 THROUGH MAY 1985
Escapes 74 109 61 73 80 3 9
Arrests 73 104 54 61 72 12
Outstanding 1 5 7 12 8 19
) Table does not include escapes from ha1 fway houses or parole, or any
juveni 1 e escapes.
Source: DOC Central Office, Inspections & Investigations Section
S t a f f i n g And Budget
According t o JLBC appropriations reports for the fiscal year ended June
30, 1985, an estimated 3,024 o f DOC'S 4,006 authorized f u l l - t i m e employee
positions ( FTE) were a1 1 ocated to the Division o f Adult I n s t i t u t i o n s ,
which includes a l l adult prisons. Table 2 shows actual expenditures f o r
f i s c a l years 1983 and 1984, and estimated expenditures f o r f i s c a l years
1985 and 1986.
TABLE 2
DOC EXPENDITURES
DIVISION OF ADULT INSTITUTIONS
FISCAL YEARS 1983 THROUGH 1986
Actual Actual Estimated ~ s t i m a t e d () l
1983 1984 1985 1986
FTE Positions 2,152.7 2,591.1 3,024.5 2,986.2
Expenditures:
Personal Services $ 38,758,900 $ 41,818,800 $ 53,397,400 $ 57,357,300
Empl oyee Re1 a ted 9,287,900 10,612,200 14,303,700 15,094,400
A l l Other Expenses 18,653,700 22,277,700 27,002,700 30,326,700
Total $ 66,700,500 $ 74,708.700 $ 94,703,800 $ 102,778,400
( l ) On June 20, 1985, DOC underwent a reorganization, a t which time the
Division o f Adult I n s t i t u t i o n s , formerly Adul t Services, was
created. As part o f the reorganization funding f o r 175.5 positions
r e l a t e d t o adult community services and previously funded as p a r t of
the Adult Services program was transferred to the Division o f
Juvenil e/ Communi ty Services. This change i s r e f l e c t e d i n the
figures shown.
Source: JLBC Appropriations Reports, June 1984 and June 1985
Audit Sco~ e And Ob- iecti ves
This audit report focuses on the Department's a b i l i t y to perform i t s
security functions e f f i c i e n t l y and effectively. The report presents
findings and recommendations i n four major areas.
a The a b i l i t y o f DOC t o adequately maintain security a t a d u l t
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,
a The a b i l i t y o f DOC t o control contraband,
The adequacy of DOC'S c l a s s i f i c a t i o n system, and
a The a b i l i t y of DOC to provide proper s e c u r i t y l e v e l inmate
housing.
The report Is findings summarize serious problems i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l
security. The report does not disclose s p e c i f i c d e t a i l s because such
d e t a i l s could be used as a " blueprint" f o r further security breaches.
However, the Department has been f u l l y informed o f a l l i d e n t i f i e d problems
t o allow it t o take necessary corrective action. Some of these corrective
actions may take time t o implement. According t o the security consultants
retained by the Auditor General, many of DOC'S security deficiencies
developed over a long period of time, and are the r e s u l t o f inadequate
resources or inadequate management of these resources. I n addition,
changes a f f e c t i n g inmate a c t i v i t i e s and privileges should be made
gradually t o minimize inmate tension and h o s t i l i t y which could lead t o
additional security problems.
lile developed other pertinent information regarding the f e a s i b i l i ty of
inmate early re1 ease option t o a1 1 evi ate p r i son overcrowding, the adequacy
of the Alhambra f a c i l i t y and the lack o f s u f f i c i e n t d i s c i p l i n a r y i s o l a t i o n
c e l l s . Due t o time constraints, we were unable t o address a l l potential
issues i d e n t i f i e d during our audit work. The section Areas For Further
Audit Work describes these potential issues.
The Auditor General and staff express appreciation t o the Director of the
Department of Corrections and his s t a f f f o r t h e i r cooperation and
assistance during the audit.
FINDING I
SECURITY AT VARIOUS ADULT PRISONS IS INADEQUATE
The Department of Corrections ( DOC) does not provide adequate security a t
some of i t s adult correctional f a c i l i t i e s . The perimeters at many
institutions do not effectively prevent or hinder escape attempts.
Security problems inside prisons pose risks to both staff and inmates.
As a result of these deficiencies, several institutions do not provide
the level of security necessary for the resident populations. DOC needs
to place greater emphasis on security through both immediate and
1 ong- range actions.
The Auditor General retained N. R. Cox and Associates, a corrections
consulting firm, to assist in analyzing security a t DOC'S adult
institutions. As part of the review the consulting team visited and
analyzed security a t the Fl orence, Perryvi 11 e, A1 hambra, Tucson and Fort
Grant facil i ties. In addition, the consul tants addressed various
department- wide security issues. These incl uded inmate classification,
avail able bed space, protective custody inmates, dissemination of inmate
gang information, and devel opment of needed pol icies, procedures or post
orders. For details of their findings see Appendix I.
Perimeter Security Deficiencies
Lead To Escapes
Although strong perimeter security is necessary to prevent escapes,
perimeters a t a number of Arizona's adult f a c i l i t i e s are seriously
deficient. Perimeter deficiencies exist i n fences, electronic detection
systems, use of guard towers and visibility. As a result, inmates have
taken advantage of inadequate perimeter security to escape.
A strong and secure perimeter enclosure can help prevent escapes and
minimize risks to the public. Escapes and intrusion a t t e ~ p t s are
delayed, and sometimes prevented by a network of fences, walls, towers
and el ectronic detection devices. Good periuleter securi ty systems have
fence lines that are well lighted and unobstructed. The degree of
perimeter security varies among minimum, medium and maximum custody
prisons. Minimum security institutions usually require no perimeter
fence other than a general purpose fence to discourage unauthorized
traffic i n or about the main compound. The Design Guide for Secure Adult
Correctional Facil i ties, pub1 ished by the American Correctional
Association, says " an extremely secure perimeter" has ". . . a double
fence and integral electronic intrusion and a1 arm devices, coup1 ed w i t h
new types of concertina wire. Such fence systems are very satisfactory
for perimeter security, particul arly when mobile patrol s are a1 so
used. " Furthermore, maximum security institutions may require additional
underground detection systems as well as subsoil barriers. The guidebook
states that " A re1 iabl e perimeter securi ty system a1 1 ows inside
operations to be more relaxed w i t h less need for constant observation of
the inmate's every movement and a resulting reduction i n both inmate and
staff tensions. "
Fencing - Some DOC institutions do not have enough reinforced fencing t o
prevent inmate escapes. A facility inspection conducted by Auditor
General security consul tants revealed that perimeter security fencing was
inadequate a t most adult institutions. Inmates have been able to cut,
climb over, dig under and slip under fences, tear fence meshing, and
cover razor wire on fences w i t h blankets to effect escapes. With the
exception of the Rincon U n i t at Arizona State Prison Cornplex
( AsPC)- Tucson, and the Central U n i t and cell block 6 a t ASPC- Florence, all
other f a c i l i t i e s visited lacked inner fences secured in cement, and
sufficient razor wire and razor tape to discourage escape or intrusion
attempts. Moreover, ASP- Fort Grant, a minimum custody faci 1 i ty, does not
have any fence whatsoever. ASP- Fort Grant has experienced more escapes
than any other prison complex during the last year and one- half. The
consultants recommend that at least a single fence be constructed t o
contain the inmates a t this facility.
Detection Systems - Deficiencies i n electronic perimeter detection
equipment also present problems. Lack of maintenance of and support for
these systems a t ASPC- Tucson and ASPC- Perryvi 11 e have been responsi bl e
for persistent system fail ures. For example:
e Institutional a1 arm displ ay boards that indicate perimeter
security intrusions do not always correspond with information
displayed on the complex main control board.
e The computer operating the electronic detection equipment has
responded slowly to user commands, has been extremely slow i n
printing alarms, and has failed to print intrusion alarms on
some occasions.
Once activated, institutional fence alarms must be shaken
repeatedly to secure the alarms.
e Temperature and moisture have caused alarms not to respond, or
to remain i n constant alarm mode.
Some inmate escapes were made possible as a direct result of system
malfunctions. Once inmates become aware of system failures they are able
to test fence alarms and determine which zones are inoperative.
Additionally, some inmates have been able to elude the electronic alarm
systems. Though DOC has tried to eliminate vulnerable areas that inmates
can penetrate without being detected, some s t i l l exist.
Guard Towers - Security a t the perimeter i s also weakenea by guard towers
that are improperly placed, incorrectly used and poorly constructed.
Some towers are not effective because temporary structures have been
placed i n their lines of sight. This creates blind spots for tower
officers and 1 i m i ts visibil i ty. In addition, some towers are ineffective
because they are being used to observe inmates rather than maintain
surveil 1 ance of the perimeter as intended. laloreover, Auditor General
security consultants determined that some towers are not even safe for
extended use, because they are temporary structures of scaffolding and
plywood. These towers pose unsafe working conditions.
Visibility - Poor lighting and lines of sight reduce perimeter
visibil i ty. While placement of perimeter 1 ighting i s adequate, the
untimely rep1 acement of burned- out bulbs reduces i t s effectiveness.
Observation i s further limited by barriers i n the lines of sight. For
example, at one facility the perimeter fence curves at various points,
which reduces straight- 1 ine v i s i b i l i t y along i t s length. Perimeter
fences should be s t r a i g h t - l i n e f o r good observation. At some f a c i l i t i e s
1 ines o f sight are broken by small p i l e s o f d i r t deposited along the
bottom o f the fence t o cover and prevent holes under the fence. This
provides a hiding spot f o r prisoners. For example, perimeter patrol
o f f i c e r s a t one i n s t i t u t i o n are unable t o see i f inmates are l y i n g behind
earthen obstructions during night hours.
Escapes - Perimeter security inadequacies have created opportunities for
escapes. Between January 1984 and May 1985, 56* inmates escaped through
the perimeters of DOC f a c i l i t i e s . Some o f these escapees have committed
crimes against l i f e and property while they were out.
0 I n 1983 an inmate from ASP- Fort Grant escaped and terrorized an
e l d e r l y couple f o r several hours.
0 I n 1984 an ASPC- Tucson Tent Unit inmate, who twice penetrated
perimeter security systems to escape, cornmi t t e d a honici de
during a burglary i n I l l i n o i s .
0 I n 1984 an ASPC- Perryville escapee was reported stealing cars.
Though 1 ocal 1 aw enforcement a u t h o r i t i e s have received several
such reports, t h i s inmate s t i l l remains a t large.
0 I n 1985 an ASPC- Perryville inmate was captured by Portland,
Oregon, authorities, and held on charges of committing armed
robbery while on escape.
Though most offenders are recaptured, some inmates s t i l l remain a t large
and continue t o place the pub1 i c a t r i s k .
Internal Security Problems Pose
Risks To Both Inmates And Staff
Security deficiencies w i t h i n DOC adul t i n s t i t u t i o n s threaten both s t a f f
and inmates. A1 though e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y features he1 p maintain
i n s t i t u t i o n a l control, security personnel are often 1 i m i ted i n t h e i r
a b i l i t y t o control inmate a c t i v i t y . Specifically, problems with 1 ockiny
* This figure does not include those inmates who have successfully
escaped while on work d e t a i l s and furloughs.
systems, control rooms, communications, pol i c i e s and procedures, and
s t a f f i n g jeopardize i n s t i t u t i o n a l security and safety.
A variety o f i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y features help provide i n s t i t u t i o n a l
control. Adequate locking mechanisms a1 1 ow inmates t o be contained or
isolated. A control center i s important because a1 1 i n s t i t u t i o n a l
a c t i v i t y i s monitored a t t h i s location. The physical layout o f an
i n s t i t u t i o n ' s housing u n i t s i s c r i t i c a l f o r proper inmate observation and
supervision. Radio communications systems a1 so enhance i n s t i t u t i o n a l
control. Further, pol i c i e s and procedures provide s t a f f with important
i n s t r u c t i o n s on the day- to- day tasks t h a t must be c a r r i e d o u t t o maintain
i n s t i t u t i o n a l control. Lastly, inmate observation and control i s
maintained through appropriate s t a f f i n g patterns a t correctional
f a c i l i t i e s .
Locks - Locking systems do not f u l l y secure inmates a t several Arizona
prisons, and pose s i g n i f i c a n t r i s k s t o inmates and s t a f f . Locking
problems stem from lack of adequate maintenance* and inadequate locking
device designs a t some f a c i l i t i e s . The following examples ill u s t r a t e t h e
extensive problems.
At ASPC- Florence Central Unit, the locking mechanism t o
c e l l block 1 has shorted out and rusted due t o the leaky showers.
Cell doors do not function e l e c t r o n i c a l l y and must be opened
manually. As a result, correctional service o f f i c e r s must carry
keys t o open individual c e l l s and keys t h a t open the f r o n t door
t o the f a c i l i t y .
0 At ASPC- Florence Central U n i t c e l l b l o c k 2, the f a c i l i t y ' s
locking system does not work properly. I n order t o open one c e l l
door on a t i e r , a l l o f the 26 c e l l s must be opened a t once. This
i s p a r t i c u l a r l y dangerous because protective custody** inmates
are housed i n t h i s f a c i l i t y .
* Black and Veatch, engineering and architectural consultants
retained by the Audi t o r General , estimates the inspection,
rep1 acement and renovation o f 1 ocking systems and re1 ated equi pnent
a t ASPC- Fl orence and ASPC- Perryvi 11 e woul d cost from $ 395,000 to
$ 2,132,000 ( see forthcoming Audi t o r General DOC Maintenance audi t
report, Finding I ) .
** Protective custody inmates are separated from the general prison
population because of threats t o t h e i r safety by other inmates.
8 A t ASPC- Florence Central U n i t cellblock 4, the doors on several
cell runs do not function properly. In order to open one cell
door, a1 1 cell doors must be opened. Many inmates have the
opportunity to leave t h e i r c e l l s a t the same time.
8 A t ASPC- Perryvi 11 e and ASPC- Tucson, faul ty 1 ocking mechanisms
a1 low inmates to open their room doors once they are closed.
Housing u n i t doors can be opened from the inside by an
obstruction jammed i n the space between the door frame and the
door. Burned- out indicator lights do not inform the control
room staff when doors are open.
A t ASPC- Perryvil le and ASPC- Tucson inmate room keys can be used
as semi- master keys when worn down, allowing inmates to gain
access to other rooms for t h e f t .
Control Centers - Control centers are poorly secured a t all b u t one of
the institutions visited. Control centers w i t h i n cellblocks control
access to and from the cellblock and the c e l l s w i t h i n , and allow
observation of inmate movement. Our consul tants found that some control
centers lack bulletproof safety glass, have safety glass that i s
improperly mounted, or have doors that are easy to penetrate. As the
control room is the nerve center for the e n t i r e f a c i l i t y , unauthorized
access by groups of inmates would render a f a c i l i t y totally vulnerable.
For example, during a 1980 New Mexico r i o t inmates were able to break
control center windows and enter the control room in three to five
minutes. Once inside the inmates obtained keys, gas grenades, a tear gas
launcher, r i o t helmets and batons. Control centers i n Arizona f a c i l i t i e s
contain similar types of emergency response equipment and weapons, and
unsecured key boxes.
Temporary Structures - The use and location of temporary structures for
inmate housing reduce internal security. Tents, t r a i l e r s , quonset huts
and other temporary structures that lack basic security features are
being widely used. Auditor General security consul tants concluded that
the use of these structures for housing obstructs vision and necessitates
a higher level of staffing to maintain adequate surveillance and
control. These structures are not designed to provide for proper inmate
observation. Further, these structures are constructed with material s
not designed to withstand extensive use or to serve as security
barriers. They are likely to become less secure w i t h time.
Communications Systems - Security personnel lack sufficient radios and
frequencies to provide proper inmate custody and control. A limited
number of radio channels results i n extensive cross t r a f f i c and blocks
communication. A recent escape i l l u s t r a t e s the problem of having too few
frequencies.
Inmates were abl e to steal a portable radio and jam the transmit
switch to produce a continuous transmit tone. This delayed other
units from responding to a reported escape, long enough for the
inmates to make their exit.
A t some institutions, complex security lacks a separate frequency to
guarantee open channel communications i n the event of a security
emergency. Also, some security personnel do not have radios. For
example:
0 In ASPC- Florence South U n i t , housing u n i t officers do not have
radios. One housing officer is assigned to each dorm and must
supervise 72 inmates. Though guard stations in these dorms are
equipped w i t h telephones, a correctional service officer 1 eaving
this area becomes vul nerabl e without any communications
equipment.
Auditor General security consul tants be1 ieve that each dormitory or
housing u n i t should have a t l e a s t one radio for routine and emergency
communications.
Likewise, every tower post should be equipped w i t h a portable radio.
Currently, only ASPC- Tucson has radios for tower personnel.
ASPC- Fl orence tower posts have telephones only. The size and compl exi ty
of some units as well as the custody levels of the inmates dictate the
need for addi tional equipment.
Policies And Procedures - Problems w i t h DOC policies and procedures
present risks to staff and inmates. These departmental policies and
procedures are deficient or are not readily adhered to. For instance:
0 Control of Medication - The Department lacks a consistent pol icy
on recording or inventorying medical suppl ies, speci fical ly
control 1 ed substances. Additional ly , some i n s t i tutions are
dispensing medication i n mu1 ti pl e doses t o inmates. Inmates
could save t h e i r drugs and s e l l them a t a l a t e r time. Auditor
General security consul tants recommend t h a t DOC adopt a pol i c y
which states t h a t medication be issued i n single doses only
( see Finding 11, page 28).
Inmate Counts - Inmate counting checks required by DOC are
i n s u f f i c i e n t i n number and l i m i t e d i n scope. Department policy
only requires three formal counts per day. There i s too long a
span between counts during which inmates may be unaccounted f o r
throughout the day. Auditor General security consultants
recommend t h a t a minimum o f f i v e counts be conducted i n each 24
hour period. Maximum and minimum custody inmates should be
accounted f o r once every three hours. Inmate counts are a major
method o f accounting f o r inmates and preventing or deterring
escape attempts. Also, DOC p o l i c y does not require inmates to
stand next to t h e i r bunks or workstations to be v i s u a l l y
inspected and counted. The consul tants recommend t h a t DOC
require mandatory standing counts a t l e a s t once per s h i f t .
0 Tool Control - Though t o o l c o n t r o l policies and procedures
exist, they are not consistently complied with. Policies and
procedures requi re t h a t tool s, equipment, and toxic and
fl ammabl e material s be secured. Throughout the audi t numerous
items including hacksaws, blades, wire cutters, propane,
gas01 ine, portable we1 ding and c u t t i n g torches, 1 adders, rebar,
and pipe stock were found unsecured ( see Finding 11, page 24).
0 V i s i t a t i o n - Though v i s i t a t i o n p o l i c i e s and procedures exist,
they are not being adhered to either. DOC security personnel do
not adequately monitor v i s i t a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s . A lack of
monitoring has enabled inmates t o commit crimes, as well as
provide opportunities f o r guests t o wander about f a c i l i t i e s to
commit i l l e g a l acts ( see Finding 11, page 20).
Staffing - Auditor General consultants i d e n t i f i e d s t a f f i n g practices as a
p o t e n t i a l s e c u r i t y problem. S t a f f i n g patterns vary widely throughout the
Department's. adul t i n s t i t u t i o n s . No consistent method f o r calculating a
s h i f t re1 i e f factor to determine the number of s t a f f needed t o maintain
each post exists. Though numerous examples o f inadequate s t a f f i n g were
found throughout the audit, Auditor General security consul tants were
unable t o determine whether they were due t o i n s u f f i c i e n t numbers of
personnel , i n e f f i c i e n t deployment o f personnel or inadequate eval uation
of personnel. The consultants recommend t h a t the Department conduct a
comprehensive s t a f f i n g study t o determine the extent of i t s s t a f f i n g
problems. *
Security Ratings At Several
F a c i l i t i e s Are Too High
Because o f the problems i n both perimeter and i n t e r n a l security w i t h i n
DOC f a c i 1 i t i e s , Auditor General security consul tants rated several
f a c i l i t i e s a t lower levels than they were designated by the Department.
The custody c a p a b i l i t i e s of these i n s t i t u t i o n s are not consistent with
t h e i r ratings.
The f a c i l i ty custody l e v e l r a t i n g s of some i n s t i t u t i o n s are inappropriate
to provide adequate security f o r the type o f inmates housed within.**
Auditor General security consul tants examined custody ratings f o r several
i n s t i t u t i o n s . Our consul tants found these f a c i l i ty custody ratings t o be
overrated and not c l e a r l y del ineated. Faci 1 i ty custody 1 evel s are
determined a f t e r an assessment o f security factors, which i n c l ude
perimeter security systems, observation towers, i n t e r n a l and external
patrols, electronic detection devices, housing arrangements, c e l l s, and
1 evel of staffing f o r population size. I n s t i t u t i o n s with inappropriate
custody level ratings are as follows.
0 ASPC- Phoenix ( A1 hambra Reception and Treatment Center) i s being
used t o house maximum custody inmates, though the f a c i l i t y i s
only rated by the consultants as minimum custody. Maximum
custody 1 evel inmates require a secure, highly control 1 ed
environment. At i n i t i a l c l assi f i c a t i o n offenders who have
committed v i o l e n t and aggravated crimes receive t h i s status.
3r DOC i s i n the process o f implementing a s t a f f i n g study that w i l l
examine whether s t a f f i n g patterns are adequate. Though DOC pl ans
t o conduct a comprehensive study including a post analysis, i t s
study may not include several important elements. Auditor General
security consul tants be1 ieve t h a t a post analysi s/ post audit shoul d
include many elements o f time and motion studies. The study should
examine work requirements and work load and how they vary from
s h i f t t o s h i f t . Other factors should include the level, type and
patterns of a c t i v i t y t h a t take place i n the i n s t i t u t i o n during the
24 hour day. Another important factor t o consider i s s t a f f needed
t o respond i n emergency situations. ** DOC uses f i v e f a c i l i ty custody 1 evel s: community custody, minimum,
medium and maximum custody, and administrative segregation.
ASPC- Florence South Unit, which DOC rates as a medium custody
f a c i l i t y , was given a 1 ow medium r a t i n g by the consultants
because it has a1 1 dormitory housing and no single c e l l s .
Though medi um custody 1 evel inmates require 1 i m i t e d s e c u r i t y and
control w i t h i n an i n s t i t u t i o n with perimeter security, t h i s
i n s t i t u t i o n i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o house these inmates.
The ASPC- Florence East Unit and Tent Unit, which house medium
security inmates, were rated as minimum custody f a c i l i t i e s
because housing u n i t s a t these f a c i l i t i e s cannot be secured.
There i s no way t o is01 a t e d i s r u p t i v e inmates u n t i l order can be
restored.
0 The ASPC- Tucson Rincon Unit, which DOC rated a medium custody
f a c i l i t y , was rated as a low medium f a c i l i t y because of
deficiencies i n control centers, housing units and perimeter
security .
Further Action Required
To Im~ roveS ecuritv
The Department of Corrections should take additional steps to improve
security a t i t s adult i n s t i t u t i o n s . A1 though the Department has
attempted t o i d e n t i f y and remedy security deficiencies, other problems
have precluded proper focus on security. Moreover, funding has e i t h e r
been unavai 1 able or not requested f o r some needed security improvements.
However, the Department can take immediate action t o address some
security problems whi 1 e devel oping m i d- range and 1 ong- term pl ans to
ensure t h a t a1 1 i n s t i t u t i o n s provide adequate security.
Other Problems Have Precluded Focus On Security - The Departrnent of
Corrections shoul d pl ace greater emphasis on security matters. The
Department has addressed many security issues and needs. However, other
problems have precl uded a s u f f i c i e n t focus on security.
Some e f f o r t has been made by DOC t o address security issues and needs.
Most security deficiencies i d e n t i f i e d during the audit are known to
Department o f f i c i a l s , and some planning i s underway t o develop solutions
f o r them. Since 1984 the department has:
o formulated task forces t o study security issues which include
inmate property, security detection systems, drugs, i mate
housing, inmate rewards and punishment systems, innate
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n by custody 1 evel , compassionate 1 eave,
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , and inmate grooming;
0 conducted on- site f a c i l i t y inspections to look for security
probl ems, w i t h senior security personnel from various
institutions inspecting the security situation of areas other
than their own;
0 inspected institutional armories to determine the adequacy of
weapons inventory and storage, ammunition, chemical agents,
records, procedures, and key control;
staged surprise vehicle and visitor inspections w i t h State law
enforcement official s to search for i l l egal contraband such as
weapons and drugs;
0 conducted surprise institutional searches for contraband; and
0 identified dangerous gang inmates to curtail i l legal a c t i v i t i e s .
Because of other problems, Central Office and institutional
administrators have been slow to address some of the known security
problems. According to the Assistant Director for adult institutions,
" i t has been d i f f i c u l t for the Department to develop logical and
comprehensive pl ans to address security probl ems because of other
day- to- day pressures encountered running the Department." These incl ude
popul ation pressures, overuse of faci 1 i t i e s , staff turnover problems,
lack of avail able maximum securi ty cell space, construction projects,
development of a new classification system and preparation of the agency
budget.
Funding Has Not Been Obtained To Correct Deficiencies - Funding has not
been obtained to correct security deficiencies. The Legislature has not
granted some funding requests for security projects. Additionally, the
Department has never compi1 ed a complete funding request out1 i n i n g
funding needs for security problems.
Auditor General security consul tants be1 ieve that current conditions are
primarily the resul t of inadequate resources, or the inadequate
management of resources, over a long period of time. The Department has
been forced to defer action on some needed security improvements a t adult
institutions due to lack of funding by the Legislature. Seven security
improvement projects requested by DOC were not funded for fiscal year
1985- 86. The Department requested more than $ 866,000 Land, Building and
Improvement ( LB& I 1 do1 1 a r s t o enhance perimeter security fencing, security
15
1 ighting, electronic 1 ocks and f i r e a1 arm systems a t adul t i n s t i t u t i o n s .
I n addition, during the previous f i v e f i s c a l years LB& I security
improvement requests estimated a t $ 5.4 m i 11 ion f o r adul t i n s t i t u t i o n s
were not funded, according t o DOC.* However, the Legislature did
appropriate more than $ 900,000 f o r security improvements during t h i s
period.
Further, the Department has not f u l l y informed the Legislature o f i t s
security problems and the funding needed t o correct them. Although some
adult i n s t i t u t i o n s have submitted pol i c y issues requesting additional
security operations funds, several requests were not included i n the
Department's budget requests i n previous years. These pol i c y issues,
which include communications c a p a b i l i t i e s and equipment, s t a f f i n g , and
other equipment requests, cannot be pursued because no funding has been
requested. Department administrators were uncertain why no action was
taken.
Security Deficiencies Shoul d Be Addressed Immediately - The Department of
Corrections should address i t s e x i s t i n g security problems. Once these
concerns are deal t with the Department can begin t o develop plans t o meet
future securi ty needs.
Several steps can be taken immediately t o correct existing security
probl ems.
The Department needs to assess the extent of i t s remaining
security problems. The Department must take an inventory of
security needs and deficiencies, and i d e n t i f y the costs for
needed improvements. Auditor General security consul tants
believe the Department should present the Legislature and
Governor with a real i s t i c summary o f a l l security problems and
the costs to correct them. Additionally, t h i s summary should
i n c l ude a comprehensive s t a f f i n g analysis t o determine the scope
of staffing deficiencies.
e DOC must continue to expand i t s e f f o r t s to see t h a t p o l i c i e s and
procedures are adhered to. Further, the Department should
* Some projects that were not funded when i n i t i a l l y requested were
included i n subsequent years' requests. The amounts c i t e d do not
include repeat requests.
reevaluate and rewrite some p o l i c i e s and procedures. Those
needing attention i n c l ude inmate counts, tool control,
medication and v i s i t a t i o n policies.
Once these tasks are accomplished the Department can evaluate and upgrade
i t s current f a c i l i t y master plans to meet future needs ( see Finding
111 ). Future f a c i l i ty expansion pl ans shoul d i n c l ude the rep1 acement o f
temporary housing structures which pose s e c u r i t y r i s k s . Auditor General
security consultants be1 ieve t h a t a real i s t i c , cost e f f e c t i v e master plan
t o guide the development o f future f a c i l i t i e s i s essential to avoid
occurrences o f security deficiencies.
CONCLUSION
Security deficiencies a t prison f a c i l i t i e s jeopardize pub1 i c safety as
we1 1 as i n s t i t u t i o n a l control. Perimeter security problems and security
deficiencies w i t h i n i n s t i t u t i o n s have resul ted i n some f a c i l i t i e s being
inappropriate to house the offenders incarcerated within. The
Department's focus on other problems and lack of funding has weakened
securi ty. The Department shoul d begin immediately t o resolve security
deficiencies. I n addition, the Department shoul d develop 1 ong- range
plans and upgrade i t s f a c i l i t y master plans.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The State Department o f Corrections should consider the following
steps to improve i n s t i t u t i o n a l security. DOC shoul d immediately:
a. Inventory perimeter and i n t e r n a l security needs and
deficiencies, correct those t h a t can be addressed immediately,
and request adequate funding from the Legislature to address the
remaining deficiencies.
b. Conduct a comprehensive s t a f f i n g analysis t o determine the scope
o f security s t a f f i n g deficiencies. This study should review
various post requirements as well as variations i n work
requirements and work 1 oad.
17
c. Revise and implement changes to some of its policies and
procedures to reduce risks to visitors, staff and inmates.
These include inmate counts, tool control, dispensing of
medication and visitation policies.
2. DOC should evaluate and upgrade its current facility master plan to
meet future needs. The plan should incl ude rep1 acing temporary
housing structures which pose security risks.
FINDING I I
THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS DOES NOT ADEQUATELY CONTROL CONTRABAND
Contraband i s widespread and easily accessible within Arizona prisons.
The Arizona Department o f Corrections ( DOC) has not e f f e c t i v e l y prevented
contraband from entering the f a c i l i t i e s nor have adequate controls been
maintained on sources o f contraband w i t h i n the i n s t i t u t i o n s . Moreover,
the Department's e f f o r t s t o control contraband are limited.
The Federal Bureau o f Prisons defines contraband as material prohibited
by law or by regulation, or material t h a t can reasonably be expected to
cause physical i n j u r y or adversely a f f e c t the security, safety or good
order of the i n s t i t u t i o n . Contraband control i s important because
contraband such as drugs combined with access t o machines t o fabricate
weapons and tools can create a severe security hazard f o r an i n s t i t u t i o n
or complex. Monthly a c t i v i t y reports maintained by DOC'S Inspections and
Investigations Unit as well as logs maintained by the various
i n s t i t u t i o n s indicate the widespread existence o f contraband w i t h i n the
i n s t i t u t i o n s .
DOC Does Not Adequately Restrict
Contraband From Entering The I n s t i t u t i o n s
The Department o f Corrections has not e f f e c t i v e l y prevented contraband
from entering i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s . A1 though v i s i t a t i o n increases
contraband, DOC does not adequately control v i s i t a t i o n to p r o h i b i t
contraband from entering i n s t i t u t i o n s . I n addition, the Department's
e f f o r t s t o detect contraband have been l i m i t e d .
V i s i t a t i o n Increases Contraband - A Department of Corrections
investigator estimates that 75 percent of contraband enters through
v i s i t a t i o n . His estimate i s supported by the amount o f contraband
discovered entering i n s t i t u t i o n s during a 1 i m i ted number o f surprise
searches conducted a t various i n s t i t u t i o n s t h i s year.
During these searches, employees as well as v i s i t o r s have been discovered
with contraband i n t h e i r possession. For example, during the vehicle and
person search conducted a t Arizona State P r i son Complex ( ASPC )- Perryvil l e
on March 16, 1985, 12 employees and 96 v i s i t o r s were found to be i n
possession of contraband. Items uncovered included marijuana, alcohol
and firearms.
V i s i t a t i o n I s Not Adequately Controlled - A1 though v i s i t a t i o n i s a source
of contraband, adequate controls to prevent v i s i t o r s from bringing
unauthorized items i n t o i n s t i t u t i o n s are not evident a t many Arizona
prisons. A1 though most i n s t i t u t i o n s have post orders t h a t emphasize
monitoring o f v i s i t a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s , s t a f f observation of v i s i t a t i o n i s
minimal. I n addition, current food and open yard practices increase the
potential f o r contraband t o enter the i n s t i t u t i o n s .
V i s i t a t i o n i s not adequately monitored by DOC s t a f f . I n s u f f i c i e n t
monitoring and observation o f v i s i t a t i o n by DOC s t a f f increases the
opportunity t o pass contraband unnoticed. Contrary t o DOC policy,
petting, prolonged kissing and embracing occurred a t most of the
i n s t i t u t i o n s v i s i t e d by Auditor General s t a f f . Pro1 onged physical
contact between inmates and v i s i t o r s enhances the possibil i ty of
contraband being passed unnoticed.* Our observation of v i s i t a t i o n
indicated t h a t s t a f f observation i s minimal. The consul tants from N. R.
Cox a1 so noted t h i s problem.
0 ASPC- T Santa Rita s t a f f reported to the consultants t h a t on the
day p r i o r t o t h e i r v i s i t a sexual encounter between a female
v i s i t o r and an inmate occurred i n the v i s i t i n g s t r i p search
room. No s t a f f were available t o supervise the v i s i t o r s i n the
v i s i t i n g room. In addition, no staff were observing v i s i t a t i o n
the day the consultants were there.
0 At ASPC- P Santa Cruz an innate walked r i g h t i n t o the v i s i t a t i o n
area without being observed because the correctional service
o f f i c e r ( CSO) responsible f o r checking inmates i n had been
called away from h i s post.
* The DOC policy statement i n effect a t the time of our v i s i t s ,
# 302.5, c l e a r l y states: " Inmates and V i s i t o r s may embrace a t the
beginning and end of a v i s i t only. SEXUAL CONTACT I S PROHIBITED.
Petting, prol onged k i s s i n g o r prol onged embracing i s not
permitted. " ( Ernphasi s i n o r i g i n a l )
I n addition, some i n s t i t u t i o n s do not adequately search food items.
Allowing food items t o be brought during v i s i t a t i o n increases the
potential for contraband t o enter an i n s t i t u t i o n . P e r r y v i l l e, Florence,
Tucson and Fort Grant complexes allow v i s i t o r s t o bring food i n t o a t
l e a s t one o f t h e i r units. Observation o f v i s i t a t i o n a t units revealed
t h a t large ice chests and bags o f food were brought i n by many of the
v i s i t o r s . A1 though these i tems were searched, Auditor General s t a f f
observed t h a t the searches were less than thorough. For example, one
large i c e chest was brought i n f i l l e d t o the top with ice. A l l that was
v i s i b l e were two cans o f pop. The l i d o f the i c e chest was merely opened
and then closed by the CSO inspecting the food items.
Furthermore, open yard v i s i t a t i o n appears t o increase the opportunities
f o r contraband t o be brought i n t o an i n s t i t u t i o n . According t o DOC, open
yard v i s i t a t i o n a1 1 ows inmates, t h e i r friends and famil ies t o p a r t i c i p a t e
i n a c t i v i t i e s on the a t h l e t i c f i e l d such as sports, picnics, etc., t h a t
cannot be pursued i n a v i s i t a t i o n room environment. Open yard v i s i t a t i o n
occurs a t three o f the units a t various times throughout the year. Open
yards are harder t o control and noni t o r because v i s i t o r s and inmates are
not confined i n an enclosed area.
On July 13, 1985, Auditor General s t a f f and t h e i r consultants observed
the open yard v i s i t a t i o n a t ASPC- F South Unit and noted several problems
t h a t could contribute to increased contraband w i t h i n the unit. A t the
time Auditor General s t a f f entered the yard, inmates and v i s i t o r s were
spread out across an a t h l e t i c yard the size o f a f o o t b a l l f i e l d . Many
inmates and v i s i t o r s were we1 1 concealed by 1 arge beach- type umbrell as.
V i 01 ations of v i s i t a t i o n pol i c i e s and procedures p r o h i b i t i n g petting and
pro1 onged embracing and k i s s i n g between v i s i t o r s and inmates were
evident. The concealment and personal con t a c t provide opportuni ty for
introducing contraband. A CSO commented t h a t the u n i t has a l o t of
problems with inmates who are drunk or high for a few days a f t e r an open
yard v i s i t . Furthermore, the large quantity o f drug contraband
discovered during the following week by the Inspections and
Investigations search team i n ASPC- F south Unit was a t t r i b u t e d t o the
open yard held the previous Saturday.
Efforts To Detect Contraband Are Limited - The Department's e f f o r t s to
detect contraband appear i n s u f f i c i e n t . Security devices t o detect
contraband are frequently broken or nonexistent. Because f r i s k or pat
searches are n o t r o u t i n e l y conducted on v i s i t o r s as an a l t e r n a t i v e to
mechanical screening, the p o s s i b i l i t y o f metal contraband entering the
i n s t i t u t i o n i s increased. I n addition, surprise vehicle and person
searches have been 1 i m i ted.
Auditor General staff and the consultants noted instances o f inoperable
and nonexi stent detection equi pment. For exampl e:
@ As of July 11, 1985, A1 hambra's metal detector had been
inoperable f o r more than a month. This detector was a l s o o u t of
commission a t the time o f a v i s i t by Auditor General s t a f f i n
March 1985.
e ASPC- T Rincon Unit staff use a hand scanner because they are
never sure when t h e i r metal detector i s working.
e ASPC- F North Unit Outside Trustee ( NUOT) does not have any metal
detection equipment and therefore, does n o t r o u t i n e l y submit
v i s i t o r s to any search of t h e i r person. Only items brought i n
by v i s i t o r s are subjected t o search. This contrasts with
ASPC- Perryville where a1 1 v i s i t o r s are scanned with a metal
detector.
Even i n the absence of operational metal detectors, v i s i t o r s have not
been pat searched unless there i s reason to believe they are concealing
contraband. As a result, metal contraband could be brought i n t o the
i n s t i t u t i o n s undetected. None of the i n s t i t u t i o n s observed by Auditor
General staff conducted pat searches on v i s i t o r s . According t o a DOC
o f f i c i a l , the Department can pat or even s t r i p search v i s i t o r s however,
it has t o be consistent to safeguard against harrassment charges. For
example, DOC could use some systematic selection process such as
searching everyone or every fourth person.
Despite t h e i r demonstrated potential f o r r e s t r i c t i n g the flow of
contraband from the outside, the surprise vehicle and person searches
conducted by Inspections and Investigations ( I & I ) have been 1 i m i ted. As
of September 9, 1985, only f i v e searches had been conducted i n a
six- month period. I n addition, the searches were only conducted on
weekends.*
DOC Lacks S u f f i c i e n t Controls On Sources
O f Contraband Within The I n s t i t u t i o n s
Sources of contraband w i t h i n Arizona's prisons are poorly control 1 ed.
Staff and inmates r a r e l y f o l l o w t o o l c o n t r o l procedures, and the
Department lacks s u f f i c i e n t functional detection equipment t o i d e n t i f y
contraband. Medical and pharmaceutical i tems are not adequately
control 1 ed or moni tored by s t a f f . I n addition, inmates entering
i n s t i t u t i o n s are n o t r o u t i n e l y searched. Furthermore, actual search
practices are ineffective.
Poor Tool Control - DOC f a i l s t o adequately maintain tool control w i t h i n
i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s . The widespread a v a i l a b i l i ty o f tools indicates t h a t
the Department's tool control policies and the procedures are poorly
imp1 emented. In addition, metal detectors are e i t h e r inoperative or
nonexistent resul t i n g i n further lack o f control.
Inmates can acquire tools w i t h i n the Department's i n s t i t u t i o n s . These
tools can be turned i n t o weapons or aid i n an escape attempt. For
example, saws, d r i l l s, we1 ding equipment and hacksaw bl ades are avail ab1 e
i n the ASPC- F Central Unit ARCOR i n d u s t r i a l yard. More than 100 tools
were confiscated a t ASPC- Fl orence by DOC ' s Inspections and Investigations
Unit i n 1984. Table 3 on Page 24 i d e n t i f i e s the tools seized a t
ASPC- Fl orence.
* According to the Assistant Director of I& Io, v ertime costs plus
increased case1 oads p r o h i b i t conducting more o f these searches. I n
addition, the element o f surprise would be diminished i f the
searches were conducted too frequently.
TABLE 3
TOOL CONTRABAND CONFISCATED IN ASPC- FLORENCE IN 1984(' )
w i r e c u t t e r s
hacksaw blade
screwdriver
f i l e
d r i l l
chisel
hammer
be1 t sander
router 1
metal tape measure 21
wrench 5
razor knife 2
c i r c u l a r saw 1
sol dering gun 1
shears 2
barber shears 2
) This report covers only items uncovered a t ASPC- Florence and only
those t h a t were discovered by the I& seIa rch team i n Florence.
American Correctional Association ( ACA) standard # 2- 4197 considers a
w r i t t e n pol i c y and procedure addressing t o o l c o n t r o l essenti a1 . *
According t o the ACA:
" Tools and utensils such as hacksaws, we1 ding equipment, butcher
knives and barber shears can cause death or serious injury. They
should be locked i n control panels and issued i n accordance with a
prescribed system. Provision should be made f o r checking tools and
utensils i n and out, and f o r the control o f t h e i r use a t a l l times."
The Department of Corrections has a w r i t t e n policy on tool control t h a t
meets the i n t e n t of the ACA standard. However observation o f areas
requiring tool control indicated t h a t t h i s pol i c y i s not followed. DOC'S
pol i c y # 408 on tool control dated A p r i l 19, 1980, states:
" It i s the policy of the Department of Corrections t h a t tools,
flammable, toxic and caustic materials be maintained i n secure areas
inaccessible to inmates, t h a t provisions be made to ensure
supervision of t h e i r use and t h a t a prescribed system be used to
account f o r t h e i r d i s t r i b u t i o n . "
* The American Correctional Association devel ops standards that provide
correctional administrators with the opportunity t o develop a planned
program for upgrading f a c i l i t i e s and procedures i n accordance with a
national l y recognized format.
ILLUSTRATICN 1-- Contraband discovered i n the ASPC- Florence- Central
Unit ( Maximum Security)
ILLUSTP4TION 2-- Contraband discovered i n the ASPC- Tucson- Santa Rita
Unit ( Medium Security)
Although DOC'S Internal Inspections Section reports indicate that most
institutions are i n compliance w i t h DOC policy # 408, numerous examples of
unsecured or unattended tool s, equipment, and toxic and flammable
materials were observed. The fol1 owing examples indicate that
institutions are not i n compliance w i t h DOC policy # 408.
e The consultants observed that the hobby shop area i n ASPC- F
Central U n i t maximum custody cellblock 2 has no general method
to control the issuance of tools. Each inmate owns his own
tools and these tools are kept i n wooden cabinets. The inmates
control access to these cabinets. There was no inventory of
these tools as of July 13, 1985.
e An unsecured portable acetylene welding torch was observed i n
the maximum custody ASPC- F Central U n i t maintenance shop by the
consul tants.
e We found 1 i t t l e tool control a t ASPC- F NUOT. NUOT's procedure
# 315.0 indicates t h a t a l l tools will be logged and inventoried,
however, NUOT has no master 1 ist of tools. An inventory cannot
be taken when there is no l i s t of the number and type of tools
to inventory. The inmate responsible for the control of these
tools was unaware of any DOC pol icy or procedure on tool control.
e Staff do not control or inventory equipment and tools for an
inmate operated TV repair business i n the ASPC- P San Juan Unit.
The consultants noted that the inmate makes his own purchases
and maintains his own tools, equipment and supplies.
Tools were unsecured a t the ARCOR building a t ASPC- Perryville.
Wire cutters, long shears, f i l e s , etc. were observed i n an
unlocked cabinet. There was no supervision i n the area. Our
consultants took several of these items and l e f t the grounds
w i t h them. Ten days later the tools had not been reported
missing.
e Tool control and supervision was nonexistent i n the facility
maintenance shop a t ASPC- T Santa Rita. Unsupervised inmates had
access to a1 1 the tools and equipment. Pipe cutters, f i l e s and
cutting pliers were observed i n an unlocked cabinet.
e ASPC- Phoenix Fl amenco ' s construction supervisor was unaware of
any DOC tool control policies or procedures. Two inmates who
work the tool room are the only ones w i t h keys to it. Auditor
General staff observed five to ten hacksaw blades hanging loose
on a board, and we were informed that these a r e n ' t inventoried
because they are a consumable i tem.
I t i s possible to thrcw tools and other i tems over the wall from
the industrial yard into the main yard i n the maximum custody
ASPC- F Central U n i t . Auditor General staff and their security
consultants threw a mallet over the wall i n t o the Central Unit
and when it was thrown back over i n t o the i n d u s t r i a l yard it
landed next t o an axe t h a t was concealed i n the grass.
e A broken window i n an inmate operated business area a t ASPC- F
Central Unit may contribute to the flow of contraband. This
window looks d i r e c t l y on the Central Unit yard. According t o
the consultants, it would be possible, and i s very l i k e l y , t h a t
tools or homemade knives are produced i n t h i s area and passed
through the broken window t o other inmates.
Compliance with t o o l c o n t r o l procedures i s more d i f f i c u l t when inmates
have d i r e c t access with 1 i t t l e supervision. I n s u f f i c i e n t s t a f f requires
DOC to r e l y on inmates to supplement i t s maintenance s t a f f . The
consultants are of the opinion t h a t a large number o f the procedural and
operational problems w i t h i n the Department are due t o i n s u f f i c i e n t s t a f f
resources.
A1 though metal detectors enhance tool control , the Department has f a i 1 ed
to adequately maintain detection equipment t o control contraband i n
several areas, and lacks detection equipment i n other areas. DOC has
numerous instances o f inoperabl e or nonexistent metal detection equipment
as the following examples indicate.
e ASPC- Phoenix Flamenco does not possess any metal detection
equipment. Currently under construction, Flamenco houses
minimum security inmates who have d a i l y access t o tools.
e The metal detectors for checking inmates leaving f o r work
assignments or returning from the ARCOR i n d u s t r i a l yard were not
operational i n the maximum custody ASPC- F Central Unit.
e The metal detector a t the pedestrian s a l l y port leading from the
ASPC- F South Unit to the ARCOR i n d u s t r i a l yard was not
operational a t the time of our consultants' v i s i t .
e ASPC- P Santa Cruz Unit has a metal detector i n the vocational
area, but it was inoperable a t the time of our v i s i t .
r Access from the ARCOR area a t the ASPC- T Rincon Unit was not
controlled. There i s no metal detector to screen prisoners
reentering the compound.
@ Alhambra's metal detector was not operable a t the time of our
v i s i t .
ASPC- F East Unit has no metal detectors for inmates returning
from vocational areas or the ARCOR mattress factory.
Medical And Pharmaceutical Suppl ies Are Not Adequately Monitored - DOC
does not adequately control medical and pharmaceutical items. ACA
standard # 2- 4317 mandates a w r i t t e n pol i c y and procedure providing f o r
the proper management of pharmaceuticals. However, no written,
consistent policy i s evident f o r recording or inventorying medical
suppl ies and speci f i c a l ly control 1 ed substances.
e Medical supplies are not secured a t the ASPC- Perryvil l e complex
pharmacy. A weekly medical supply i s kept i n an unsecured metal
storage cabinet 1 ocated i n a treatment room. On the days of the
consultants' v i s i t and the audit s t a f f v i s i t t h i s cabinet was
unlocked and open. Anyone could reach i n and take the
medication.
0 A pharmacist a t the ASPC- F Central Unit responsible f o r
preparing prescription medication did not know how inventory
records were kept a t the f a c i l i t y .
a An open box o f syringes was observed i n a suppply room a t
Alhambra where an unsupervised resident inmate was attempting t o
repair a compressor. When the inventory clerk was questioned
she indicated t h a t she would not know i f a needle were missing
or not. a
Extortion, assaults and unmanageable inmates may develop as a d i r e c t
r e s u l t o f drug a v a i l a b i l i t y . At ASPC- F NUOT an inmate was found to be i n
possession o f 18 Tylenol I11 tablets ( codeine). It was believed that
t h i s inmate stole the tablets from the pharmacy where he was a porter.
The inmate admitted i n t e n t to s e l l the tablets to other inmates. A
second inmate was discovered attempting to smuggle Tyl en01 tab1 ets i n t o
the ASPC- F South Unit, also thought t o be stolen from the pharmacy. I n
addition, the security consul t a n t s s t r o n g l y advise against DOC'S practice
o f dispensing weekly doses o f drugs t o some inmates ( see Finding I, page
12).
Inmates Entering I n s t i t u t i o n s Not Properly Searched - Inmates are
sometimes a1 1 owed to enter an i n s t i t u t i o n , either from another
i n s t i t u t i o n or from outside an i n s t i t u t i o n , without being searched.
Consequently, inmates may bring contraband i n t o an i n s t i t u t i o n
unchecked. Observation of i n s t i t u t i o n sal ly ports by Auditor General
staff and the consultants demonstrated the potential for inmates to bring
contraband into an insti tutio'n.
Minimum security level inmates working outside the Alhambra
perimeter were not searched either by machine or by hand before
entering the main yard of the Alhambra maximum security
institution. These inmates were arriving from a maintenance
shop where they had access to tools. These minimum security
inmates mingl e w i t h maximum security inmates w i t h i n the A1 hambra
institution.
The consultants observed that no searches were conducted on an
unsupervised medium security inmate a t ASPC- Tucson. T h i s inmate
was working on a construction project outside the u n i t perimeter
b u t inside the complex perimeter. The inmate was permitted to
enter and leave the ASPC- T Santa Rita U n i t through the vehicular
gate without being searched.
Search Practices Are Ineffective - Current institutional search practices
fail to . control contraband. The extensive presence of contraband
indicates that thorough contraband searches are not routinely conducted.
Regular searches are necessary to: 1) prevent the introduction and
possession of weapons or other dangerous contraband i n institutions; 2)
detect the manufacture of weapons, escape devices, etc. w i t h i n an
institution; 3) discover and suppress trafficking between employees and
inmates; 4) discourage theft and trafficking i n institutional stores;
and 5) discover hazards to health or safety that may go unnoticed during
a more routine inspection. ACA standards recommend searches. According
to ACA:
" the control of weapons and contraband i n an adult correctional
institution i s a security measure. The institution's search plans
and procedures shoul d incl ude the fol 1 owing: Unannounced and
irregularly timed searches of cells, inmates, and inmate work areas;
frequent search and careful supervision of inmate trustees; use of
metal detectors a t compound gates and entrances into cell blocks; and
complete search and inspection of each cell prior to occupancy by a
new inmate."
Auditor General consul tants strongly endorse this pol icy. According to
the consul tants, security searches of inmate housing and other activity
areas should be conducted regularly, and they recommend that each
institution have i t s own search team to conduct regular searches and
security checks.
The Department's search efforts to control contraband appear inadequate.
Only one DOC facility, ASPC- T Santa Rita, has a designated full- time
search team, however its efforts have been limited. T h i s search team i s
staffed by two CSOs from the unit who conduct searches i n the facility.
The search team conducts cell, inmate and common area searches a t Santa
Rita, and performs investigative work. T h i s search team was organized i n
March 1985 by the unit warden in an effort to control contraband. No
staff were budgeted for these positions, therefore staff were pulled from
other areas of the u n i t . However, the team has been temporarily
disbanded for the second time since its inception as the result of lack
of s t a f f t o f u l f i l l the search duties. In addition, the search team's
log book indicates that the search team is utilized for transporting
inmates, supervising work crews and other nonsearch related functions.
The Inspections and Investigations Unit's search team based at
ASPC- F1 orence cannot effectively provide searches for a1 1 State
institutions. I t is staffed by four officers and a narcotics dog.* This
search team conducts shakedowns and special searches for all the units in
the Florence complex. The surprise searches of visitors, employees and
vehicles entering DOC grounds are also conducted by this u n i t . This is
also a Statewide search team, therefore, searches a t other institutions
are conducted upon request. However, the search team has conducted only
13 searches at other institutions. The search team believes that
traveling across the State to conduct searches for other institutions is
an inefficient use of i t s time. Separate institutional search teams
could a1 leviate this inefficiency.
* DOC has only one narcotics dog, which it acquired on an
experimental basis. According to I& I personnel, the dog has been
effective in finding drugs. The Department has not determined
whether it will purchase more narcotic dogs.
The remaining three institutions visited have no full - time designated
search teams and use various approaches to conduct searches.
ASPC- Phoenix has recently designated and trained personnel to conduct
searches as a team. However, the search activities would take the CSOs
away from their regular duties. This team does not conduct searches on a
daily basis. ASPC- Perryville and ASP- Fort Grant rely on u n i t CSOs to
conduct random cell searches along w i t h their routine duties. A1 though
most of the institutions indicated that they do perform thorough searches
on a regular basis, designated search team CSOs believe that most u n i t
CSOs don't have the time to conduct thorough searches. In fact, NUOT
CSOs at Florence do not conduct room searches on a regular basis because
of staff shortages. Room searches are conducted only upon probable
cause. ASPC- P Santa Maria Unit conducted only 24 cell searches i n the
three months of March through May. An I& I inspector from the Central
Office believes that sufficient staff are not available a t the
institutions to conduct thorough contraband searches, and our consultants
agree.
Efforts To Control
Contraband Are Limited
DOC ' s efforts to control contraband are 1 imi ted. The Department's
control of contraband may be limited by Departmental policies and
facil i t i e s . Even when contraband i s found DOC'S options for p u n i s h i n g
inmates are limited. In addition, DOC may lack the necessary staff to
effectively control contraband.
Policies May Promote Contraband Movement - The Department of Corrections'
control over contraband may be limited by certain policies. The
commingling of inmates of various custody levels may help the movement of
contraband through the system. In addition, allowable inmate property
appears excessive.
DOC a1 lows inmates of different custody levels to come i n t o contact with
each other. This may adversely affect contraband control because lower
custody level inmates have greater freedom and increased access to areas
where contraband may be obtained.
e Medical faci 1 i t i e s a t ASPC- F1 orence and ASPC- Tucson provide
medical treatment f o r a1 1 prisoners i n each complex. Therefore,
d i f f e r e n t custody level inmates have the opportunity t o come i n
contact with each other.
e The ASPC- F Special Programs Unit t r e a t s substance abuse inmates
and mentally ill inmates o f a l l custody levels. According t o
our consultants, the former drug abusers are probably predators
on the mentally ill, who are on medication and are obviously
victims. I n the consultants' opinion, mixing these two groups
i n t h i s f a c i l i t y creates an enormous l i a b i l i t y f o r the State
Department o f Corrections.
Inmates are allowed t o accumulate large amounts o f personal property
w i t h i n i n s t i t u t i o n s , which makes searches f o r contraband extremely
d i f f i c u l t . An A p r i l 1985 task force report i n d e n t i f i e d t h a t DOC lacked a
clear pol i c y regarding inmate property. This report indicates t h a t
inmates are allowed t o possess too much property. This i s substantiated
by DOC'S current inmate property pol icy, # 420, dated November 21, 1980,
which does not l i m i t the amount o f property an inmate can have.* The
consultants found a number of examples o f excess personal property
throughout the i n s t i t u t i o n s . For example, two vans were needed t o
transport 100 boxes of personal property f o r 13 inmates relocated t o
Fl orence from Perryvi 1 1 e.
Facil i t i e s May Affect Contraband Control - Facil i ty placement and design
may hinder contraband control. The f o l l owing exampl es ill ustrate the
potential f o r contraband t o be passed w i t h i n the i n s t i t u t i o n s as a r e s u l t
of the the design and placement o f buildings.
e According to the consultants, the design and placement of the
v i s i t a t i o n s t r i p search room a t ASPC- F South Unit could hamper
the u n i t ' s attempt t o control contraband. A connecting door
between the inmate s t r i p room and the t o i l e t area used by
inmates i n the v i s i t i n g room has approximately a one inch gap
between the f l o o r and the bottom o f the door. Inmates could
pass contraband under the door.
e The s t r i p search area a t ASPC- T Tent City i s not a secured area
that i s free from contraband. The consultants observed that
inmates are s t r i p searched i n the t o i l e t area used during
v i s i t a t i o n a t Tent City. It i s possible f o r an inmate t o hide
* The Department i s i n the process of revising the inmate property
pol i c y to 1 i m i t the amount of property allowed.
contraband i n the inmate t o i l e t during the v i s i t i n g period and
pick it up l a t e r . A v i s i t o r could hide contraband i n the
v i s i t i n g area or merely throw it i n t o the compound to be picked
up l a t e r . It would not be d i f f i c u l t , once the contraband i s i n
t h i s unit, to transport it i n t o the Rincon Unit.
V i s i t o r s must be bused from v i s i t o r control t o each u n i t a t the
ASPC- T and ASPC- Perryvi 11 e compl exes. The transportati on
vehicles are operated by inmates who may handle, hide and
del i v e r contraband.
DOC'S A b i l i t y To Punish Inmates For Contraband Possession Limited - The
Department of Corrections i s l i m i t e d i n i t s a b i l i t y t o punish inmates f o r
contraband violations. Court prosecutions are hindered due t o d i f f i c u l ty
i n establishing proof o f possession. I n addition, i n s t i t u t i o n a l
d i s c i p l inary actions are 1 i m i ted due t o overcrowding and inadequate
lockup f a c i l i t i e s .
The i n a b i l i t y of prosecutors t o establish possession i s a major obstacle
to prosecuting inmates f o r contraband violations. When inmates are
housed i n close proximity t o each other it i s d i f f i c u l t t o prove a
contraband case because it could be argued t h a t another inmate placed the
contraband. Therefore, the practice o f double bunking and dorrni tory type
housing r e s t r i c t s the Department's abi 1 i ty t o criminal ly prosecute
inmates f o r possession of contraband through the court system, which
could 1 engthen the inmate' s sentence time.
The Department of Corrections has the authority to handle inmate
d i scipl ine v i o l a t i o n s as an i n s t i t u t i o n a l di s c i p l inary matter, however
penal t i e s are 1 i m i ted due to overcrowding and inadequate 1 ockup
f a c i l i t i e s . Inmates can receive various types of penal t i e s for
contraband violations, ranging from a reprimand t o is01 ation.* Is01 ation
i s a severe penalty. However, t h e l a c k o f i s o l a t i o n c e l l s r e s t r i c t s DOC
from using t h i s harsh penalty as a d i s c i p l i n a r y punishment ( see Other
Pertinent Information, page 56). .
* Other penalty options are loss of good time earned, loss of
e l i g i b i l i t y f o r parole, extra work d e t a i l , and loss o f store or
other p r i v i 1 eges.
Staffing May Be I n s u f f i c i e n t - There are not enough guards to adequately
control and supervise inmates and t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . As a r e s u l t , e f f o r t s
t o control contraband may be hindered ( see Finding I, page 5).
CONCLUSION
Contraband i s preval ent w i t h i n the Department of Corrections '
i n s t i t u t i o n s . Contraband has not been kept from the i n s t i t u t i o n s . I n
addition, adequate controls are not maintained on sources o f contraband
w i t h i n the i n s t i t u t i o n s . Furthermore, DOC'S e f f o r t s to control
contraband have been limited.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Department o f Corrections shoul d f u r t h e r r e s t r i c t contraband from
entering the i n s t i t u t i o n s by:
a. Better enforcing v i s i t a t i o n policies and procedures.
b. Repairing and maintaining metal detection equipment, and
purchasing metal detectors f o r those i n s t i t u t i o n s that currently
have none.
c. Searching a1 1 inmates before they enter i n s t i t u t i o n s .
d. Reviewing the open yard v i s i t a t i o n practice and i t s potential
impact on contraband control. If open yards are allowed to
continue, more s t a f f should be allocated f o r observation, and
v i s i t a t i o n p o l i c i e s and procedures should be enforced.
e. Reviewing the Department's pol i c y and the i n s t i t u t i o n s '
procedures regarding food being brought in.
f. Continuing and increasing the surprise vehicle searches by I& I.
2. The Department should increase i t s control over sources of contraband
w i t h i n the institutions by:
a. Informing staff of tool control policies and procedures,
ensuring that tools and equipment are inventoried regularly, and
reviewing tool control policies and procedures annually.
b. Reviewing DOC policies and procedures on inmate operated
businesses and hobby shops for control measures. Specifically,
tools and equipment shoul d be inventoried regularly.
c. Implementing policies and procedures regarding the control of
pharmaceutical and medical suppl ies. The Department shoul d
contact the State Board of Pharmacy for assistance i n developing
a record- keeping and inventory system for uniform application i n
a1 1 institutions within the system.
d. Reviewing for legal ramifications the current practice of mixing
various custody levels of inmates i n the Special Programs Unit.
e. Developing and utilizing search teams at other f a c i l i t i e s to
conduct regul ar searches.
f. Reviewing and revising the Department's inmate property pol icy
to decrease the amount of personal property allowed to inmates.
g. Planning for additional 1 ockup cell s for di scipl inary purposes
i n order to deter contraband and other violations.
FINDING I11
THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS MISCLASSIFIES ADULT INMATES, WHICH INCREASES
SECURITY RISKS
The Department of Corrections' ( DOC) inmate classification system does not
properly classify adult male inmates. Inmate underclassification
increases security risks by placing higher risk inmates i n lower security
f a c i l i t i e s . Misclassification occurs because DOC uses a subjective
classification system and has an overcrowded prison system.
Proper inmate classification is essential for safe and orderly prison
operations. * The classification process determines inmates ' needs and
risk potential and assigns them to housing u n i t s and programs according to
these needs and risks, and existing Departmental resources. **
Classification i n Arizona occurs throughout an inmate ' s incarceration
period and is performed by classification committees. Newly comni tted
inmates complete a two to three week diagnostic and classification period,
which determines each inmate's custody 1 evel ( supervision required) and
institutional assignment. Periodic reclassification actions a t the
inmate ' s resident institution determine whether an inmate's custody level
or institutional assignment need to be changed. Central Office
Classification reviews for approval both i n i t i a l and reclassification
comni t t e e recommendations. Criteria determining inmate custody incl ude
sentence 1 ength, offense, criminal and escape hi story, outstanding
detainers, and behavioral adjustment. Current custody 1 evel s are
adn~ insit rative segregation, maximum, medium, minimum and trusty/ communi ty.
DOC Miscl assification Increases Security
Xisks And Causes Other Problems
The Department miscl assi fies inmates, causing increased security risks and
other problems. Some maximum custody inmates are undercl assi f ied and
* Classification As A Management Tool : Theories and Models for
Decisionmakers, American Correctional Association, 1982, p. 6.
** Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, Second Edition,
American Correctional Association, January, 1981, p. 126.
placed i n lower custody f a c i l i t i e s than warranted by t h e i r degree of r i s k .
I n addition, security i s inadequate a t some f a c i l i ties, which further
increases miscl a s s i f i c a t i o n risks. Unnecessary costs and inmate
r e s t r i c t i o n s also occur because some inmates are overclassified when
entering the system.
Maximum Custody Inmates I n Lower Custody Levels - DOC'S current
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n system undercl a s s i f i e s some a d u l t male inmates. During
r e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a substantial number of maximum custody inmates are
inappropriately c l a s s i f i e d as minimum or medium custody. The most serious
o f these instances involve placing maximum custody inmates i n minimum
custody f a c i l i t i e s . A random sample shows t h a t more than 6 percent o f the
inmates ( 21 of 339 inmates sampled) i n minimum custody or lower would be
assigned t o maximum custody by the Federal Prison System ( FPS) Custody
Determination Instrument.* This i s a serious undercl a s s i f i c a t i o n problem
i n t h a t inmates are placed two custody l e v e l s below t h a t warranted for
t h e i r needs and risks.
Cumulatively, the sample shows t h a t DOC assigns nearly 18 percent o f the
inmates t o maximum custody, while the Federal model places nearly 31
percent i n t h a t custody 1 eve1 . Inappropriately assigning inmates to 1 ower
custody f a c i l i t i e s presents considerable danger w i t h i n the i n s t i t u t i o n s and
t o the general pub1 i c . Undercl a s s i f i c a t i o n can contribute to serious
d i s c i p l i n a r y i n f r a c t i o n s , suicide or other i n s t i t u t i o n a l violence because
* The Auditor General Is Office contracted with Correctional Services
Group, Inc., a correctional consulting f i r m , t o assess the DOC inmate
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n system. The consul t a n t selected the FPS Custody
C l assi f i c a t i o n Instrument to compare the resul t s of DOC
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n decisions to those o f FPS, using a s t a t i s t i c a l l y
valid, randomly selected sample of 339 adult male Arizona inmates.
The FPS Custody Determination Instrument was chosen by the
consultants f o r t h i s analysis because it i s an objectively based
model. The FPS instrument has been validated and the courts have
accepted it as a v a l i d tool i n assessing misclassification. A1 though
the Federal model has not been val idated f o r Arizona, i t ' s docuniented
v a l i d i t y as a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n system and the large difference i n
resul t s from Arizona's present system s t r o n g l y i n d i c a t e that DOC has
underclassified a substantial number of inmates.
inmates are housed i n lower security environments than warranted. Public
risk also increases because underclassification can lead to inmate escape.
Figure 1 demonstrates maximum security undercl assi fication during
reclassification.
FIGURE 1
COMPARISON OF DOC AND FPS CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS
ON ADULT FlALE INbNTES DURING RECLASSIFICATION
Percent
Security Level
( 1 ) Differences i n administrative segregati on results were insignificant
and are not included. Therefore, figures will total less than 100
percent.
L2 ) Minimum incl udes minimum custody, community correctional and trusty
status.
Source: Compiled by Auditor General s t a f f from Correctional Services
Group, Inc. classification report, pages 18- 1 9*
Inadequate Facility Security Increases Risks - Security risks resulting
from miscl assi fications are further increased by DOC'S inadequate faci 1 i ty
security. Security consul tants retained by the Auditor General determined
that many DOC f a c i l i t i e s are less secure than the current designations
* The Correctional Services Group, Inc. classification report, Analysis
of the Arizona DOC Offender Classification System, August 1985, i s
available for review a t the Office of the Arizona Auditor General.
39
indicate ( see Finding I, page 13). For example, two medium f a c i l i t i e s were
rated only minimum by the security consultants. I n addition, DOC uses the
Alhambra adult male reception center, as a maximum custody f a c i l i t y but
security consultants rate it as minimum custody. Thus, a maximum security
inmate c l a s s i f i e d as medium may actually be housed i n an i n s t i t u t i o n that
provides only minimum security because o f security deficiencies.
I n i t i a l Overclassification - A1 though DOC undercl assi f i e s many inmates as
they progress through the system, the consultant's analysis showed t h a t DOC
overcl assi f i e s many inmates during i n i t i a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . While not
posing a security r i s k , t h i s r e s u l t s i n unnecessary costs and inmate
r e s t r i c t i o n s . At i n i ti a1 c l assi f i c a t i o n the Department assigned 58 percent
of the adult male sample t o medium custody, while FPS c r i t e r i a assigned
approximately 21 percent of inmates i n the same sample t o that custody
1 evel .* These overcl assi f i c a t i ons increase DOC'S costs by inappropriately
placing inmates i n higher security 1 evel f a c i l i t i e s which require increased
physical and s t r u c t u r a l security, and more operating s t a f f . Figure 2
ill ustrates overclassi f i c a t i o n occurring during i n i t i a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .
* Medium custody overclassification i s a1 so high during
r e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , with the difference between the FPS and DOC systems
reduced t o 28 percent. I n addition, the FPS instrument assigned 9
inmates of the sample to minimum custody while DOC placed them i n
maximum custody.
FIGURE 2
Percent
COMPARISON OF DOC AND FPS CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS
ON ADULT MALE INMATES DURING INITIAL CLASSIFICATION
2 0
DOC ' FPS DOC FPS DOC FPS
Minimum Medium Maximum.
Securi t . ~ Le vel
) Differences i n administrative segregation resul ts were insignificant
and were not included. Therefore, figures will total less than 100
percent.
L 2 ) Minimum incl udes minimum custody, community correctional and trusty
status.
Source: Compiled by Auditor General s t a f f from Correctional Services
Group, Inc. report, pages 15 and 16
Overclassification may a1 so result i n viol ations of certain inmate
constitutional rights. A recent Federal court decision has held that
excessive r e s t r i c t i v e confinement is considered cruel and unusual
punishment.* By overclassifying inmates DOC may be violating that decision
and exposing i tsel f to prisoner 1 awsui ts.
- k Rarnos v. Lanm, 485 F. Supp. 122 ( 1979)
41
The current c l a s s i f i c a t i o n process combined with overcrowded i n s t i t u t i o n s
causes mi scl assi fication. DOC uses an inadequate subjective c l assi f i c a t i o n
system i n assigning inmates a custody 1 eve1 designation and i n s t i t u t i o n .
However, even i f the system were more objective, overcrowding woul d s t i l l
1 i m i t DOC ' s a b i l i ty t o place inmates appropriately. Further, prison gang
information important f o r proper c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s not e a s i l y accessible.
Current C l a s s i f i c a t i o n System I s Subjective - Currently DOC uses a
subjective c l a s s i f i c a t i o n decision- making process. DOC'S system i s
subjective, rather than objective, because it 1 acks a formal
decision- making model. A1 though DOC has custody placement pol i c y and
employs a national ly recognized psycho1 oyical and ski1 1 s test, resul t s are
not weighted or considered i n a structured manner. DOC recognizes t h a t i t s
current c l a s s i f i c a t i o n system i s inadequate, and recently began devel opment
o f an objective system. The Department allocated $ 50,000 and established
time frames f o r the project. Federal funds'' ( from the NIC) have been
requested t o support the project. DOC plans t o develop and implement the
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n model by January 3, 1986. Our c l a s s i f i c a t i o n consul tant
states t h a t system validation ensuring proper performance should occur
w i t h i n 12 t o 18 months a f t e r implementation.
Overcrowded Prison System Contributes To Miscl assi f i c a t i o n - Even i f
Arizona's c l a s s i f i c a t i o n system were objective, the currently overcrowded
prison system would continue t o corltribute t o prisoner miscl assi fication.
Arizona's adul t prison population exceeds prison capacity by approximately
25 percent of permanent capacity, a1 though use of temporary bed f a c i l i t i e s
such as tents and quonset huts has reduced overcrowding to about 1
percent. Regardless, a national correctional expert has noted that " once a
system h i t s 90 percent capacity, c l a s s i f i c a t i o n fa1 1 s apart. "* Reduced
* " Objective C l a s s i f i c a t i o n . . . A Catalyst f o r change," Corrections
Magazine, S. Gettinger, June 1982, p. 33.
fl exi b i l i ty regarding i n s t i t u t i o n a l placement occurs when prison systems
are over capacity. This often r e s u l t s i n inmates being placed wherever
beds are available. * A val i d , o b j e c t i v e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n system, however,
would ensure t h a t inmates with the greatest security r i s k s would be
assigned t o the most secure i n s t i t u t i o n s .
Maximum custody beds are currently i n highest demand and DOC has the l e a s t
fl exi b i l i ty i n assigning maximum custody inmates ( see Finding I V , page
50). Approximately one- thi r d o f the Department's 932 maximum beds have
been used f o r protective custody inmate housing. DOC has begun to address
t h i s problem by recently t r a n s f e r r i n g 93 inmates from the Central Unit
maximum custody area t o a medium security u n i t a t P e r r y v i l l e .
Prison Gang Information I s Not Readily Accessible - Important
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n information r e l a t i n g t o prison gangs i s n o t r e a d i l y
0
accessible, and t h i s may contribute t o misclassification. Currently,
inmate f i l e s include l i t t l e gang a f f i l i a t i o n information. Although
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s t a f f have access t o t h i s information, communication
procedures between I n t e l 1 igence and Investigations ( 1811 ) gang i n t e l l igence
staff and c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s t a f f are lacking. This has reduced a c c e s s i b i l i t y
t o t h i s information. As a consequence, inmates may have been
inappropriately assigned to i n s t i t u t i o n s and thus subjected to physical
i n j u r y and intimidation. For example, an inmate was recently beaten with a
pipe and k i l l e d w i t h i n two t o three hours o f his a r r i v a l a t a new
i n s t i t u t i o n . This inmate was believed t o be the v i c t i m of gang
r e t a l i a t i o n . C l a s s i f i c a t i o n s t a f f transferred t h i s inmate unaware t h a t he
was a gang member possibly targeted f o r r e t a l i a t i o n . DOC c l a s s i f i c a t i o n
staff, I& gIa ng i n t e l l i g e n c e s t a f f and the consultant believe that inmate
f i l e s should include nonconfidential gang a f f i l i a t i o n information.
* The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n consultant noted a relationship between DOC'S
current bed space d i s t r i b u t i o n by custody level and i t s
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n recommendations. This i s apparently a r e s u l t of DOC's
need to use available beds, which l i m i t s i t s c a p a b i l i t y to
effectively match an inmate ' s needs with the Department's resources.
43
CONCLUSION
The Department of Corrections' adult inmate classification system
m i scl assi fies inmates. Undercl assi f ied inmates increase security risks.
Overclassification results i n unnecessary costs and inmate restrictions.
DOC ' s current subjective cl assi f icati on process and overcrowded prison
system cause miscl assification.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. DOC should continue to develop and implement an objective inmate
classification system.
2. DOC should objectively classify all institutions and units i n terrrrs of
securi ty and program capabi 1 i ti es.
3. DOC shoul d incl ude nonconfidential gang affi1 iation information i n
inmate record f i l es.
FINDING I V
THE CURRENT CONSTRUCT1 ON PROGRAM WILL NOT PROVIDE THE DEPARTMENT WITH
ENOUGH MAXIMUM CUSTODY BEDS
The Department of Corrections ( DOC) w i l l not have enough maximum custody
beds t o securely confine present o r f u t u r e adult male inmates. As
previously discussed i n Finding 111, the Department underclassifies
inmates who should be i n maximum custody p a r t l y because the Department
does not have enough maximum custody beds t o house these inmates. The
Department's present construction program w i l l not provide enough maximum
custody beds to meet e i t h e r current or future needs. DOC needs to begin
addressing t h i s c r i t i c a l shortage.
The Department Lacks
Maximum Custody Beds
The Department does not have enough maximum custody beds t o securely house
i t s current adul t male inmate population. Our consul t a n t ' s analysis
indicates t h a t the Department currently needs an additional 1,400 maxinun
custody beds. I n addition, DOC may lack enough minimum custody beds.
Maximum Bed Shortfall - According to our calculations based on the
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n consul t a n t ' s analysis, DOC needs more maximum custody
beds.* Analysis indicates that DOC currently needs more than 2,400
* The consultant's findings are based on the use of the Federal Prison
System ( FPS) c l a s s i f i c a t i o n model. This model i s an objective
system t h a t has been validated f o r the FPS population. Because o f
differences between Arizona and Federal inmate populations the
Federal model may not be completely val i d f o r Arizona. However, i t s
documented v a l i d i t y as a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n system and the large
difference i n results from Arizona's present system strongly
indicate t h a t DOC w i l l f i n d t h a t it lacks s u f f i c i e n t maximum custody
beds when it begins using an objective c l a s s i f i c a t i o n system. The
numbers presented i n t h i s finding are used t o i l l u s t r a t e the
magnitude of the differences between DOC'S current system and an
objective system. The actual r e s u l t s o f DOC'S new system may d i f f e r
i n detail from the FPS model, but w i l l very l i k e l y show a
substantial increase i n the number o f maximum custody inmates over
the current DOC c l a s s i f i c a t i o n system.
maximum custody beds. However, DOC has only 972 maximum beds. Thus, DOC
should have a t l e a s t an additional 1,400 maximum beds. This lack of
maximum beds causes some inmates requiring t h i s custody level t o be housed
i n lower custody i n s t i t u t i o n s , thus increasing security r i s k s to the
pub1 i c , Departmental s t a f f and other inmates. Table 4 shows what custody
level DOC housing should consist o f under the Federal Prison System ( FPS)
Custody Determination Instrument c l a s s i f i c a t i o n model .
TABLE 4
CURRENT ADULT MALE INMATE BED SPACE REQUIREMENTS
Current FPS Model Bed
Operati ng Housing Surplus/
Custody Level capacity ( I ) Requirements ( Shortage )
Minimum 2,818 3,987 ( 1,169)
Medi um 3 ,798( 2) 1,283 2,515
Maximum 972( 3) 2,406 ( 1,434)
Administrative
Segregation 180 92 88
Total
( 1) Includes 1,541 temporary beds. Permanent adult male inmate bed
capacity i s 6,227. Reception and j u v e n i l e beds are not included i n
permanent housing available.
( 2) Includes 168 mental health and substance abuse beds.
( 3) Includes 40 mental health beds.
Source : Compi 1 ed by Audi t o r General s t a f f using Correctional Services
Group, Inc. report, pages 32 through 34, and DOC Bed Capacity
Report, updated September 1985
Lack of Minimum Security Beds - I n addition t o i n s u f f i c i e n t numbers of
maximum custody beds, DOC may a1 so lack enough minimum beds. As shown i n
Table 4, the consultant's analysis indicates t h a t the State prison system
needs another 1,000 minimum beds. However, DOC could, with l i t t l e cost
and e f f o r t , modify several e x i s t i n g medium security f a c i l i t i e s for minimum
use.
Current Construction Program Wi 11 Not
Provide tnoueh Maximum Beds When Com~ leted
The Department's current construction program wi 11 not provide enough
maximum custody beds to meet either current or future adult male inmate
custody requirements. Our analysis also indicates that DOC will build too
many medium custody beds and not enough minimum custody beds.
Current Construction Will Not Provide Enough Maximum Beds - Even after the
current construction program is completed DOC will lack enough maximum
custody beds. By the completion of the current construction program i n
March 1987, DOC will have more than 2,700 maximum inmates, i n part because
of inmate popul ation growth.* The construction program wi 11 only provide
an additional 768 maximum beds beyond the existing 972 beds, leaving the
Department s t i l l 1 acking 1,000 maximum beds. Using the Department's
conservative estimate of $ 45,000 per bed to construct maximum custody
beds, an additional $ 45 mil 1 ion of construction would be required to build
enough additional maximum custody beds to meet classification custody
requirements by March 1987.
* All calculations are based on November 1985 Department of
Admini stration- Correctional Facil i t i e s PI anninq and Construction
Division estimated completi. on date for the ; urrent construction
program. The Douglas f a c i l i t y ( l a s t f a c i l i t y to be constructed) is
scheduled to be completed i n March 1987. However, a previous
Auditor General performance audit report forecasts conpl etion in
October 1987. I f t h i s delay occurs, DOC would be short an
additional 100 maximum beds. ( See Auditor General report 1185- 2,
Department of Corrections, Facil i t i e s Construction Division, page
34. )
TABLE 5
PERMANENT BEDS REQUIRED FOR ADULT MALE INMATES
AFTER CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM COMPLETION
IN MARCH 1987
Current Total Surplus/
Permanent Construction Permanent Estimated ( Shortage)
Custody Housing Program Housing After Inmate Permanent
Level ~ v a ialb l e ( l ) Additions ( 2) Construction ( 3) popul ation ( 4) Housing
Minimum/
Communi ty 2,310 1,020
Maximum 972 7 68 1 ,740 2,754 ( 1,014)
Administrative
Segregation 180 180 105 75
Total
Does not include 1,541 temporary beds currently i n use. These beds a
and possibly some deteriorated permanent f a c i l i t i e s are scheduled f o r
replacement by new construction beds.
( 2) Includes 427 minimum and 708 medium custody permanent status
emergency beds currently under construction.
( 3) Community Corrections and DWI beds are included because the
Department's estimated inmate population a1 so includes these. •
( 4) The numbers i n t h i s column were obtained by multiplying t o t a l
estimated adult male inmate population i n March 1987 by the
percentage o f inmates assigned t o each custody level a t
recl assi f i c a t i a n using the FPS Custody Determi nation Instrument. See
Correctional Services Group, Inc. ( CSG) report, p. 33, f o r FPS
security d i s t r i b u t i o n percentages a t r e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . •
Source: Prepared by Auditor General s t a f f from CSG report, p. 33, Auditor
General Department o f Corrections Faci 1 i t i e s and Construction
Division performance audit, February 1985, p. 2, and DOC male
inmate population estimates, DOC bed capacity report, and other
department information
Department W i l l A1 so Lack Minimum Beds After Construction - I n addition t o
lacking high security beds, the Department w i l l also be short on minimum
custody beds. As i l l u s t r a t e d i n Table 5, when current construction i s
complete DOC w i l l lack minimum beds but w i l l have an overabundance of
medium custody beds.
Advance Pl anni ng Required
To A1 l e v i a t e Shortage
DOC needs t o begin addressing i t s maximum custody bed needs. The 1 ong
lead time f o r prison construction requires t h a t planning begin as soon as
possible to construct the needed f a c i l i t i e s . DOC can immediately make
available more maximum beds by continuing t o move appropriate protective
segregation inmates from the ASPC- Fl orence Central Unit. Several other
a1 t e r n a t i ves e x i s t t h a t coul d provide needed maximum beds i ncl udi ng
a1 t e r i n g existing f a c i l i t i e s , r e d i r e c t i n g the current construction program
and developing further construction plans.
Immediate Action Needed - Because o f the t y p i c a l l y lengthy time frames f o r
prison construction, the Department shoul d begin pl anni ng to provide
maximum custody beds. I n a previous audit report of the current prison
construction program our analysis indicated t h a t a minimum o f 24 months i s
required to construct a major prison f a c i 1 i ty. * This construction time
frame, when combined with the time required t o develop a funding request
and receive funding, would push any new construction completion past the
current construction program completion date o f October 1986.
The objective c l a s s i f i c a t i o n instrument now under devel opment by the
Department would be the best indicator o f future bed needs. However, the
new c l a s s i f i c a t i o n system w i l l not provide accurate information u n t i l
validated i n l a t e 1986. Implementation and validation o f the system i n
l a t e 1986 w i l l occur too l a t e f o r use i n planning f o r the f a c i l i t i e s
construction currently i n process.
* Report # 85- 2, Department o f Corrections, Facil i t i e s and Construction
Division, page 34.
4 9
The consultant's analysis indicating a need f o r more maximum security beds
i s s u f f i c i e n t t o begin planning f o r additional construction or other
a1 ternatives. Whi 1 e the FPS c l a s s i f i c a t i o n model used i n the consul t a n t ' s
analysis may not apply d i r e c t l y t o Arizona, the model i s a validated
objective c l a s s i f i c a t i o n instrument. The magnitude of the projected
maximum bed shortage s t r o n g l y i n d i c a t e s a need f o r the planning for new
maximum beds p r i o r t o impl ementation o f the new c l a s s i f i c a t i o n system.
Additional Maximum Beds Could Be Made Available Immediately - DOC can
immediately make avail able additional maximum beds by continuing t o move
appropriate protective custody inmates from the ASPC- Fl orence Central
Unit. Currently, the Department continues t o unnecessarily house some
protective segregation inmates i n the maximum custody f a c i l i ty. DOC could
better control the protective segregation population by impl ementing a
two- tiered housing system.*
The Department continues to house some lower custody protective
segregation inmates i n i t s maximum custody f a c i l i ty. U n t i l recently, DOC
housed a l l protective segregation inmates i n i t s maximum custody
f a c i l i t y . Auditor General analysis shows t h a t a t l e a s t 43 percent o f the
July 1985 protective segregation popul ation entered t h a t status from a
medium or lower custody unit. According t o both the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and
security consul tant teams, many of these inmates could be placed i n 1 ower
custody protective segregation. Professional correctional 1 i terature says
t h a t some states have protective segregation units i n medium custody
f a c i l i t i e s . * *
DOC has addressed t h i s problem by recently converting a general population
housing pod a t the P e r r y v i l l e prison for medium custody protective
segregation use. I n September 1985 DOC re1 ocated 93 protective
segregation inmates from the Central Unit t o P e r r y v i l l e , leaving more than
200 s t i l l a t the Central Unit. Protective segregation inmates now
* Protective segregation i s a form of separation from the general
population for inmates requesting o r r e q u i r i n g protection from other
i nma tes.
** Protective Custody I n Adul t Correctional Facil i t i e s , American
Correctional Association, 1983, pp. 14- 1 5.
occupy about one- fourth o f available maximum custody beds. Our analysis
indicates t h a t a t l e a s t another 41 inmates i n maximum custody protective
segregation might be e l i g i b l e for placement i n a lower custody segregation
unit. However, DOC has no further plans f o r other protective segregation
reallocations. According to the Department, these inmates cannot be moved
u n t i l an e n t i r e housing u n i t i s open so these inmates can be kept
segregated. Currently, the Department does not have enough beds to do
this.
The Department shoul d consider using a two- tiered protective segregation
program t o discourage inmates from requesting t h i s status except for
documentable reasons. The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n consul t a n t states t h a t a
two- tier system should he1 p ensure t h a t inmates requesting protective
segregation l e g i t i m a t e l y need the e x t r a p r o t e c t i o n and supervision.*
Inmates i n the f i r s t level are admitted i n t o protective segregation e i t h e r
by s t a f f or have themselves produced a legitimate, documentable reason f o r
needing protective segregation. These inmates would have the same r i g h t s
and p r i v i 1 eges as general population inmates. Second level inmates are
those not w i l l i n g or able t o document the request f o r protective
segregation. Inmates i n t h i s level would have mandatory r i g h t s but
c e r t a i n privileges would be kept t o a minimum. Such an environment should
encourage the inmate to e i t h e r transfer back t o general population or
substanti ate his protective segregation need. Correctional standards say
t h a t care should be taken t o ensure t h a t inmates do not see protective
segregation pl acement as desi rabl e.
A1 ternatives Exi s t To Provide Needed Maximum Beds - Several a1 t e r n a t i ves
e x i s t f o r the Department to a l l e v i a t e i t s current and future maximum
custody bed shortage.
F i r s t , the ~ epartment coul d analyze whether any existing medium security
f a c i l i t i e s could be upgraded to securely house maximum custody inmates.
Second, the Department coul d request t h a t the Legi s l ature modi fy the
* According to our c l a s s i f i c a t i o n consul tant, most states require some
substantiation of the potential threat t o the inmate to warrant
protective segregation. Arizona provides protective segregation
upon inmates ' requests.
5 1
current construction program, building more maximum custody beds and fewer
medium beds. Finally, the Department coul d request new construction. As
mentioned previously, an additional 1,000 maximum beds a t an estimated
cost of $ 45 mill ion are required by March 1987. However, modifying the
exi sting program woul d reduce costs by not bui 1 ding unneeded medi um
custody beds.
CONCLUSION
The Department does not have enough maximum custody beds to meet current
and future adult male inmate population needs. DOC currently lacks enough
maximum custody beds. Further, the construction program will not provide
enough maximum beds f o r e i t h e r current or future use. DOC needs to
immediately begin eval uating a1 ternatives for providing additional maximum
custody bed space.
RECOMMENDAT1 ONS
1 . The Department shoul d continue to transfer appropriate protective
segregation inmates to specific areas w i t h i n lower custody facil i t i e s .
2. The Department should consider several a1 ternatives to provide
additional maximum custody bed space, incl uding:
a. analyzing existing facil i t i e s to determine whether upgrading to
higher custody level is possible,
b. modifying the current construction program, and
c. requesting new construction.
3. The Department shoul d use its new objective classification system,
once i t is implemented and validated, to refine its bed space
requirement projections.
4. The Department should develop formal policies and procedures for
identifying and classifying protective segregation inmates. A1 so, DOC
shoul d consider adopting a two- 1 eve1 protective segregation system.
OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION
During the audit we developed pertinent information on early release
programs, is01 ation c e l l s, and the adult ma1 e reception center.
EARLY RELEASE TO ALLEVIATE OVERCROWDING
A1 though early release programs can be an e f f e c t i v e emergency management
tool f o r reducing prison overcrowding, Arizona has l i m i t e d the use o f t h i s
option i n recent years. An analysis o f Arizona's inmate population
indicates t h a t more than one- fourth could be released e a r l y w i t h 1 i t t l e
1 ikelihood o f rearrest. However, DOC must f i r s t develop and validate an
objective c l a s s i f i c a t i o n system to ensure proper eval uation and
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f early release candidates.
Arizona's use o f early release has changed over time. The o r i g i n a l e a r l y
release program, e f f e c t i v e f o r crimes committed a f t e r August 1974,
consisted o f 180- day mandatory release f o r those inmates completing t h e i r
maximum sentences. Statutory changes e f f e c t i v e f o r crimes committed a f t e r
May 1985 made the 180- day release discretionary, requiring inmates t o meet
c r i t e r i a established by DOC through rules and regulations.
Several other states, including Michigan, Mary1 and and Kentucky, have
u t i l i z e d some form o f early release programs i n order to s t a b i l i z e t h e i r
growing prison popul a t i ons. Early re1 ease programs general 1y i ncl ude some
form of evaluation system whereby inmates are assessed t o determine t h e i r
potential f o r committing new crimes a f t e r being released early. Once
evaluated, 1 ow r i s k inmates can be released from 30 t o 180 days p r i o r t o
t h e i r par01 e el i g i b i l i ty or completion of sentence date.
Results of a study conducted f o r the Auditor General by Correctional
Services Group, Inc., suggest t h a t there are a number of Arizona inmates
who could be released from confinement 60 to 180 days p r i o r t o t h e i r legal
release date e i t h e r through parole or expiration o f sentence.
Using the Sel ective Incapacitation Model * developed by the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency, the study r e s u l t s a s shown i n Table 6
indicate that almost 10 percent of the Arizona inmate population could be
released early w i t h extremely minimal threat to the safety and welfare of
the general public, and that almost one- fourth could leave the prison
early w i t h only a minimal 1 ikel ihood of further criminal activity.
TABLE 6
RESULTS OF EARLY RELEASE STUDY
Percentage Of Likely Arrest
Inmates In Rates Within One
Category of Risk Range ( Points) Category Year Of Release
LowLow
Low
Moderate
High
H i ghHi gh
0 - 5 9.14 3 to 5%
6 - 10 25.70 20 to 25%
11 - 14 29.20 45 to 50%
11 - 20 29.50 65 to 70%
21 plus 6.50 85 to 90%
Population sample size = 339
Source: " Analysis of The Arizona DOC Offender Cl assi fication System,"
August 1985, Correctional Services Group, Inc.
* In the Selective Incapacitation Model assessment, points are
assigned to an inmate based on the following factors.
Offense Seriousness
Prior Arrests
Prior Juvenile Commitment
Prior Imprisonment ( Jail/ Prison)
History of Disciplinary Grade Demotion
Age A t Release
Prior Parole Viol ations
Weapon Used In Offense
History Of Heroin/ Barbi tuate Abuse
Security Level A t Re1 ease
Inmates receiving more points have a greater 1 ikel ihood for
recidivism and are therefore, 1 ess el igibl e for early re1 ease.
The implementation of an early release program could produce a savings f o r
the State by reducing the inmate population i n e x i s t i n g f a c i l i t i e s . This
reduction would make needed beds available and potential ly improve the
inmate c l a s s i f i c a t i o n process ( see Finding 111, page 37). These benefits
can be achieved a t minimal r i s k to public safety. According to the
consul tan ts, an inmate ' s 1 i kel i hood o f rearrest i s no d i f f e r e n t a f t e r
early re1 ease than a t the completion o f the f u l l sentence.
Although an early release program could provide benefits t o the State,
DOC'S e x i s t i n g c l a s s i f i c a t i o n system does not provide s u f f i c i e n t
information to adequately evaluate inmates f o r early release. The
subjective nature of the present system ( see Finding 111, page 37) cannot
assure t h a t only low r i s k inmates w i l l be i d e n t i f i e d and selected f o r
early re1 ease. However, DOC i s developing an objective c l a s s i f i c a t i o n
system, which when val idated, could provide adequate information for a
successful early re1 ease program.
ISOLATION CELLS
DOC lacks an adequate number o f i s o l a t i o n c e l l s t o ensure e f f e c t i v e inmate
d i s c i p l i n e . Many i n s t i t u t i o n s have few or no c e l l s f o r isolation. As a
resul t, inmates sentenced to d i s c i p l inary is01 ation often must wait to
serve t h e i r time or never serve t h e i r time.
DOC does not have an adequate number of i s o l a t i o n cells.* Currently, the
department has 134 i s o l a t i o n c e l l s . These c e l l s account f o r less than 2
percent of permanent bed capacity and only 1.5 percent o f t o t a l operating
capacity. Because is01 ation c e l l s are important to e f f e c t i v e d i s c i p l ine,
the Auditor General c l a s s i f i c a t i o n consul t a n t suggests a minimum o f 5
percent i s o l a t i o n c e l l capacity a t every i n s t i t u t i o n , or about 420 c e l l s
systemwide. The Federal Prison System currently b u i l ds i t s new prisons
with 10 percent capacity reserved f o r is01 ation.
* I s o l a t i o n c e l l s house inmates f o r a short tine. Inmates are placed
i n is01 ation c e l l s f o r d i s c i p l inary detention and other purposes.
Prisoners i n is01 ation are not afforded a c t i v i t i e s or items
generally considered t o be privileges.
I n addition, e x i s t i n g i s o l a t i o n c e l l s are not we1 1 dispersed throughout
the system. Eight o f the e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s have no i s o l a t i o n c e l l s .
I n addition, some f a c i l i t i e s with i s o l a t i o n c e l l s may not have enough.
This causes some o f t h e i r resident inmates t o be transferred t o other
f a c i l i t i e s f o r isolation. On July 18, 1985, f o r example, 21 of the 70
inmates i n the Tucson- Rincon I s o l a t i o n U n i t were e i t h e r Fort Grant or the
Community Correctional Center- Tucson residents. Table 7 shows i s o l a t i o n
c e l l d i s t r i b u t i o n w i t h i n the prison system.
TABLE 7
FACILITY BED CAPACITY AND ISOLATION CAPACITY
I n s t i t u t i o n Operating I s o l a t i o n Cells Percent
Fl orence 2,983 43 1.4
Tucson 1,453 50 3.4
Perryvi 11 e 1,400 12 .9
Fort Grant 803 2 5 3.1
Community Correction
Cen ter- Tucson 140
Other I n s t i t u t i o n s
Total 8,452
Includes permanent, temporary and permanent r e s t r i c t e d beds.
Source: Prepared by Auditor General s t a f f from DOC bed capacity
information.
Lack o f i s o l a t i o n c e l l s also l i m i t s e f f e c t i v e use of maximum custody bed
space. DOC routinely houses otherwise manageable inmates a t ASPC- Florence
c e l l b l ock 6. These inmates are awai t i n g tri a1 for di sci pl i nary
i n f r a c t i o n s and occupy beds t h a t could be used f o r higher custody
inmates. Auditor General security consul tants recon~ mend that when
possible, inmates awaiting investigation or d i s c i p l inary actions for
offenses other than escape or serious assault should be held i n regional
is01 ation c e l l s while t h e i r cases are pending. Due t o a lack of available
i s o l a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s , t h i s has not been possible.
56
Because i s o l a t i o n c e l l s are scarce, some inmates must wait months t o serve
d i s c i p l i n a r y detention time, or never serve the time. According t o the
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n consul tant, inadequate lockup space severely impedes
e f f e c t i v e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n system operation by a1 1 owing inmates assigned
t o d i s c i p l i n a r y i s o l a t i o n t o remain i n the general population. DOC s t a f f
have stated t h a t inmates often must wait f i v e t o s i x months f o r an open
i s o l a t i o n c e l l . For example, as o f July 2, 1985, 59 Florence South Unit
( medium custody) inmates were awaiting d i s c i p l inary is01 ation. O f these,
some had been sentenced t o i s o l a t i o n since February 5, 1985.*
Some inmates never serve t h e i r i s o l a t i o n t i n e because when a c e l l f i n a l l y
opens, they have either been transferred to a d i f f e r e n t i n s t i t u t i o n or
re1 eased from prison. Many inmates from a1 1 ASPC- Fl orence units sentenced
t o d i s c i p l i n a r y i s o l a t i o n are placed on a waiting l i s t . I n l a t e 1984 and
again i n January 1985 Central Unit management deleted a l l inmates on the
d i s c i p l i n a r y i s o l