Performance audit, Department of Emergency and Military Affairs

              PERFORMANCE AUDIT
DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY
AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
Report to the Arizona Legislature
By the Auditor General
November 1994
Report 94- 9
DOUGLAS R. NORTON, CPA
AUDITOR GENERAL
STATE OF ARIZONA
OFFICE OF THE
AUDITOR GENERAL
DEBRA K. DAVENPORT, CPA
DEPUTIAUDlTORTENERIL
November 3, 1994
Members of the Arizona Legislature
The Honorable Fife Symington, Governor
Major General Glen Van Dyke, Adjutant General
Department of Emergency and Military Affairs
Transmitted herewith is a report of the Auditor General, A Performance Audit of the
Department of Emergency and Military Affairs. This report is in response to a May
5, 1993, resolution of the Joint Legislative Audit Committee. The Performance audit
was conducted as part of the sunset review set forth in A. R. S. § § 41- 2951 through 41-
2957.
The report addresses concerns within both the Division of Emergency Management
and the Division of Military Affairs. We found that the Division of Emergency
Management needs to take action to improve its ability to coordinate disaster
response. In addition, the Department needs to improve its oversight of state and
federal funds flowing through the Division of Emergency Management. Further,
statutes should be revised to clarify the authority of the Adjutant General over the
Division. Our report also contains two findings addressing Camp Navajo, a state-operated
enterprise activity within the Division of Military Affairs. While Camp
Navajo was established to generate monies to support a federal training site, the
Department needs to take action to eliminate the liability the enterprise poses for the
State. Further, the Department needs to ensure that all efforts are made to facilitate
the timely environmental cleanup of Camp Navajo.
My staff and I will be pleased to discuss or clarify items in the report.
This report will be released to the public on November 4, 1994.
Sincerely,
~ e b r aK. Davenport 1
Deputy Auditor General
I 2910 NORTH 44TH STREET . SUITE 410 . PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85018 ( 602) 553- 0333 FAX ( 602) 553- 0051
SUMMARY
The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance audit and Sunset
review of the Department of Emergency and Military Affairs, pursuant to a May 5,
1993, resolution of the Joint Legislative Audit Committee. This audit is conducted under
the authority vested in the Auditor General by Arizona Revised Statutes 5541- 2951
through 41- 2957.
The Department of Emergency and Military Affairs ( DEMA) was established by
Arizona Revised Statutes 526- 101 in 1972 to:
" promote, protect and defind the peace, health and safity of the citizens of this state
and to respond in emergencies to restme and maintain public mder."
The Department consists of two divisions, the Division of Emergency Management and
the Division of Military Affairs.
The Division of Emergency Management
Should Take Action To Improve Its
Ability to Coordinate Disaster Response
( See pages 5 through 10)
The Division of Emergency Management is statutorily charged with the preparation and
coordination of all state government efforts during emergencies. Despite this
responsibility, the Division lacks a comprehensive state emergency plan, has not
ensured its emergency operations center has crucial response information, and has not
performed enough drills to prepare responders. This failure to adequately prepare for
disasters could impact the Division's ability to coordinate the State's response to a
sudden disaster. During the State's most recent major disaster, the 1993 floods, the
Division failed to provide proactive leadership and coordination, although it had nearly
two months to prepare for flood waters reaching Yuma County.
The Department Should Improve
Oversight of State and Federal Funds
( see pages 11 through 16)
DEMA needs to implement stronger controls over state and federal monies. During our
1983 audit of the Department, we identified problems that demonstrated the need for
strong oversight of funds flowing through the Division of Emergency Management. In
response to our 1983 audit, the Department established an audit function to perform
ongoing expenditure reviews; however, the Department has not ensured adequate
oversight of audit staff, and mandated audits have not been conducted in a timely
manner, if at all. Further, the audits of disaster relief monies, which are conducted by
a Division auditor, are of such poor quality that federal officials have deemed the
audits unreliable and have ceased funding the audit position until improvements are
made. To strengthen oversight and resolve federal concerns, the Department should
centralize the audit function at the Department level, and ensure all necessary audits
are completed and in compliance with government auditing standards.
The Adjutant General Should
Exercise Greater Control Over
the Division of Emergency Management
( see pages 17 through 20)
The Adjutant General should ensure the Division of Emergency Management receives
adequate oversight. As previously noted, the Division has demonstrated an inability to
effectively manage its statutory responsibilities. Although the Adjutant General has
authority over the Division, the Division has been allowed to largely define the limits
of oversight it will accept. This condition has been fostered by the Division Director's
use of political support from the counties to resist consolidation and Department
oversight. Further impacting the Adjutant General's authority are statutes that allow the
Division director, during declared emergencies, to assume authority over all
Department personnel ( including the Adjutant General), and assets, and to report
directly to the governor.
In recent years, the Division and others have proposed separating the Division from the
Department, ostensibly to improve emergency management. In reviewing this issue, we
found that across the country, other states have a variety of command structures.
Currently, emergency management agencies are combined with military organizations
in 20 states, with police agencies in 14 states, and with various departments in 6 states.
Only 10 states have established their emergency management agency as a separate
entity. This suggests Arizona can have an effective program with its current
organizational structure. However, to ensure clear leadership the Legislature should
consider amending statutes to give the Adjutant General, rather than the Division
director, authority over the Department at all times.
Department Activities At Camp Navajo
May Not Be In the Best
Interests of the State
( see pages 21 through 25)
Department efforts to establish a state- operated enterprise activity at Camp Navajo may
not be in Arizona's best interest. The operation involves the storage of over $ 1 billion
of military hardware, including Minuteman rocket motors and air- launched cruise
missiles, and is intended to support federal training activities at Camp Navajo.
However, the Department's agreements with the various Department of Defense
agencies for which it is storing hardware place significant liability on the State for any
damages incurred to the commodities stored there. Further, these agreements do not
allow for the use of storage operation funds to support training activities. While
changes to the agreements might resolve some of these problems, the need for adequate
oversight of the operation should also be addressed.
The Department Should Act to Ensure
the Timely Environmental Restoration
of Camp Navajo ( see pages 27 through 30)
Federal legislation ordering the Navajo Army Depot's closure includes specific
requirements for environmental restoration of the installation. However, the current
restoration plan for Camp Navajo, developed by the Department and U. S. Army
officials, does not comply with the legislation and could significantly delay cleanup.
Although the Department's efforts to secure Camp Navajo for Arizona National Guard
use may have contributed to the funding problems and delays, complying with the
federal legislation appears to be the best means of remediating the environmental
damage at Camp Navajo.
Table of Contents
Page
Introduction and Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Finding I: The Division Of Emergency
Management Should Take Action
To lmprove Its Ability To Coordinate Disaster Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Division Not Well Prepared
for Disaster Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Division Needs to Implement Changes
to Ensure Proactive Leadership and
Coordination of Response Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 0
Finding II: The Department Should lmprove
Oversight Of State And Federal Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Past Problems Demonstrated
Need for Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Department Has Not Instituted
Effective Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Oversight of Division Expenditures
Should be Strengthened . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Table of Contents ( con't)
Page
Finding Ill: The Adjutant General Should Exercise
Greater Control Over The Division
Of Emergency Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Factors Which Impede Adjutant General Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Statutes Allow Division Director to
Assume Control During Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Statutes Should Be Amended to
Clarify Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Finding IV: Department Activities At
Camp Navajo May Not Be In The
Best Interests Of The State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
State Enterprise Designed to
Support Federal Training Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Storage Operation Places Liability on the
State and Is Inconsistent with
Federal Regulations and Grant Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Need for Oversight Has Implications
for Program Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Table of Contents ( concl'd)
Finding V: The Department Should Act
To Ensure The Timely Environmental
Restoration Of Camp Navajo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Legislation Closing Camp Navajo
Includes Requirements for
Environmental Restoration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 7
The Department Has Not Fully
Complied with Base Closure
Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 7
Compliance with BRAC
Is Best Means of Restoring the Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 9
Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 0
Sunset Factors
Department of Emergency and Military Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 1
State Emergency Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5
Agency Response
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance audit and Sunset
review of the Department of Emergency and Military Affairs, pursuant to a May 5,
1993, resolution of the Joint Legislative Audit Committee. This audit is conducted under
the authority vested in the Auditor General by A. R. S. 5541- 2951 through 41- 2957.
Department Purpose
and Structure
The Department of Emergency and Military Affairs ( DEMA) was established by A. R. S.
526- 101 in 1972 to:
" promote, protect and defend the peace, health and safety of the citizens of this state and
to respond in emergencies to restore and maintain public order."
The Department consists of two divisions, the Division of Emergency Management and
the Division of Military Affairs.
Division of Emergency
Management
The Division of Emergency Management prepares and coordinates the emergency ser-vices
required to reduce the impact of natural, nuclear, or chemical disasters or other
state emergencies. The Division's preparation responsibilities include the development
of the state emergency response plan; financial and technical assistance to counties to
provide qualified personnel for county response planning; emergency response training;
and exercises to test state and local government emergency response capabilities. When
a significant disaster occurs and state assistance is requested, the Division serves as the
central point of contact within Arizona for both resource allocation and the coordination
of response efforts by local, state, and federal agencies. After the disaster response
phase, the Division manages the recovery efforts and the disbursement of state and
federal disaster recovery funds. The Division has three sections to carry out these func-tions:
Administration and Training, Operations, and Preparedness and Hazardous
Materials.
Division of
Military Affairs
The Division of Military Affairs is primarily responsible for managing and operating
the National Guard of Arizona, including both the Army National Guard and the Air
National Guard. The National Guard of Arizona is part of the reserve component of
the U. S. Army and U. S. Air Force and provides the armed services with trained,
equipped units in case of a state or national emergency. During Operation Desert Storm
in 1990, ten units of the Arizona Army National Guard were ordered into federal
service. The National Guard provides valuable services to the State of Arizona,
including performing search and rescue missions, fighting forest fires, and responding
to floods.
In addition to their reserve component and emergency responsibilities, the Arizona
National Guard is involved in several other significant training and community service
roles. The Air National Guard trains more than 200 fighter pilots annually for the
United States, Singapore, and the Royal Netherlands Air Forces. The Army National
Guard operates one of two national training sites responsible for training helicopter
pilots and aircrew members, graduating over 700 students in fiscal year 1992- 93.
Through the Joint Counter Narcotics Task Force, the National Guard supports local,
state, and federal drug enforcement agencies in reducing the illegal drug supply. In
addition, with a $ 2.6 million grant from the federal government, in 1993 the National
Guard established one of ten programs in the nation designed to provide counseling
and education opportunities to high- school dropouts in an effort to aid them in
obtaining their General Education Diploma ( GED).
Budget and Personnel
The Department's operating budget consists of State- appropriated funds, federal grant
funds for emergency management, and federal appropriations for the National Guard.
During fiscal year 1993- 94, the budget controlled by the Adjutant General totaled over
$ 192 million. Of that amount, approximately 2 percent came from State appropriations,
1 percent came from federal grant funds for emergency management, and 97 percent
came from federal appropriations for the Arizona National Guard. Also during that
same fiscal year, the Department was authorized 90.5 full- time equivalent ( FTE)
positions, with 62.5 budgeted from State appropriations and 28 from federal program
grant funds. In addition, the National Guard had a total of 2,065 FTE's in fiscal year
1992- 93,1,422 technicians and 643 Active Guard Reserves on extended assignments. The
Department also has over 7,800 traditional National Guard members, who participate
in military training at least 1 weekend a month and 15 days each year.
Audit Scope
This audit report of the Department of Emergency and Military Affairs presents
findings and recommendations in five areas:
1. The Division of Emergency Management's lack of preparedness.
2. The Division of Emergency Management's use of funds.
3. The two divisions' inability to work together as one department.
4. The operation of Camp Navajo and whether it poses a significant financial
risk to the State of Arizona.
5. The environmental situation at Camp Navajo and efforts needed to ensure
timely restoration.
In addition to these audit areas, the report contains a response to the 12 Sunset Factors
( see pages 31 through 34) for the Department, and also a Sunset Factor response ( see
pages 35 through 37), for the State Emergency Council. The State Emergency Council
was established per A. R. S. § 26- 304 in 1971. The Council is responsible for approval of
emergency expenditures exceeding $ 100,000, and for monitoring governor- declared
emergencies.
This audit was conducted in accordance with government auditing standards.
The Auditor General and staff express appreciation to the Adjutant General and the
staff of the Department of Emergency and Military Affairs for their cooperation and
assistance throughout the audit.
( This Page Intentionally Left Blank)
FINDING I
THE DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
SHOULD TAKE ACTION TO IMPROVE
ITS ABILITY TO COORDINATE
DISASTER RESPONSE
The Division of Emergency Management is responsible for coordinating the response
to state disasters. Despite this responsibility, the Division lacks a comprehensive state
emergency response plan, has not ensured its emergency operations center has crucial
response information, and has not performed enough drills to prepare responders. This
failure to adequately prepare for disasters could impact the Division's ability to
coordinate the State's response to a sudden disaster.
Both state statutes and federal requirements governing federal emergency funding
require that the State have a current emergency operations plan defining how it will
respond to emergencies. The plan should include actions to address the systems and
services that could be impacted by a disaster. For example, the plan should provide for
continuation or restoration of public services ( such as law enforcement and fire
protection), transportation systems, medical services, utilities, shelters, food supplies,
fresh water, and communication systems. The recent California earthquakes demon-strate
that Arizona needs to be able to quickly provide services and information to
individuals impacted by a disaster.
By statute, the Division of Emergency Management is responsible for developing the
State's emergency response plan and for coordinating the disaster response efforts of
all governmental agencies. Specifically, the statutes direct the Division director to
develop and test plans for the mobilization and management of state personnel and
equipment in response to an emergency. To assist the State in its preparedness efforts,
the Division receives funding from the Federal Emergency Management Agency
( FEMA) for training, equipment, personnel, and administration. Further, when an
emergency occurs, the Division is responsible for administering state and federal
disaster relief monies to local governments, public utilities, nonprofit agencies, and
individuals.
Division Not Well Prepared
for Disaster Response
Despite its responsibilities, the Division is not adequately prepared to effectively
respond to disasters. The Division failed to update the emergency operations plan for
over a decade and still does not have a comprehensive plan. Further, the Emergency
Operations Center lacks essential coordination materials. Additionally, the Division has
not provided adequate training and statewide exercises for its staff and other state
agencies. Although federal funds are available for planning, training, and exercising,
the Division has not used them efficiently.
State pkn is ineflective - While a comprehensive plan is crucial for disaster prepared-ness,
the Division failed to update the State Emergency Operations Plan for over a
decade. A current state plan is essential because it describes how response efforts will
be coordinated in the event of a disaster and identifies the personnel, equipment,
facilities, and resources available for disaster response. Despite its importance and
federal guidelines that call for updates every four years, the Division had not reviewed
and revised the state plan since 1982.
Having failed to routinely update the plan, the Division worked sporadically over the
last three years developing a new one, finally completing it in February 1994. However,
the new plan has been criticized by FEMA, which has noted several deficiencies. They
found the plan lacks specific information on the response capabilities state agencies
have in place, although ths is one of the plan's major purposes. For example, the plan
does not indicate what mutual aid agreements and standard operating procedures state
agencies have developed; whether agencies have participated in exercises; what
hardened communications and databases agencies have in place; or what intensity of
disaster the agencies can be expected to handle. Also, FEMA felt that the plan was
confusing to the reader and should be organized so that agencies and other users can
quickly find their role and responsibilities.(') Further, the plan is inconsistent with the
proposed organizational changes the Division is developing and as such will need to
be revised again.
To help ensure effective responses to future disasters, the Division. should establish an
emergency operations plan that is comprehensive, clear, well organized, and concise.
The plan should reflect the emergency organization of the Department, enable the
Division to work with the federal response plan, and clearly assign responsibility to
state agencies. In addition, the plan should address the resources available and the
capabilities of state agencies and other responders. Finally, the plan should be revised
as changes occur in organization, staffing, equipment, and other factors. As such, the
Division should review it at least annually to make necessary changes and complete a
comprehensive revision at least every four years, as required by FEMA.
(') FEMA approved a draft of the plan while at the same time citing these significant deficiencies.
However, this action appears consistent with the United States General Accounting Office's ( GAO)
recent criticism of FEMA's failure to adequately monitor states' preparedness efforts. In fact, the
GAO noted that FEMA has the authority to withhold funding from states that do not meet
performance objectives, such as updating the emergency response plan; however, FEMA has not
done this.
Etnergency Operations Center lacks basics - The lack of basic materials in the
Emergency Operations Center ( EOC), the command center for the Division's
coordination efforts, also illustrates the Division's lack of preparedness. For example,
during the 1993 floods, the Division did not have the basic, yet vital, emergency
management information and materials needed for effective coordination of the
emergency response, such as:
Standard operating procedures - These are detailed procedures to guide staff in
fulfilling their emergency response roles. Almost 50 percent of the Division
employees reported that they had not received any procedures or checklists for the
duties they were assigned during the flood emergency.
State resource listing - Ths statutorily required listing should identify resources
available for use in emergencies. For example, the State of California Emergency
Services Office maintains a resource directory to guide EOC staff in assigning
emergency work. The directory contains sections on water, transportation, etc. and
lists the agencies that are responsible for these areas. The Office further defines
agency capabilities. For example, the directory lists the California Department of
Drinking Water as a provider of bottled water. The Department of Drinking Water
is responsible for developing procedures defining how bottled water would be
obtained and delivered in the event of an emergency. The Office has found this
system to be more useful than an inventory listing.
Flood maps - While flood maps aid in predicting where flooding will occur, the
Division did not have such maps available as the flood emergency began.
Phone lists - At the time of the flood, the EOC did not contain phone lists for
emergency responders, state agency duty officers, public information officers, and
dam owners and operators.
Fax machines - The EOC did not contain a fax machine for public information
officers.
Ttmining and dses lacking - The Division has not provided adequate disaster
response training or exercises for its own and other agencies' staff. Training and
exercise activities are necessary for staff to learn and practice techniques for coordinat-ing
the resources of federal, state, and local governments, as this is the Division's major
responsibility. Despite the importance of exercises, the Division had not conducted a
statewide natural disaster exercise for over three years prior to the 1993 flood disaster.
Also, 30 percent of Division staff reported that training provided by the Division left
them unprepared for the flood emergency. Finally, when conducting an exercise, the
Division should critique its performance during the exercise to evaluate the lessons
learned and revise training requirements, plans, and operating procedures accordingly.
Funding is available for planning and tmining - The Division has failed to fulfill its
statutory responsibilities for planning and training despite the availability of federal
funds. The Division receives federal monies annually for planning and training;
however, some monies have not been used efficiently. As presented in Finding I1 ( see
pages 11 through 16), we found several instances where these monies were not used
appropriately. For example, the Division used over 65 percent of the 1990- 91 training
monies on meals and meeting space at conference hotels, although Department facilities
were available at no cost. In the future, the Divlsion should use the federal monies it
receives more appropriately to fund planning, training, and other activities in order to
ensure effective response to disasters.
Division Needs to Implement Changes
to Ensure Proactive Leadership and
Coordination of Response Efforts
The Division's lack of planning and preparation could hinder the State's ability to
respond to a sudden disaster. During the State's most recent major disaster, the 1993
floods, the Division had nearly two months to prepare, yet Division management failed
to provide proactive leadership and coordination. Further, the Division has been slow
to address problems that surfaced during the floods.
In early 1993, the President of the United States declared Arizona a major disaster area
after record rainfall caused severe flooding throughout the state. With damage estimates
exceeding $ 135 million, the 1993 flooding was the most costly disaster ever to affect
Arizona. Ths flooding destroyed homes, roads, bridges, and farmlands, with some of
the most severe damage taking place nearly two months after the emergency began,
when the Painted Rock Dam overflowed its spillway and flooded more than 20,000
acres of land in Yuma County.
Leadership Iacking - Although one of the Division's primary responsibilities during
a disaster is to direct the response efforts, several Division employees indicated a
general lack of leadership existed during the 1993 flood emergency. In addition, our
survey of Emergency Management Division employees revealed that over 50 percent
felt they received less than adequate direction for their flood response duties. The
activities of the Division director then in office would appear to support these concerns.
Specifically, we found the Division director was out of town for at least 17 days during
the 2- month period of the 1993 floods. The travel included at least four trips clearly
unrelated to the disaster; for example:
On January 7,1993, the day the Division activated its Emergency Operations Center
and the day before the governor officially declared the flood emergency, the director
left for Washington D. C. The purpose of the trip was to attend a national
emergency management association conference to discuss issues to lobby before
Congress. The director did not return until late in the day after the emergency was
declared.
Only three days after Yuma County was declared a disaster, the director and his
assistant traveled to northern Arizona to meet with the emergency managers of the
only two counties not affected by the disaster. On the trip, they diverted to stay in
Laughlin, Nevada. Records indicate that the only work done on this two- day trip
was less than three hours of meetings.
Reactive to events - Without appropriate planning and effective leadership, the
Division's response efforts focused on reacting to individual requests for assistance
rather than anticipating events and planning the appropriate response. For example, the
Division closed its EOC for nearly one month during the winter floods simply because
the number of telephone requests for assistance had slowed. However, during this time,
flood waters from around the state were approaching the Yuma area and the Division
did little to plan for the response that would be needed.
The lack of preparation and leadership also contributed to the Division's failure to
collect and disseminate emergency management data on the severe flooding in Yuma
County. For example, the Division failed to:
Track the completion of missions;
Display information on the situation in each county, such as the local emergency
declarations, shelters established, and evacuations;
Provide road closure information that was needed by a federal agency;
Communicate flood stage warnings effectively to those who needed them; and
Advise all state agencies of the state emergency declaration in a timely manner.
Problems are not addressed afler disaster - Although the Division's response to the
disaster demonstrated the need for improvements, over a year later it is probably no
better prepared to respond. This is primarily because the Division has not analyzed the
lessons learned from any recent disaster response, including the 1993 flood, since it has
not adequately critiqued or documented its response to the disasters. The lessons
learned are important and need to be identified so that the Division can make
improvements to problem areas using training, exercises, plan revisions, procedure
changes, or other methods. Shortly after a disaster, the Division should conduct a
comprehensive critique of the emergency response to identify problems and potential
solutions. The Division should compile the results of the critique in a report, similar to
one produced in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
report details the events of a disaster and response as they occurred, summarizes major
response operations and problems encountered, and presents the lessons learned from
a formal critique. Further, to be able to conduct a critique, the Division should keep
adequate records of the disasters and the response effort made.
Over one year after the floods, the few problems that were identified have at been
addressed. Although no comprehensive critique was done, meetings held with county
directors, state and federal agencies, and others indicated some specific response
coordination problems; but the Division has not taken actions to address them. For
example, two groups recommended annual statewide flood exercises and the Division
agreed; however, no exercises have taken place, nor are any scheduled for 1994. In fact,
there has been only one statewide exercise since the disaster and this was for
earthquakes. Also, state agencies identified the need for a listing of federal agencies and
contact points in the state plan, but the Division has not included this information in
the 1994 plan revision.
The Division should:
Develop an effective plan and periodically test the quality of the plan through
exercises.
Develop standard operating procedures and ensure that other state agencies have
adopted effective procedures to carry out their disaster relief responsibilities.
H Compile the resource listing required by A. R. S. $ 26- 306. A. 8, including the
responsibilities and capabilities of state agencies and other responders.
w Maintain necessary materials in the Emergency Operations Center at all times in
case of disaster, including phone listings for all possible responders ( state agencies,
federal agencies, county directors, dam operators, etc.)
w Increase the level of its staff's preparedness through increased training and
statewide exercises for handling natural disasters, using the monies currently
available for these activities.
w Keep records of the disaster response as it occurs, tracking missions assigned and
completed, for use during the response effort and for review afterward.
Formally critique the response coordination efforts and produce an after- action
report that identifies areas needing improvement after each disaster.
FINDING I1
THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD IMPROVE
OVERSIGHT OF STATE AND
FEDERAL FUNDS
DEMA needs to implement stronger controls over state and federal monies. During our
1983 audit of the Department, we identified problems that demonstrated the need for
strong oversight of funds flowing through the Division of Emergency Management. In
response to our 1983 audit, the Department established an audit function to perform
ongoing expenditure reviews; however, the Department has not ensured adequate
oversight of audit staff, and mandated audits have not been conducted in a timely
manner, if at all. Further, audits of disaster relief monies are of such poor quality that
federal officials have deemed the audits unreliable and have ceased funding the audit
position until improvements are made. To strengthen oversight and resolve federal
concerns, the Department should centralize the audit function at the Department level,
and ensure all necessary audits are completed and in compliance with government
auditing standards.
The Division of Emergency Management receives and distributes both federal and state
funds. During fiscal year 1993- 94, the Division received $ 30.5 million in state and
federal funds. Federal funds, totaling $ 25 million, were used for disaster assistance
($ 22.8 million) and for Emergency Management programs ($ 2.2 million). State funds,
totaling nearly $ 5.5 million, were used for emergencies/ disaster assistance ($ 3.6 million),
Emergency Management programs ($ 1.3 million), and for hazard mitigation projects
($ 550,000).
Past Problems Demonstrated
Need for Oversight
Our 1983 performance audit of the Department found the Division of Emergency
Management had mismanaged a substantial amount of state and federal monies. The
audit found that the Division misspent over $ 1.4 million in state and federal disaster
funds to construct a building, purchase and repair vehicles, purchase equipment, pay
expenses for local emergency managers, and sponsor conferences ( including greens fees
and bar bills). The audit attributed these problems to mismanagement by the former
Division director and poor internal controls, As one means of addressing these
problems, the report recommended and the legislature subsequently passed, legislation
that required DEMA to establish an audit position reporting to the Adjutant General
to conduct expenditure reviews and ensure compliance with laws and regulations.
Department Has Not
Instituted Effective
Oversight
While the Department has taken actions to strengthen financial controls, effective
control over state and federal funds has not been achieved. Since our 1983 audit, the
Department has established audit positions to conduct expenditure reviews. However,
the Department has not ensured that audits are conducted in a timely manner, and that
they meet established standards. Further, the Division has continued to inappropriately
use some grant monies, although current abuses are nowhere near the level found in
our 1983 review.
Background - As an important step to improving oversight, our 1983 audit report
recommended that the Department establish an audit function. Through a statutory
change in 1984, the Legislature directed the Department's Adjutant General to establish
an audit function to review Department expenditures and ensure compliance with laws
and regulations. The Department established a chief auditor position reporting to the
Adjutant General, and required the chief auditor to conduct expenditure reviews of
state and federal funds. In addition, the Division obtained federal funds for an auditor
to conduct audits of public entities receiving disaster relief monies. This auditor reports
to the Division director and has had no oversight by the Department's chief auditor.
Audits perfomzed by Division auditor are urnliable - While the Division auditor has
conducted audits of public entities receiving large sums of federal and state disaster
relief monies, these audits are of such poor quality that they have been deemed
unreliable by federal officials. Monies flowing through the Division to public entities
can be quite large, depending on the impact of the disaster; for example, the Division
oversaw the distribution of almost $ 85 million to public entities as a result of the 1993
floods. Payment of disaster relief monies is based on expenditures incurred by the
recipients. It is the Division auditor's responsibility to review expenditure documenta-tion
and determine whether the dollar amount claimed by the public entity is
appropriate.
Both our own review as well as a review conducted by FEMA's Inspector General's
Office identified concerns with the audits conducted by the Division auditor, which are
illustrated in the following example.
Based on an inquiry from a County Attorney's Office in January 1993, our Office
provided the Division of Emergency Management with evidence that a city may
have falsified a disaster assistance claim involving a flood- damaged road grader.
Following discussions with our office, Division officials agreed to conduct audit
work to evaluate the legitimacy of the city's claim. However, the Division's auditor
failed to conduct the necessary audit work to determine whether reported damage
was indeed incurred. Instead, Division officials reported finding no ineligible costs
and authorized payment of the city's claim for nearly $ 40,000 to repair the
equipment. However, after a warrant was prepared to pay the claim, Division
officials held the warrant for over six months. Then, shortly after we began our
audit, Division officials, without conducting any additional inquiry, requested that
FEMA disallow the claim. As a result, FEMA officials requested a criminal
investigation of the case.
In January 1994, the FEMA Inspector General's Office conducted a review of the
Division's audit work and found it to be unacceptable. The Inspector General's review
found that the Division's audits did not comply with government auditing standards.
As a result, the FEMA Inspector General's Office recommended that FEMA no longer
accept audits conducted by the Division and that federal funding for audits be withheld
until an acceptable audit function is developed by the Department.
Department auditor has failed to conduct matuiuted audits - Following our 1983
audit, the Legislature mandated that the Department conduct expenditure reviews.
However, the Department's chief auditor has failed to conduct these required reviews
in a timely manner, if at all.
Emergency fund audits - In 1984, statutes were amended to require the Depart-ment
auditor to review all liabilities and expenditures for state emergencies, and
provide reports to the State Emergency Council. These reviews are to be conducted
every 90 days during an emergency, and within 90 days after the emergency has
ended. Despite this requirement, these reviews are backlogged to 1992. Because of
this backlog, reports by the Department's auditor to the State Emergency Council
have been completed using expenditure figures that have been compiled without
the required reviews.
Compliance audits - In 1984, statutes were amended to require the Department
auditor to conduct compliance audits of the Department's divisions and offices. The
statutes specifically called for audits to determine compliance with purchase and
bidding procedures. Despite the addition of these statutes, compliance audits have
never been completed. However, at the time of our review, the Department had
initiated an audit of the Department's procurement procedures.
Financial audits - The 1984 statutory amendments also required the Department
auditor to conduct at least annual financial audits of all accounts open more than
one year, but these audits have not been conducted.
Failure to perform necessary audits stems from both lack of dedicated resources and
the Department's failure to exercise its authority. Until recently, the Department had
only one central position to conduct these statutorily required audits. The Department
has recently filled a second auditor position, and is evaluating the future staffing needs
of the audit function. Further, when attempts were made by the chief auditor to audit
Division expenditures, the Division resisted these attempts and no further Department
action was taken.
Lack of adequute controls evidenced in small abuses - Although current abuses are
minor in comparison to problems found in our 1983 review, our review of federal
disaster preparedness and administration expenditures identified instances where grant
monies were used inappropriately. The following examples illustrate problem expendi-tures.
Excessive conference costs - Although these expenditures have been significantly
reduced in recent years, in fiscal year 1990- 91 the Division spent over 65 percent of
its available training funds to provide meals and meeting space at conference resorts
rather than using in- house training facilities. These monies could have been used
to provide much- needed training for emergency preparedness. Further, we identified
several instances in which the Division's expenditures exceeded grant guidelines. For
example, in 1991 the Division hosted a conference at a resort hotel in Sedona. Using
grant monies designated for training, the Division paid $ 149 per night, almost three
times the amount allowed by grant guidelines, for one employee's lodging; and over
twice the allowable amount for five other employees. During the conference, the
Division spent almost three times the amount allowed by grant guidelines to
provide lunch for the participants.
Expenditures for items unrelated to programs - The Division has used over $ 2,200
in federal grant monies for administration of disaster assistance on items clearly not
related to tlus purpose. For example, monies were used to purchase a navigating
device, a professional association membership, a digital camera, and out- of- state
travel for employee training. Because ths grant is intended to defray the cost to the
State for administering federal disaster assistance, the monies could have been used
to reduce state expenditures. Further, any monies spent inappropriately may have
to be repaid according to the grant guidelines.
Improper use of registration fees - During fiscal years 1991- 92 and 1992- 93, the
Division collected nearly $ 13,000 in registration fees for some grant- funded training
sessions and conferences, reportedly to offset expenses. However, Division officials
have not used any of these monies to defray conference costs. Instead, the monies
have been spent on items such as baseball caps, T- shirts, Division logo pins,
out- of- state employee travel, and computers.
Oversight of Division
Expenditures Should Be
Strengthened
Several changes are needed to strengthen Department oversight of federal and state
monies. First, the Department should centralize the audit function at the Department
level. As noted earlier, audits are currently performed both by Department and
Division auditors. Centralizing this function at the Department level would improve
audit independence. Further, the Department auditor should be responsible for all
audits of state and federal monies, including Division of Emergency Management funds
not currently audited, such as grants for planning and training. To fulfill the
Department's responsibilities under state and federal rules and regulations, the
Department should ensure that the audit function:
Conducts all audits in accordance with government auditing standards.
Determines whether the Division's recipients have met federal audit requirements,
Ensures that recipients of federal disaster assistance and other grant monies have
spent the monies appropriately. To do this, the federal regulations allow the
Department to review single audits of the recipients or perform a program review
of those who do not have single audits.
w Ensures that any instances of noncompliance reported in the recipient's audit reports
are corrected within six months,
Audits claims for disaster assistance before making final payments to local
jurisdictions,
Reviews all liabilities and expenditures of the Governor's Emergency Fund and
reports to the State Emergency Council as required by statute,
w Conducts financial and compliance audits of each Division, and
Audits all accounts open for more than 12 months.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The audit function should be centralized at the Department level. The Department
auditors should conduct all necessary audits of state and federal monies to fulfill
their oversight responsibilities under state and federal regulations.
2. The Department auditors should audit funds used by the Division of Emergency
Management ( such as grants for planning and training) to ensure these funds are
used appropriately.
FINDING Ill
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL SHOULD
EXERCISE GREATER CONTROL OVER THE
DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
The Adjutant General should ensure the Division of Emergency Management receives
adequate oversight. Although the Adjutant General has authority over the Division, the
Division has been allowed to largely define the limits of oversight it will accept.
Further, statutes allow the Division Director to assume control over all Department
personnel, including the Adjutant General, and assets during declared emergencies. The
Legislature should consider amending statutes to remove the problems created by
having this dual reporting relationship.
Factors Which Impede
Adjutant General Action
As discussed in Findings I and I1 ( see pages 5 through 16) of our report, the Division
of Emergency Management has demonstrated an inability to manage its statutory
responsibilities. While the Adjutant General has authority over the Division of
Emergency Management, he has not exercised this authority to address these and other
problems in the Division. Instead, even though the Division of Emergency Management
was merged with the Department of Military Affairs over two decades ago, the
Division has been allowed to function much like a separate agency. This condition has
been fostered by the Division director's use of political support from the counties to
resist consolidation and Department oversight. Further, during the 1994 legislative
session, the former Division director actively lobbied for support of a bill to separate
the Division from the Department.
Division still attempts to fincfion like a separate agency - The Division and the
Department were combined more than 20 years ago, yet they do not function as one
agency. Although efforts were made in 1989 to consolidate some administrative
functions such as accounting and personnel, the Division opposed such consolidation.
Further, against Department opposition in 1990, Division officials were successful in
obtaining a budget appropriation separate from that of the Department. In addition, the
Division continues to maintain a separate telephone system, audit function, and
emergency operations center.
Division appears to maintain indepenrlence through political support - The Division's
ability to resist consolidation within the Department appears to be based upon the
political support it receives from local government emergency management officials and
the association that represents them. For example,
In November 1993, the president of the Emergency Services Association wrote the
Adjutant General attempting to influence the selection of a replacement for his
" good friend," the retiring Division director, and to inform him that local emergency
managers would be carefully monitoring the selection process. The association
president stated that the new director should allow staff to " perform without
unnecessary constraints or a layer of military bureaucracy getting in the way." He
closed the letter by stating that he would personally lobby for the selection of a
replacement for the retiring Adjutant General who would be more " friendly" to the
emergency management community.
During the 1993 legislative session, the Arizona Emergency Services Association
lobbied against a bill designed to increase the Adjutant General's responsibility for
state emergency management.
After the Division was successful in obtaining a budget appropriation separate from
the Department in 1990, the association urged its members to contact their
legislators to request their support to continue the separation.
In response to a 1989 recommendation to consolidate the Division's accounting
function within the Department's, the Division director then in office sent the
Adjutant General a memo from a county emergency services director arguing
against the consolidation. In his cover memo, the Division director states that the
county's position was " representative of all or most of the other counties."
According to the former Adjutant General, this political pressure from the local
emergency managers and the association clearly influenced his decisions regarding the
Division, and negatively impacted his efforts to oversee the Division's activities.
However, this support must be viewed in the context of the financial and other
relationships which exist between the Division and the local emergency managers. The
Division oversees the annual distribution of hundreds of thousands in other federal
grant dollars, including various forms of federal and state disaster assistance monies
to local governments. In addition, Division officials establish the funding distribution
that accounts for approximately one- half of the salaries and administrative expenses for
the county emergency managers. The Division also hosts conferences and provides
training for the county emergency managers.
Division Dimctm lobbied fm separation - The former Division director has used h s
relationshp with county officials to lobby for separation from the Department. At a
November 1993 meeting hosted by the Division, the Division director then in office
asked the county emergency managers to support a bill in the upcoming legislative
session to separate the Division from the Department. Specifically, the director asked
each of the emergency managers to contact their state legislators and solicit support for
the legislation.
Statutes Allow Division Director
to Assume Control During Emergencies
Current statutes provide the Division director with certain powers during declared
emergencies, including authority over all state agencies' response efforts. During
emergencies, the Division director assumes authority over a11 Department personnel and
assets, including the National Guard and the Adjutant General. Dual leadership can
hamper response capabilities. We identified instances in which the Division director
impeded efforts by National Guard officials to plan for and respond to requests for
assistance during the 1993 floods. In one instance, the Director initially opposed the
Adjutant General's decision to pre- position resources in the Winkelman area in
anticipation of the predicted Gila river flooding. Local officials also maintained that
frictions arose between the Adjutant General and Director in the deployment of
resources in the Yuma area.
Statutes Should Be Amended
to Clarify Leadership
In recent years, the Division and others have proposed separating the Division from the
Department, ostensibly to improve emergency management. In reviewing this issue, we
found that across the country, other states have a variety of command structures.
Currently, emergency management agencies are combined with military organizations
in 20 states, with police agencies in 14 states, and with various departments in 6 states.
Further, 10 states have established their emergency management agency as a separate
entity. In addition, states with their emergency management agency combined with
other organizations had varying reporting structures during emergencies ( i. e. report to
the Adjutant General, the Governor, or department director). We surveyed several
states and found that each of these structures can be effective. In other words, Arizona
can have an effective program with its current organizational structure. However, to
do so, leadership must be strong and clear. As the Department director, the Adjutant
General should have control of the Department and its personnel and equipment,
allowing for a coordinated and unified response to a disaster. To accomplish this, the
Legislature should consider amending A. R. S. $ 26- 302, $ 26- 303. H and s26.305. C to give
the Adjutant General, rather than the Division director, the emergency powers of the
governor and control of state resources when authorized. Further, the Legislature
should consider revising A. R. S. $ 26- 102 to allow the Adjutant General the authority to
delegate these powers when deemed necessary.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The Legislature should consider amending A. R. S. 526- 302, 526- 303. H and 526- 305C
to place the Governor's emergency powers with the Adjutant General to provide for
a unified emergency response and proper leadership. Further, the Legislature should
consider amending A. R. S. 526- 102 to allow the Adjutant General to delegate these
powers when deemed necessary,
2. The Adjutant General should increase h s oversight over the Division of Emergency
Management, to ensure the Division fulfills its statutory responsibilities and that the
Division's functions are consolidated into the Department.
FINDING IV
DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES AT
CAMP NAVAJO MAY NOT BE IN THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE STATE
Department activities at Camp Navajo may not be in the best interests of the State. The
Department has established a state- operated enterprise activity designed to support the
federal training mission at Camp Navajo. However, decisions made by the Department
in establishing the operation place significant liabilities on the State and are inconsistent
with federal laws and regulations. While changes to the business operation might
resolve these problems, the need for adequate oversight of the operation should also
be addressed.
In 1942, over 28,000 acres of National Forest Service lands were withdrawn from public
use to establish the Navajo Army Depot. Located approximately 12 miles west of
Flagstaff and consisting of over 750 concrete storage bunkers and several large
warehouses, the Depot operated as an ammunition and supply storage facility for the
United States Army. It was placed in reserve status in 1971, and in 1982, under a
license agreement with the Army, the Arizona National Guard assumed control of the
Depot, primarily for the purpose of destroying surplus munitions stockpiles located
there. In 1988 the Base Realignment and Closure ( BRAC) Commission recommended
closure of the Depot. In 1993, the Department obtained a new license from the Army
to operate the Depot as a training site for Arizona National Guard troops, renaming it
Camp Navajo.
State Enterprise Designed to
Support Federal Training Mission
Utilizing the extensive storage facilities located at Camp Navajo, the Department, as
an agency of the State of Arizona, has contracted through the National Guard Bureau
( an agency within the Department of Defense that acts as a communication channel
between the federal government and the State) with various branches of the Depart-ment
of Defense ( DOD) to store certain types of military hardware, primarily
Minuteman rocket motors, air- launched cruise missiles, and raw rubber. Department
officials estimate the value of these commodities at over $ 1.25 billion. Under existing
contracts, by the end of 1995 the inventory levels should increase to an estimated value
of nearly $ 4 billion. According to Department officials, the primary purpose of the
storage operation is to financially support the training site and activities at Camp
Navajo. Specifically, the Department's concept plan for Camp Navajo indicates:
" Utilization of Camp Navajo's idle stmage space to provide a customer service will
generate revenues to operate the Installation and significantly reduce OM ARNG
( Operational Maintenance - Army National Guard) funding required to support training
at the Training Site."
The Department's fiscal year 1994- 95 budget for Camp Navajo indicates nearly $ 100,000
in storage operation revenues will be used to support training site activities.
Storage Operation Places Liability on
the State and Is Inconsistent with Federal
Regulations and Grant Agreements
The Department's intent in running the storage operation is to support the training
function at Camp Navajo. However, significant problems exist with this approach. First,
the Department has potentially made the State of Arizona financially responsible for
the commodities stored at Camp Navajo. Second, current agreements between the
Department and DOD agencies do not allow for the use of storage operation funds to
support training activities. As a result, the State could be liable for repaying over $ 5
million dollars collected for these purposes.
State potentially liable for commodities stomd at Camp Navajo - The Department's
agreements with the various DOD agencies place significant liability on the State of
Arizona for any damages to commodities stored at Camp Navajo. Our review of these
agreements indicates the only limitation on the Department's, and therefore the State's,
liability for property damage is where the loss is due to acts of God. Additionally, the
license agreement between the Department and the Army provides:
" That the ( United States) Government will not be responsible fm any injury to persons
or damage to property arising out of or incident to the use m occupancy of the licensed
property by the licensee ( the Department), howsoever such injury m damage may be
caused and the licensee shall indemnify and save the Government harmless from anv and
all claims for any such iniurv m damageL excepting claims for any injury or damage
arising porn activities of the Government on the said property which are conducted
exclusively fm the benefit of the Government." ( Emphasis added)
There is no exception to the State's obligation to protect the government against loss,
because the sole beneficiaries of the storage operation are the State of Arizona and the
National Guard Bureau. In addition, the National Guard Bureau has eliminated its
responsibility for losses arising from the storage operation through its agreement with
the Department. As a result, unless the Department can modify its agreement with the
National Guard Bureau to hold the State harmless, it appears the State has assumed all
risk for the storage operation.
In addition, risk management officials with the Arizona Department of Administration
( DOA) acknowledge the State has assumed some level of risk for the storage operation
at Camp Navajo. Despite this assumption of risk, for fiscal year 1993- 94 the Department
paid only $ 8,500 into the State's risk management fund to insure the $ 1 billion
inventory and related operational activities at Camp Navajo. In comparison, the State
pays $ 1 million in premiums to a private insurance carrier to insure approximately $ 1
billion of state- owned property against loss. DOA officials, relying on the Department's
interpretation of its agreements and loss prevention procedures, have informed us there
is no need for the State to purchase additional property coverage for Camp Navajo.
Although the estimated value of the rockets, missiles, and rubber stored at Camp
Navajo under existing contracts will increase to nearly $ 4 billion by the end of 1995,
DOA officials believe that any probable loss can be managed under the State's self-insured
program. Regardless of the DOA's position regarding the appropriate cost to
the Department for insurance coverage, the storage operation has created a significant
liability for the State of Arizona.
Liability for overcharges under c u m t agreements - The State could be required to
repay the federal government over $ 5 million. Although the Department intended to
use storage site revenues to support training activities, under existing agreements,
federal regulations do not allow monies to be used for this purpose. The agreements
between the Department and the DOD agencies, for whom commodities are being
stored, are essentially grants.( 1) Federal regulations governing grant funds do not
generally allow costs that are indirectly related to the activity being funded. A
provision of the Department's agreement specifically disallows indirect costs. These
regulations also require that the amount charged for the services provided by the State
be basically the same as what the State pay for those services. In addition, the
regulations specifically forbid creating any profit associated with the grant activity or
establishing unspecified reserves of grant funds.
Despite these restrictions, the Department has accumulated a fund balance of over $ 5
million. Department officials now state the fund balance is being accumulated to pay
for future capital improvements and maintenance projects. While Federal regulations
do allow monies to be accumulated and used for these purposes, the regulations are
very specific as to how this must be done. For example, the Department cannot charge
more than the actual labor costs. Yet, under their fiscal year 1993- 94 agreements with
the U. S. Air Force to store Minuteman rocket motors, the Department charged the Air
Force over $ 880,000 in labor costs. However, Department budget documents for the
same period indicated only $ 368,423 in actual labor costs for the services provided.
Under Federal regulations, the Department must also be able to demonstrate the basis
on which it has projected its future maintenance and capital improvement needs, and
The Department contracts with the various DOD agencies through the National Guard Bureau using
a cooperative agreement. This agreement is governed by the same provisions as are grants; the
only difference being the National Guard Bureau's expressed intent to be involved in the activity
covered by the agreement.
develop an acceptable cost allocation plan for accumulating the monies to meet the
needs. Currently the Department does not have a cost allocation plan. As a result, the
Department may be liable for repayment of the over $ 5 million dollars in excess funds
it has accumulated.
Need for Oversight Has Implications
for Program Improvements
Changes to the Department's business approach at Camp Navajo might resolve the
problems associated with the storage operation. However, the need to ensure adequate
oversight of the business operation should also be addressed.
Changes might make propm feasible - By altering the nature of the relationship with
the DOD agencies from grant agreements to competitive procurement contracts, the
Department could begin to address the significant legal and financial issues associated
with the current operational approach at Camp Navajo. Specifically, by obtaining
procurement contracts with the DOD agencies, the Department could probably avoid
the restrictions involving the generation and use of profits associated with grant- funded
projects. In addition, the Department could purchase liability and property loss
insurance coverage for the inventory and related operations at Camp Navajo,
potentially addressing the State's financial responsibility for the activities taking place
there. However, these changes could also negatively impact the Department's ability to
operate the storage facility at a profitable level. For example, to change to procurement
contracts, the DOD would have to use a competitive bidding process. If the DOD were
to use a competitive bidding process, there is no guarantee the Department would be
the successful bidder, or obtain the level of financial support needed to continue the
operation. Additionally, the increased operating costs associated with purchasing
insurance, perhaps as high as $ 4 million annually, could make the entire function
infeasible.
Oversight of operation need! ed - Based upon the financial and legal problems encoun-tered
by the Department in establishng the storage operation at Camp Navajo,
additional oversight by the Legislature is clearly necessary. Currently, since the
operating budget for Camp Navajo is derived from its enterprise activities, which are
nonappropriated funds, all decisions relating to this multimillion- dollar operation are
the responsibility of one person, the Adjutant General. As with most agency activities,
this responsibility should be subject to periodic legislative oversight, including annual
review of the operating budget for Camp Navajo and review of all capital construc-tion
projects the Department has planned.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. To ensure adequate oversight of the Department's operations at Camp Navajo, the
Legislature should consider requiring the Department to submit annual operating
and capital construction budgets for review.
2. The Department should modify its agreements with the National Guard Bureau to:
a) hold the State harmless for loss to commodities stored at Camp Navajo, thereby
eliminating the State's liability for Camp Navajo's operations, and b) to comply with
federal laws and regulations governing the expense of grant monies.
( This Page Intentionally Left Blank)
FINDING V
THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD ACT TO ENSURE
THE TIMELY ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION
OF CAMP NAVAJO
The Department should act aggressively to ensure the timely environmental cleanup
of Camp Navajo. Federal legislation ordering the Navajo Army Depot's closure includes
specific requirements for environmental restoration of the installation. However, the
Department entered into an agreement with the Army that does not comply with the
legislation and could result in significant delays in cleanup. Although the Department's
efforts to secure Camp Navajo may have contributed to the current problem, complying
with the legislation appears to be the best means of remediating the environmental
damage.
Legislation Closing Camp Navajo
Includes Requirements for
Environmental Restoration
The Base Realignment and Closure ( BRAC) Commission officially closed the Navajo
Army Depot through the 1988 legislation. The closure of the depot was later confirmed
by the Assistant Secretary of the Army through a written Record of Decision dated
September 30, 1991. BRAC legislation provides funds for environmental restoration of
closed facilities and requires that only those funds be used for such activities.
Specifically, the legislation states that the base closure account is to be the " exclusive
source of funds for environmental restoration projects." At present, Camp Navajo has
about 70 different sites suspected of containing groundwater, surface water, air, or soil
pollution. The estimated cost of cleaning these sites is over $ 111 million. According to
the U. S. Department of Defense, all contamination is attributable to the activities of the
former Army depot.
The Department Has
Not Fully Complied with
Base Closure Requirements
Despite the specific BRAC funding requirements, the current restoration plan for Camp
Navajo does not comply with ths portion of the legislation. The details of environmen-tal
restoration management are included in an agreement between the Department and
the Army. However, this agreement contradicts BRAC legislation. As suchf the
agreement may result in significant delays in Camp Navajo's cleanup.
Agreement between the Department and the Amty - In September 1993, the
Department entered into an agreement with the Army that gives the Department the
responsibility of managing Camp Navajo's environmental restoration and delineates
funding sources for specific contamination sites. According to the agreement, the
Department shares the responsibility of managing Camp Navajo's restoration with the
National Guard Bureau, an agency within the U. S. Department of Defense. Specifically,
the Department is responsible for identifying and evaluating contamination sites and
requesting cleanup money from the appropriate funding source. Actually, the
Department had already begun performing these duties prior to their agreement with
the Army.
In addition to assigning responsibilities, the agreement delineates funding sources for
specific contamination sites at Camp Navajo. According to the agreement, the
Department is required to request money for most contamination sites from the Defense
Environmental Restoration Account ( DERA), an environmental restoration funding
account for active military sites. In addition, the agreement allows for a limited number
of contamination sites to be funded by BRAC.
Apement contradicts BRAC and could delay cleanup - The agreement between the
Department and the Army contradicts BRAC legislation. According to BRAC, all
environmental restoration activities must be funded exclusively with BRAC money.
Because Camp Navajo was included in the 1988 BRAC legislation, this provision applies
to the installation. Despite this fact, the agreement instructs the Department to request
funds from sources other than BRAC for the majority of the contamination sites at
Camp Navajo.
The agreement's noncompliance with BRAC requirements could significantly delay
needed restoration at Camp Navajo. Under the agreement, the majority of the
restoration is to be funded using DERA rather than BRAC monies. However, DERA
funds are difficult to obtain due to the criteria that must be met. Essentially, to receive
DERA monies, an active military installation must be on the National Priority List,
signifying that the level of contamination is known to be threatening to human health
and the environment. Because the testing conducted at Camp Navajo to date indicates
that no such threat exists, the installation is not a part of the list and therefore not a
priority for DERA funding.(')
( I) Although Camp Navajo is not on the National Priority List, Arizona Department of Environmental
Quality officials question whether the testing conducted to date is sufficient to adequately determine
the level of threat to human health and the environment. However, under the agreement with the
Army, to conduct the additional testing necessary to accurately determine the level of threat and
potentially increase the DERA funding priority, the Department must obtain DERA funds.
Compliance with BRAC is
Best Means of Restoring the Site
The Department's efforts to secure Camp Navajo for Arizona National Guard use may
have contributed to the funding problems and delays. Regardless of these efforts,
complying with the BRAC requirements would appear to be the best means of
remediating the environmental damage at Camp Navajo.
Department effmts to obtain Camp Navajo - Various explanations for the inconsistent
funding provisions of the agreement between the Department and the Army have been
given, including an interpretation by Army officials that since Camp Navajo is now an
active training site it never actually " closed," and therefore is not eligible for BRAC
funding. However, the available evidence discounts these explanations, particularly
since Camp Navajo has already received more than $ 700,000 of BRAC funding for
various closure- related projects.
The Department and the Army likely sought the current funding agreement believing
it to be mutually beneficial. Department officials may have endorsed the agreement in
an effort to enhance their ability to maintain control of Camp Navajo. Because the
original 1942 agreement withdrawing the installation's lands from the U. S. Forest
Service stipulated its return when there was no longer a " military purpose," the BRAC
closure of the depot created a legal dispute over control of the lands. As such, it is
clear the Department was eager to obtain the Army's support for their efforts to use
the installation as an Arizona National Guard training site. At the same time, the Army
may have seen the agreement as an opportunity to diminish their responsibility to fund
the environmental restoration efforts. It appears the Army knew the high threshold for
obtaining DERA funds would significantly reduce Camp Navajo's chances of securing
these monies.
BRAC best means of remediating Camp Navajo - Despite the actions of the
Department and the Army, according to Department of Defense officials we spoke with,
the use of BRAC funds would be the most expeditious means of remediating the
environmental damage at Camp Navajo. These same officials stated that Camp Navajo
had been scheduled to receive BRAC restoration funds prior to the Army's decision to
move the camp into active site status and utilize DERA funding. Further, the
expeditious nature of the BRAC funds over DERA funding is perhaps best illustrated
in the agreement itself. Specifically, the agreement identifies 5(') of the 69 recognized
contamination sites for restoration using BRAC monies. However, these sites are part
of a federal environmental compliance program that requires timely cleanup in order
to avoid penalty assessment. These exceptions clearly suggest that even the Army
recognizes the desirability of BRAC funds to ensure timely remediation efforts.
') Although the agreement specifies only five sites to be restored with BRAC money, the Department
received BRAC money for the cleanup of ten sites associated with the compliance program.
RECOMMENDATION
To ensure timely remediation of the environmental damage at Camp Navajo and to
comply with the requirements of BRAC, the Department should seek to revise its
agreement with the Army and secure BRAC funding for all necessary remediation I
efforts. 1
SUNSET FACTORS
Department of Emergency and Military Affairs
In accordance with A. R. S. 541- 2954, the Legislature should consider the following 12
factors in determining whether the Department of Emergency and Military Affairs
should be continued or terminated.
1. Objective and purpose in establishing the Agency
The Department of Emergency and Military Affairs was established by the
Legislature in 1972 to:
" promote, protect and defend the peace, health and safety of the citizens of this state
and to respond in emergencies to restore and maintain public order."
The Department consists of two divisions. The Division of Military Affairs is
primarily responsible for managing and operating the Arizona Army and Air
National Guard. The National Guard is part of the reserve component of the
United States Army and Air Force and provides the armed services with trained,
equipped units in case of a state or national emergency. The National Guard must
be available to serve for active federal duty when ordered by the President of the
United States.
The Division of Emergency Management serves the State by preparing and
coordinating emergency services required to reduce the impact of disasters. The
Emergency Management Division coordinates its efforts with the federal govern-ment,
Arizona's political subdivisions, and various state agencies. In addition, the
Division develops and maintains a nuclear emergency plan, manages a state
hazardous materials emergency management program, and is the lead agency for
implementing Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 ( P. L. 99- 499).
2. The effectiveness with which the Agency has met its objectives and
purposes and the efficiency with which the Agency has operated.
While the Department has generally been effective in meeting its overall objectives
and purpose, we identified particular areas in which the Department could
improve its effectiveness. Specifically, we found the Division of Emergency
Management is not well prepared to effectively respond to disasters ( see Finding
I, pages 5 through 10). For example, the Division had not updated the State's
emergency response plan in over 10 years, and lacks important information and
materials needed for effective coordination of an emergency response. In addition,
we found the Department had not ensured adequate oversight of funds ( see
Finding 11, pages 11 through 16).
3. The extent to which the Agency operates within the public interest.
Overall, we found the Department operates within the public interest. For
example, the Department has responded to numerous state emergencies in recent
years, and over 1,500 Arizona National Guard troops were called to active duty
to participate in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. However, the
Department's activities related to the operation of Camp Navajo may not be in the
public interest ( see Finding IV, pages 21 through 25). We found the Department's
operation involving the storage of military hardware at Camp Navajo is
inconsistent with federal laws and may place significant liabilities on the State. In
addition, we found the Department has entered into an agreement with the federal
government that could indefinitely delay needed environmental restoration at
Camp Navajo ( see Finding V, pages 27 through 30). Finally, we found the Division
of Emergency Management has resisted efforts to consolidate and work under the
direction of the Department, despite having been merged with the Department
more than 20 years ago ( see Finding 111, pages 17 through 20).
4. The extent to which rules and regulations promulgated by the Agency are
consistent with the legislative mandate.
According to the Department's attorney general representative, all rules promulgat-ed
are consistent with each division's legislative mandate.
5. The extent to which the Agency has encouraged input from the public
before promulgating its rules and regulations and the extent to which it
has informed the public as to its actions and their expected impact on the
public.
The Department keeps the public informed through a combination of news
releases, display ads, legal notices, public service announcements, and public
affairs plans. In addition, the Department has also established community advisory
groups and held public scoping meetings. Finally, during emergency periods, the
Division of Emergency Management maintains a high level of public visibility due
to increased media involvement.
6. The extent to which the Agency has been able to investigate and resolve
complaints that are within its jurisdiction.
This factor does not apply because the Department has no statutory authority to
investigate and resolve complaints.
7. The extent to which the Attorney General, or any other applicable agency
of state government, has the authority to prosecute actions under enabling
legislation.
The Department's enabling legislation does not establish such an authority.
8. The extent to which the Agency has addressed deficiencies in the enabling
statutes that prevent it from fulfilling its statutory mandate.
In recent years, the Department has pursued legislation pertaining to both
divisions of the Agency. For example, during the 1992 legislative session a bill was
passed giving the National Guard authority for involvement in drug interdiction
activities. In addition, legislation has been enacted pertaining to the Division of
Emergency Management's Nuclear Emergency Management Fund and various
flood relief appropriations.
9. The extent to which changes are necessary in the Agency's laws to
adequately comply with the factors listed in the subsection.
Based on our findings and conclusions presented in Finding III ( see pages 17
through 20) we recommend the Legislature consider amending A. R. S. 526- 302,
526- 303. H and 526- 305C to place the governor's emergency powers with the
Adjutant General, rather than the director of the Division of Emergency
Management, to ensure a unified response during state emergencies, and to clarify
Department leadership. In connection with these changes, the Legislature should
consider amending A. R. S. 526- 102 to allow the Adjutant General clear authority
to delegate these powers when deemed necessary.
10. The extent to which termination of the Agency would significantly harm
the public health, safety, or welfare.
The Department's role is to provide " personnel, equipment, and funds to
contribute to the defense, safety and welfare of the citizens of Arizona."
Termination of the Department would undoubtedly harm the public's safety and
welfare. The Arizona National Guard is part of the nation's first- line defense, and
is an important resource during state emergencies. In recent years, the Guard has
responded to numerous flood emergencies throughout the state. The Arizona
National Guard also benefits public safety and welfare through participation in
federally funded programs designed to assist Arizona law enforcement in their
drug interdiction efforts, and they aid Arizona youths by providing drug
intervention and education programs.
Despite the fact that it is not adequately prepared, ( see Finding I, pages 5 through
lo), the Division of Emergency Management plays a significant role in public
safety and welfare. The Division provides services to coordinate state and local
response to disasters. In addition, the Division is the only state agency through
which federal emergency management programs are implemented.
11. The extent to which the level of regulation exercised by the Agency is
appropriate and whether less or more stringent levels of regulation would
be appropriate.
This factor does not apply as the Department has no regulatory authority.
12. The extent to which the Agency has used private contractors in the
performance of its duties and how effective use of private contractors
could be accomplished.
Private contractors are used extensively by the Department for activities such as
construction, custodial services, vehicle and aircraft maintenance and repair, and
office furniture and supplies, etc. In addition, the Division of Emergency Manage-ment
uses private contractors for hazardous materials training and trained disaster
response personnel who assist in disaster response, damage assessment, and
recovery programs. However, due to the nature of the duties performed by the
Arizona National Guard, private sector contractors appear to be inappropriate or
unavailable for many functions. Our audit work does not indicate the need for
further private sector contracting.
SUNSET FACTORS
State Emergency Council
In accordance with A. R. S. 541- 1954, the Legislature should consider the following
factors in determining whether the State Emergency Council should be continued or
terminated.
1. The objective and purpose in establishing the State Emergency Council.
The State Emergency Council was established per A. R. S. 526- 304 in 1971. By
statute, the Council is comprised of ten voting members and two advisory
members, with representation by the governor, the secretary of state, the attorney
general, the president of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
and the directors of seven state agencies. The Council's responsibilities include:
A) Making recommendations to the governor for orders, rules and procedures,
and assignment of any responsibility, service, or activity to a state agency
relative to emergencies or planning for emergencies, issuing state of
emergency proclamations in the event the governor is inaccessible,
B) Providing approval for expenditure of more than $ 100,000 for any single
contingency or emergency declared by the governor, and
C) Monitoring each emergency declared by the governor and reporting to the
governor and the Legislature when emergency conditions have stabilized and
the emergency is substantially contained.
2. The effectiveness with which the Council has met its objective and
purpose and the efficiency with which the Council has operated.
During the last four fiscal years ( 1990- 93), the Council has met an average of four
times per year. It reviews an updated listing of " open" state emergencies that
identifies the status of each, and sometimes projects close out dates. The Council
has also made funding recommendations needed to address these ongoing
emergencies. Per A. R. S. $ 35- 192, the director of the Division of Emergency
Management annually presents a report to the governor detailing the actions of
the Council. This annual report lists the fiscal year gubernatorial proclamations,
the gubernatorial proclamations that are terminated, and the proclaimed
emergencies that are still open. Additionally, tables presenting fund allocations
and expenditures are provided.
3. The extent to which the Council has operated within the public interest.
Refer to Sunset Factors 1 and 2.
4. The extent to which rules and regulations promulgated by the Council are
consistent with the legislative mandate.
The Council has no statutory authority to promulgate rules and regulations.
5. The extent to which the Council has encouraged input from the public
before promulgating its rules and regulations and the extent to which it
has informed the public as to its actions and their expected impact on the
public.
The Council's meeting dates and times are duly posted in accordance with open
meeting laws, and although the Council does not have the authority to promulgate
rules and regulations, its recommendations on funding allocations have included
input from the public.
6. The extent to which the Council has been able to investigate and resolve
complaints that are within its jurisdiction.
Ths factor is not applicable to the Council as it has no statutory authority to
investigate and resolve complaints.
7. The extent to which the Attorney General or any other applicable agency
of state government has authority to prosecute actions under the enabling
legislation.
This factor is not applicable.
8. The extent to which the Council has addressed deficiencies in its enabling
statutes which prevent it from fulfilling its statutory mandate.
There have been several minor statutory changes to the Council statute since it
was added by laws in 1971. Changes in previous years have included slight
wording modifications, and increasing the number of Council members. The most
recent amendment was during the 1992 legislative session, which added two
additional Council members.
9. The extent to which changes are necessary in the laws of the Council to
adequately comply with the factors listed in the Sunset Law.
See response to Sunset Factor 8. Our review indicates no other statutory changes
are currently being pursued.
10. The extent to which termination of the Council would significantly harm
the public health, safety, or welfare.
Because the Council is charged with declaring state of emergency proclamations
in the event of an inaccessible governor, termination of the council could
potentially harm the public by delaying the declaration of an emergency.
However, to this date, the Council has never had to exercise this authority.
11. The extent to which the level of regulation exercised by the Council is
appropriate and whether less or more stringent levels of regulation should
be appropriate.
The Council has no regulatory authority, nor is there a need for such authority.
12. The extent to which the Council has used private contractors in the
performance of its duties and how the effective use of private contractors
could be accomplished.
Ths factor does not apply as the Council does not directly contract for services.
( This Page Intentionally Left Blank)
I
FIFE SYMINGTON
STATE OF ARIZONA
Department of Emergency And Military Affairs
5636 EAST McDOWELL ROAD
PHOENIX. ARIZONA 85008- 3495
( 602) 267- 2700 DSN: 853- 2700
GOVERNOR I
31 October 1994
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
MAJ. GEN. GLEN W. VAN DYKE
DIRECTOR
4 Mr. Doug Norton, The Auditor General
Office of the Auditor General
2910 North 44th Street
Suite 410
I Phoenix, AZ 85018
Dear Mr. Norton:
I In accordance with your draft report of the Sunset Audit of DEMA, I am providing to you
our response. I greatly appreciate the efforts of your staff to understand the complexities
8 of this Department and some vey unique projects.
. VAN DYKE, Maj Gen, AZ ANG
FINDING I
Recommendations:
The Division should:
Develop an effective plan and periodically test the quality of the plan through exercises.
Develop standard operating procedures and ensure that other state agencies have
adopted effective procedures to carry out their disaster relief responsibilities.
Compile the resource listing required by ARS. 526- 306A. 8, including the
responsibilities and capabilities of state agencies and other responders.
Maintain necessary materials in the Emergency Operations Center at all times in case
of disaster, including phone listings for all possible responders ( state agencies, federal
agencies, county directors, dam operators, etc.).
Increase the level of its staFs preparedness through increased training and statewide
exercises for handling natural disasters, using the monies currently available for these
activities.
Comment: We concur, with the following comments:
Recommended Solutions
A large portion of the Division's funding is obtained through an annual contract with the
Federal Emergency Management Agency ( FEMA), which coincides with the federal fiscal
year. Obligations which were contracted for in the prior fiscal year had to be completed
before the restructuring of personnel assignments could occur to address this finding.
However, beginning in federal fiscal year 1995, the Division will dedicate a full- time position
within the Plans, Training and Exercises Section ( PT& E) to revise the state plan to ensure
that it is a product that provides a high level of readiness for the State of Arizona to
respond to emergency conditions. Enclosed ( Attachment A) is a list titled
" Recommendations" which identifies the work effort for N ' 95 that addresses each of the
recommendations in Finding One.
The state planning effort will address the deficiencies noted in the audit, i. e.; specific
information on the response capabilities of state agencies, state agency mutual aid
agreements and standard operating procedures, description of hardened communications and
databases, a listing of federal agencies and contact points, and integration with the Federal
Response Plan. However, it should be noted that the integration of the concepts in the
Federal Response Plan have been difficult to formalize. With each new federal disaster, the
federal plan has changed. In addition, the critical link to the federal plan, the Regional
Response Plan, has not been completed. In our discussions with the leadership at FEMA
Region IX, they have recognized that the State Plan can not proceed to incorporate the
Emergency Response Functions ( ESFs) until the Regional Plan matures. This is a transi-tional
period for the federal and state emergency management community, and while this
" reinvention of government" is proceeding, it should be noted that there is a current State
Plan and it has been signed by all of the state agencies that have a role in it's
implementation.
During the previous administration, the responsibility for the operation of the Emergency
Operating Center ( EOC) rested with a single person. Since the reorganization, Operations
has been refocused as a collective responsibility of each person in the Division. The
Division has started a program to train all of the staff and assign responsibilities that are
consistent with daily job descriptions to reduce the personal learning curve that each
employee faces when the EOC is activated. Standard Operating Procedures, checklists and
operational guidelines are being developed for each position and functional area.
The concept of having a state " current" resource list as envisioned in A. R. S. 26- 306,
paragraphs 6,7,8 is not feasible, as the audit staff has recognized by suggesting the
implementation of the California concept, which lists state agency capability only. Perhaps
the Legislature could consider a change in the law that would enable ADEM to utilize
precious manpower more effectively, rather than concentrating effort on keeping resource
lists " current." Resource lists like the one which is attached are updated every four years
to comply with the Four Year Plan Update ( Attachment B).
The amount of monies used to fund meals and meeting spaces for training has been
reduced significantly since 1990- 91. An internal audit of the training account showed that
in 1992- 93 and 1993- 94 the amount spent on these costs was approximately 5% of the
training budget. The Division will continue to hold these costs to a minimum, and will use
governmental training facilities available at no cost whenever possible.
Beginning in calendar year 1994, the Division has implemented a policy to review each state
emergency proclamation by writing a state mitigation plan that reviews the conditions of the
emergency, the actions and the recovery efforts. The plan focuses on mitigative activities
that will reduce the need to respond to similar events in the future.
FINDING II
Recommendation 1
The audit function should be centralized at the Department level. The ~ e ~ a r t i eanudti tors
should conduct all necessary audits of state and federal monies to fulfill their oversight
responsibilities under state and federal regulations.
We concur with the Auditor General's recommendation and have centralized the audit
function at the Department level to ensure organizational independence. The centralization
also ensures oversight of the former Division auditor by the Department's Chief Auditor.
All audits will be conducted in accordance with government auditing standards, and the
Department auditors have responsibility for audits of all state and federal monies.
With respect to mandated audits, the termination audits are now current. The first quarter
review of the Governor's Emergency Fund for fiscal year 1995 has begun. The compliance
audit report for purchasing and bidding has been completed and the report issued.
Recommendation 2
The Department auditors should audit funds used by the Division of Emergency
Management ( such as grants for planning and training) to ensure these funds are used
appropriately.
We concur and a review of the Division of Emergency Management's internal controls and
grants has been scheduled for this fiscal year.
Recommendation 1
The Legislature should consider amending ARS. 526- 303. H to place the Governor's
emergency powers with The Adjutant General to provide for a unified emergency response
and proper leadership.
Comment: We do not concur
Recommended Solution:
While it can be argued that the points made in the report are valid, we think, since the
leadership has changed significantly, that this issue should be eliminated from the report.
The audit team should recognize that they had the unfortunate timing of conducting their
audit at the height of ADEM's organizational disfunctionalism. A number of personnel
actions and the stress placed on the staff ( 12 hour days, every day from January 5th through
March) in an emotionally charged situation where lives and significant property hang in the
balance, caused the staff to become frustrated. Many took the opportunity to vent some of
their anger. Unfortunately, the audit staff had the responsibility of sorting out what was real
and what was exaggerated. Since the leadership has changed, I believe this issue should be
stricken from the record. There are enough substantive issues that the reader can draw
their own conclusions about leadership without being this blatant.
This finding identifies the root of the problem that manifests itself as Finding One. The
Division has always seen itself as a separate agency and that attitude has been allowed to
exist for a variety of reasons, politically and personally, for over a decade. As a result, an
organizational personality has developed that has created a general feeling of distrust
between the ADEM staff and our military partners. Department leadership allowed that
attitude to foster and mature by not addressing the problem and took no substantive action
to change the attitude of the Division leadership.
Recommendation 2
The Adjutant General should increase his oversight over the Division of Emergency
Management, to ensure the Division fulfulls its statutory responsibilities and that the
Division's functions are consolidated into the Department.
Comment: We do not concur
Recommended Solution:
We agree that the statutes need to be examined to identify conflicts, and areas that
represent potential for conflict. A. R. S. 26- 303. H, is not the problem. The legislative intent
of the law is to provide the Director with the authority to mobilize state resources in events
that will undoubtedly become emergencies or disasters when the Governor can not be
reached immediately. The power of the Director in this case is short lived and has never
been invoked. The statute that creates the problem with who has control over all federal,
state personnel and equipment ( including equipment of the Arizona National Guard) is
A. R. S. 26- 305. C. In addition A. R. S. 26- 302 allows the Governor to delegate emergency
management authority to either the Adjutant General a the Director of Emergency
Management which, at a minimum, sends a subtle message which implies equality. There
are other emergency management statutes that are out- of- date, vague and contradictive.
Comprehensive emergency management legislation should be considered to clarify the
Department's and Division's role in making Arizona a safer place to live and work.
FINDING IV
Recommendation 1
To ensure adequate oversight of the Department's operations at Camp Navqjo, the
Legislature should consider requiring the Department to submit annual operating and
capital construction budgets for review.
DEMA supports the concept of informing the legislature regarding the Camp Navajo
operating and deferred maintenance budgets. The annual budget is approved by the
General Staff at its July meeting pursuant to ARS 26- 114 and 26- 115. The minutes and
actions are forwarded to the Governor for his approval. It can then be made available to
the Legislature for review. The assertion that the Adjutant General is solely responsible for
the financial decisions, relating to Camp Navajo, is contrary to statute and practice at Camp
Navajo.
Recommendation 2
The Department should attempt to mod@ its agreements with DOD agencies in order to
eliminate the State's liability for Camp Navdo's operations and to comply with federal laws
and regulations.
DEMA concurs with this recommendation to modify the agreement, however, changes
needed are not those indicated in the recommendation. The report identifies two potential
sources of state liability, one for the commodities stored at Camp Navajo, and one for what
is termed as " overcharges". These issues will be addressed separately.
a. " State potentially liable for commodities stored at Camp Navajo".
On the Reentry System Launch Program ( Appendix 1 of the Master Cooperative
Agreement) and the Air Launch Cruise Missile Program ( Appendix 3 of the Master
Cooperative Agreement) there is no clear break in passing of responsibility on to the
National Guard by way of the USPFO. These are clearly matters which need to be
amended to conform with the intention of the parties ( USPFO & Arizona National Guard).
In each of the other appendices, the MOA indicates that the USPFO would not be
responsible for losses which are beyond of the control and without the fault and negligence
of the Arizona National Guard. Thus, if the National Guard was at fault, it would trigger
liability on the part of the USPFO. There is not, however, any passing of this liability by
the USPFO on to the state by way of the respective appendices involved.
In an effort to reassure the Review Team that the State bears no more liability for losses
at Camp Navajo than would ordinarily be expected in the event of an act of gross negligence
by one of its employees, the USPFO has agreed to restructure its liability clause in each of
its Inter- Service Support Agreements. The following language, consistent with that found
in the Agreement with the U. S. Navy, will be proposed by the USPFO to each DOD Agency
with which the USPFO has " contracted for service at Navajo:
Each party to this agreement shall be responsible for loss or damage to their
respective property, equipment, and materials. The USPFO for Arizona shall
not be liable for the loss or damage to ( as applicable to appendix) materials
stored at Camp Navajo. Likewise, ( DOD agency) is not liable for the loss or
damage to the utilized igloos, transfer facility, storage warehouses, or
equipment used at Camp Navajo for this storage mission. Each party shall
follow established standard operating procedures for dealing with the
commodities and equipment of the other party.
Additionally, the following language will be proposed to the National Guard Bureau as an
additional sentence for Section 713 of the Master Cooperative Agreement:
" It is not the intention of the USPFO for Arizona to pass along to the Arizona
National Guard any liability under this Agreement other than that which the
State expressly accepts."
It is hoped that this additional language will allay the State's apprehensions over its legal
vulnerability in operating Camp Navajo.
b. " Liability for overcharges under current agreements".
There are two subparts of this concern. The first addresses the appropriateness of the
charges made for the services provided. The second is based on concerns regarding
compliance with OMB Circular A- 87 as it relates to using the funds for " contingencies".
The points made by the Sunset Audit Review Team regarding cost appropriateness under
the provisions of the Camp Navajo Master Cooperative Agreement ( MCA), in concert with
OMB Circular A- 87, are well taken and appreciated as an aid to improving the Navajo
operation.
It must be noted, however, that the Department is operating Camp Navajo for the Federal
Government ( specifically, the National Guard Bureau, represented locally by the U. S.
Property and Fiscal Officer ( USPFO), in a contiguous relationship, with substantial
involvement by NGB. Thus, we are operating under a cooperative agreement as opposed
to a grant. The USPFO is in full concurrence with the operating procedures at Camp
Navajo, and was and is an integral participant in the drafting of the MCA with the
Department. The requirements and intentions of the NGB are being efficiently and
cogently accomplished through the synergistic interface between the storage and training
missions at Camp Navajo.
The Concept Plan for Camp Navajo is an attempt to conceptualize the operations of the
installation with the best interests of the Arizona National Guard at heart. The Auditor
General Report has identified several inconsistencies in the language the two parties have
incorporated into the Plan, as well as some inconsistencies in the MCA verbiage itself. The
Department is in full compliance with the " intentions" of NGB for accounting and costing
the Navajo operation. The USPFO has established the requirements for the continued,
effective operation of Camp Navajo as a training site. Also, the USPFO has endorsed the
storage mission as a means of supporting the infrastructure at Camp Navajo.
It is the USPFO's prerogative as the agent of the Federal Government to accept or reject
costs presented by the Arizona National Guard for reimbursement for Navajo operations.
It is the USPFO as the Grantor who must be assured that the Federal Government's
intentions and regulations are duly satisfied. A detailed cost report, that has successfully
met the USPFO's scrutiny since the operation's inception, is submitted with each
Departmental reimbursement request.
As discovered by the review and pointed out in the report, the MCA and the Concept Plan
are in need of revision to more thoroughly articulate the consistency required to bring them
into concert with one another and regulatory guidelines. This provides a higher level of
reassurance to all players involved that Camp Navajo's operation fully complies with
applicable laws.
Since the USPFO is the Grantor as defined in A- 87, his authority will allow the necessary
changes to Section 502 of the MCA to incorporate any costs in question that are allowed
by law, to include a listing of allowable indirect costs. The Cost Allocation Plan will be
improved in keeping with regulatory directions contained in A- 87 and the MCA, and will
continue to be refined as a working document in order to respond to the fluidity of the
changing missions and programs supporting the operation of Camp Navajo.
OMB Circular A- 87 defines a contingency as a reserve for " Unforeseen Events". As
referenced on Page 12, Section VIII, Para d( 2) of the Concept Plan for Camp Navajo, the
" Contingency Account" is defined as a " Fund to offset capital improvement expenditures and
repairs of facilities at Navajo". Obviously the term " contingency" as used in the Concept
Plan is not consistent with the definition for contingencies found in A- 87. The funds held
in reserve, and referred to as " profit" or " overcharges" from the grantor, are not profit or
overcharges. Rather, they are intended for deferred maintenance expenditures and facilities
repairs. Such expenditures and repairs are suitably predictable, and hence, not unforeseen
in terms of time or usage measurements, and for which projections can be calculated and
costed. Said costs, as defined in OMB A- 87 under Attachment B, Para B. ll, B. 17, B. 18, C. 2
and C. 3 are specifically allowable and are the intended costs referred to as the " Contingency
Account" in the Concept Plan. A more precise description, consistent with OMB A- 87,
would be a Reserve Account. This would better distinguish it from a " Contingency" fund
and will be incorporated into the Concept Plan to eliminate any future misconceptions as
to the appropriateness of these costs.
The Concept Plan will be revised to eliminate any reference to the utilization of reserve
funds to fund shortfalls in the operating account with assurances created to preclude such
use.
FINDING V
Recommendation
To ensure timely remediation of the environmental damage at Camp Navqjo and to comply
with the requirements of BRAC, the Department should seed to revise its agreement with
the Army and secure BRAC funding for all necessary remediation efforts.
The Base Commission report directed the Army's mission at Camp Navajo to end, and for
Camp Navajo to transfer to the Arizona National Guard. BRAC law was fulfilled when, in
September 1994, the demilitarization of obsolete ammunition was completed, bringing to
a close the Army's mission. Camp Navajo remains federal land, controlled by the National
Guard Bureau, and operated under a license issued to the Arizona National Guard. Camp
Navajo's cleanup is not incidental to or necessary for the implementation of BRAC law,
except that portion directly related to the Army's mission. Other portions of Camp Navajo
remain eligible for Defense Environmental Restoration Account ( DERA) funds.
The Arizona National Guard has sought funding for environmental projects at Camp Navajo
consistent with the direction that we have received from the Secretary of the Army. The
Department of the Army's interpretation is that funding under DERA is authorized. In this
regard, see the enclosed photocopy ( Attachment C) of an undated letter to Major General
Owens ( received by facsimile on August 7, 1992). Further, Chapter 9 of Army Regulation
200- 1, Environmental Quarterly: Environmental Protection and Enhancement ( April 23,
1990), gives the Army's guidance that DERA funds are appropriate for remediating
installations under current military control. With this in mind, legal opinions from the U. S.
Army, the National Guard Bureau, the Arizona National Guard, and the Army Material
Command reached a consensus in the Memorandum of Agreement clarifylng environmental
funding sources and responsibility. Thus, although it appears as though funding should be
exclusively from the Base Realignment and Closure Account ( BRAC) the Army has not
" closed Camp Navajo in the same manner as other " closure" actions. The Memorandum
of Agreement accurately reflects both BRAC and DERA funding, as applicable, for all
necessary remediation efforts. Since 1989, over $ 7 million in DERA funding, and
approximately $ 200,000 in BRAC funding, has been provided for environmental restoration.
ATTACH A
RECOMMENDATIONS
Develop an effective plan and periodically test the quality of the plan through exercises.
HQlO5 Develop or update State or local EOPs or annexes.
25%/ 25%/ 25%/ 25% ( EMA, HAZ, OA)
HQ107 Integrate Federal Respotlse Plan concepts into EOPs.
6/ 6/ 6/ 6 ( EMA, OA)
HQ108 Iderztlfy Federal response Plan State co) ttponents in EOPs; e. g., staging
areas, DFOs, POAs, MOB centers.
25 % / 25 % / 25 % / 25 % ( EMA, OA)
HQIll Develop or update Stare or local disaster recorlery plans; e. g., debris
rentoval, reconstruction, econotnic development.
1 / O/ l / O ( D PI)
HQ112 Develop and inlplemertt a corrective acrion progrant following an uercise
or actual disaster event.
25 % 125 % / 25 % / 25 % ( OA)
HQ401 Develop/ update nrulti- year exercise sclredule.
O/ O/ O/ l ( EMA, EMT)
HQ402 Develop, conduct, and/ or participa~ e in exercises; e. g., chemical, natural
disaster response, hazardous materials, radiological.
25%/ 25%/ 25%/ 25% ( DPI, EMA, EMT, EP, HAZ, OA)
Develop standard operating procedures and ensure that other state agencies have adopted
effective procedures to carry out their disaster relief responsibilities.
HQ 103 Develop or update preparedness plarzs; e. g., critical resources, SCM,
RIM& C Operation, contmurrications.
25 %/ 25 % / 25 % / 25 % ( D PI, EMA, OA)
HQlW Develop or update State or local SOPs; e. g., in~ pleme~ rtindgo cuments,
damage assessment handbook.
6/ 6/ 6/ 6 ( EMA, OA)
Participate in operational activities; e. g., stand 24- hour watch, mainrain
updated call down list, checklists and SOPs, update operatiorzal/ response
databases.
No activity listed.
Compile the resource listing required by A. R. S. 526- 306. A. 8, including the responsibilities and
capabilities of state agencies and other responders.
HQI03 Develop or update preparedness plans; e. g., critical resources, SCM,
RIM& C Operation, communications.
25%/ 25%/ 25%/ 25% ( DPI, EMA, OA)
HQlW Develop or update State or local SOPS; e. g., implenlenting documents,
danzage assessnlent handbook.
6/ 6/ 6/ 6( W, O A)
HQ507 Participate in actual disaster operations. ( Note: I f this code is used,
narrative must be provided regarding finding and/ or resources used.)
o/ o/ o/ o ( OA)
HQ601 Cullduct needs assessnlerlt for use in developing program and acl~ ieving
progra~ lt goals; e. g., irtventory of ltr~ ntan and progrumntatic resources,
progranunatic tecl~ nical reviews.
25 %/ 25 %/ 25 %/ 25 % ( EMA, EP, USR)
Maintain necessary materials in the Emergency Operations Center at all times in case of disaster,
including phone listings for all possible responders ( state agencies, federal agencies, county
directors, dam operators, etc.).
HQ508 Parficipare in operational activities; e. g., srand 24- hour watch, maintain
updated call down list, cl~ ecklisrsa nd SOPs, update operational/ respo~ lse
databases.
No activities listed.
Increase the level of its staff's preparedness through increased training and statewide exercises
for handling natural disasters, using the monies currently available for these activities.
HQ301 Identzjj training/ education requirements including target audiences,
training/ education needs assessment, and recornmendations for course and
curriculunt development.
25 % / 25 % / 25 % / 25 % ( EMA , EMT, SA R)
Participate in training/ education courses, conferences, worksltops,
seminars, presentations, or denlonstrations; e. g., worhizops, system,
conferences, ntulti- disaster protection, SALEMD UG.
25 % / 25 % / 25 %/ 25 % ( D PI, EP, OA, USR)
Develop, conduct, and/ orpanicipate in orercises; e. g., clzemical, natural
disaster response, hazardous nzaterials, radiological.
25 %/ 25 %/ 25 %/ 25% ( DPI, EMA, EMT, EP, HAZ, OA)
Keep records of the disaster response as it occurs, tracking missions assigned and completed,
for use during the response effort and for review afterward.
HQ403 Develop artd conduct evaluations/ critiques of exercises.
25 % / 25 % / 25 % / 25 % ( EMA, EM T, HAZ, OA)
HQ404 Perfonn exercise reporting require~ iiatts; e . g., EMERS.
25 %/ 25 %/ 25 %/ 25 % ( EMA, EMT, IiAZ, OA)
HQ507 Participate irt actual disaster operatiorts. ( Note: I f this code is used,
narrative nlust be provided regarding fi~ nclinga ~ td/ orr esources used.)
o/ o/ o/ o
HQ5lO PeIfonn critiquc/ evaluation of disuster operations.
No activities listed.
Formally critique the response coordination efforts and produce an after- action report that
identifies areas needing inlprovement after each disaster.
HQ403 Develop and conduct evaluationr/ critiques of exercises.
25 %/ 25 %/ 25 %/ 25 %
HQ404 Perform exercise reporting requirements; e. g., EMERS.
25 %/ 25 %/ 25 %/ 25 %
HQ507 Participate in actual disaster operations. ( Note: this code is used,
narrative 171ust be provided regardirlg funding and/ or resources used.)
o/ o/ o/ o ( OA)
HQ510 Perform critiquc/ evaluation of disaster ol~ erations.
No activities listed.
ATTACH B
FOUR YEAR PLAN UPDATE
CENSUS EOP DATE 1994 1995
07/ 01/ 91 NO YES
NO
NO
YES
07/ 01/ 90 YES NO
02/ 01/ 91 NO YES
09/@ 1/ 89 NO NO
SPRINGERVILLE 1,802
ST. JOHNS ( CTY SEAT) 3,294
20CHISE COUNTY 97,624 01/ 28/ 91 NO YES
' 3ENSON 3,824 05/ 15/ 93 NO NO
07/ 16/ 90 YES NO
05/ 15/ 93 NO NO
10/ 30/ 91 NO YES
10/ 15/ 92 NO NO
07/ 15/ 91 NO YES
07/ 30/ 93 NO NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
YES
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES
ISB BEE ( CTY SEAT) 6; 288 I 30UGLAS 12,822
3UACHUCA CITY 1,782
SIERRA V I S T A 32,983
I TOMBSTONE
; JILCoX
)!:% IN0 COUNTY 96,591 03/ 30/ 91 NO YES
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
05/ 01/ 91 NO YES
08/ 01/ 93 NO NO
11/ 01/ 92 NO NO
11/ 01/ 92 NO NO
12/ 01/ 90 YES NO
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
( IL7AGSTAAFF (~ CTY iSEA~ T) 4~ 5,8~ 57 ~ 1,207
6,598
$ ZDONA 7,720
2,532
( E r n )
SILA COUNTY 40,216
6,062
07/ 01/ 90 YES NO
COVERED BY G I L A COUNTY EOP
07/ 01/ 88 NO NO
COVERED BY GILA COUNTY EOP
03/ 01/ 91 NO YES
12/ 01/ 88 NO NO
YES
> AYSON
JINKELMAN
NO
YES
T
( ( E m 1
; R A W COUNTY 26,554 YES
? IMA 1,725 YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
07/ 01/ 87 NO NO
04/ 01/ 91 NO YES
05/ 30/ 92 NO NO
; REENLEE COUNTY 8,008 06/ 01/ 90 YES NO
NO
YES
08/ 01/ 90 NO YES
11/ 01/ 86 NO NO
( EMA 1
LA PAZ COUNTY 13,844 08/ 01/ 90 YES
RKEX( CTY SEAT) YES
( Ern)
MARICOPA COUNTY YES
AVONDALE
BUCKEYE
CAREFREE
CAVE CREEK
CHANDLER
EL MIRAGE
GILA BEND
GILBERT
GLENDALE
GOODYEAR
GUADALUPE
LITCHFIELD PARK
MESA
PARAD I S E VALLEY
PEORIA
PHOENIX ( CTY SEAT)
SCOTTSDALE
SURPRISE
TEMPE
" qLLESON
- CKENBURG
YOUNGTOWN
NO
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
( E m )
MOHAVE COUNTY 93,497 06/ 01/ 90 YES
YES
NO
YES
BULLHEAD CITY
KINGMAN ( CTY SEAT)
LAKE HAVASU
( Ern)
NAVAJO COUNTY YES
HOLBROOK ( CTY SEAT)
? INETOP/ LAXESIDE
SiiOWLOW
SNOWFLAKE
TAYLOR
WINSLOW
4,686 07/ 01/ 91 NO
2,422 04/ 30/ 93 NO
5,019 07/ 14/ 92 NO
3,679 04/ 24/ 92 NO
2,418 08/ 01/ 91 NO
8,190 09/ 01/ 90 YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO
( ERA)
PIMA COUNTY YES
: L4RANA
<? qO VALLEY
UTH TUCSON
TUCSON ( CTY SEAT)
2,187 COVERED BY COUNTY EOP
6,670 COVERED BY COUNTY EOP
5,093 COVERED BY COUNTY EOP
405,390 COVERED BY COUNTY EOP
( NON- EMA)
116,379 07/ 15/ 93 NO
? ACHE JUNCTION 18,100 04/ 15/ 92 NO
19,002 06/ 30/ 92 NO
6,927 12/ 03/ 86 YES
ELOY 7,211 10/ 29/ 90 YES
YE:
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
I FLORENCE ( CTY SEAT) 7,510 09/ 30/ 92 NO
I< LT JWY 2,262 12/ 30/ 90 YES
MAMMOTH 1,845 12/ 30/ 86 YES
STJPERIOR 3,468 12/ 30/ 86 YES
SANTA CRUZ COUNTY 29,676 10/ 30/ 90 YES
NOGALES( CTY SEAT) 19,489 09/ 30/ 88 YES NO
PATAGONIA 888 09/ 01/ 92 NO NO
IT 0
YES
107,714 08/ 30/ 91 NO YES
I CAMP VERDE 6,234 05/ 25/ 91 NO YES
CHINO VALLEY 4,837 04/ 31/ 91 NO YES
CLARKDALE 2,144 01/ 31/ 88 NO NO
COTTONWOOD 5,918 01/ 31/ 88 NO NO
JEROME 403 04/ 31/ 91 NO YES
01/ 31/ 89 NO NO
PRESCOTT VALLEY 8,858 11/ 30/ 84 NO NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
YES
YUMA COUNTY 106,895 09/ 30/ 90 YES NO
( SAN LUIS 4,212 09/ 30/ 91 NO YES
SOMERTON 5,282 06/ 30/ 91 NO YES
1,066 09/ 30/ 91 NO YES
Y SEAT) 54,923 12/ 31/ 92 NO NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
( TOTAL POPULATION OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA AS OF 1990 IS 3,665,228
1 ATTACH C
!
OEPARTMEM OF THE ARMY
OmCE cf fM WSTANT SEmnARY
WCSHTKITON, DC mm11
'
~ a jc; senerif Donald Lo Owns
The Adjutant General
Arizona National Guard
5636 East McDcwell Road
Phoenix, Arizona 85088
Dear General Owens:
Thf s responds to your memorandum of June 17, 1992,
regarding environmental responsibilities at the Navajo
Army D e p o t A c t i v i t y ( W A ) . We w a n t to assure you that
the Amy will respond to the environmental contamination
cleanup requirements at NADA in a manner that is fully
protective of human health and tho environment.
NADA will remain federal land with a license to h e
- izona National Guard. Under no circuxnstanoes w i u
liability for Anv- senerated contami. nation be
transferred to the State of Arizona, I am unaware of
any regulatozy scheme under which a etate oan be hcld
liable for past federal contanination on land that
remains in federal hands. Because lqADA is an Army
property, all Comprehensive Envfronmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act ( CERCLA) response
actions w i l l be eligible for participation in the Army
Installation Restoration Program ( IRP). Such respoqse
actions are centrally funds by the Department of
Defense, using the Defense Environmental Restoration
Account ( am). Thua, the issue oe IRP managemtat at
NADA cancezna which MACOM ( AMC or NGB) will process
paperwork for submission to D6D. It i s gg& an issue of
transfez of liability from the Army to the State.
TO ensure that this process is clear, I will
highlight the mechanics of IRP project management.
Funding priority for IRP i s based on a worst- first:
concept. That is, response actions for sites that pose
a human health risk or environmental hazard receive '
funding priority. Installations must identify theit
requirements in the semi- annual 1383 report for 1-
pragtsarming coa~ ideration~ The U. S. Army Toxic and
Hazardous Materials Agency ( USATHAMA) uses the 1383
report exhibits to compile a prioritized XRP wtkplan
and to ptepare budget submfssion to DODO
If it i s deterrained that contamination at NADA'
represents a imminent human health or environmental
hazard, the IRP priorities are adjusted to provide For
- .... the appropriate response action. Xmmediate, in- the- field,
assfstance fs available in the IRP to respond t o imminent
human% ealth or enviromental hazards. ~ d dtff o nally, the
IRP recognizes the importance of compliance with reifula-tory
agency requirements and funding priorities can'be
adjusted accordingly. . .
I am somewhat confused by NGB'S concern with we
IRP as it relater to onqoing operations at NADA. yes
IRP work interfere with mission activities? I do not
understand how a a a n u e~ nf orcement action would affect
ongoing operations. It seems more likely that a medfa
pomoliance issue ( i. e,, Clean Aix, Clean Water or R w
compliance, etc.) rather than a issue would
impact mission activities. Therefore, we think it
entirely appropriate for NGB to negotiate with AMC
during the relocation period to ensure that AMC leaires
I infrastructure ( sewage treahent plants,
- waste storageltreatnent f a c i l i t i e s ) in a
condition such that NADA will not be faced w i t h
enforcement actions in the near future which could
inpact mission activities. I will aupport you in your
efforts to secure such assurances from AMC;
A f t e r AMC leaves W A , upon completion of the
relocation of their storage mission in 1993, the
continuing Army environmental restaratfan program
should transition to, and be managed by the National
Gpard Bureau. Sower, w have no objection to yout
entering into a M e m o r d u m of Agreement ( M A ) with khe
Army Materiel Command ( APIC) for 1) the provision bf
environmental program management services; and 2)
assurance that camplianco infrastructure will be left
in a condition commensurate with sustained media
compliaace at NADA.
The point of contact in this office i s Mr. ~ ick
Newsome at ( 703) 614- 9531.
Sincerely,
Lewis D. Walker
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Arm$
( Environment, Safety and Occupational Health)
OASA( 1, LLE)