Performance audit, Arizona Criminal Justice Commission and the Drug and Gang Enforcement Task Force

              DOUGLAS R. NORTON, CPA
AUDITOR GENERAL
STATE OF ARIZONA
OFFICE OF THE
AUDITOR GENERAL
July 10,1996
Members of the Arizona Legislature
DEBRA K. DAVENPORT, CPA
DEPUTY AUDITOR CENEInL
The Honorable Fife Symington, Governor
Mr. Rex Holgerson, Executive Director
Arizona Criminal Justice Commission
Transmitted herewith is a report of the Auditor General, A Performance Audit of the Arizona
Criminal Justice Commission and the Drug and Gang Enforcement Task Force. This report
is in response to a May 17,1996, resolution of the Joint Legislative Audit Committee. The
performance audit was conducted as part of the Sunset review set forth in A. R. S. 5541- 2951
through 41- 2957.
The report addresses both the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission ( ACJC) and the Drug and
Gang Enforcement Task Force. Regarding the ACJC, it is a 19- member body consisting
primarily of representatives from criminal justice agencies that is mandated to enhance the
coordination and effectiveness of the criminal justice system. However, we found that the
Commission should play a greater role as Arizona's systemwide resource for information
about criminal justice issues and analysis of criminal justice data. No other body within the
State contains such a broad range of representatives from criminal justice entities or is charged
with reviewing, reporting, and making recommendations on the criminal justice system as a
whole. As such, the Commission has a unique opportunity to provide systemwide
perspectives and recommendations. In addition, our report suggests the need to diversify the
Commission's membershp to further broaden its perspective on criminal justice issues.
Finally, the Commission's statutes regarding the Arizona Criminal Justice Information System
should be amended to eliminate mandates regarding the system that are duplicative of the
mandates for the Department of Public Safety.
Regarding the Drug and Gang Enforcement Task Force, we recommend that the Legislature
consider sunsetting it because its activities essentially duplicate those of the Arizona Criminal
Justice Commission. The Task Force was originally established in 1987 to provide the
Governofs Office with a diwd participative role in monitoring the nature and scope of drug-and
gang- related activities. By statute, the Governor serves as chair of the Task Force.
However, our review indicates that the Task Force's responsibilities, operations, and
membership essentially duplicate those of the Commission's Drug, Gang, and Violent Crime
Committee. Despite the similarities, the Governol's Office has expressed a desire to retain
2 9 1 0 NORTH 44TH STREET - SUITE 4 1 0 . PHOENIX, ARIZONA 8 5 0 1 8 m ( 6 0 2 ) 5 5 3 - 0 3 3 3 rn FAX ( 602) 553- 0051
July 10,1996
Page - 2-
involvement in the development of criminal justice policy. We believe that the Governor
could retain such involvement as a permanent member of the Commission. However, a
statutory change would be necessary to amend the Commission's composition to allow the
Governor's appointment.
My staff and I will be pleased to discuss or clarify items in the report.
This report will be released to the public on July 11,1996.
Sincerely,
D O U R~. N orton
Auditor General
Enclosure
SUMMARY
The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance audit and Sunset review of
the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission and the Drug and Gang Enforcement Task Force,
pursuant to a May 17,1995, resolution of the Joint Legislative Audit Committee. This audit
was conducted as part of the Sunset review process set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes
( A. R. S.) 5541- 2951 through 41- 2957.
ARIZONA CRIMINAL
JUSTICE COMMISSION I
The Legislature created the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission, a 19- member body
consisting primarily of representatives from criminal justice agencies, in 1982. The
Commission is mandated to enhance the coordination and effectiveness of the criminal justice
system by monitoring criminal justice legislation, facilitating information and data exchange
among criminal justice agencies, and preparing an annual criminal justice system review
report. The Commission is supported by an Executive Director and 17 staff.
The Commission Should
Provide More Criminal Justice
Information and Analyses
( See pages 5 through 11)
The Commission should play a greater role in providing systemwide criminal justice
information and analyses. Although the Commission effectively monitors legislation and
administers several criminal justice funds, it performs other important duties, such as
evaluation and analyses, only to a limited extent Further, it has prepared only three system
review reports in the last ten years, even though it is required to produce an annual report.
This lack of focus on evaluation, analyses, and reporting hinders the Commission's ability to
serve Arizona as a systemwide resource for information about criminal justice issues.
To become a more effective systemwide resource, the Commission needs to take several steps.
Specifically, the Commission needs to begin collecting and analyzing basic criminal justice
information, such as number of arrests and number of cases prosecuted. It will also need to
prepare its annual system review report, more fully utilize its Statistical Analysis Center to
conduct analyses and evaluations, and establish systemwide goals that can be incorporated
into long- term strategic plans.
Diversifying the Commission's Membership
Could Provide Broader Perspective
( See pages 13 through 17)
The Commission could broaden its perspective on criminal justice issues with diversified
membership. Arizona's statutes prescribe a commission membership that emphasizes law
enforcement and prosecution positions. Specifically, these positions comprise 12 of 19, or 63
percent, of the Commission's overall membership. While law enforcement and prosecution
are vital system components, the criminal justice system contains many other aspects that are
not represented by the Commission's current membership. In contrast, other states'
commissions place less emphasis on law enforcement and prosecution, contain broader
representation from other criminal justice agencies, such as juvenile justice representatives and
members of the judiciary, and are likely to include legislators, citizens, or social service agency
representatives.
To increase the Commission's ability to provide a comprehensive approach to criminal justice
issues, a change in commission membership should be considered. This could be accom-plished
by reducing the number of duplicate positions, and replacing them with representa-tives
from other areas within the criminal justice system and/ or increasing the number of
Commission members.
Commission's Statutes Should
Be Amended to Eliminate
Duplicative ACJIS Mandates
( See pages 19 through 21)
The Commission's mandates regarding the Anzona Criminal Justice Information System
( ACJE) are unnecessary, as they parallel responsibilities of the Department of Public Safety
( DPS). The ACJIS, a computerized network of criminal justice information, is operated and
managed by the DPS. Responsibility for the system's development and oversight was
originally given to the Comprehensive Data Systems Policy Board in 1977. However, the
Board was sunset in 1988 and its duties were given to the Commission. The Commission has
not played an active role in the system's oversight, since they believe that many of the ACJE
responsibilities concern operational issues that should be left to the DPS. In fact, DPS current
statutory authority overrides the Commission's authority regarding ACJIS and allows it to
perform many of the Commission's ACJE duties.
To clarify the Commission's duties and to eliminate duplicative responsibilities, several
statutory changes are needed. Eliminating most of the Commission's ACJE mandates and
revising several other statutes to correspond with these changes will eliminate the potential
for future duplication.
DRUGANDGANG
ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE I
The Drug and Gang Enforcement Task Force was created in 1987 to provide the Governofs
Office with a participative role in monitoring the nature and scope of drug- and gang- related
activities. The Task Force serves in an advisory capacity to the Arizona Criminal Justice
Commission, and is r e q d to make recommendations for funding and report on programs
supported by the Drug and Gang Enforcement Account, which is administered by the
Commission.
Drug and Gang Enforcement Task
Force Should Be Sunset
( See pages 35 through 37)
The Task Force is not needed because its activities essentially duplicate those of the Arizona
Criminal Justice Commission. Specifically, the Task Force's duties and operations are similar
to the Commission's Drug, Gang, and Violent Crime Committee. For example, the Task Force
has combined its meetings with the Committee's on several occasions, it uses the same
meeting agenda ( even when meetings are not combined), and it makes recommendations that
are identical to the Commission's. Finally, the Task Force's membershp is similar to the
Commission's with the exception of the Governor, who acts as chair of the Task Force.
However, since 1994, even this distinction has been absent, since the Governor has designated
the DPS Director to serve as the chair. Because the Task Force's duties, operations, and
membership are virtually identical to the Commission's, it should be considered for sunset
The Governofs Office has expressed a concern that sunsetting the Commission may reduce
the Governor's direct involvement in criminal justice policy formulation. Therefore, if the Task
Force were sunset, the Governofs involvement could be continued through direct
membership on the Commission. To do this, the Legislature would have to amend the
Commission's statutes to include the Governor as a permanent member of the Commission.
iii
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Table of Contents
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ARIZONA CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION
Introduction and Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Finding I: The Commission Should
Provide More Criminal Justice
Information and Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Commission Could Play an
Important Role in Helping to Coordinate
the Complex Criminal Justice System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lack of Evaluation and Analyses
Limits the Commission's Ability
toProvideRecommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Several Factors Impede the
Commission's Ability to Provide
MeaningfulMormation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Changes Needed to Enhance
the Commission's Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Finding II: Diversifying the Commission's
Membership Could Provide
Broader Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Commission's Law
Enforcement Emphasis May
Limit a Systemwide Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other States' Commissions
Promote a Broader Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table of Contents ( con't)
Paae
Finding 11: ( con't)
Arizona Should Consider Diversifying
the Commission's Membership ..................................... 16
Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Finding Ill: Commission's Statutes Should Be
Amended to Eliminate Duplicative
ACJIS Mandates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Commission Has Never Taken an
ActiveRoleinACJIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
DPS Also Received Authority
to Perform ACJE Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
The Commission's Statutes
Should Be Amended to Remove
Duplicative ACJIS Mandates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Other Pertinent Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
The Commission Oversees
Nearly $ 16 Million in
Criminal Justice Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
The Commission's Duties for
Administration of Funds Vary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Established Rules Guide
the Commission's Allocation
ofFundsandMonitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Table of Contents ( con't)
Agency Response
AppendixA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
AppendixB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 1:
Table 2:
Tables
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27
a- i
a- ii
Frequency of Other Criminal Justice
Representatives Not Found on Arizona's
Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Criminal Justice Funds Administered by
the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission
Fiscal Year 1996 ( unaudited) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
DRUG AND GANG ENFORCEMENT
TASK FORCE I
Introduction and Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Finding I: Drug and Gang Enforcement
Task Force Should Be Sunset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Task Force Duties Mirror
Commission's Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
vii
Table of Contents ( concl'd)
Finding I: ( con9t)
Task Force Not Necessary
forGovernofshput . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Paue
Sunset Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Agency Response
viii
ARIZONA CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance audit and Sunset review of
the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission, pursuant to a May 17,1995, resolution of the Joint
Legislative Audit Committee. This audit was conducted as a part of the Sunset review set forth
in Arizona Revised Statutes ( A. R. S.) 5541- 2951 through 41- 2957.
Overview of the
Criminal Justice System
The criminal justice system consists of a complex, loosely connected network of agencies,
bureaus, and organizations designed to prevent or control crime, establish defendants' guilt
or innocence, and punish or rehabilitate those who have been found guilty. The system is
considered multi- tiered because its functions - law enforcement, prosecution, adjudication,
incarceration, and extended supervision- are carried out at various levels of government.
Specifically, in Arizona, more than 400 separate agencies or departments are involved in the
system, including local police departments; county sheriff departments; the Department of
Public Safety; city, county, and state prosecutorsf offices; county probation offices; and the
Arizona Department of Corrections and the courts.
In addition to involving several agencies and functions, the criminal justice system is also
quite expensive. During fiscal year 1995, an estimated $ 591 million was dedicated to state
criminal justice functions? The U. S. Bureau of Justice Statistics indicates that total expenditures
for all the agencies and departments involved in Arizona's criminal justice system ( i. e., state,
county, and municipal) exceeded $ 1.4 billion in fiscal year 1992.'
This figure is compiled from the Joint Legislative Budget Committee's Appropriations Report for Fiscal Years
Ending June 30,1996 and 1997, and includes the following state criminal justice functions: the Department of
Public Safety, the Department of Corrections, the Attorney General's Office ( Criminal Division), the Department
of Juvenile Corrections, the Board of Executive Clemency, the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission, and the
judiciary ( Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and Superior Court). While some monies appropriated to the
judiciary are easily discernable as non- criminal justice related, it is difficult to isolate all monies that are
exclusively aiminal justice activities. Therefore, the judiciary figure included in the total amounts dedicated to
criminal justice functions is the best available estimate.
U. S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook ofCrimina2 Justice Statistics - 1994. ( Most current figures available.)
Arizona Criminal Justice Commission
Created to Help Coordinate the
Complex Criminal Justice System
The Legislature created the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission in 1982. Although it is not
a " criminal justice" agency, its responsibilities are designed to help coordinate and enhance
the system. The Commission has 12 mandates outlined in A. R. S. § 41- 2405( A) that include the
following:
Monitor the progress and implementation of new and continuing criminal justice
legislation;
Facilitate Information and data exchange among criminal justice agencies;
Prepare an annual criminal justice system review report;
1 Evaluate and gather information concerning potential and existing programs designed to
effect community crime prevention; and
Make recommendations to the Legislature and Governor regarding the Criminal Justice
Enhancement Fund, the Drug and Gang Enforcement Account, the Victim Compensation
Fund, and the Victim Assistance Fund.
Although its statutes do not contain an objective or purpose statement, the Commission has
adopted the following mission statement:
". . . to develop, implement, monitor and report on programs, finctions and actiuitks to sustain
and enhance the coordination, the cohesiveness, the productivity, and the efictiveness of the
criminal justice system in Arizona." I
Organization and Budget
The Commission's membership consists primarily of state, county, and municipal criminal
justice representatives, and includes
The Attorney General Three County Attorneys
The Director of the Department of Public Safety Three County Sheriffs
The Director of the Department of Corrections One Law Enforcement Leader
The Administrative Director of the Courts One former Judge
The Chairman of the Board of Executive One Mayor
Clemency One member of a County Board
Three Police chiefs' of Supervisors
One Chief Probation Officer
The Governor appoints the 14 non- state agency members, and no more than 7 of these
positions may be from the same political party.
The Commission is authorized an Executive Director and 17 staff. 2 It receives both state and
federal funds to support its operations. For fiscal year 1996, the Commission received
approximately $ 335,000 in state- appropriated funds and approximately $ 500,000 in federal
funds. In addition, the Commission administers nearly $ 40 million in federal and state
criminal justice monies dedicated to specific programs such as the Crime Victim
Compensation Program and the Street Gang Enforcement Program. 3 Its duties regarding
administration of funds vary by type of fund, but include acting as a pass- through agency,
making recommendations for funding allocations, receiving and reviewing funding
applications, and distributing and monitoring funds.
Audit Scope and
Methodology
This audit focuses primarily on the extent to which the Commission has met its mandates. To
evaluate how well the Commission is fulfilling its purpose, we analyzed its statutory
One police chief, county attorney, and county sheriff must be from a county with a population of 1,200,000 or
more persons; one of each from a county with a population equal or greater than 400,000 but less than 1,200,000;
and one of each from a county with a population of fewer than 400,000.
Five positions are funded by state appropriations. The remaining positions are federally funded.
The Victim Compensation Program consists of both federal and stake monies dedicated to compensating crime
victims for expenses incurred as a result of victimization. The Street Gang Enforcement Program receives a state
appropriation that is dedicated to helping prosecute gang members charged with an offense. For more
information on the funds administered by the Commission, please refer to pages 23 through 25 of this report.
mandates, observed commission meetings, and reviewed minutes of previous meetings dating
back to the Commission's inception. To obtain further perspectives on its performance, we
interviewed all commission members, some individuals who regularly attend commission
meetings on behalf of commission members, some former members, and several individuals
knowledgeable about the Commission. Our audit also included a review of past and current
criminal justice reports the Commission prepared to determine how these documents help it
to fulfill its mandates. Finally, to offer recommendations for improving the Commission's
operations, we contacted other states' commission directors and reviewed statutes and
documents pertaining to their commissions.
Our report presents findings and recommendations in three areas:
The need for the Commission to focus more of its efforts on planning, research, and
evaluation so that it can provide more meaningful information to policy makers;
The need to diversify the Commission's membership to enable it to provide a
comprehensive systemwide perspective; and,
The need to revise the Commission's mandates regarding the Arizona Criminal Justice
Information System since these duties are currently being handled by the Department of
Public Safety.
This report also contains a section on the Commission's administrative responsibilities for
various criminal justice funds, and responses to the 12 Sunset Factors.
This audit was conducted in accordance with government auditing standards.
The Auditor General and staff express appreciation to the Commission, and its Executive
Director and staff, for their cooperation and assistance throughout this audit.
FINDING I
THE COMMISSION SHOULD PROVIDE
MORE CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION
AND ANALYSES
The Arizona Criminal Justice Commission has not fully met its potential to serve as a
systemwide resource on criminal justice issues. The Commission, which consists of several
experienced criminal ~ ustice leaders, has a unique opportunity to provide systemwide
perspectives and recommendations. Although the Commission has numerous responsibilities
designed to effectively coordinate the system, its lack of analyses and evaluation hinder its
ability to provide meaningful recommendations. Varied perspectives on the Commission's
role, funding restrictions, and limited data collection have impeded the Commission's ability
to fulfill its overall mission. Therefore, to enhance its role as a systemwide resource, the
Commission should focus more on such activities as planning, research and analysis, and
developing meaningful recommendations for policy makers.
The Commission Could Play an
Important Role in Helping to Coordinate
the Complex Criminal Justice System
The Commission is in a unique position to provide Arizona policymakers and agencies with
comprehensive information, policy analyses, and recommendations for improvements to the
criminal justice system. Specifically, the Commission includes several key criminal justice
leaders with extensive experience, and its overall mission is to enhance the effectiveness and
coordmation of the criminal justice system. To do this, the Commission's duties as defined in
A. R. S. 541- 2405( A) include establishing criminal justice archives, facilitating data and
information exchange among criminal justice agencies, and coordinating, evaluating, and
reporting about criminal justice system programs.
No other body within the State contains this broad range of representatives from criminal
justice entities or is charged with reviewing, reporting, and making recommendations on the
criminal justice system as a whole.
Lack of Evaluation and Analyses
Limits the Commission's Abilijr
to Provide Recommendations
Although the Commission has numerous responsibilities designed to effectively coordinate
criminal justice activities, its lack of evaluation and analyses may hinder its ability to make
effective recommendations. While it effectively monitors criminal justice legislation and
administers several criminal justice funds, it performs other duties, such as analyzing and
evaluating criminal justice information, only to a limited extent Further, it has failed to
provide an annual review of the system since 1992.
Commission efiectively monitors legislation and funds - The Commission effectively
performs several activities designed to monitor criminal justice legislation. For example,
during the legislative session it holds weekly informal meetings with criminal justice lobbyists,
it monitors proposed legislation, and it makes recommendations on whether to support or
oppose any legislation that affects the criminal justice system.
The Commission also effectively administers funds, and has several administrative duties
pertaining to this role that vary by type of fund. These duties range from providing
recommendations for funding allocations to distributing and monitoring funds. Our review
found that the Commission follows state and federal policies, procedures, or guidelines when
conducting these activities. For example, the Commission withheld an agency's quarterly
distribution when it failed to meet financial reporting requirements. ( See the Other Pertinent
Information section of this report on pages 23 through 25 for more information on the
Commission's administration of funds.)
Commission does little evaluation and analysis - The Commission performs h i t e d
evaluation and analysis of the criminal justice system. For example, the Commission does not
regularly solicit or disseminate materials that would be useful for research purposes. The
Commission is also required to evaluate or analyze several programs, but generally only
compiles information about these programs rather than assessing their effectiveness. For
example, it is required to " evaluate and gather information" regarding community crime
prevention programs, and has interpreted ths to mean compiling a directory. This directory,
the Crime Prevention Programs in Arizona - 1994 Directmy, merely identifies school districts,
organizations, and criminal justice agencies throughout the State that have prevention
programs. Moreover, it has been produced only once, and is not actively disseminated to the
public, despite the mandate's requirement
Other reports prepared by the Commission also contain little analysis. For example, it
produced a 400- page document titled Crime and the Criminal Justice System in Arizona ( also
known as the White Paper). Although this document contains very detailed information on
crime trends and criminal justice expenditures, it does not contain any analysis or evaluation
of the system that could be helpful in determining the effectiveness of criminal justice
expenditures. The White Paper was part of a November 1995 symposium on crime and the
criminal justice system, and was distributed to more than 250 elected officials, and business,
civic, and criminal justice leaders throughout the State who attended. This day- long seminar
divided participants into regional work groups that raised fundamental criminal justice issues
and offered solutions. However, despite several suggestions made by each work group, the
Commission has yet to compile or report on the symposium's outcome or determine what
further action is required to address the many issues raised.
In addition, whde the Commission has been involved in a number of studies addressing
various criminal justice issues, such efforts are not conducted on an ongoing basis. For
example, in 1993, the Commission created a Youth and Crime Task Force which produced two
reports making recommendations regarding youth crime issues. While the Commission
recently recognized the substantial increase of juvenile crimes in the State in its 1995 White
Paper, it has not initiated another effort similar to that of the 1993 Task Force.
Finally, the Commission has failed to produce an annual system review report as currently
required by statute. This report should consist of an overall system review, an assessment of
funding needs, and recommendations for necessary constitutional, statutory, or administrative
changes. Over the last 10 years, the Commission has produced only 3 such reports, in 1986,
1987- 88 ( biennial), and 1992. The Commission does not consider this report a priority because
the Governor's Office has not expressed concern over its absence.
Several Factors Impede the
Commission's Ability to Provide
Meaningful Information
Several factors impede the Commission's ability to provide meaningful information or more
fully developed analyses and recommendations. First, commission members disagree as to its
overall mission and responsibilities. Second, the Commission's dependence on federal
funding dictates much of its activity. Finally, the Commission lacks sufficient data to report
on the State's criminal justice system.
Perspectives about the Commission's role va y- Commission members' perspectives vary
regarding the Commission's overall mission and responsibilities. Since its inception, the
Commission has struggled with what its primary and ultimate role can and should be. During
its earlier years, commission members debated whether it should move beyond administration
of funds and play an important role in criminal justice policy making. This debate continues
today. Interviews with commission members and other parties indicate that the Commission
is perceived as a viable body capable of valuable analysis and lobbying on behalf of the
criminal justice system as a whole, even though many feel the Commission's primary role is
to adrmnister funds. For example, one commission member felt that it is in a unique position
to comprehensively study the State's criminal justice problems, because no other group takes
into account systemwide issues. Further, symposium participants in November 1995
suggested that the Commission can play a more important role in actively coordinating
criminal justice activities throughout the State. For example, participants expressed an interest
in the Commission performing systemwide evaluations of existing programs and efforts and
coordinating activities among criminal justice entities.
Federal funding dictates many of the Commission's staf activities- The majority of the
Commission's staff are funded through federal grants, and dedicate most of their activities to
fulfilling federal requirements, including monitoring and reporting on federal grants.
Moreover, four of these staff are assigned to the Commission's primary research unit- the
Statistical Analysis Center ( SAC). Although these positions are federally funded, the federal
govenunent does not require SAC activities to be limited to federal issues. For example,
according to the Criminal Justice Statistics Association, SACS ( which operate in each of the 50
states), were established to collect and analyze data and generate statistical reports. State-related
SAC activities in other states include projects such as:
Providing objective analysis of criminal justice data and generating statistical reports on
crime;
Collecting, analyzing, and disseminating management and administrative statistics on the
criminal justice resources expended in the State;
Promoting the orderly development of criminal justice information systems in the State;
and
Providing uniform data on criminal justice processes for the preparation of national
statistical reports.
Cotnmission fails to obtain suficient criminal justice information- However, even if the
Commission's SAC was focused on researching state issues, the Commission lacks sufficient
data to accurately report on the State's criminal justice system. The SAC currently has regular
access to Uniform Crime Reporting ( UCR) data maintained by the DPS. However, this data
addresses only certain aspects of the criminal justice system, such as the number of crimes
reported and number of persons arrested. Since the criminal justice system also encompasses
many other facets, such as prosecution, treatment, and corrections, the Commission should
formally establish minimum data reporting standards for the State's criminal justice agencies.
For example, the Commission should regularly be collecting data on the number of crimes
reported, investigations pursued, and arrests made from law enforcement agencies. Likewise,
from prosecutor's offices, it should be obtaining data on the number of cases submitted for
prosecution by law enforcement agencies, cases formally charged for prosecution, cases sent
to trial or plea bargained, and convictions. This additional information would enable the
Commission to provide the criminal justice community and its policy makers with relevant
and useful information for the purpose of determining system trends and projecting system
resource needs.
The Commission has taken some steps toward this end through its Criminal Justice Records
Improvement Plan. As part of qualifying for available federal grant funds, the Commission
has developed a comprehensive plan for the improvement of criminal justice records
throughout the State at all government and agency levels.
However, to ensure the Commission can collect needed data, it may need a change in its
statutory authority. Currently, under A. R. S. 541- 2405( B)( 1), the Commission may only request
that agencies provide them with data, rather than require them to do so. Therefore, if the
Commission embarks on a study and requests data, agencies may decline or ignore the
request, For instance, when the Commission attempted to compile the White Papm, only 2
percent of the contacted agencies provided requested information. This resulted in the project
scope being narrowed, and commission staff expending many hours seeking out alternate
sources of data. Even then, there were gaps in the report because other sources of information
could not always be found.
Changes Needed to Enhance
the Commission's Effectiveness
The Commission needs to take several steps to enhance its role in serving as a criminal justice
resource and policy- recommending body. For example, other states indicate that research and
analysis is a vital function of commission entities. In addition, practices in other states, as well
as current commission members and symposium participants, suggest the need for the
Commission to refocus its efforts by conducting statewide planning.
Perfom more in- depth research and analyses- To better fulfill its systemwide coordination
role, the Commission needs to move its research and analysis efforts beyond statistical or
" descriptive reporting" to the next level- policy analysis. While the Commission's SAC has
performed research in the past, its current activities focus on compiling descriptive statistics
and monitoring grant recipients. Although these activities are required to meet statutory
mandates and federal grant requirements, it is policy analysis information that assists policy
makers in understanding the systemwide ramifications of their decisions.
Periohc surveys conducted by the Justice Research and Statistics Association W A ) indicate
that the majority of state SACS have been performing some type of policy analysis since 1985.
Likewise, in 1995, the JRSA published a directory indicating that while 44 of 49 states perform
general data compilations, nearly two- thirds perform additional forms of analyses, such as
program evaluations and impad analysis.' Specifically, unlike Arizona, 22 of 49 states conduct
program evaluations, and 23 of 49 states perform impact analysis. For example:
This information was based on 1994 activities and was compiled in the Justice Research and Statistics
Association publication Crim'nal Jwtie lssm in the States, 1995 Directory. Information on SAC activities was only
reported for 49 states. Nevada did not respond to the survey.
Iowa's SAC is conducting various analyses to help prepare it for potentially extensive
changes in Iowa's sentencing laws and practices. The SAC's studies are used by the State's
Criminal and Juvenile Justice Planning Advisory Council to develop recommendations for
changes in correctional policy.
Texas' SAC monitors the number of adult felons and compares them with inmate
projections to assist the Department of Criminal Justice administrators in planning the
opening of new facilities and assuring that Texas fulfills its legislative duty to accept
offenders sentenced to prison within 45 days of sentencing.
Washington's SAC produces a 240- month forecast of juvenile inmates by crime type and
age. The forecast is based on admission and length of stay data and is used to determine
state funding for juvenile institutions.
Similar to other states, the Commission needs to support and direct the SAC in performing
more meaningful and useful analyses. The Commission can do this through reassigning grant
monitoring activities to other commission staff and providing input on a research agenda that
addresses systemwide issues and is useful to state policy makers. It can then promote the
SAC's research products to the policy makers.
Concentrate more on statewide planning eforts- Commission members, criminal justice
leaders, and trends in other states suggest that the Commission also needs to broaden its
efforts by conducting statewide planning for the criminal justice system. Through interviews,
we found that several commission members believe that the Commission can provide
meaningful information and statewide direction for criminal justice policy makers. One
member stated that the Commission should refocus its efforts and emphasize statistical
gathering in order to facilitate an informed debate of issues facing the criminal justice system.
This opinion was also presented throughout the November 1995 symposium. For example,
one work group identified the need for systemwide critical evaluations of existing programs
and efforts, while another group suggested that the Commission should be gathering,
analyzing, and reporting accurate and timely information for the purpose of making policy
decisions.
Similarly, trends in other states also suggest that commissions are participating in statewide
planning efforts. While the Commission disbanded its Strategic Planning Committee in
January 1995, several other states see strategic planning as a priority and have initiated
comprehensive efforts to plan a future direction for their criminal justice systems. For example,
Iowa, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Utah produce annual reports that outline various goals
and objectives of their state's criminal justice system. Likewise, some state commissions are
mandated to prepare strategic plans, with projected goals and activities as far as 20 years into
the future. For example:
w Iowa's 1995 Criminal and Juvenile Justice Plan presents 8 long- range goal areas, including
violence reduction and crime prevention, and supervision and treatment services for adult
and juvenile offenders. The goals and their objectives are designed to " serve as a guide to
the Governor and General Assembly as they respond to proposals and develop initiatives
to address immediate justice system issues and concerns."
Delaware's Criminal Justice Council's Strategic Planning and Budgeting Workgroup
developed a 3- to 5- year criminal justice system strategic plan and presented identified
budget priorities to the State Budget Office. While the Council continues to lobby for the
support of these identified priority budget issues, the working group continues its efforts
to develop a strategic plan. In addition, Delaware's comprehensive crime victims report
contains recommendations for improving the system's response to crime victims.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. To ensure that the Commission is able to collect systemwide data, the Legislature should
consider increasing the Commission's statutory authority by revising A. R. S. 541- 2405( B)( 1),
to allow the Commission to require criminal justice agencies to submit any necessary
information.
2. The Commission should develop minimum data standards for all criminal justice agencies
and should begin collecting basic information about the criminal justice system. This
information should be used to provide general system information or trends as well as to
project resource needs.
3. The Commission should take addtional steps to ensure more meaningful data is available
for policy makers by:
Preparing an annual criminal justice system review report,
Directing and utilizing the SAC to conduct analyses and evaluations, and present
reports and recommendations, and
Developing long- term strategic plans for the system.
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FINDING I1
DIVERSIFYING THE COMMISSION'S
MEMBERSHIP COULD PROVIDE
BROADER PERSPECTIVE
The Commission could broaden its perspective on criminal justice issues with diversified
membership. The Commission's statutorily prescribed membership emphasizes law
enforcement positions, which may limit its ability to provide a diversified perspective. In
contrast, other states' commissions contain broader representation from the criminal justice
system. Therefore, to ensure the Commission can provide a balanced perspective on a broad
range of criminal justice issues, the Legislature should consider modifying the Commission's
membership.
The Commission's Law
Enforcement Emphasis May
Limit a Systemwide Approach
The Commission's current membership may lunit its ability to provide a systemwide approach
to criminal justice issues. Although the criminal justice system spans a wide range of entities
and activities, Arizona's statutes prescribe a commission membership heavily weighted
toward law enforcement and prosecution positions. This emphasis, which came about in 1987,
may hinder the Commission's ability to address a broad range of criminal justice issues and
fulfill its responsibilities.
Conzmission's mwnbership does not represent broader criminal justice system- While the
Commission contains a number of Arizona's criminal justice leaders, it does not necessarily
represent the broader criminal justice system. The criminal justice system includes a broad
range of entities and activities. As defined by the U. S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, " law
enforcement and criminal justice" means any activity pertaining to crime prevention, control,
or reduction or the enforcement of the criminal law, including, but not limited to:
Police efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or to apprehend criminals;
Activities of courts having criminal jurisdiction and related agencies ( including prosecubrid
and defender services);
H Activities of corrections, probation, or parole authorities; and
H Programs relating to the prevention, control, or reduction of juvenile delinquency or narcotic
addiction.
In contrast to this definition, Arizona's statutes prescribe a Commission that consists primarily
of law enforcement and prosecution officials. Current statutes require 8 law enforcement
representatives and 4 prosecutors to serve on the 19- member Commission. Collectively, these
12 individuals comprise the majority ( 63 percent) of the Commission's membership, while
representing only 2 aspects of the complex criminal gustice system.
The remaining 7 Commission members consist of the Director of the State Department of
Corrections, the Administrative Director of the Courts, the Chairperson of the Board of
Executive Clemency, a former judge, one mayor, one member of a county board of supervisors,
and one chief probation officer. While the remaining members represent other criminal justice
components, Arizona's membership still falls short of representing the full system because it
lacks some key components, such as public defenders or defense attorneys, current trial court
criminal judges, juvenile justice advocates, and advocates for treatment or rehabilitative
services.
Cmission's membership changed in 1987- In 1982, when the Commission was established,
its membership consisted of five law enforcement and prosecution representatives, six
legislators, three criminal justice leaders, and four civic and business representatives. However,
in 1987, the legislators and the civic and business leaders were removed and an additional 7
law enforcement and prosecution representatives were added. As a result, the percentage of
law enforcement and prosecution representatives nearly tripled, growing from 28 percent to
71 percent Even with the addition of a chef probation officer and the Administrative Director
of the Courts in 1988, the law enforcement and prosecution emphasis continues today.
Since 1988, there have been few attempts to modify the Commission's current composition.
According to commission meeting minutes, approximately four years ago the Commission
requested legislation to increase its membership to include a public defender and the Director
of the Department of Juvenile Corrections. However, when a number of other positions were
added through the legislative process, the Commission requested that the bill be removed from
further consideration " before it sank under its own weight." Consequently, it has been the
Commission's position for several years to not recommend adding any members. Although
a few commission members indicated the need to add such positions as a public defender or
a juvenile justice representative, the majority of interviews with commission members did not
suggest the need for membership changes. Nevertheless, during the most recent legislative
session, a bill proposing the addition of a public defender position to the Commission passed
the Legislature. However, the Governor vetoed this bill, indicating the Commission did not
need another lawyer. The Governor stated he would rather see a crime victim than a public
defender as a member of the Commission if another person were added.
Commission's narrow focus may limit a systems approach- Because the criminal justice
system includes a broad range of organizations, the Commission's law enforcement emphasis
may limit its ability to address a broad range of criminal justice issues and fulfill its
responsibilities. Specifically, the Commission's mission is to ". . . enhance the coordination, the
cohesiveness, the productivityI and the effectiveness of the criminal justice system in Arizona."
To acheve this, the Commission is required to perform various criminal justice system analyses
and make recommendations on areas for improvement and funding needs for the criminal
justice system. To make meaningful systemwide recommendations, the Commission would
need expertise in a number of criminal justice areas, such as juvenile corrections, treatment,
and defense.
Other States' Commissions
Promote a Broader Perspective
Other states' commissions, although comparable in size to Arizona's, contain a much more
diversified membership. We conducted a 50- state survey and found 23 other states that have
commissions similar to Arizona's.' Among these 23 states, commission size ranged from 6 to
51 members, with an average of 21 members. However, aside from commission size, there were
few similarities between Arizona's membership and that of other states. Specifically, as
illustrated in Table 1 ( see page 16) our analysis revealed that other states' commissions contain
a much broader range of criminal justice representatives, with less emphasis on law
enforcement, and greater participation by the legislature, social services programs, and the
general public:
Less Emphasis on Law Enforcement- The first notable difference is the reduced emphasis
on law enforcement and prosecution. Whereas all commissions contain at least one
representative from the law enforcement and prosecutor categories, these members
comprise, on average, only 29 percent of other states' commission membership. Though
all state commissions acknowledge the importance of law enforcement and prosecution
participation, it is not at the expense of other groups' representation.
Increased Giminal Justice Agency Representation- Additionally, we found that 21 of
the 23 commissions have broader criminal justice agency representation than Arizona. For
example, of the 23 state commissions, 17 have juvenile justice representation and 17 have
at least one active judge. Further, more than half of the commissions include either a public
defender or defense attorney.
' Each state was contacted to determine whether a commission existed that dealt with similar criminal justice
issues beyond grant administration such as conducting systemwide planning, performing research or
evaluation, and monitoring the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. Our review determined that 23 other
states had similar commissions, created either by statute or executive order. Commission size and composition
were analyzed, taking into account only voting members. See Appendix A for a listing of the other states'
commissions and their size.
Greater Legislative, Social Service, and Citizen Participation - Other states' commissions
also include more participation by legislators, social service agencies, and members of the
public. While Arizona's Commission lacks representatives from the Legislature, treatment
programs, education, social services, and citizens, all 23 state csmmissions contain members
from one or more of these groups. More specifically, half contain legislators, half include
treatment, rehabilitation, or social service representatives, three- fourths have citizen
participation, and a third has education advocates. These groups can be particularly
important since the Commission is mandated to participate in prevention, education, and
treatment activities, as well as address victims' issues.
Table 1
Frequency of Other Criminal Justice Representatives
Not Found on Arizona's Commission
Of 23 states:
Criminal Justice Agency Representation
Juvenile Justice
Judiciary ( excluding chief justice of supreme court)
Public Defender or Defense Attorney
( At least one of the above three categories) 21 ( 91%)
Legislative, Social Service, and Citizen Participation
Legislator
Treatment/ Rehabhtation or Social Services
Citizen Participation
Education Representation
( At least one of the above four categories) 23 ( 100%)
Source: Auditor General survey of other states' commission membership.
Arizona Should Consider Diversifying
the Commission's Membership
To ensure the Commission can provide policy makers with a systemwide perspective, a change
in membership should be considered. Following the examples of other states, Arizona has
several options for altering its membership. For example:
H Reduce number of duplicative positions- The Commission could consider reducing
duplicative positions ( e. g., police chiefs, county sheriffs, and county attorneys) and replacing
them with representatives from other areas within the criminal justice system. Arizona's
Commission contains the largest percentage of law enforcement and prosecution positions
of any state commission. These positions could be reduced by limiting these groups to one
representative per government level ( i. e., one municipal police chief, one county shelrff),
a method commonly used by other states. To address concerns of rural versus urban
representation, some states allow the police chief, sheriff, or county attorney representative
to be selected by their own state association rather than be appointed by another source,
such as the governor or legislature. By eliminating duplicative positions, additional
perspectives could be added in their place, leaving the Commission's size relatively
unchanged.
Increase Commission size- Our review indicates that other commissions' average size is
21 members, slightly higher than Arizona's 19 members. Several states, however, have
commissions considerably larger than average. For example, California, Louisiana, North
Carolina, and Rhode Lsland have more than 30 members on their commissions. Arizona
could diversify its membership by adding a few positions such as a public defender or
defense attorney, a juvenile justice representative, a criminal trial court judge, and a private
citizen.
Eliminate multiple positions and increase size- Alternatively, Arizona could implement
a combined option of increasing commission size and eliminating certain positions. This
option could provide for several additional perspectives ( i. e., representatives from juvenile,
education, criminal defense, judiciary, treatment, citizen, legislative, and victims' groups)
while keeping the Commission's overall size near the national average of 21 members.
RECOMMENDATION
To increase the Commission's ability to provide a comprehensive system approach to criminal
justice issues, the Legislature should consider diversdying the Commission's membershp. This
could be accomplished by:
1. Reducing the number of duplicated positions and replacing them with representatives from
other areas within the criminal justice system,
2. Increasing the number of commission members to include such positions as a public
defender or defense attorney, a juvenile justice representative, a criminal trial court judge,
and a private citizen, or
3. Using a combination of these options.
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FINDING Ill
COMMISSION'S STATUTES SHOULD
BE AMENDED TO ELIMINATE
DUPLICATIVE ACJIS MANDATES
The Commission's mandates regarding oversight of the Arizona Criminal Justice Information
System ( ACJIS) are unnecessary as they parallel responsibilities of the Department of Public
Safety ( DPS). Although the Commission was given oversight responsibility for the system in
1988, it never took an active role in fulfilling its ACJIS duties. In 1992, the DPS was statutorily
mandated similar oversight responsibilities. Therefore, the Commission's statutes should be
amended to remove the parallel responsibilities.
Background
The ACJIS is a computerized network of criminal justice information managed and operated
by the DPS. It consists of hardware, software, human resowes, and databases containing more
than 10 million records. Via the ACJIS network, authorized agencies can access information
such as criminal history records, stolen vehicle files, and outstanding warrants, at any time.
In addition, the DPS' network is linked to criminal justice and other information systems in
other agencies in Arizona and in other states, and at the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
In its early stages of development, ACJIS was administered and managed by the Comprehen-sive
Data Systems ( CDS) Policy Board. The Board was established in 1977 as a means of
obtaining federal funding for the ACJIS and was responsible for system development, policies,
and rules. However, as the system matured, the Board's role in system and policy development
diminished. In 1988, the Board was sunset and its duties were transferred to the Commission.
Commission Has Never Taken
an Active Role in ACJIS
Since receiving its ACJIS duties in 1988, the Commission has not played an active role in the
system's oversight. These duties, as specified in A. R. S. 541- 2405( A)( 11), are virtually unchanged
from those originally charged to the CDS Policy Board. The ten specified duties include
adopting rules for the administration and management of the system, formulating policies and
plans for any necessary expansion of the system, setting developmental priorities for the system,
and receiving petitions for the review of criminal history record information by individuals.
The Commission has argued that many of the responsibilities outlined in statute concern
operational issues that should be left to DPS, which actually manages the system. In addition,
both the Commission and the DPS have indicated some of the responsibilities that were
appropriate for the CDS Policy Board when the system was being developed are no longer
relevant now that the ACJE is a mature, operational system. As a result, the Commission has
essentially left its ACJIS responsibilities unfulfilled.
DPS Also Received Authority
to Perform ACJIS Duties
The DPS has assumed most ACJIS responsibilities. In fact, authority granted the DPS under
state and federal law overrides the Commission's authority regarding ACJIS, and allows the
DPS to perform similar duties.
In 1992, the DPS sought and received statutory authority ( under A. R. S. 541- 1750) to perform
many of the Commission's ACJIS duties because the Commission was not fulfilling them. These
duties involve adopting rules and regulations relating to the collection, dissemination, and
security of criminal history record information as well as establishing procedures for citizen
review and challenges of their criminal history records.
In addition to state authority, federal regulations also mandate the DPS with managing ACJIS.
As system manager, DPS is authorized to set system operational and developmental priorities,
and establish policies governing its operation. Therefore, as system manager, the DPS can and
does perform many of the Commission's ACJE mandates. In fact, our review found that the
DPS is addressing all but the following three commission mandates regarding the ACJIS:
Develop a cost- sharing formula for system participants - Although DPS has considered
cost sharing, it does not feel it is appropriate to charge agencies for using ACJIS services
since the DPS is intended to be a support agency for the criminal justice community.
Provide information to the public on the system's purposes- Neither the DPS nor the
Commission feels ths is necessary since the system is primarily a law enforcement tool.
Oversee the Statistical Analysis Center ( SAC) - The DPS does not oversee the SAC because
it is an operating section of the Commission.
The Commission's Statutes
Should Be Amended to Remove
Duplicative ACJIS Mandates
To prevent the Commission from duplicating DPS' activities relating to ACJIS, several statutory
changes are needed. The statutes regarding several of the Commission's ACJIS responsibilities
have been rendered ineffective by the statutory duties assigned DPS. Therefore, if the
Commission did attempt to carry out some of the mandates, such as making rules for operating
the system, DPS would be under no obligation to implement the rules.
To clarrfy the Commission's duties and to eliminate duplicative responsibdities, there are several
sections within both the Commission's and DPS statutes that will need to be reviewed for
continued applicabihty. However, in considering elunination of the Commission's ACJIS duties,
the Legislature should be careful to retain the statute regarding the SAC. Since this group
conducts research and analysis and prepares reports and publications of criminal justice
statistics for the Commission, it would not be appropriate to transfer its function to DPS. ( See
the Sunset Factors section of this report on pages 27 through 31 for more information on
statutory changes needed.)
Even though its A m mandates should be eliminated, the Commission still has a role in the
development of Arizona's overall criminal justice information system. For example, the
Commission recently coordinated development of the State's Criminal Justice Records
Improvement Plan and allocated over $ 2.5 million to 20 projects supporting the Plan's goals
and objectives. In addition, the Commission also seeks out and applies for funding. In fact, its
staff regularly reviews the Federal Register to identify federal funding sources that can be used
to enhance criminal justice information systems.
RECOMMENDATION
To eliminate the potential for future duplication, the Legislature should consider reviewing
and amending the Commission's and DPS ACJIS statutes.
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OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION
During the audit, we obtained other pertinent information regarding the Arizona Criminal
Justice Commission~ sa dministration of funds.
The Commission Oversees
Nearly $ 16 Million in
Criminal Justice Funds
Each year, nearly $ 16 million in federal and state criminal justice funds is overseen by the
Arizona Criminal Justice Commission, and distributed to various criminal justice agencies
throughout the State. As illustrated in Table 2, during fiscal year 1996, the Commission
administered six specific appropriated and nonappropriated funds, totahg $ 15,987,700:
Table 2
Criminal Justice Funds Administered by the
Arizona Criminal Justice Commission
Fiscal Year 1996
( unaudited)
Fund or Proclram Name Fundina Amount
Appropriated State Funds
Street Gang Enforcement Program
Drug Prevention Resource Center
Nonappropriated State,
Local, and Federal Funds
Drug and Gang Enforcement Account ( state, local, and federal)
Crime Victim Compensation Program ( state and federal)
Crime Victim Assistance Program ( state)
Total ( Appropriated and Nonappropriated)
Source: Auditor General Analysis of the Fiscal Year 1996 and 1997 Joint Legislative Budget Committee
Appropriated and Nonappropriated Funds Reports. Please refer to Appendix B for a description of each
fund.
The Commission's Duties for
Administration of Funds Vary
The Commission's administrative duties related to the administration of funds vary by type
of fund. For example, the Commission acts merely as a pass- through agency for the two
appropriated funds listed in Table 2 ( see page 23). Specifically, the Commission received a
$ 1,100,000 general fund appropriation for the Street Gang Enforcement Program. These monies
were allocated to county and city prosecutors statewide to assist in the prosecution of gang
offenders. It also received $ 220,000 from the Drug and Gang Enforcement Account that was
distributed to the Drug Prevention Resource Center to help offset its operating costs.
For the nonappropriated funds, the Commission plays a more direct role. The Commission's
responsibilities for these funds include receiving and reviewing applications for funding,
determining which programs receive funding, distributing funds on a quarterly basis, and
monitoring and reporting on the activities of fund recipients. For example, the Drug and Gang
Enforcement Account comprises over $ 12 million in federal, state, and local funds, and is
distributed among 39 criminal justice programs throughout Arizona. Program recipients
typically include law enforcement agencies, and the monies are generally used to hire additional
personnel to assist in enhancing the State's drug, gang, and violent crime control efforts.
In addition, the Commission has limited involvement in another nonappropriated fund - the
Criminal Justice Enhancement Fund ( CJEF). Specifically, the Commission's sole responsibility
for the CJEF is to provide annual recommendations to the Governor and Legislature on how
to distribute the CJEF monies.' The CJEF monies are statutorily allocated among 14 criminal
justice entities or programs, and the Commission must make recommendations regarding the
percentage share each program receives. During fiscal year 1996, program recipients received
anywhere from 1.6 percent to 17 percent of the total $ 22,726,000 available.
Established Rules Guide
the Commission's Allocation
of Funds and Monitoring
When the Commission must allocate and monitor funds, its activities are guided by established
rules, or policies and procedures. It has established rules for allocating the Drug and Gang
Enforcement Account, the Crime Victim Compensation Fund, and the Crime Victim Assistance
Fund. These rules prescribe what types of programs are eligible for funding and therefore p d e
the Commission's funding allocation decisions.
The State Treasurer receives and distributes the CJEF monies. This fund's revenues are generated by a 46
percent assessment on every fine, penalty, and forfeiture imposed by the courts for criminal offenses, civil traffic
violations, motor vehicle violations, and game and fish statute violations.
24
Additionally, the U. S. Department of Justice has established certain restrictions on the use of
criminal justice funds. For example, it does not allow awards to be used to supplant state or
local funds. Further, it requires that the parent political subdivision ( i. e., the County Board of
Supervisors) formally approve the reversion of unused funds. The federal government, like
the State, also designates the purposes for which its monies can be used. For example, it has
designated 26 " purpose areas" for the Edward Byrne Memorial Grant. Monies for this grant
flow through the Drug and Gang Enforcement Account, and Arizona has chosen to focus these
resources in 6 of the 26 purpose areas- apprehension, prosecution, detention, education,
forensics, and adjudication.'
Similarly, the Commission uses federal guidelines to direct its fund monitoring and review
process by conducting annual on- site visits with each subgrantee to compare the recipients'
use of funds with federal requirements. Additionally, the Commission requires that grant
recipients submit monthly activity reports and quarterly financial reports. The monthly activity
reports include information such as number of arrests or drug seizures, weapons confiscated,
and the value of assets seized. The quarterly financial reports focus on whether the subgrantees
are expending funds for the dedicated purpose and according to grant requirements. The
financial reports are used by the Commission to determine if programs should continue to
receive funding. For example, if an entity fads to meet its financial reporting requirements ( i. e.,
submitting quarterly financial statements), the Commission may withhold the entity's next
quarterly disbursement until proper documentation is received.
The Commission dedicates approximately ten staff to activities related to the administration
of funds. The Commission's monitoring and reporting activities result in both federal and state
reports. For example, the Commission must produce an annual report for the Governor and
Legislature on the activities funded by the Drug and Gang Enforcement Account. This report
includes the name and description of each program, the programs' goals and objectives, and
the amount of money received by each program. The Commission is also required to submit
this report to the federal government to help determine the need for continued funding.
' Prior to choosing these six purpose areas, the Commission conducted statewide hearings to obtain input on
which areas to focus Arizona's resources. However, these areas have remained constant since they were
implemented in 1988.
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SUNSET FACTORS
In accordance with A. R. S. 541- 2954, the Legislature should consider the following 12 factors
in determining whether the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission should be continued or
terminated.
1. The objective and purpose in establishing the Commission.
The Arizona Criminal Justice Commission was created by the Legislature in 1982. The
Commission's 19 members consist primarily of state, county, and municipal criminal
justice representatives including the attorney general, several county attorneys and
sheriffs, police chiefs, and the directors of the Department of Corrections and the
Department of Public Safety.
The Commission is required, in accordance with A. R. S. $ 41- 2405( A), to conduct ( among
others) the following activities:
Monitor new and continuing criminal justice legislation;
Facilitate information and data exchange among criminal justice agencies;
Evaluate and gather mformation concerning potential and existing programs
designed to effect community crime prevention;
Make recommendations on the purpose and allocation of several criminal justice
funds; and,
Review, report, and make recommendations for system improvement.
Although the mandates do not contain an objective statement, the Commission has
adopted the following mission statement:
N . . . to develop, implement, monitor and rqort on programs, finctions and actiuities to
sustain and enhance the coordination, the cohesiveness, the productivity, and the
efictiveness of the criminal justice system in Arizona. "
The effectiveness with which the Commission has met its objective and
purpose and the efficiency with which it has operated.
Our review indicates that the Commission has not fulfilled its sole to serve as a
systemwide resource on criminal justice information. While there are a few areas where
the Commission has been effective, such as monitoring legislation and administering
funds, there are other areas where it could improve its efforts. For example, it has
prepared its annual system review report only three times in the last ten years. This
report provides the Governor with an overall review of the criminal justice system in
addition to any recommendations for constitutional, statutory, and administrative
changes necessary to develop and maintain a cohesive and effective criminal justice
system. Likewise, the Commission conducts few analyses of criminal justice information
or evaluations of various criminal justice programs. Therefore, the Commission cannot
adequately assess criminal justice trends or program effectiveness.
Due to the unique mandates of the Commission, it is the only entity in the State poised
to evaluate and analyze criminal justice information and to make recommendations for
improving the criminal justice system as a whole. Therefore, to enhance the Commis-sion's
effectiveness in serving as a criminal justice system resource, the Commission
should focus more of its efforts on collecting basic criminal justice information,
conducting analyses, and implementing systemwide strategic planning ( see Finding
I, pages 5 through 11).
The extent to which the Commission has operated within the public interest.
The Commission generally operates in the public interest by bringing together key
criminal justice representatives from throughout the State to & cuss fundamental issues
facing the criminal justice system. Its mandates are designed to facilitate information
exchange among criminal justice agencies and to provide policy makers with reports
about the system and recommendations for improvements. Further, the Commission's
funding recommendations could help achieve a more efficient use of resources.
However, our review indicates the Commission could do more to operate in the public's
interest by focusing more of its efforts on conducting analyses of criminal justice trends,
coordinating systemwide planning, and providing meaningful information to policy
makers that could be used to enhance system effectiveness ( see Finding I, pages 5
through 11). It could also increase its ability to provide systemwide information by
diversifying its membership to include elements currently not represented, such as
defense, judiciary, or juvenile justice representatives, as well as citizens, social service,
and education representatives ( see Finding II, pages 13 through 17).
4. The extent to which rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission
are consistent with the legislative mandate.
The Commission has the authority to promulgate rules for the purpose of allocating
monies from three specific state hrnds - the Drug and Gang Enforcement Account, the
Crime Victim Compensation Fund, and the Crime Victim Assistance Fund. These rules
are located in the f i m a Administrative Cock section R104- 101 through R104404 and
are consistent with the purposes outlined in Amona's statutes for each fund.
5. The extent to which the Commission has encouraged input from the public
before promulgating its rules and regulations and the extent to which it has
informed the public as to its actions and their expected impact on the public.
The Commission's meetings are open to the public, and held at various locations
throughout the State. Further, the Commission solicits public input at these meetings,
including those when funhg allocations are considered. We did not find any instances
of noncompliance with Open Meeting Law requirements.
6. The extent to which the Commission has been able to investigate and resolve
complaints that are within its jurisdiction.
The Commission has no authority to investigate and resolve complaints.
7. The extent to which the Attorney General or any other applicable agency of
state government has the authority to prosecute actions under enabling
legislation.
This factor is not applicable to the Commission.
8. The extent to which the Commission has addressed deficiencies in the
enabling statutes which prevent it from fulfilling its statutory mandate.
The Commission indicates that its enabling statutes outline specific objectives in some
areas but contains general language in others areas so that objectives and purposes must
be implied. However, the Commission has not sought any legislative changes because
it " does not perceive the statutory language as an obstacle or hindrance in carrying out
its overall mission."
I 9. The extent to which changes are necessary in the laws of the Commission
1 to adequately comply with the factors listed in the sunset laws.
~ The Commission's statutes may need revisions in several areas:
1 To ensure the Commission can collect the data needed to perform evaluations and
analysis, the Commission should seek a change in its statutory authority. Currently,
per A. R. S. 541- 2405( B), the Commission may only " request" that criminal justice
agencies submit information. The word " request" should be changed to " require"
( see Finding I, pages 5 through 11).
The Legislature may want to consider revising the Commission's membership as
outlined in A. R. S. $ 41- 2404( A). The current statutes prescribe a membership that
emphasizes law enforcement and prosecution, and lacks representation from other
areas such as juvenile justice, the judiciary, and the general public ( see Finding IT,
see pages 13 through 17).
The Commission's responsibilities regarding ACJE, outlined in A. R. S. 541-
2405( A)( 11)( a) through ( i), should be eliminated to remove duplicative mandates.
Our review found that the DPS is fulfilling these responsibilities so there is no need
for the Commission to retain these mandates. However, A. R. S. 541- 2405( A)( ll)( j)
should be retained under the Commission's authority since it pertains to the
Statistical Analysis Center located within the Commission ( see Finding III, pages
19 through 21).
In conjunction with eliminating the Commission's ACE mandates, there are several
other statutory changes needed regarding ACJJS:
1) Amend A. R. S. 541- 2201 to eliminate the definition of the Commission w i h
the ACJE statutes.
2) Amend A. R. S. § 41- 2204 to eliminate references to the Commission and its
policies, rules, and regulations; and remove mandates ( 5) " submit recommen-dations
to the Commission concerning establishment of research, statistical
and planning programs including a study of the system," and ( 7) " perform
such other powers and duties as may be prescribed or delegated by the
Commission.''
3) Amend A. R. S. 541- 2205( A) to eliminate reference to the Commission and its
rules and regulations.
4) Amend A. RS. 541- 2206 substituting the DPS for the Commission andl thereby
authorizing the DPS to remove ACJIS participants who do not comply with
the rules and regulations governing the system.
5) Amend A. R. S. 541- 1750 eliminating the reference to 541- 2205 because, after
these clallfying changes, the Commission will not have any responsibility
for the operation of the Central State Repository.
10. The extent to which the termination of the Commission would significantly
harm the public health, safety or welfare.
Although the termination of the Commission would not significantly harm the public
health, safety, or welfare, its elimination could hinder the effectiveness of the criminal
justice system. Because the Commission's membership contains several criminal justice
experts, and it duties are designed to enhance the effectiveness of the system, it is an
ideal entity for serving as a systemwide resource. If the Commission improves its
performance in reviewing, reporting, and making recommendations on the criminal
justice system, it could provide the public and policy makers with meaningful criminal
justice information. This information could then be used to make any necessary
statutory changes and to redirect funding so that h o n a can " develop and maintain
a cohesive and effective criminal justice system.''
11. The extent to which the level of regulation exercised by the Commission is
appropriate and whether less or more stringent levels of regulation would be
appropriate.
The Commission has no regulatory authority.
12. The extent to which the Commission has used private contractors in the
performance of its duties and how effective use of private contractors could
be accomplished.
The Commission reports that it has used very few private contractors in the performance
of its duties. Further, it indicates that the use of private contractors would be difficult
to achieve due to the nature of its mandates and its limited budget resources.
( This Page Intentionally Left Blank)
Agency Response
( This Page Intentionally Left Blank)
B Chairman
G. C. ' BUCK' BUCUANAN
Yavapai County Sheriff
M Vice Chairman
MARLIN GILLESPIE
Board of Supervisors
Navajo County
I GRANT WOODS
Attorney General
JOE ALBO. Director
Department of Public Safety
TERRY L. STEWART. Director
Departr~ ient of Corrections
I DAVID K. BYERS, Director
Administrative Office of the Courts
DUANE BELCHER. Chairman
Board of Executive Clemency 8 RICHARD M. ROMLEY
Maricopa County Attorney
STEPIIEN NEELY I Ptma County Attorney
CIIARLES HASIINGS
Yavapai County Attorney
1 JOSEPH ARPAIO
Marlcopa County Sheriff
CLARENCE DUPNIK P Pirna County Sheriff
- MICHAEL HEIDINGSFIELD, Chief
Scottsdale Police Department
E WILLIAM ROBINSON, Ch~ ef
Yurna Police Department
DOUGLAS F. SMITII, Chief
Tucson Police Department
WILLIAM HOLOHAN
Chief Justice Retired
I CHRISTOPIIER BAVASI
Mayor, C~ tyof Flagstaff
LES TAYLOR
Executive D~ rector I Assoc. of Chiefs of Police
ROBERT G. LAYTON
Chief Probation Officer
Graharri County I Exec~~ tlvDel recfor
Anzona Criminal Justice Commission
June 26, 1996
Mr. Douglas R. Norton
Auditor General
29 10 N. 44th Street
Suite 4 10
Phoenix, Arizona 850 18
Dear Mr. Norton:
Enclosed are the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission's final
comments to the performance audit revised draft report.
Please convey to the members of the performance audit team our
appreciation for the professional manner in which they carried out their
responsibilities and our appreciation of the effort that was devoted to this
performance audit by the team members.
Enclosure
RMH: sap\ i:\ rex\ 96\ audit. ltr
Sincerely,
Rex M. Holgerson
Executive Director
REX .? I. HOLGERSON
I Suite 207
1501 I\'. Wasllinglon
Phoenix. Arizona 85007
( 602) 542- 1928 FAX: 542- 4852
Arizona Criminal Justice Commission
Response to Auditor General Performance Audit Draft Report
Finding I: The Commission should provide more criminal justice information and analysis.
The Commission acknowledges the audit report opinion that the Commission should play a
greater role in providing systemwide criminal justice information and analysis and that the
Commission has not fully met its potential to serve as a systemwide resource on criminal
justice issues. The Commission also acknowledges the audit report opinion that varied
perspectives on the Commission's role, fbnding restrictions, and data collection limitations
have impeded the Commission's ability to totally fulfill this aspect of the Commission's
potential mission.
The Commission welcomes and appreciates the overall assessment in the audit report
regarding the potential for systemwide statistical reporting, analysis, and evaluation given the
unique opportunity that the Commission has. In fact, the Commission has focused on
precisely that potential on selected issues and is currently enhancing that focus with
organizational and programmatic actions. It is appropriate to briefly describe a few of these
past and current activities which received very brief mention in the audit report.
The audit report makes very brief mention of the Youth and Crime Task Force created in
1993 by the Commission. This 14 member group was augmented by four working groups,
each containing 15 members representing the spectrum of the criminal justice system. The
Task Force and working groups produced two ( 2) reports ( December 1993 and July 1994)
with systemwide, government wide, and legislative recommendations. These reports were
approved by the Commission and disseminated widely to all policy- makers and criminal
justice entities. This work, and the attendant liaison and advocacy, was a very relevant work
in the initiation and development of serious policy dialogue on youth crime issues. Some of
the recommendations in these reports were the foundation for current high government level
policy proposals and actions regarding the youth crime situation in Arizona.
In 1992 and 1993, the Commission contributed significantly to the extensive revision of the
Arizona criminal code that was passed by the Legislature and signed into law by the
Governor. During those years the Commission created a Criminal Code Committee chaired
by the Attorney General, which then developed an ad hoc working group of system
representatives who participated significantly in the actual development of the criminal code
revisions. This working group of ten was referred to by state legislators and others as the
Rump Group. That criminal code revision dealt with many serious criminal codes issues of
that time.
More recently the research, development, and production of the I995 White Paper - Crime
and the Criminal Justice System in Arizona was a unique and massive undertaking in focus
Arizona Criminal Justice Commission
Response to Auditor General Performance Audit Draft Report
development regarding collection of criminal justice data statewide. This 1995 White Paper
project was a necessary and very eye- opening educational experience for the Commission and
its staff. As the audit report points out, the Commission does not have the authority to
require criminal justice system entities to provide reports and data, and many did not provide
the requested data. The 1995 White Paper was produced on time by deadline using
alternative sources of information in many circumstances. This alone was a signal
achievement. The Commission believes that most system entities would have provided the
data ifthey could have and this was the most relevant lesson learned in the project. With the
exception of several large agencies and a few in- place or developing statewide reporting
systems, most agencies either do not collect and collate the data requested in any type of
format andfor they lack any type of automated data processing ability to collate and produce
the data. In addition, there had not been any incentive or requirement to collect and produce
such data before.
This revelation not only identifies the existing foundation deficiency ( or impediment)
regarding collection and analysis of systemwide data, but also confirmed the identification of
a sigmficant systemwide operational problem. Many criminal justice agencies throughout the
system lack the ability, or the capacity, or the resources, to provide realtime, accurate, and
comprehensive criminal history record reporting on offenders to the state repository of such
information at the Arizona Department of Public Safety.
The Commission is, and has been, addressing these system deficiencies in several ways. In
1994, the Commission developed and produced a Criminal Justice Records Improvement
Plan for Arizona. One reason for development of this plan was to qualifL for available federal
grant hnds fiom two federal programs. The second reason was to put into action an overall
comprehensive plan for the improvement of criminal justice records throughout the State at
all government and agency levels. This Commission program is not limited to administering
federal gmts but is a priority issue program regarding the statewide crirninai justice system.
There is only brief mention of this program and the plan in the audit report. The development
and implementation ofthis plan involved considerable research and analysis by the Statistical
Analysis Center ( SAC) and again included a working group of relevant representatives fiom
many agencies in the system. A very intensive current research and analysis project is
underway by the Commission to collect the information, data, and justification needed to seek
state and local fbnding in 1997 and 1998 and possibly beyond for this very important
systemwide records improvement program.
These examples are cited to demonstrate that the Commission has been, and is, a system
resource and coordinator on statewide system issues.
Arizona Criminal Justice Commission
Response to Auditor General Performance Audit Draft Report
As a result of reviewing the audit report, and to give the analysis and evaluation potential
optimum focus and direction, the Commission has established a standing ' Systems Analysis
Committee containing six key members of the Commission representing the principle
disciplines and government levels in the criminal justice system. This Committee is charged
with providing enhanced focus, leadership and direction, and executive level energy to the
research, analysis, and evaluation of criminal justice system issues and activities.
The Commission will also develop and introduce legislation seeking statutory authority to
require criminal justice agencies to submit necessary and appropriate information to the
Commission. Such authority without commensurate ability to sanction non- compliance is
often impotent so the Commission will also explore possible approaches in this category.
The audit report states that practices in other states suggest the need for the Commission to
refocus its efforts by conducting statewide planning. Examples previously cited in this
response, such as the Criminal Justice Records Improvement Plan, demonstrate that the
Commission is involved in statewide planning and, such as the Youth and Crime Task Force
and the criminal code revision activities, demonstrate that the Commission has been involved
previously in statewide, systemwide policy and planning. The Commission agrees that more
should be done and that the focus in this area is being enhanced.
Strategic planning for the criminal justice system by the Commission is also advocated in the
audit report. It must be noted that strategic planning for the criminal justice system by the
Commission is not mandated by statute, and it is not authorized by statute. In other states,
this may be mandated to, or authorized for, similar state entities. Nevertheless, the
Commission did undertake such a large scale project in 1991 establishing a Strategic Planning
Committee and creating a 60 member task force of system representatives to develop such
a strategic plan. In 1992, this task force and Committee had developed a mission statement
and a set of four ( 4) goals and eighteen ( 1s) suppofiing objectives as the foundation for a
strategic plan for the criminal justice system. The Commission approved this initial effort and
it was published as part of the 1992 Arizona Criminal Justice System Review Report.
Subsequently, one discipline in the criminal justice system informed the Commission it could
not support the mission statement and the wording in two goals. The task force and the
Committee continued their work for two ( 2) more years. Eventually the effort became so
compartmentalized by system disciplines and so discipline- specific that their recommendations
were rejected by the Commission as lacking in overall system cohesion and less than a
systemwide strategic plan. The Commission shut down this effort in late 1994 and eliminated
the Committee in January 1995 because the effort was not cost effective, not making
Arizona Criminal Justice Commission
Response to Auditor General Performance Audit Draft Report
definitive progress, and the demands of other Commission activities required the time and
energies of the small Commission staff
The pivotal consideration is what is envisioned by the term strategic plan. If it is the elaborate
detailed strategic plan concept currently mandated on each state agency for their own agency
and programs then any attempt to develop such a strategic plan for a criminal justice system
with over 400 departments and agencies is a multi- year project of considerable difficulty and
complexity. It is also problematic that a meaningful practical strategic plan can be developed
for a " system" such as the criminal justice system with disciplines that are juxtaposed by
constitutional design, agencies and departments at three levels of government many controlled
by either state, county or locally elected officials, and all competing for limited available
resources. At this time, the Commission will unlikely initiate a criminal justice systemwide
strategic planning effort unless it is specifically mandated and authorized by statute.
Recommendations:
1. To ensure that the Commission is able to collect systemwide data, the Legislature
should consider increasing the Commission's statutory authority by revising A. R. S.
8 41- 2405( B)( 1), to allow the Commission to require criminal justice agencies to
submit any necessary information.
The Commission agrees and will seek such statutory authority by the development and
introduction of legislation in 1997. To be effective, such authority must also contain sanction
authority for non- compliance. This will be explored.
2. The Commission should develop minimum data standards for all criminal justice
agencies and should begin collecting basic information about the criminal justice
system. This information should be useci to provide general sysiem idormation or
trends as well as to project resource needs.
This minimum data standards recommendation has merit and the Commission will begin such
an activity. The Commission is already collecting basic statistical activity data where it is
available and the implementation of the Criminal Justice Recorh Improvement Plan will
make more information available as system entities acquire and develop automated data
processing capabilities.
Arizona Criminal Justice Commission
Response to Auditor General Performance Audit Draft Report
3. The Commission should take additional steps to ensure more meaninghl data is
available for policy makers by:
Preparing an annual criminal justice system review report
The Commission agrees and will issue a Criminal Justice System Review Report in 1996
precisely as required in the statute.
Directing and utilizing the SAC to conduct analyses and evaluations, and
present reports and recommendations, and
The Commission agrees and is increasing and enhancing focus and direction to the activities
of the SAC
Developing long- term strategic plans for the system.
The Commission will unlikely initiate a significant and necessarily large scale criminal justice
systemwide strategic planning program unless and until it is statutorily authorized and
mandated to do so with the appropriate resources made available to do the job well. If such
a systemwide long- range strategic planning mandate is dictated, it should contain a clear
definition of the strategic planning concept being mandated. The Commission is and has been
engaged in systemwide planning on specific issues or programs.
Finding 11: DiversiQing the Commission's membership could provide broader perspective.
The audit report expresses the opinion that the Commission could broaden its perspective
with diversified membership and the Commission's current membership may limit its ability
to provide a systemwide approach to criminal justice issues. The audit report does provide
some history on the original membership changes in 1987 and 1988. It also relates that no
changes have occurred since 1988.
According to available information, the Commission membership was changed in 1988 with
the realization that it was an executive branch agency now administering finds and it was
determined that legislators should not serve on it. When the Commission membership was
reconstituted in 1987, the judiciary took the position that sitting judges should not serve on
Arizona Criminal Justice Commission
Response to Auditor General Performance Audit Draft Report
the Commission because the Commission was required to take certain actions, and set policies
regarding criminals and the criminal law that might give the appearance of partiality.
The audit report goes into some detail on the membership of similar commission's in 23 other
states. The membership of these similar commission's vary from six to fifty- one. The audit
report also expresses the opinion that 24 states ( including Arizona) have commission's with
responsibilities broader than grant administration, but it does not provide detail on the
specifics for them.
Recommendations:
1. Reducing the number of duplicated positions and replacing them with representatives
from other areas within the criminal justice system,
2. Increasing the number of Commission members to include such positions as a public
defender or defense attorney, a juvenile justice representative, a criminal trial court
judge, and a private citizen, or
3. Using a combination of these options.
The Commission responds that the membership of the Commission is certainly a subject
worthy of fbrther consideration and ultimately it is a legislative issue. The audit report
recommendations with this finding are addressed to the Legislature
Finding III: Commission's statutes should be amended to eliminate duplacative ACJIS mandates.
The Commission agrees with the audit report assessment of the ACJIS responsibilities and
operations. The Commission agrees that the Commission's ACJIS mandates are unnecessary
and in conflict because ACJIS is an operational computerized network managed and operated
by the Department of Public Safety. The audit report also correctly states that DPS authority
to operate ACJIS under state and federal law overrides the Commission's statutory
responsibilities. The Statistical Analysis Center ( SAC) is not an element of the ACJIS and
the oversight and responsibility for the SAC were statutorily transferred to the Commission
in 1994.
Arizona Criminal Justice Commission
Response to Auditor General Performance Audit Draft Report
Recommendations:
1. To eliminate the potential for future duplication, the Legislature should consider
reviewing and amending the Commission's and DPS' ACJIS statutes.
The Commission agrees and will coordinate with DPS on the development and introduction
of appropriate legislation to accomplish this recommendation in the 1997 legislative session.
A senior stafmember of the Commission, the Criminal Justice Records Coordinator, has been
assigned to carry out this action.
Other Pertinent Information:
The Commission does directly administer over $ 16,000,000 in federal and state criminal
justice hnds each year and that figure has been si@ cantly higher when the Commission was
administering the federal High Intensity Drug Trailicking Area ( HIDTA) funds in Arizona for
several years. The annual amount will vary somewhat but is more likely to be higher than
lower because additional federal grant monies in other criminal justice related programs are
available for 1997 and 1998. The administration of these funds is a high profile and essential
part of the Commission's mission and coordination potential.
The audit report does not appear to relate the effective administration of these hnds with the
systemwide coordination and planning potential it critiques. Each program requires statewide
planning, strategy development, considerable analysis, and effective distribution and
management of the program and grants. The effective expenditure of these funds in such
systemwide, statewide priority issue subjects as drug, gang, 2nd violent crime control, crime
victim assistance/ compensation and criminal justice records improvement is of significant
importance and relevance to the Commission's mission.
Appendices
Appendix A
State with Criminal Justice Commissions
A 50state survey determined that a total of 24 states ( including Arizona) have commissions
with responsibilities broader than grant administration, such as conducting systemwide
planning, performing research or evaluation, monitoring the effectiveness of the criminal justice
system, or assessing the appropriateness of criminal justice legislation.
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Utah
Virginia
Wisconsin
a- i
Criminal Justice System Task Force Committee
Commission on Crime and Delinquency
Criminal Justice Policy Board
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice
Criminal Justice Services Board
Governo8s Law Enforcement and Crime Commission
19
26
32
17
27
14
( This Page Intentionally Left Blank)
Appendix B
Criminal Justice Funds Administered
by the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission
for Fiscal Year 1996
( unaudited)
I Street Gang Enforcement Program ($ 1,100,000) I
Created by the Governor and Legislature in fiscal year 1994 as part of the enhanced
effort against criminal street gangs in Arizona, this General Fund money goes towards
the prosecution of gang members charged with an offense. h
Drug Prevention Resource Center ($ 220,000) I
Established to decrease the incidence of drug and alcohol abuse by children and youth.
A. R. S. $ 12- 284( C) maintains that 2 percent of Superior Court filing fees must be depos-ited
into the Drug and Gang Enforcement Account and then appropriated to the Pre-vention
Resource Center.
Drug and Gang Enforcement Account ($ 12,516,600)
This includes federal grant money from the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local
Law Enforcement Assistance Grant Program administered by the Bureau of Justice As-sistance,
mandatory fines collected for state drug offense felony convictions, and local
cash match funds furnished by grantees.
Crime Victim Compensation Program ($ 1,588,600)
Comprised of federal grants and 4.7 percent of Criminal Justice Enhancement Fund
monies, this fund compensates crime victims for expenses incurred as a result of victirn-ization.
4 Crime Victim Assistance Program ($ 562,500)
Developed to help crime victims recover from trauma, this program is financed through
probation and parole supervision fees.
a- ii
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DRUG AND GANG
ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE
( This Page Intentionally Left Blank)
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance audit and Sunset review of
the Drug and Gang Enforcement Task Force, pursuant to a May 17,1995, resolution of the
Joint Legislative Audit Committee. This audit was conducted as a part of the Sunset review
set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes ( A. R. S.) # 41- 2951 through 41- 2957.
History and Purpose
The Legislature created the Drug and Gang Enforcement Task Force in 1987 to provide the
Governor's Offrce with a dmct, participative role in monitoring the nature and scope of drug-and
gang- related activities. The Task Force acts in an advisory role to the Arizona Criminal
Justice Commission regarding funding allocations for programs designed to reduce the
incidences of drug and gang activities. Specifically, the Task Force has five mandates that are
outlined in A. R. S. 541- 2406( B):
1 Monitor the nature and scope of drug offenses and gang- related activity and related
criminal activity in this State;
Recommend to the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission specific purposes for monies in
the Drug and Gang Enforcement Account to enhance the deterrence, investigation,
prosecution, adjudication, and punishment of drug offenders and members of criminal
street gangs;
Recommend to the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission specific programs for the
purpose of enhancing the deterrence, investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and
punishment of drug offenders and members of criminal street gangs;
Recommend to the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission constitutional, statutory, and
administrative revisions that are necessary to enhance the deterrence, investigation,
prosecution, adjudication, and punishment of drug offenders and members of criminal
street gangs; and
Evaluate and report to the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission the effectiveness of
programs funded through the Drug and Gang Enforcement Account
Organization and Budget
The eight- member Task Force consists of state, county, and municipal criminal justice
representatives, including:
The Governor, or designee ( Chairman)
The Director of the Department of Public Safety
The Administrative Director of the Courts,
or designee
The Attorney General
A County Attorney
A County Sheriff
Two Police Chiefs
As members are not eligible for compensation, the Task Force does not have a budget. Instead,
the Task Force's activities are supported through the staff of the Arizona Criminal Justice
Commission. This includes the preparation of meeting agendas, minutes, transcripts, and any
other materials necessary for Task Force meetings.
Audit Scope and
Methodology
This audit focuses on the continued need for the Drug and Gang Enforcement Task Force. To
evaluate the extent to which the Task Force serves a useful purpose, we observed its meetings
and reviewed minutes of previous meetings from March 1993 to current meetings. We also
compared the statutory mandates of the Task Force to those of a subcommittee of the h o n a
Criminal Justice Commission to analyze the duties and responsibilities of both. Finally, we
conducted interviews with task force members, commission members ( current, former, and
proxy members), and the Governor's Office to obtain their perspective on the task force
duplication and continued need for it.
This audit was conducted in accordance with government auditing standards.
The Auditor General and staff express appreciation to all the Task Force and Commission
members, and staff of the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission, for their cooperation and
assistance throughout the audit.
FINDING I
DRUGANDGANGENFORCEMENT
TASK FORCE SHOULD BE SUNSET
The Drug and Gang Enforcement Task Force is not needed because its activities essentially
duplicate those of another entity. Specifically, the Task Force's responsibhties, operations, and
membership are similar to the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission's. Therefore, the Task
Force parallels the efforts of the Commission, and it should be considered for sunset.
Task Force Duties Mirror
Commission's Responsibilities
Although the Governor's Office has expressed a desire to retain the Task Force because it
" provides a unique dimension to the work of the Commission," our review indicates that the
Task Force's responsibilities, operations, and membership essentially duplicate those of the
Commission.
Duplicative responsibilities- The Task Force's activities are encompassed within the broader
duties of the Commission; therefore, a duplication of effort exists between the two groups.
Like the Task Force, the Commission is mandated to review and make recommendations on
programs that are designed to enhance the deterrence, investigation, prosecution, adjudication,
and punishment of drug offenders and members of criminal street gangs. In March 1989, the
Commission designated its Drug, Gang, and Violent Crime Committee to complete these
responsibilities. Based on recommendations developed separately by both the Committee and
the Task Force, the Commission prepares an annual report for the Governor and the
Legislature on the law enforcement programs that are funded by the Drug and Gang
Enforcement Account.
Not only are the two groups' overall objectives the same, their specific statutory mandates
regarding the Drug and Gang Enforcement Account are identical. For example, both entities
are required to:
Make recommendations regarding the purposes of monies in the Drug and Gang
Enforcement Account;
Report on the effectiveness of programs funded through the Drug and Gang Enforcement
Account; and,
Make recommendations for constitutional, statutory, and administrative revisions that are
necessary to enhance these programs.
The Task Force, however, is only required to make recommendations to the Commission. The
Commission, on the other hand, makes recommendations and reports to the Governor and the
Legislature.
Similar operations- Because the Task Force's responsibilities parallel those of the Commis-sion,
its operations are very similar. Our review of meeting minutes as well as observation of
both groups reveals that the Task Force and the Commission's Committee conduct similar
meetings and make similar recommendations. Specifically, since 1993, the Task Force has met
12 times. Three of the 12 sessions occurred on the same day as the Committee, while 4 sessions
were combined with the Committee. Although both entities conducted separate votes on
agenda items, agendas for the Task Force and the Committee were identical in all 7 of the
aforementioned meetings. Likewise, since 1993, the Task Force developed a total of 17
recommendations, all of which were identical to recommendations provided by the
Committee during the same time period.
Cmpamble membership- In addition to having similar duties and performing similar tasks,
both entities are comprised of similar participants. For example, the Attorney General and the
Director of the Department of Public Safety serve on both groups. Additionally, each group
contains a county sheriff, county attorney, and a police chief. Although the same person in
each of these positions cannot serve on both groups, they stdl represent the same criminal
justice element Therefore, the only unique element to the Task Force is the Governor, who acts
as the chairperson. However, since 1994, the Governor has designated the DPS Director to
chair the Task Force.
Task Force Not Necessary
for Governor's Input
While we did not find sigruficant ddferences in the functioning of both the Task Force and the
Commission, the Governofs Office believes it is important for the Governor to have a voice
in the development of criminal justice policy. However, the Governor could still be included
in decision making on criminal justice issues without the continuation of the Task Force. If the
Task Force were to be sunset, the Governor could retain direct involvement as a permanent
member of the Commission. During our audit of the Commission, we found that some other
state commissions similar to Arizona's have either the Governor or a member of the
Governofs Office on the Commission. Specifically, 9 out of 23 states surveyed included such
representation. However, a statutory change would be necessary to amend the composition
of Arizona's Commission to allow for a Governor appointment.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The Legislature should consider sunsetting the Drug and Gang Enforcement Task Force
because its responsibilities, operations, and membership duplicate the efforts of the
Arizona Criminal Justice Commission.
2. If the Task Force is sunset, the Legislature may want to consider amending the Arizona
Criminal Justice Commission's statutes to allow the Governor to participate as a permanent
member of the Commission.
( This Page Intentionally Left Blank)
SUNSET FACTORS
In accordance with A. R. S. 541- 2954, the Legislature should consider the following 12 factors
in determining whether the Drug and Gang Enforcement Task Force should be continued or
terminated.
1. Objective and purpose in establishing the Agency.
The Drug and Gang Enforcement Task Force was created by the Legislature in 1987 to
provide the Governor's Office a direct, participative role in monitoring the nature and
scope of drug- and gang- related activities. The Task Force's eight members include the
Governor as chairman, as well as various representatives from the criminal justice
community ( see page 34 of this report for a listing of current members). The Task
Force's primary responsibility is to provide recommendations to the Arizona Criminal
Justice Commission on issues regarding the establishment and funding of programs
designed to enhance the deterrence, investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and
punishment of drug and gang offenders.
2. The effectiveness with which the Agency has met its objectives and
purposes and the efficiency with which the Agency has operated.
The Task Force has regularly met and provided recommendations to the Commission
as required by statute. However, the Task Force's duties are duplicated by the
Commission's Drug, Gang, and Violent Crime Committee. Therefore, we do not believe
there is a continued need for the Task Force ( see Finding I, pages 35 and 37).
3. The extent to which the Agency has operated within the public interest.
The Task Force operates in the public interest by reviewing numerous programs
designed to enhance the deterrence, investigation, prosecution, adjudication, education,
and punishment of drug and gang offenders and making recommendations regarding
funding allocation for such programs.
4. The extent to which rules and regulations promulgated by the Agency are
consistent with the legislative mandate.
The Task Force has no authority to promulgate rules and regulations.
5. The extent to which the Agency has encouraged input from the public before
promulgating its rules and regulations and the extent to which it has
informed the public as to its actions and their expected impact on the public.
The Task Force's meetings are open to the public. The Task Force solicits public input
at these meetings. Our review indicates that the Task Force has followed Open Meeting
Law requirements.
6. The extent to which the Agency has been able to investigate and resolve
complaints that are within its jurisdiction.
The Task Force has no authority to investigate and/ or resolve complaints.
7. The extent to which the Attorney General or any other applicable agency of
state government has authority to prosecute actions under the enabling
legislation.
This factor does not apply to the Task Force.
8. The extent to which the Agency has addressed deficiencies in its enabling
statutes which prevent it from fulfilling its statutory mandate.
This factor does not apply to the Task Force.
9. The extent to which changes are necessary in the Agency's laws to
adequately comply with the factors listed in the subsection.
We did not identify the need for any statutory changes.
10. The extent to which termination of the Agency would significantly harm
public health, safety, or welfare.
We recommend that the Legislature consider sunsetting the Task Force as its duties are
duplicated by another entity and its termination would not significantly harm public
health, safety, or welfare. As noted earlier, the Task Force serves in an advisory
capacity to the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission. The Commission is required to
report to the Governor and the Legislature on programs funded by the Drug and Gang
Enforcement Account, and the Commission has established the Drug, Gang, and
Violent Crime Committee to perform these duties. Our review found that the Task
Force and Committee perform virtually the same functions and have produced
identical recommendations to the Commission for the last five years. In addition, the
Task Force and Commission are comprised of virtually identical participants with the
exception of the Governor, who serves on the Task Force. However, the Governor
designated the Director of DPS to serve as the chair of the Task Force in June 1994.
While the Task Force may have been intended to provide a distinct perspective, its
duplication of duties and members within the Commission supports the argument that
elimination of the Task Force would not significantly harm public health, safety, or
welfare. However, the Governor's Office continues to view the Governor's direct
involvement in criminal justice matters as important. This involvement could still be
accomplished by including the Governor as a permanent member of the Arizona
Criminal Justice Commission. However, a statutory change to the composition of the
Commission would be necessary to allow for such an appointment.
11. The extent to which the level of regulation exercised by the Agency is
appropriate and whether less stringent levels of regulation would be
appropriate.
This factor does not apply to the Task Force.
12. The extent to which the Agency has used private contractors in the
performance of its duties and how the effective use of private contractors
could be accomplished.
This factor does not apply to the Task Force.
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Agency Response
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FIFE SYMINGTON
I Governor
June 28,1996
Mr. Douglas R. Norton
Auditor General
2910 North 44th Street, Suite 410
Phoenix, Arizona 85018
Dear Mr. Norton:
I have read your draft report on the Drug and Gang Enforcement Task Force
( DGETF) which was attached to a letter dated 20 June 1996. In response to your
request for comments, I offer the following:
o The DGETF should not be sunset because it is an arm of the Arizona
Criminal Justice Commission ( ACJC) that is allowed to meet in
executive session to discuss confidential issues such as, for example,
the funding of ongoing investigations. Although this option is not
exercised frequently, it can be quite beneficial under certain
circumstances.
The membership of the DGETF is different from the Drug, Gang, and
Violent Crime Committee ( DGVCC). The membership of the DGVCC
is limited to ACJC members. The membership of the DGETF is not. I
believe there may be some benefit to retaining a mechanism for
interested law enforcement agencies that are not represented on the
ACJC to make formal recommendations to the Commission.
Because of my unique position in state government, I can contribute
substantially to the work of the ACJC. This is particularly true as
programs and projects are being developed. The mechanism through
which I currently can contribute most directly is the DGETF. Were the
DGETF sunset, this important " front e n d opportunity would be lost.
The need for such front- end participation is certain to be enhanced as
the federal government moves further toward a " block grant" funding
system in which governors often are asked to name disbursing
agencies.
Mr. Douglas R. Norton
June 28,1996
Page Two
I appreciate your suggestion, were the DGETF to be sunset, that our statutes be
amended to allow my office permanent membership on the Commission. Such a
change would be vital under the aforementioned circumstance. I will conclude,
however, by reemphasizing my continued opposition to the elimination of the task
force.
Thank you for this opportunity to comment.
Sincerely,
F. G- 3 Fife Symington
GOVERNOR