Hazardous Materials
Transportation in Arizona
Final Report 624
Prepared by:
Kelly W. Kading and Kathryn E. Bender, Faisal Chowdhury
HDR Engineering, Inc.
3200 East Camelback Road, Suite 350
Phoenix, AZ 85018-2311
March 2010
Prepared for:
Arizona Department of Transportation
206 South 17th Avenue
Phoenix, Arizona 85007
In cooperation with
U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Highway Administration
The contents of this report reflect the views of the authors who are responsible for the facts and
the accuracy of the data presented herein. The contents do not necessarily reflect the official
views or policies of the Arizona Department of Transportation or the Federal Highway
Administration. This report does not constitute a standard, specification, or regulation. Trade or
manufacturers’ names which may appear herein are cited only because they are considered
essential to the objectives of the report. The U.S. Government and The State of Arizona do not
endorse products or manufacturers.
This report can also be found on our web site…
http://www.dot.state.az.us/ABOUT/atrc/Publications/Publications.htm
Technical Report Documentation Page
1. Report No.
FHWA-AZ-10-624
2. Government Accession No.
3. Recipient's Catalog No.
5. Report Date
March, 2010
4. Title and Subtitle
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION IN ARIZONA
6. Performing Organization Code
7. Author
Kelly W. Kading, Kathryn E. Bender, Faisal Chowdhury
8. Performing Organization Report No.
10. Work Unit No.
9. Performing Organization Name and Address
HDR Engineering Inc.
3200 East Camelback Road, Suite 350
Phoenix, Arizona 85018-2311
11. Contract or Grant No.
SPR-624
13.Type of Report & Period Covered
FINAL REPORT
June 2008 – December 2009
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
Arizona Department of Transportation
206 S. 17th Avenue
Phoenix, Arizona 85007
ADOT Project Manager: Estomih M Kombe, PhD, PE
14. Sponsoring Agency Code
15. Supplementary Notes
Prepared in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration
16. Abstract
The purpose of this report is to summarize the data that have been collected, provide references to other
researched material that supports the findings of this study, and provide a set of viable recommendations for
moving forward with the preparation of a hazardous materials transportation plan (HMTP) for ADOT.
Overviews of other states’ programs are documented and describe which plans or portions of the plans may be
adapted for use by ADOT. This report includes an overview of the computer modeling software available, and
discusses the evaluations of the models. State and federal regulations and guidance with regard to
transportation of hazardous materials and incidents involving hazardous materials are discussed.
Strengths and weaknesses of some of the available data are identified. It is concluded that ADOT should
consider the Texas approach for preparing an HMTP. The following are actionable recommendations to begin
the process for the HMTP preparation:
• Use the Texas Administrative Codes as a basis for Arizona to develop and pass similar statutes.
• Support a statute to require all trucks transporting hazardous materials to stop at ports of entry.
• Develop a Web site with GIS-based maps for designated routes and other suitable information.
• Create an alliance with AZSERC for using the commodity flow studies and prioritize corridors for
completion of coverage of the state.
• Form an interagency task force consisting of representatives from ADOT, AZSERC, ADPS, EMD,
FHWA, FMCSA, metro Phoenix and Tucson municipalities, and others.
• Fill in data gaps with air, rail, borders, and intrastate transport of hazardous materials.
• Participate in a peer-to-peer program with Texas DOT for experience and technical transfer related to
the HMTP preparation and utilization.
17. Key Words
Hazardous Materials Transportation Plan,
Commodity Flow Study
Data Gaps
18. Distribution Statement
Document is available to the U.S.
public through the National
Technical Information Service,
Springfield, Virginia, 22161
19. Security Classification
Unclassified
20. Security Classification
Unclassified
21. No. of Pages
37
22. Price
23. Registrant's Seal
SI* (MODERN METRIC) CONVERSION FACTORS
APPROXIMATE CONVERSIONS TO SI UNITS APPROXIMATE CONVERSIONS FROM SI UNITS
Symbol When You Know Multiply By To Find Symbol Symbol When You Know Multiply By To Find Symbol
LENGTH LENGTH
in inches 25.4 millimeters mm mm millimeters 0.039 inches in
ft feet 0.305 meters m m meters 3.28 feet ft
yd yards 0.914 meters m m meters 1.09 yards yd
mi miles 1.61 kilometers km km kilometers 0.621 miles mi
AREA AREA
in2 square inches 645.2 square millimeters mm2 mm2 Square millimeters 0.0016 square inches in2
ft2 square feet 0.093 square meters m2 m2 Square meters 10.764 square feet ft2
yd2 square yards 0.836 square meters m2 m2 Square meters 1.195 square yards yd2
ac acres 0.405 hectares ha ha hectares 2.47 acres ac
mi2 square miles 2.59 square kilometers km2 km2 Square kilometers 0.386 square miles mi2
VOLUME VOLUME
fl oz fluid ounces 29.57 milliliters mL mL milliliters 0.034 fluid ounces fl oz
gal gallons 3.785 liters L L liters 0.264 gallons gal
ft3 cubic feet 0.028 cubic meters m3 m3 Cubic meters 35.315 cubic feet ft3
yd3 cubic yards 0.765 cubic meters m3 m3 Cubic meters 1.308 cubic yards yd3
NOTE: Volumes greater than 1000L shall be shown in m3.
MASS MASS
oz ounces 28.35 grams g g grams 0.035 ounces oz
lb pounds 0.454 kilograms kg kg kilograms 2.205 pounds lb
T short tons (2000lb) 0.907 megagrams
(or “metric ton”)
mg
(or “t”)
mg megagrams
(or “metric ton”)
1.102 short tons (2000lb) T
TEMPERATURE (exact) TEMPERATURE (exact)
ºF Fahrenheit
temperature
5(F-32)/9
or (F-32)/1.8
Celsius temperature ºC ºC Celsius temperature 1.8C + 32 Fahrenheit
temperature
ºF
ILLUMINATION ILLUMINATION
fc foot candles 10.76 lux lx lx lux 0.0929 foot-candles fc
fl foot-Lamberts 3.426 candela/m2 cd/m2 cd/m2 candela/m2 0.2919 foot-Lamberts fl
FORCE AND PRESSURE OR STRESS FORCE AND PRESSURE OR STRESS
lbf poundforce 4.45 newtons N N newtons 0.225 poundforce lbf
lbf/in2 poundforce per
square inch
6.89 kilopascals kPa kPa kilopascals 0.145 poundforce per
square inch
lbf/in2
SI is the symbol for the International System of Units. Appropriate rounding should be made to comply with Section 4 of ASTM E380
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................1
1. INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................3
1.1 LIMITATIONS............................................................................................................3
2. PROJECT DESCRIPTION..........................................................................5
3. LITERATURE REVIEW.............................................................................7
3.1 STATE PLANS ............................................................................................................7
3.1.1 Arizona.................................................................................................................7
3.1.2 California.............................................................................................................8
3.1.3 Colorado...............................................................................................................8
3.1.4 Kansas ..................................................................................................................8
3.1.5 Michigan ..............................................................................................................8
3.1.6 New Mexico..........................................................................................................9
3.1.7 Nevada..................................................................................................................9
3.1.8 Texas.....................................................................................................................9
3.1.9 Utah ....................................................................................................................10
3.2 STATE PLAN SYNOPSES.......................................................................................10
3.2.1 Arizona...............................................................................................................10
3.2.2 California...........................................................................................................11
3.2.3 Colorado.............................................................................................................11
3.2.4 Kansas ................................................................................................................12
3.2.5 Michigan ............................................................................................................12
3.2.6 New Mexico........................................................................................................12
3.2.7 Nevada................................................................................................................13
3.2.8 Texas...................................................................................................................13
3.2.9 Utah ....................................................................................................................14
3.3 ARIZONA REGULATIONS....................................................................................14
3.4 FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES................................................15
4. MODEL ANALYSIS...................................................................................17
4.1 INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................17
4.2 SOFTWARE REVIEW.............................................................................................17
4.3 RISK ANALYSIS MODELS ....................................................................................17
4.3.1 Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations (CAMEO) ........18
4.3.2 SLAB Simulation Model...................................................................................18
4.3.3 Dense Gas Dispersion Model (DEGADIS)......................................................18
4.4 MODEL OVERVIEW...............................................................................................18
4.5 MODELING IN ARIZONA AND OTHER STATES ............................................21
5. DATA GAP ANALYSIS .............................................................................23
6. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS..............................................25
6.1 FINDINGS ..................................................................................................................25
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS...........................................................................................26
6.2.1 Recommendations for Route Designation for Hazardous Materials ...........26
6.2.2 ADOT and AZSERC ........................................................................................27
6.2.3 Interagency Task Force ....................................................................................27
6.2.4 Borders...............................................................................................................28
6.2.5 Mining ................................................................................................................28
6.2.6 Airports ..............................................................................................................28
REFERENCES.......................................................................................................31
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 - Overview on Various Modeling Packages ...........................................................19
Table 2 - Various Models by Release Scenarios..................................................................21
List of Acronyms
ADOT Arizona Department of Transportation
ADPS Arizona Department of Public Safety
AHEOP All Hazards Emergency Operations Plan
ALOHA Area Location of Hazardous Atmospheres
AZSERC Arizona State Emergency Response Commission
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CFS commodity flow study
CFSR commodity flow study reports
CHP California Highway Patrol
CAMEO Computer Aided Management of Emergency Operations
CoDOT Colorado Department of Tranportation
DEGADIS Dense Gas Dispersion Model
DEQ Department of Environmental Quality
DHS Department of Health Services
DOE Department of Energy
EMD Emergency Management Division
EPA United States Environmental Protection Agency
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FHWA Federal Highway Administration
FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
FRA Federal Railroad Authority
GIS Geographic Information Systems
HDR HDR Engineering Inc.
ICS Incident Command System
KDOT Kansas Department of Transportation
HMTP Hazardous Materials Transportation Plan
LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
MARPLOT spatial mapping software for CAMEO package
MIOSHA Michigan Occupational Safety & Health Administration
NHI National Highway Institute
NHS National Highway System
NMDOT New Mexico Department of Transportation
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NRHM non-radioactive hazardous materials
OEM Office of Emergency Management
PHMSA Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
SARA Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
SHIM State Highway Incident Management Plan
TAC Technical Advisory Committee
TxDOT Texas Department of Transportation
TRB Transportation Research Board
USCG United States Coast Guard
UDOT Utah Department of Transportation
USDOT United States Department of Transportation
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
HDR Engineering, Inc. (HDR) was contracted by the Arizona Department of
Transportation (ADOT) to perform a study of hazardous materials transportation and
routing throughout the state of Arizona. This final report and Research Note summarize
the data that has been collected, provide references to other researched material that
supports the findings of this study, and provide a set of viable recommendations for
preparing a hazardous materials transportation plan (HMTP) for the state of Arizona.
For reasons of public health and safety, transportation of hazardous materials (“hazmat”)
should be limited to designated routes. These routes should be chosen with consideration
given to the sources and destinations of hazardous materials, as well as the different
modes of transportation used. Arizona statutes should contain a suitable declaration of
public purpose to this effect.
Rail transport is generally regarded as safer than highway transport and also takes place
within corridors that are exactly defined (e.g. the locations of rail tracks are well known
and not subject to sudden change). Hazardous materials can however, be transported via
various modes, in addition to rail transport. The commodity flow study reports (CFSRs)
owned by the Arizona State Emergency Response Commission (AZSERC) contain
information regarding hazardous commodity flows on Arizona rail lines. Because the
information relies to some extent on voluntary disclosures by private organizations, it is
not complete.
The highest level of concern is engendered by truck transport on public roadways,
because currently trucks have the ability to travel on virtually any road. In contrast, cargo
aircraft is limited in where it can safely land or take off, and freight rail is limited to
existing track. Therefore, the major focus of this report is on truck transport of hazardous
materials. For long-distance traffic, the national interstate highway system is presumed to
be the major trucking route for hazardous materials. All interstate routes should be
regarded as hazardous material corridors and treated accordingly. In addition to interstate
routes, other major transportation corridors may be designated as hazardous materials
routes.
For this study, the planning of hazardous material transportation in nine states was
reviewed. These states were chosen because of their location and/or similarity to Arizona
regarding hazmat transportation, border crossings, and interstate and intrastate hazmat
transportation by railroads, highways, and air. Most of the researched states do not
include railroads and air traffic in their plans. Railroads are private entities and are
regulated by the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) Federal Railroad
Authority (FRA) and by the Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA) regulations. Air transportation of hazardous materials is closely regulated by
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and also the PHMSA regulations.
2
This report also provides an overview of available computer modeling software packages
and evaluates the potential use of the models in ADOT’s preparation of an HMTP.
Commonly transported hazardous materials have the potential to cause serious health and
environmental effects if released. Simulation models are particularly valuable for
assessing the impacts of discharges, the risk associated with these materials, and
determining areas of concern adjacent to the transportation corridors.
After review of data gathered from the targeted comparison states (California, Nevada,
Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, Michigan, and Kansas), HDR has determined that
the Texas approach is best suited to the state of Arizona. A discussion of Texas’ approach
and methods that fit Arizona is in section 6.1 of this report.
HDR recommends that ADOT adopt the Texas approach for preparing an HMTP. The
following are recommendations to begin the process for the HMTP preparation:
• Use the Texas Administrative Codes as a basis for Arizona to develop and pass
similar statutes.
��� Find a sponsor to support a statute to require all trucks transporting hazardous
materials to stop at ports of entry (POE).
• Develop a Web site to be housed at ADOT, with Geographic Information System
(GIS)-based maps for designated routes and other suitable information.
• Create an alliance with AZSERC for using the CFSRs already available, and
prioritize corridors for complete coverage of Arizona.
• Form an interagency task force with representatives from ADOT, AZSERC, the
Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS), the Emergency Management
Division (EMD) of the Arizona Department of Emergency and Military Affairs,
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA), metropolitan Phoenix and Tucson municipalities, and
others as appropriate.
• Develop a public information and partnering process to allow public input to the
rulemaking process.
• Fill in data gaps with air, rail, borders, and intrastate transport of hazardous
materials by performing CFSRs for corridors not yet studied.
• Participate in a peer-to-peer program with the Texas Department of
Transportation (TxDOT) to draw on its experience and technical expertise in
HMTP preparation and utilization.
3
1. INTRODUCTION
HDR Engineering, Inc. (HDR) was contracted by the Arizona Department of
Transportation (ADOT) to study hazardous materials transportation and routing
throughout Arizona. This report provides the results of the research, including the review
of current programs in place in various other states. The purpose of reviewing and
presenting information from other states’ programs is to identify plans or portions of the
plans that may be adapted for use by ADOT. This report also provides an overview of
available computer modeling software packages, and evaluates the potential use of the
models in ADOT’s preparation of a hazardous materials transportation plan (HMTP).
This report also includes a summary of state and federal regulations and guidance with
regard to transportation of hazardous materials and incidents involving hazardous
materials.
1.1 LIMITATIONS
A literature review has been prepared for use by ADOT. The information presented in it
is based on the project scope of work, which included research of other states’ hazardous
materials plans, state of Arizona plans and statutes, limited interviews, and a computer
model analysis. HDR has relied on information provided in interviews with employees of
state and federal agencies for its description of state hazardous materials plans. HDR
makes no guarantees regarding the accuracy or completeness of the information provided
or compiled by others. HDR made every attempt to gather reasonably ascertainable
public data. No guarantee is made that all available information was gathered and
reviewed (e.g., some information requested from public agencies was not released due to
security issues).
4
5
2. PROJECT DESCRIPTION
This project provides ADOT with resource information for the preparation of an
integrated HMTP, complete with modeling and a publicly accessible HMTP document.
The goals of the study were to:
• Gather existing information.
• Review and assess literature from ADOT.
• Review and assess literature from other state DOTs.
• Review and assess literature from other state agencies.
• Review Arizona and federal regulations related to hazardous materials
transportation.
• Assess available risk assessment computer models used by other states.
• Provide an analysis of information gathered (and identify gaps in needed
information) to the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), other ADOT
stakeholders, or the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA).
• Summarize data gathered to date.
• Provide references to other researched material that supports findings and
conclusions of this study.
• Recommend actions for Arizona agencies to take to progress towards preparation
of an HMTP for the state of Arizona.
6
7
3. LITERATURE REVIEW
HDR performed a literature review of materials from various sources including states
within the southwest region of the United States, states with hazmat transportation issues
similar to those in Arizona, and from states with specific HMTP elements that have been
effectively implemented. Similar issues include border crossings, interstate and intrastate
transportation of hazardous materials, metropolitan and rural areas, railroads, and airports
statewide. California, Colorado, Kansas, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and
Utah were contacted and researched for each state’s HMTP or similar plan.
3.1 STATE PLANS
3.1.1 Arizona
The Arizona State Emergency Response Commission (AZSERC) was contacted to
review the five commodity flow study reports (CFSRs), prepared by AMEC Earth and
Environmental, Inc. for the state of Arizona. HDR personnel visited the AZSERC office
of Mr. Roger Soden and reviewed the CFSRs. HDR filed a request for information from
AZSERC for portions of the reports. Specifically, HDR requested copies of the report
cover, submittal letter, acknowledgements, table of contents, executive summary, body of
publication and the references page for all five reports. At a later date, another request for
information was filed for the modeling appendix pages from each of the five reports.
The five reports provide information on the transportation of hazardous materials on
Arizona’s the interstate highway system, national highways, arterial state highways,
railroads, and through its POE. These studies focus on the through the state. The studies
include a survey of placarded trucks, railroad data reviews, identification of
environmentally high risk areas, computer modeling of hazardous material incidents to
delineate areas of concern along interstate corridors, and railroad corridors.
The specific reports reviewed were:
• Santa Cruz County Hazardous Materials Commodity Flow Study Report, 2003.
This report covered from the U.S./Mexico border to Tucson, Arizona; Santa Cruz
and Pima counties, Arizona; and the Tohono O’Odham Nation.(5)
• Arizona I-40 Corridor Hazardous Materials Commodity Flow Study Report,
2004. This report covered the I-40 Corridor, arterial highways and railways in
Mohave, Coconino, Navajo and Apache counties, Arizona.(4)
• I-8 and I-10 Hazardous Materials Commodity Flow Study Report, 2006. This
report covers the I-8 and I-10 Corridor, arterial highways and railroads in Yuma,
Maricopa, Pinal, Pima, and Cochise counties, Arizona.(3)
• US 60 Hazardous Materials Commodity Flow Study Report, 2007. This report
covers the US 60 Corridor, arterial highways and railroads in Pinal and Gila
counties, Arizona.(2)
• US 60 and US 70 Hazardous Materials Commodity Flow Study Report, 2008.
This report covers the US 60 and US 70 corridors, arterial highways and railroads
in Gila, Navajo, Apache, Graham and Greenlee counties, Arizona.(1)
8
3.1.2 California
The California Highway Patrol (CHP) bases alternate route decisions on the state and
federal regulations for route determination. Restricted routes and designated routes for
hazmat cargo are defined by CHP.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region IX, US/Mexico
Border Program produced at least two hazardous material commodity flow studies. These
are the Calexico Commodity Flow Study(33) and the San Diego Hazardous Material
Commodity Flow Study,(34) dated January 2001 and June 2001 respectively.
Research of California information is continuing to determine what other literature is
available relevant to this project.
3.1.3 Colorado
The Colorado Department of Transportation (CoDOT) Web site was researched, and an
interview was conducted with the CoDOT Research Branch Librarian, Joan Pinamont.
She provided a Web link for the Department of Public Safety (DPS) Division of State
Patrol, Rules and Regulations Concerning the Permitting, Routing, and Transportation of
Hazardous and Nuclear Materials and the Intrastate Transportation of Agricultural
Products in the State of Colorado.(11)
Ms. Pinamont also provided the Web link for the Colorado Department of Transportation,
2006, FINAL REPORT, Risk Analysis Study of Hazardous Materials Trucks through
Eisenhower/Johnson Memorial Tunnels, “Executive Summary.”(12)
3.1.4 Kansas
Kansas Department of Transportation’s (KDOT) Safety Highway Engineer, Mr. Steven
Buckley, was unaware of anything that their department has concerning a HMTP. He
advised contacting Mr. Tim Braxmeier, Safety Investigator at the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration (FMCSA) in Kansas. Mr. Braxmeier advised that KDOT does not
have a HMTP, but that it follows the sections in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFRs)
that apply to hazardous materials transportation.
Kansas State University produced a guide for small communities to handle emergencies
resulting from the accidental release of hazardous materials during transport. This is
referred to as the “Kansas Model.”(22)
3.1.5 Michigan
The Michigan Emergency Management and Homeland Security Division of the
Department of State Police produced two guides for hazmat response plans for
communities.(15,16) The guides cover the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA) Title III (Michigan Fire Fighter Right-to-Know), and the Michigan Occupational
9
Safety and Health Administration (MIOSHA) Hazardous Waste Operations and
Response certification for fire fighters plans. Michigan also has a workbook for
developing a site emergency plan.
In addition, the Hazardous Materials Bulletin, December 2007,(17) from the Michigan
State Police, designates routing restrictions for the state of Michigan.
3.1.6 New Mexico
The New Mexico Department of Public Safety (DPS) compiled an All Hazards
Emergency Operations Plan (AHEOP)(19) at the direction of the Governor’s office in
1999. The AHEOP was updated in 2007. Cabinet secretaries are signatories to this
document and each agency (New Mexico State Police, NMDOT, Risk Management
Division, NM Environment Department, Governor’s Office of Homeland Security, and
all local jurisdictions) are responsible for fulfilling their responsibilities. The NMDOT
has prepared a supplement to the plan, called the State Highway Incident Management
Plan (SHIM), completed in 2001.(20)
3.1.7 Nevada
The state of Nevada has an incident-based approach to hazmat incident response and
alternate routing involving the Nevada DOT and the Nevada Department of Public
Safety. They do not have a HMTP. Metropolitan Las Vegas and Reno have some routes
classified as restricted, but the state has not been involved in the process for designating
these routes.
3.1.8 Texas
Mr. Charles Koonce at the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT), Traffic
Operations Division, advised that the non-radioactive hazardous materials (NRHM)
routing process establishes which roads may be used to transport certain hazardous
materials. These routes are generally developed by local jurisdictions (cities and counties)
and must follow federal regulatory guidelines. TxDOT’s Administrative Codes contain
the rules designating NRHM routes. The relevant Administrative Codes are Title 43, Part
1, Chapter 25, Subchapter F, Rules 25.101 through 25.104.(24) The Administrative Codes
give TxDOT the responsibility to review and approve NRHM routes. The routes are
listed, and maps are available on the TxDOT Web site at www.dot.state.tx.us/services/
traffic_operations/non-radioactive_routings.htm. These NRHM route maps are listed by
city and county. The Traffic Operations Division at TxDOT is the “keeper of the maps.”
The City of Laredo, Texas, has a Hazardous Cargo Community Risk Assessment and
Transportation Route Alternative Analysis.(10) This analysis follows the Texas
Administrative Codes and is a good example of a metro-area plan that deals with issues
related to the shipment of hazardous materials across a border.
10
3.1.9 Utah
HDR contacted Mr. Chad Sheppick, Motor Carrier Safety Manager, at the Utah
Department of Transportation (UDOT). He reported that the only rules that govern
hazmat transport in Utah are the Code of Federal Regulations. He reported that Utah does
not have any restricted routes or modeling software for determining alternative routes,
nor do they have special permits or registration requirements mandated by UDOT. Mr.
Sheppick is listed as the contact on the Safety Regulations for Motor Carriers
Transporting Hazardous Materials and/or Hazardous Waste.
3.2 STATE PLAN SYNOPSES
3.2.1 Arizona
The AZSERC CFSRs(1,2,3,4,5) focus on transportation of hazardous materials along
interstate highways, arterial highways, and railways throughout the state of Arizona.
They include the following data:
• Inventories of hazmat transported along the study corridors.
• Flow of hazmat into and out of the study corridors.
• Locations of high risk and environmentally sensitive areas.
• Placarded truck counts.
• Counts of rail cars carrying hazardous materials.
• Flow of hazmat through the Arizona POE.
• Review of databases identifying hazmat incidents.
• Computer modeling of potential releases of hazmat.
These studies do not include hazmat transportation into or out of Arizona by air. The
current reports do not cover the entire state. In particular, Interstate 10 from its
intersection with Interstate 8, south of Phoenix, to the California state line still needs to
be studied. Interstate 15 at the northwesternmost corner of Arizona has not yet been
studied. There are multiple crossings on the Mexican border that still need to be studied ,
as well as state line crossings with New Mexico, Colorado, Utah, Nevada, and California.
The studies state that there are placarded trucks which bypass the POE on the interstate
highways where the studies were performed. Various reasons contribute to this including
hours of operation at POE, weigh-in-motion sites, and the PrePass system. Apparently,
commercial trucks using the PrePass system are supposed to stop at POE if they are
transporting hazardous materials, but they don’t always stop. Stated in the studies, the
POE officials indicated that no state law exists requiring that all trucks transporting
hazardous materials stop at POE for inspection.
11
3.2.2 California
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region IX, US/Mexico
Border Program produced at least two hazardous material commodity flow studies. These
are the Calexico Hazardous Commodity Flow Study(33) and the San Diego Hazardous
Material Commodity Flow Study.(34) These studies include:
• A regional overview of the counties and cities involved in the study.
• Identification of the nature, quantities, and routes of hazardous substances
transported through the Calexico and San Diego areas.
• Import and export of hazmat by rail, truck, air, or water.
• Geographic and environmental data including environmentally sensitive areas,
airports, brokerage warehouses, waterways, residential areas, business districts,
educational facilities, and other public locations.
• Truck and rail traffic carrying hazmat.
• Maps of the study areas and maps of specific areas of concern.
These studies are similar to the studies from AZSERC, but include more information
regarding air traffic, waterways, and warehouses.
3.2.3 Colorado
Colorado Department of Public Safety, Chief of the Division of State Patrol has the
authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the permitting, routing, and safe
transportation of hazardous materials and nuclear materials by motor vehicle within the
state of Colorado. These rules cover:
• Colorado State Patrol agency information regarding hazmat, nuclear material, and
agricultural products transportation.
• Permits, insurance, etc. (administrative requirements) for transporting hazmat.
• Hazmat route designation process.
• Minimal CoDOT role except for the purpose of petitioning for a hazmat route
designation.
• List of designated hazmat routes.
• List of designated nuclear material routes.
• State map of designated hazmat and nuclear material routes including county
maps.
• References to 49 CFR Parts 107, 171-173, 177, 178, 180, 387, and 397.
The information provided by these rules is comprehensive and allows for proactive
compliance with the regulations of the Colorado State Patrol for motor vehicle transport
of nuclear and other hazardous material. Maps depicting the designated hazmat and
nuclear materials routes are very clear and useful. The rules promulgated by the State
Patrol do not address hazmat and nuclear material transportation by rail or air. No
discussion is provided regarding cooperative efforts with other state agencies during a
state of emergency.
12
3.2.4 Kansas
Mr. Tim Braxmeier, Safety Investigator at FMSCA in Kansas, advised that the KDOT
does not have a HMTP, but that they follow the CFRs that apply to hazmat transportation
in their state.
The Kansas Model produced by the Kansas State University is a simple guide for small
communities dealing with hazmat transportation emergencies.
3.2.5 Michigan
The Michigan Emergency Management and Homeland Security Division of the
Department of State Police produced a guide for hazmat response plans for
communities.(15,16) This guide includes:
• Extensive local entity planning and training information referring to SARA Title
III plans.
• Extensive information for local level assistance from state police.
• Workbook for guiding local governments to develop site emergency planning.
This guide is for local governments looking at “site” emergency planning rather than
creating a cumulative statewide, regional, or corridor plan. DOT involvement is not
included. This is not a plan but purely a guide. SARA Title III regulations require each
community to develop emergency response plans to address an accidental release of an
extremely hazardous substance from a site within that community, and these regulations
are referenced. The Michigan governor assigned the Michigan State Police‘s Emergency
Management, and Homeland Security Division to assist the communities to develop their
plans. These publications are copyrighted by the state of Michigan.
The Hazardous Materials Bulletin,(17) December 2007, from the Michigan State Police
includes:
• References to federal regulations with regard to hazmat transportation.
• Lists of routing restrictions within the state of Michigan.
3.2.6 New Mexico
The New Mexico Department of Public Safety compiled the All Hazards Emergency
Operations Plan (AHEOP)(19) in 1999 and updated it in 2004 and again in 2007. This is a
general incident plan for natural disasters, hazmat, and terrorism. This plan includes:
• Specific guidance relating to emergency incidents on the National Highway
System (NHS).
• Assumptions based on the Incident Command System (ICS). The ICS is a
federally standardized, on-scene, all-hazard incident management concept,
designed to provide a common framework within which multiple agencies can
work together effectively.
13
• Details on establishing coordinated communications between agencies and the
public.
• Clear guidance on procedures and organizational responsibilities for other
agencies during an emergency event.
• A map of the NHS in New Mexico.
• An incident flow chart.
• Graphical representation of technical terms.
• A master contact list of state agencies, districts, FHWA, and railroads emergency
personnel.
This plan is specific in many areas, but it is directed at individual incidents rather than
proactive planning. Coordinated communication is a focus of the plan, which does not
refer to any of the federal regulations regarding hazmat transportation or identify any
routing restrictions.
The NMDOT State Highway Incident Management (SHIM)(20) plan generally parallels
the NMDPS AHEOP and is titled as a supplement to the AHEOP. It includes:
• An overview of NMDOT’s approach to emergency operations.
• The NMDOT organizational chart for chain of command for AHEOP.
• A matrix of NMDOT organization responsibility for entire agency.
• A list of critical points along New Mexico’s interstate system that have no
reasonable alternate routing available.
• A rating system for incident type and probable level of response required.
• Multiple attachments from a wide variety of sources which vary in applicability.
The NMDOT SHIM was written within months of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks, and provides a good basis for an HMTP. It does discuss airports and their
specifics in New Mexico. The rating system for incident type is useful because of
strategies identified in the SHIM for responding to different types and magnitudes of
incidents. It does not refer to any federal regulations for hazmat transportation.
3.2.7 Nevada
The state of Nevada does not currently have an HMTP, according to Nevada DPS and
DOT contacts.
3.2.8 Texas
Texas DOT’s Administrative Code(24) includes rules designating non-radioactive
hazardous materials routes. TxDOT is responsible for review and approval of the routes,
14
while local jurisdictions are responsible for designating the routes following the federal
guidelines. The TxDOT plan includes:
• City and county maps of hazmat routes (available online).
• City and county hazmat route descriptions (available online).
• State statutes for designating hazmat routes.
• References to Federal guidelines.
This plan does not include coordinated efforts with other state or federal agencies and
does not include coordinated communications in the event of an emergency incident.
The City of Laredo, Texas, has a Hazardous Cargo Community Risk Assessment and
Transportation Route Alternative Analysis.(10) This analysis follows the Texas
Administrative Codes and includes:
• An executive summary with a detailed synopsis of the document.
• A community risk assessment.
• Route alternative analysis.
• Issues related to the transport of hazardous and materials across a national border.
• A focus on population risk assessment and sensitive sites.
• Consideration of congestion delay, environmental risk, and emergency response.
This is a good example of a community-based plan that is organized and thorough.
3.2.9 Utah
Utah does not have a plan, according to the UDOT Motor Carrier Safety Manager.
3.3 ARIZONA REGULATIONS
The Arizona State Legislature established the Emergency Management Division (EMDin
the Department of Emergency and Military Affairs) with Arizona Revised Statute (ARS)
section 26-305.02.(6) The EMD is the designated lead agency for developing and
implementing a state hazardous materials emergency management program. It is also
responsible for emergency planning and community right to know issues. The following
agencies and departments are involved in the development and implementation of the
program:
• Department of Environmental Quality
• Department of Health Services
• Department of Public Safety
• Department of Transportation
• Department of Agriculture
• Corporation Commission
• Industrial Commission
15
• State Fire Marshal
• State Mine Inspector
• Radiation Regulatory Agency
With regard to hazardous materials transportation in Arizona, DPS(8) is responsible for
establishing a special hazardous materials emergency response unit as the initial response
element of the hazardous materials emergency management program, pursuant to ARS
26-305.02.(6)
DEQ is responsible for the registration of and fee collection from transporters of
hazardous waste, pursuant to ARS 49-929.(9)
ADOT is responsible, pursuant to ARS 28-5204,(7) for rules governing safety operations
of motor carriers, shippers and vehicles transporting hazardous materials, hazardous
substances or hazardous wastes. ADOT also may audit records and inspect these vehicles
(as prescribed in Title 49), pursuant to ARS 28-5204.(7).
ARS 28-7045 (7) gives ADOT complete and exclusive operational control and jurisdiction
over the use of state highways and routes, and for rules regarding the use of these
highways and routes.
3.4 FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES
Numerous federal guidance documents and regulations are available to provide direction
in preparing an HMTP. The primary source for designating routes are the federal
regulations found at 49 CFR 100 – 185 and 49 CFR 397.
Title 49, CFR Part 397, Subpart C - Routing of non-radioactive hazardous materials;
authorizes a political subdivision of a state to establish NRHM route designations on
roads and highways open to the public under the jurisdiction of the political subdivision.
Highway Routing of Hazardous Materials: Guidelines for Applying Criteria
(USDOT/FHWA/NHI, 1996)(28) is a comprehensive document describing in technical
detail the federal guidelines that must be followed by states, territories, and Indian tribes
when designating NRHM routes. The National Highway Institute (NHI) provided
training covering these guidelines in the past, but it appears that this training is no longer
offered. These guidelines include the 13 criteria that are critical in identifying and
designating a hazardous material transportation route.
The United States Department of Transportation (USDOT), Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration, Office of Hazardous Material Safety is the federal
authority for ensuring safe transport of hazmat by air, rail, highway, and water. These
regulations are found at 49 CFR Part 100 -185.(29)
The USDOT Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s (FMCSA) mission is to
promote safe commercial motor vehicle operation through education, regulation,
16
enforcement, and innovative research and technology, and to reduce truck and bus
crashes resulting in fewer fatalities and injuries. The FMSCA strives to achieve a safer
and more secure transportation environment through shared responsibilities with their
partners and stakeholders. The FMSCA is responsible for the upkeep of The National
Hazardous Materials Route Registry (NHMRR),(25).which is the national repository of
motor carrier routes that are either designated or restricted for hazmat transportation (both
radioactive and non-radioactive).
The FMCSA has a guidebook for building a model state hazardous materials program.
The FMCSA State HM Program Model Guidebook(26) helps states develop plans for
hazardous materials transportation.
Guidelines for Selecting Preferred Highway Route Controlled Quantity Shipments of
Radioactive Materials was authored by the USDOT Research and Special Programs
Administration in 1992.(30) This publication comprehensively details the federal
guidelines for selecting highway routes for transporting controlled quantities of
radioactive materials.
Hazards Analysis on the Move, SARA Title III (EPCRA) and Conducting a Commodity
Flow Study, (USDOT, 1993)(27) are guiding documents for local planners and responders
on how to conduct a commodity flow study through communities and priority areas.
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4. MODEL ANALYSIS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Numerous computer models are available for the purpose of analyzing the potential public
risk resulting from an accidental release of hazardous materials during transport. This
chapter gives a summary overview of various computer models and tools used to assess the
risk within Arizona, as well as comparing other states’ programs to one another. Widely used
models have been evaluated in terms of their usability, input parameters, end results,
limitations, and applicability, as well as the training and educational needs required to
understand and implement the model.
4.2 SOFTWARE REVIEW
The most commonly transported hazardous materials in Arizona include gasoline, propane,
diesel, sulfuric acid, ammonium nitrate, pesticides, and copper concentrate products.(1) These
materials have the potential to cause serious health and environmental damage in the event of
an accidental release. Computer models are particularly valuable for assessing the impacts of
discharges and the risk associated with these materials; they are also useful in determining
the areas of concern adjacent to the transportation corridors.
The models’ appropriateness and efficiency are important considerations in the selection of a
model to use in analyzing the risk resulting from an accidental release of hazardous
materials transported on public routes. Many dispersion models and software packages are
available that are designed to perform the dispersion analysis for various accidental releases.
The data handling capabilities of each software program are such that an accurate output is
based on the characteristics associated with the accidental release. These characteristics can
include emission source characteristics (released chemicals, chemical properties, released
source orientation, and release conditions), plume characteristics (dense or neutrally
buoyant), release duration, and/or atmospheric conditions (wind, temperature.(13) Therefore,
the characteristics associated with the release and the data handling capabilities of the model
can play an important role in choosing a model.
The accuracy of the parameter data, such as emission and meteorological data, is important
in assessing the risk, irrespective of the model type and use. The software can only provide
accurate outputs if the data entered into the system is accurate. In addition to choosing a
suitable model for the task (based on parameters), other significant factors that determine the
quality and accuracy of the results are the availability of accurate source information, and the
availability of accurate meteorological data.(18)
4.3 RISK ANALYSIS MODELS
Some of the commonly used models were identified to conduct a comparative analysis of
their salient features. The following sections discuss the software model packages
reviewed for this report.
18
4.3.1 Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations (CAMEO)
This application consists of three integrated tools: Area Location of Hazardous
Atmospheres (ALOHA), Mapping Applications for Response, Planning, and Local
Operational Tasks (MARPLOT), and Computer Aided Management of Emergency
Operations (CAMEO). This package was developed by EPA’s Office of Emergency
Management (OEM) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
Office of Response and Restoration, to assist front-line chemical emergency planners and
responders.(31) ALOHA is an emergency planning and response tool, while MARPLOT is
a spatial mapping application integrated in the CAMEO suite. CAMEO provides a
powerful search engine that lets users find chemical-specific information on fire and
explosive hazards, health hazards, firefighting techniques, cleanup procedures, and
protective clothing.
4.3.2 SLAB Simulation Model
This computer model simulates the atmospheric dispersion of denser-than-air releases.
The types of releases treated by the model include a ground-level evaporating pool, an
elevated horizontal jet, a stack or elevated vertical jet, and an instantaneous volume
source.(14) SLAB was developed in the 1980s by Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL), with financial support from the Department of Energy (DOE). .
4.3.3 Dense Gas Dispersion Model (DEGADIS)
This tool models the atmospheric dispersion of elevated or ground-level, area-source,
denser-than-air gas (or aerosol) contaminants released with negligible momentum or as a
jet from pressure relief valves, into an atmospheric boundary layer over flat, unobstructed
terrain. DEGADIS Version 1.0 was developed for the United States Coast Guard (USCG)
and Gas Research Institute (GRI) in 1985. In 1989, this model was modified (DEGADIS
Version 2.1) to provide for an elliptical plume cross-section with air entrainment
consistent with the Pasquill-Gifford plume dispersion coefficient representation of
atmospheric turbulent entrainment.(23)
Another commonly used tool is RMP*Comp, which is used to perform the off-site
consequence analysis (both worst case and alternative scenarios) required under the Risk
Management Program rule published by the EPA. RMP*Comp is a planning tool and
cannot be used for emergency response.(4) There are numerous other emergency
management models capable of assessing the risks. However, this study is limited to the
models which are commonly used, widely accepted, and have proven applicability
throughout the nation.
4.4 MODEL OVERVIEW
Table 1 summarizes various emergency management computer models for assessing risks
from accidental release of hazardous materials.
Table 1 - Overview on Various Modeling Packages
Review
Items
ALOHA (used alongside CAMEO & MARPLOT) SLAB DEGADIS
Model
Description
ALOHA computes time-dependent source strength for
evaporating puddles, pressurized or non-pressurized gas, or
liquid release from a storage vessel, and pressurized gas from
a pipeline. It models pure non-reactive chemicals, Gaussian
puff and plume, heavy gas dispersion. Wind speed and
direction are assumed constant. It accounts for the effects of
vertical wind shear on both Gaussian and heavy gas
dispersion, and on pool evaporation.
SLAB is one of the simplest dense gas models to set up
and begin using. It does not calculate source emission
rates. It assumes that all source input conditions have been
determined externally. The model can treat evaporating
pool sources, jet releases at any height, and instantaneous
volume sources. It produces outputs of chemical
concentrations at various positions downwind and at
specified heights above the ground.
DEGADIS models the atmospheric dispersion of denser-than-
air contaminants released with negligible momentum
or as a jet into an atmospheric boundary layer over flat,
unobstructed terrain. It models the dispersion processes
that accompany the gravity-driven flow, contaminant
entrainment into the atmospheric boundary layer, and
subsequent downwind travel from the release.
Application
Limitations
ALOHA does not account for terrain steering or changes in
wind speed and horizontal direction, nor does it model
particulate dispersion. It does not account for initial positive
buoyancy of a gas escaping from a heated source. Due to its
non-robust Gaussian nucleus, improvements in its ability to
address comprehensive scenarios, is limited.
SLAB does not calculate source emission rates. It handles
jets in a simplified manner and does not calculate the
details of the jet motions and thermodynamics. It is not
suitable for use with strongly buoyant plumes.
Model has limited ability to address release scenarios in
complex terrain. Application of the model is limited to
releases where the depth of the dispersing layer is much
greater than the height of the surface roughness elements.
It does not provide for concentration time averaging in the
wind direction.
Strengths
Downloadable at no charge from the EPA Web site with a
user’s manual. The ALOHA code has evolved over the years
to add capabilities, improve algorithms, and correct errors.
SLAB is recognized as the easiest-to-use dense gas
model. It agrees well with available field data.
It can address many types of dense gas releases and
address atmospheric dispersion of contaminant releases in
various fluid flow regimes.
Drawbacks
Results are less reliable for conditions of low wind speed or
very stable atmospheric conditions. It does not account for the
effects of fires or chemical reactions and terrain steering
effects. It limits predictions to one hour after the release
begins or to distances up to 6 miles and does not model the
evaporation of chemical constituents in a mixture or solution.
It does not calculate source emission rates. Model is
restricted to dense gas releases or liquid spills that
evaporate into a dense gas. The model assumes a flat
atmospheric flow with no obstructions and takes no
sloping terrain into account.
It does not account for positive thermal buoyancy; unable
to address complex meteorological flow phenomena; does
not account for aerodynamic effects of nearby buildings;
does not account for dry or wet deposition effects; can
only address pure chemical releases. It does not consider
chemical mixtures or chemical transformations.
Input
Parameters
Mean wind speed, wind direction, and air temperature,ground
roughness length, cloud cover, and relative humidity. Time,
date, latitude, and longitude are required to compute solar
radiation and atmospheric pressure.
Pollutant properties, source conditions, meteorological
conditions, maximum receptor downwind distance, and
receptor heights. There is an option of specifying either
the traditional or a continuous discrete stability class.
Release type, rate, duration, source flux, initial density,
initial temperature, average time, release Richardson
number, wind speed at elevation, surface roughness,
Pasquill stability class, ambient temperature and pressure,
absolute humidity, surface temperature.
19
Output
Summary
User inputs and model results; graphs of predicted source
strength and on and off-centerline indoor and outdoor
concentrations; dose over time at specified locations; and a
"footprint" plot of the area downwind of a release where
concentrations may exceed a user-set threshold level.
The output file contains distributions with downwind
distance of the maximum pollutant concentration, the time
when the maximum concentration occurs, the duration of
the cloud, and the parameters that describe cloud
geometry (width and depth).
Tabular reflection of input data and calculated source
parameters (time, gas radius, height, mole fraction,
density, Richardson number, etc.), mole fraction,
concentration, density, temperature, half width, sigma-y,
sigma-z as a function of various downwind distances.
User
Friendliness
Designed to be extremely user friendly. It contains pull-down
menus with prompts and warning and caution messages.
Model has a rudimentary command-line user interface.
User manually prepares the input file using a text editor
and executes the program by typing the program name.
DEGADIS is designed to be user friendly once the user
becomes familiar with the physical principles of the
model and the input-output details.
Program
Operation
Identify whether the code has any error diagnostic messages
to assist the user in troubleshooting operational problems.
Run-time error diagnostics are missing. The code appears
to be robust and encounters any numerical problems and
can be run in batch mode using DOS batch files.
Provides various diagnostic messages to assist the user in
determining the source of problems in running the model.
Program setup time is relatively minimal.
Source: Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology,(21) User’s Manuals for ALOHA, SLAB and DEGADIS
20
21
Each model, described in Table 1, has its strengths and limitations. Choosing a proper
model is a should be based on cost and technical expertise, as well as applicability for
various release scenarios. The Richardson number1 can help determine the type of model
best used for analysis. Typically, a Richardson number greater than 32 indicates a
continuous gas release, whereas Richardson numbers exceeding 700 indicate the
instantaneous release of a dense gas. (32) Based on the capabilities of various computer
models, Table 2 shows the model type that could be used for various release scenarios.
Table 2 - Various Models by Release Scenarios
Release Type
Source Type
Continuous Finite Transient Instantaneous
Ground Level
ALOHA,
DEGADIS, SLAB
ALOHA,
DEGADIS, SLAB
DEGADIS --
Evaporating
Liquid Spill
ALOHA,
DEGADIS, SLAB
ALOHA,
DEGADIS, SLAB
--
ALOHA,
DEGADIS, SLAB
Vertical Jet//Plume
ALOHA,
DEGADIS, SLAB
ALOHA,
DEGADIS, SLAB
-- --
Horizontal Jet SLAB SLAB -- --
Instantaneous -- -- -- SLAB
Source: Trinity Consultants, Dallas, TX (2004), User’s Manuals for ALOHA, SLAB and DEGADIS
Results from various models could vary due to the inherent assumptions and limitations
associated with each model. Therefore, choosing an appropriate model is important.
4.5 MODELING IN ARIZONA AND OTHER STATES
Review of the hazardous commodity flow studies conducted in various states indicated
that the CAMEO package, including ALOHA and MARPLOT, is widely used for off-site
consequence analysis in the states of Arizona, Michigan, California, Nevada, Oregon,
Alaska, Florida, Ohio, and Washington. Spatial compatibility (through MARPLOT),
availability at no cost, user-friendliness, and simplicity made this model very popular. In
addition, the CAMEO package is EPA-recognized. RMP*Comp and TNT-EMA are
additional models which are used occasionally within Arizona, depending on the task and
objective of the study.
The Arizona State Emergency Response Commission (AZSERC) was contacted to
conduct an overview on computer models used across the country for risk assessment.
Texas uses the model HOTSPOT for initial emergency assessment or safety analysis
1 The Richardson number is the dimensionless number that expresses the ratio of potential to kinetic energy.
22
planning of a radionuclide release. Colorado does not use any particular computer model
for assessing risk. Availability, user-friendliness, and accuracy of outputs appeared to be
contributing factors in selecting a specific computer model throughout the states.
23
5. DATA GAP ANALYSIS
Data gaps are related to the availability of information encountered during the
investigative and research processes that may affect the ability of the analysts/modelers to
draw conclusions. The environmental professional thus estimates the relative importance
of the data gaps. The environmental professional uses multiple data sources as a method
to provide coverage for data gaps. For the purpose of developing an HMTP, the following
items may constitute data gaps:
• Limited information offered due to the sensitive nature of the information.
• Lack of air transport information.
• Incomplete railroad transport information in the AZSERC CFSRs.
• Limited AZSERC CFSR coverage for the entire state.
▪ I-10 from its intersection with I-8, south of Phoenix to the California state
line, still needs to be studied.
▪ I-15 at the northwestern corner of Arizona has not yet been studied.
▪ Primary and secondary highways with multiple border crossings still need to
be studied on the Mexican border as well as with New Mexico, Colorado,
Utah, Nevada, and California.
The following items are considered to be significant data gaps for the purpose of
developing an HMTP:
• The lack of complete coverage of the state with commodity flow study
information.
• Lack of air transport information.
• Incomplete railroad transport information.
• Placarded trucks bypassing POE stations.
24
25
6. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 FINDINGS
Nine states (including Arizona) were researched for HMTPs. These states were chosen
based on their locations and/or similar issues regarding hazmat transportation. Specifically,
border crossings, and interstate and intrastate hazmat transportation by railroads, highways,
and air. Most of the states do not include railroads and air traffic in their plans. Railroads
are private entities and are regulated by the USDOT Federal Railroad Authority and by
portions of the PHMSA regulations. Air transportation of hazardous materials is closely
regulated by the Federal Aviation Administration and also by portions of the PHMSA
regulations.
The CFSRs (which AZSERC owns) provide coverage for the interstate highway system,
U.S. highways, arterial highways, railroads, and certain POEs across Arizona. These studies
focus on the transportation of hazardous materials through the state. The studies include
placarded truck surveys, railroad data review, identification of environmentally high risk
areas, and computer modeling of hazardous material incidents to delineate areas of concern
along both interstate and railroad corridors. The key component for analyzing various
routes and options for transport of hazardous materials in Arizona is the CFSRs. These
studies are absolutely critical as the basis for any work performed by a cooperative
interagency task force looking at non-interstate route designations.
These reports do not completely cover the state. Incomplete areas of coverage include I-10
from its intersection with I-8, south of Phoenix to the California state line, and I-15 at the
northwesternmost corner of Arizona. Multiple international and state border crossings with
Arizona, which are primary and secondary highways, still need to be studied prior to the
preparation of an HMTP.
The EPA Hazardous Material Commodity Flow Studies for San Diego and Calexico could
be useful to ADOT in the preparation of an HMTP because they reference cargo flowing in
and out of Southern California to Arizona.
HDR found a 1986 Transportation Research Board (TRB) study on handling hazmat
transportation emergencies. This study states that little or no uniformity existed in state
laws of the day, and that sources of data on hazardous material shipments were inconsistent
or nonexistent. The research performed during this study for ADOT indicates that little has
changed in the intervening years. Following the events of September 11, 2001, emphasis in
the field seems to have changed from hazardous materials transport to terrorist threats.
Information previously regarded as technical is now considered sensitive to homeland
security, and is therefore difficult to obtain.
There appears to be no consistency among states or major metropolitan areas regarding
planning for or responding to hazardous material transportation issues. After review of the
data gathered from the targeted comparison states (California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado,
26
New Mexico, Texas, Michigan, and Kansas), and the federal regulations and guidance
documents, it appears that an adaptation of the Texas approach is best suited to Arizona.
The Texas approach has the most applicability and includes useful methods for route
designation which Arizona could follow for hazardous material route designation. Texas
specifies two parallel methods for designation of hazardous material routes, one at the local
level and one at the state level. These methods are similar and use the 13 factors for
determining the route designations found in 49 CFR 397. The local method allows political
subdivisions to establish routes and requires municipalities with a population of more than
750,000 to establish routes. It includes a simple public involvement process,
intergovernmental consultation, involvement by TxDOT, and specifications for posting the
adopted route. An analogous state-level process is similar, but includes approval by the
state transportation commission.
Applied to Arizona, this approach would require Phoenix and Tucson to develop local
hazardous material routes, with approval from ADOT. The rest of the state designations
would be performed by ADOT with appropriate input from other entities and agencies.
An important component of the Texas approach is the use of GIS-based mapping for all
designated routes. The route maps are available online at the TxDOT Web site in a
consistent format. TxDOT is the “keeper of the maps,” providing single-point access to the
maps, which are maintained and updated on a regular basis. It also ensures easy access to
these maps in the event of a hazardous material accident.
The Colorado approach may be useful to supplement the HMTP process with regard to
enforcement and for routing shipments of radioactive materials.
In general, the planning and route designation, enforcement, and incident response aspects
of hazardous material transport are separate functions. While they may involve many of the
same partners, the designated lead agency and appropriate processes are distinct and
different. Incident response, in particular, includes widely differing scenarios; these require
carefully designated procedures that will work well in stressful situations and extremely
short timeframes. This is different from the planning aspect of route designations, which
requires thorough consultation with all affected parties. It is also different from the routine
aspect of year-in, year-out truck inspection and law enforcement.
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
6.2.1 Recommendations for Route Designation for Hazardous Materials
HDR recommends that ADOT adopt the Texas approach for preparing an HMTP. The
following are viable recommendations to begin the process for the HMTP preparation:
• Use the Texas Administrative Code as a basis for developing and passing similar
statutes.
• Find a sponsor to support a statute to require all trucks transporting hazardous
materials to stop at POE.
27
• Develop a Web site to be housed at ADOT, with GIS-based maps for designated
routes and other suitable information.
• Create an alliance with AZSERC for using the CFSRs already available, and
prioritize corridors for completion of coverage of the state.
• Form an interagency task force consisting of representatives from ADOT, AZSERC,
ADPS, EMD, FHWA, FMCSA, metro Phoenix and Tucson municipalities, and
others as appropriate.
• Develop a public information and partnering process to allow public input to the
rulemaking process.
• Fill in data gaps about air, rail, borders, and intrastate transport of hazardous
materials by performing commodity flow studies (CFSs) for corridors not yet
studied.
• Participate in a peer-to-peer program with TxDOT for experience and technical
transfer related to the HMTP preparation and utilization.
6.2.2 ADOT and AZSERC
ADOT and AZSERC should work cooperatively to find the funding and conduct CFS in the
corridors still lacking studies at the earliest possible opportunity. In the normal course of
events, there may be little reason for these two agencies to cooperate closely, since both
agencies have broad mandates and many responsibilities. In this case, the need for
cooperation, coordination, and mutual understanding cannot be overemphasized. The two
agencies should begin bilateral discussions at the earliest possible opportunity.
6.2.3 Interagency Task Force
ADOT should develop and lead an interagency task force to oversee the development of all
hazardous material transport routes within the state. Many partners could be considered for
membership in this task force, but in the interest of efficiency, the primary members should
be ADOT, DPS, AZSERC, EMD, FHWA, and FMCSA. The task force should have close
linkages to the EMD and that division’s cooperative working group of departments and
divisions as specified in section 3.3 of this report and in ARS 26-305.02. Additional repre-sentation
should include the local governments of the Phoenix and Tucson metro areas,
when appropriate, and could include the air and rail sectors, as well as mining interests.
The task force should work with AZSERC to prioritize CFS corridors that have not yet
been assessed. The task force could serve as an advocate for needed funding for the priority
CFS in the state legislature, if Homeland Security grant funds are no longer available to
AZSERC. The task force would be responsible for assuring coordination among involved
agencies for route designation, enforcement, and incident management.
The task force should work toward filling in data gaps in non-highway modes of
transportation of hazardous materials. The borders of Arizona as well as intrastate
transportation of hazardous materials are other data gap areas for which some kind of
data is required.
28
6.2.4 Borders
It is probably not practical to expect to intercept and inspect all hazardous materials
shipments at Arizona’s borders. However, it may make sense to emphasize the
international border with Mexico. Additional information may be available at this border
(in comparison to internal U.S. borders with neighboring states). For example, the
commodity flow studies owned by AZSERC indicate that explosives and other hazardous
materials related to mining are entering Arizona by truck and rail (which may not be
discovered at existing border checkpoints).
6.2.5 Mining
The widespread presence of mining interests in Arizona indicates a considerable
intrastate component to hazardous material transport. In addition to the mines themselves,
Arizona has facilities that support mining, such as sites for storage, processing, waste
disposal, and manufacturing. The intrastate flows of materials resulting from these
activities need to be incorporated into the various route designation analyses. The
transport of hazardous materials for mining operations is conducted by truck and rail.
6.2.6 Airports
With regard to air transportation of hazmat, it does not appear that information is
currently available for Arizona. Airports that have hazardous materials flowing through
them, together with the types, quantities, sources, and destinations of these materials,
need to be identified.
29
REFERENCES
1. Arizona State Emergency Response Commission.2008. US 60 and US 70 Hazardous
Materials Commodity Flow Study Report. Phoenix, AZ.
2. Arizona State Emergency Response Commission. 2007. US 60 Corridor Hazardous
Materials Commodity Flow Study Report. Phoenix, AZ.
3. Arizona State Emergency Response Commission. 2006. I-8 and I-10 Hazardous
Materials Commodity Flow Study Report. Phoenix, AZ.
4. Arizona State Emergency Response Commission. 2004. Arizona I-40 Corridor
Hazardous Materials Commodity Flow Study Report. Phoenix, AZ.
5. Arizona State Emergency Response Commission. 2003. Santa Cruz County
Hazardous Materials Commodity Flow Study Report. Phoenix, AZ.
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