


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REPORT OF THE ADVISORY  
COMMITTEE ON REORGANIZATION  
OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
IN ARIZONA

Submitted to the

STATE PLANNING BOARD

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## INTRODUCTION

Our state and local governments in Arizona, like those in the other states, have grown and expanded to meet changing conditions and to provide new services without benefit of any comprehensive pre-arranged plan. City government has not yet come to be a major problem in the state, and adequate constitutional basis probably exists for coping with any situation which is likely to develop in that field. In our state and county governments, however, we seem to have the typical decentralized and irresponsible organizations which have come to be the common heritage of most of the states in the Union.

Certain movements which have started during and since the war period, directed toward reorganizing and improving state and county governments, have been greatly stimulated by the tax consciousness, the budget difficulties, and the economic distress which have been experienced during the past five years. These movements have resulted in rather extensive reorganization of state and county governments in many states. They have already aroused some interest and produced some activity in Arizona. And the time seems to be ripe for further intelligent and effective effort in the direction of state and county government reorganization here.

The Committee has given considerable study to the matter, though it has not had the facilities or the time to make a thorough survey of the problem in all its aspects. Our report consists of: (1) observations showing briefly the nature and scope of reorganizations which have been consummated in other states; (2) indications of the nature and scope of the situation in Arizona; (3) certain rather specific recommendations with respect to a few aspects of the problem; and, (4) recommendations that a comprehensive survey be undertaken in order to get the necessary information concerning the existing situation which may serve as the basis of an intelligent program for necessary changes in the interest of efficiency and economy.

The committee desires to emphasize the fact that it has been necessary, in all states in which significant reorganizations have been made, that the aid and stimulus of intelligent, non-partisan organizations of interested citizens groups be available to support and encourage those members of the legislature who are interested in accomplishing comprehensive improvements in state and local government. And we urge that this aspect of the problem shall not be neglected.

Part I.

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO IMPROVEMENT IN THE CENTRAL  
ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM OF THE STATE.

What is the impetus directing attention to state administrative organization? Clearly the financial impetus is at once a dominating force commanding searching inquiry into the work of state administration. An era of steadily diminishing revenue accompanied by increasing demands upon ~~upon~~ state administrative agencies continues to be a cause of concern both to those directly responsible for the performance of state administrative functions, and to those who pay the bill. Thus the taxpayer and state governmental officials are compelled to face the problems attendant to a time when the tax dollar must purchase the greatest administrative services with the least waste and inefficiency.

While efficiency and economy become important goals in a governmental administrative program, yet another important goal is to be insisted upon; that of effective and adequate governmental service to the state's citizens and population.

With these ideas in mind, this survey proposes to be suggestive relative to: (1) Arizona's present administrative organization; (2) problems apparent in Arizona's administrative organization; (3) attempts in Arizona to reorganize the administrative organization; (4) the administrative reorganization movement in other states; (5) some results of administrative reorganization; (6) underlying principles in administrative reorganization programs as exemplified in some twenty states; (7) the need for a thorough and authoritative survey of state administrative organization in Arizona; and (8) some of the objectives to be attained by an authoritative Arizona administrative survey.

ARIZONA'S PRESENT ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

Taking account of both Constitutional and statutory administrative agencies, Arizona seems to have about seventy distinct agencies responsible for the carrying out of the state's multifarious administrative functions. These agencies are denoted as boards, commissions, offices, commissioners, superintendents, and the like. They may be classified on the basis of whether plural or single-headed as: (1) Boards and commissions and (2) officers and commissioners. About forty-one are of the plural-headed or board or commission type, and about twenty-nine are single-headed or of the officer or commissioner type.

On the basis of manner of supplying the chief personnel of these agencies, there are four classes of administrative agencies as follows: (1) The ex-officio type; (2) the agency whose personnel (that is, the chief personnel) is appointed by the Governor alone; (3) the agency the personnel of which is selected by the Governor subject to confirmation by the Senate; and (4) the agency filled by election by the qualified voters.

About eleven of these agencies are of the ex-officio type; that is, are constituted of officials, who, by virtue of holding other state administrative office, take membership on these agencies. Examples of the ex-officio agency are the Board of Health and the State Land Commission. About twenty-nine agencies receive their personnel by virtue of appointment by the Governor alone; while about thirteen agencies are filled by the Governor and the Senate acting in conjunction. Nine agencies of administration are filled by the electors at the polls.

It is to be noted especially that the boards and commission consist of from three to eight members, usually appointed by the Governor either with or without the consent of the Senate for overlapping terms varying from two to eight years.

Viewed historically, Arizona's administrative organization shows a trend toward ever increasing agencies, created "opportunistically" in answer to demands resulting from the state's developing conditions and the insistence of various interests. Originally eleven administrative agencies were provided by the Constitution, but beginning with the First Arizona State Legislature, additional ones have been created. By 1921 (nine years after admission as a state) fifty-two distinct offices and agencies were in existence.<sup>2</sup> In December, 1934 (after thirteen years more) about sixty-nine administrative agencies exist. Thus the trend to increase the total has persisted. Governor Campbell remarked in 1921 that "Little thought evidently was given, at the time of their creation as to the effect their individual operation might have upon the state government as a whole."<sup>3</sup>

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1. A fourth category might be mentioned; that is, those agencies subordinate to another administrative agency, receiving its chief personnel through appointment by the parent agency. Examples of this type are: (1) The Superintendent of the Girl's Home and the Purchasing Agent, appointed by the Board of Directors of State Institutions; and (2) the President of the University of Arizona, appointed by the University Board of Regents.

2. See Special Message of Governor Campbell of February 7, 1921 to Fifth Arizona State Legislature, Special Session. Found in Messages Biennial Veto and Special, Thomas E. Campbell, Governor of Arizona, Jan. 11, 1921 to Mar. 22, 1921, pp. 23 to 29.

3. Ibid., p.23



Considering personnel of these agencies, it is apparent that several hundred persons constituting the state's administrative forces are employed. What semblance of a "merit system" has been provided by which to recruit, examine, appoint, transfer, promote, compensate, and retire the state's public administrative servants? No rules pertaining to a "merit system" of civil service appear on the statute books. On the contrary, an examination of budgets and audits and an ear to the ground indicate that reasons foreign to a "merit system" of classified service dominate the field.

Has Arizona a budget system? The answer is "Yes", of the executive type. By constitutional grant, Arizona's Governor has the "item veto" in appropriation measures,<sup>4</sup> and by law of 1919,<sup>5</sup> he is made responsible for the preparation and submission of a budget. The State Financial Code of 1922 supplemented and strengthened the budgetary procedure.<sup>6</sup>

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4. Constitution of Arizona, Art. V., Sec. 7.

5. The Revised Code of 1922, Arizona, 2607-2613.

6. Arizona Revised Code, 1928, 2614-2631. The purpose and effect of the Financial Code was as follows: First, to abolish all continuing appropriations and special funds, except those expressly set forth; second, to provide that all expenses for every kind of state agency not chargeable to one of the twenty special funds named be paid out of the general fund, and through appropriations authorized only be the appropriation bill; third, to enact that indirect revenue could not be used, unless a specific amount was appropriated from it except that the proceeds of certain indirect taxes might be apportioned in toto for the University of Arizona and the highway account, without the amount appropriated being specified; twenty special funds named be paid out of the general appropriation bill, at the end of the current fiscal year after the Legislature adjourned any balance unspent or unincumbered of an appropriation previously made should lapse and return to the general fund, except that balance of such appropriations made for the University of Arizona, the roads, or for building purposes of any nature should be carried over and be used in ensuing fiscal years. Hunt v. Callaghan, (1927), .... Arizona .... 257 Pac. 648

## PROBLEMS APPARENT IN ARIZONA'S ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

What specific defects are apparent in these agencies when fitted into a unified pattern of administrative organization? In the first place, they are nearly all independent of one another and in many cases they are subject to no direct and effective control by the Governor. It is true that the Governor has in a number of instances the power of appointment and removal, many of the more important appointments are made with the approval of the Senate; while in many important instances, the filling of the agency is entirely removed from him. In nearly every case of appointment in which the Governor has a part the officers appointed serve for longer terms than that of the Governor.

Secondly, not only are the administrative offices and agencies widely scattered, but the main functions of the government are not co-ordinated. Little or no successful attempt has been made to departmentalize the work of the government. Though the Governor is considered the "Chief Executive" under the Constitution, a term which implies full power and authority to control the administrative organization, he is in reality far from possessing such power and authority. By law the Governor has fixed upon him the responsibility for budget making and for carrying out the state's financial plan. Unified financial planning with a great number of independent and scattered administrative agencies is impossible; and even if it were possible, the Governor is in no position to carry out the budget plan since he cannot control the organization with which he must do the work.

Third, it seems apparent that a careful and authoritative survey of the actual functioning of the Arizona budget system would be beneficial. Answers to the following questions would seem pertinent: (1) Is the state budget system not working because of (a) inertia of state officers; (b) shifting of responsibility in budget planning; (c) political squabbles and deadlocks; (d) obsolete machinery and antiquated methods of state government? (2) Are state officials in many cases disregarding the budget process or performing it in a perfunctory manner? (3) Is "passing the buck" being practised? Oklahoma is a very good example of the wrecking of the budget system by political squabbling. Then to be stressed is the statement that correct governmental organization and methods are very essential to sound financial planning and the proper conduct of the public business.

In the fourth place, an authoritative survey is suggested to portray the practices relative to the recruitment, retention, and retirement of the state's administrative public servants. Some of the following questions might well be answered: (1) Are there present practices relative to recruitment and dismissal which are detrimental to the morale of the public servant, which reflect themselves adversely in the service and work of the public servant?

- (2) Does the failure to classify the public service positions result in inequitable conditions relative to: (a) amount of work required; (b) pay received; (c) responsibility entailed?
- (3) To what extent does the present system produce jealousies and non-cooperation within the family of public servants?
- (4) Is the present system entitled to be called a "spoils system"?

Finally, let it be recalled that Governor Campbell in 1921 made rather a sweeping condemnation of the state's administrative system. To what extent is this true today? Has not the continuous increase in the number of administrative agencies tended to increase the unwieldiness of the structure? Does not the pressure of interests tend to increase the demand to sacrifice the welfare of the general public in insisting on the satisfaction of individual desires in administration? Is it not impossible to achieve real economy and efficiency without fundamental reform of administrative structures and financial administration? In the words of Governor Campbell, "... Experience demonstrates in many instances that our machinery is antiquated and our methods of administration cumbersome, unwieldy, expensive, and inefficient. ...The evils resultant from such a loss and unbusinesslike system daily become more manifest. Where there should be harmony, discord exists; where there should be economy, there is extravagance; where there should be efficiency, there is incapacity and a slowing down of the machinery of government. In some instances, there is a patent lack of sufficient authority, and in others too much authority or the inclination to assume powers which should not rightfully be exercised. From the standpoint of economy the situation is more vicious. Duplication and overlapping are always expensive, but doubly so when their ramifications extend into every form of state endeavor. Practices which would never be countenanced by private business enterprises have grown to be fixed and accepted habits with us. There is a woeful lack of coordination and our efforts and services are disjointed, instead of being connectedly applied for the common good."<sup>6</sup>

#### ATTEMPTS IN ARIZONA TO REORGANIZE THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

Certain notable attempts to reorganize Arizona's administrative machine have been made, beginning in 1921. In his biennial message to the 1921 Arizona State Legislature, Governor Campbell recommended administrative consolidation.<sup>7</sup> He then secured Mr. A.E. Buck, a staff member of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research to prepare an administrative reorganization plan for the state. On February 7, he

<sup>6</sup>. Governors Campbell's Special Message to Fifth Arizona State Legislature, Feb. 7, 1921. See Op. cit., pp. 23-24

<sup>7</sup>. Op. cit., pp. 8-9

submitted his plan to the Legislature accompanied by a special message urging its adoption. This plan proposed to consolidate almost forty statutory administrative agencies in eight departments, as follows:<sup>8</sup> (1) Military Affairs; (2) Finance; (3) Agriculture; (4) Public Welfare; (5) Public Works and Buildings; (6) Reclamation and Irrigation; (7) Education and Registration; (8) Labor and Industry. These departments were to be administered by single heads appointed by the Governor and serving at his pleasure. A bill embodying the plan was passed by the Senate, but House Bill embodying the same plan apparently died on the calendar of the Committee of the Whole House after being favorably reported out from the committee to which it was referred.

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During the 1927 session of the Legislature, Mr. Elijah Allen, a member of the House, introduced a bill (House Bill No. 23) to provide for the reorganization of the state administration. This bill was practically identical with the one introduced in 1921. This time it received favorable action by the House, but was defeated by the Senate.

In the Tenth Legislature (1934), Senator Pomeroy was instrumental in the sponsorship of a plan for administrative reorganization and consolidation.<sup>10</sup> Under this plan ten departments were proposed as follows: (1) Health and Welfare; (2) Executive; (3) Finance; (4) Husbandry; (5) Conservation; (6) Public Works; (7) Corporations; (8) Industrial Relations; (9) Public Utilities. It was similar to the earlier plans in that departmentalization was provided with single-headed control; appointment being vested in the Governor. This measure also failed of legislative enactment.

Among the objections raised against such plans in Arizona are the following: (1) The plan is too revolutionary; (2) it will create too many appointive offices; (3) it promises to lay the foundation for building a political machine; (4) it will be more expensive to maintain.<sup>11</sup> These objections in view of the experiences of states where such plans have been in operation for several years, seem to beg the question, for the most part. In relation to these attempts at administrative reorganization, there is evidence that they were accompanied by a lack of sufficient favorable publicity; that was a lack of sufficient intelligent public opinion to lend sufficient "push".

#### THE ADMINISTRATION REORGANIZATION MOVEMENT IN OTHER STATES

Beginning with Illinois in 1917, more than twenty states have adopted comprehensive plans of state administrative consolidation. Within the present era of depressed economic conditions, such states as Kentucky, Colorado,

8. The plan was introduced in the Senate as Senate Bill 125, in the House as House Bill 163; see Journals of the Fifth State Legislature of Arizona, 1921. The plan itself may be found in Messages Biennial Veto and Special by Thos. E. Campbell, Governor of Arizona, pp. 29-45

9. See other side for note

9. An examination of Journals of the Fifth State Legislature of Arizona, 1921 reveals that the Committee of the Whole House failed to cast a vote of record on the measure. However, A. E. Buck in his ADMINISTRATIVE CONSOLIDATION IN STATE GOVERNMENTS (4th edition, 1928) states that the Arizona Senate passed the plan but it was defeated in the House by a single vote.
10. Senate Bill No. 45 and House Bill No. 82
11. See Governor Campbell's Special Message of Feb. 7, 1921, op. Cit., pp. 26-27

Maine, Georgia, North Carolina, and Indiana have adopted such plans. Moreover, several other states have given serious consideration to administrative reorganization and consolidation plans. Among these are Oregon, Iowa, Delaware, Connecticut, Arkansas, Nevada, Oklahoma, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.

Illinois is usually considered the pioneer in the reorganization movement, inaugurating the first comprehensive reorganization plan in 1917 with the adoption of the Illinois civil administrative code. A brief resume of the Illinois code provisions, and those of other states follow:

### Illinois

The first comprehensive plan was adopted in 1917. Preceded by a survey of the Committee on Efficiency and Economy headed by John A. Fairlie of the University of Illinois. Upon the report of this committee there was no immediate action. The reorganization became, however, a big issue in Frank A. Lowden's campaign for Governor in 1916. The Civil Code was submitted to the legislature in 1917, with the following provisions: (1) It abolished over 100 agencies, consolidating their functions in nine departments as follows: (a) Finance; (b) Agriculture; (c) Labor (d) Mines and Minerals; (e) Public Works and Buildings (f) Public Welfare; (g) Public Health; (h) Trade and Commerce; (i) Registration; (2) each department director appointed by the Governor with approval by the Senate for a four year term; (3) quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers were vested in advisory boards and commissions. Later two additional departments (Purchases and Construction and Conservation) were created and certain of the functions of the original nine departments were transferred to them. This was in 1925 on the recommendation of Governor Small.

### Idaho

Consolidation plan was adopted in 1919 as an emergency measure, though no preliminary survey was made. Fifty agencies were abolished and their functions were transferred to nine departments as follows: (1) Commerce and Industry; (2) Finance; (3) Immigration; (4) Labor and Statistics; (5) Law Enforcement; (6) Public Investments; (7) Public Welfare; (8) Public Works; (9) Reclamation. Each department has a single head (Commissioner) appointed and removable by the Governor.

### Nebraska

Civil Administrative Code adopted in 1918, though an abortive attempt was made in 1915. Governor McKelvie was elected on the program in 1918. The Code abolished numerous minor agencies and established six departments as follows: Finance, Labor, Agriculture, Trade and Commerce, Public Welfare, Public Works. Under the plan were retained eight constitutional officers and four constitutional boards. The secretary of each department is appointed by the Governor

for a four year term. In 1920 occurred a revision, adding four administrative departments.

#### Massachusetts

Previous to the adoption of the Administrative Consolidation Act of 1919 were two surveys by special agencies; first by the Commission on Economy and Efficiency created in 1912, which reported in November, 1914; and second, by a special committee of the Legislature, which reported in 1918. The provisions of the act are as follows: (1) Creation of four departments under constitutional officers, and sixteen departments under single, dual, and triple heads. These heads are appointed by the Governor with the approval of a council, an independent body of nine members.

#### Washington

Governor Hart authorized to have an administrative code drafted in 1920. The code was presented in 1921 and was adopted with the following provisions: sixty-nine agencies were abolished and ten departments were created. Each department is headed by a single officer, appointed by the Governor with approval of the Senate. The ten directors with the Governor constitute an administrative board with supervisory powers.

#### Ohio

By virtue of recommendations of a joint Legislative Committee on Administrative Reorganization established in 1919, a definite program was passed by the legislature in 1921. The features of the plan are: six departments, headed by elective constitutional officers; eight departments administered by directors appointed by the Governor with Senate consent.

#### California

Reorganization agitation began in 1911 when a state board of control began to function. The Governor in 1918 appointed a commission to further the study of possibilities. A plan for consolidation was proposed by the Tax Payers Association in 1919. No action for adoption of a program until 1921, when Governor Stephens recommended the passage of bills providing consolidation. The provisions of the program adopted are as follows: The creation of five departments, the appointment of directors by the Governor, the selection of the minor administrative officials by the merit system, and the alteration with a view to its improvement, of the civil service commission. However, the plan passed in 1921 was a make-shift, which took advantage of existing departments or agencies, rearranging them without the abolition of many agencies necessary for an effective

consolidation program. In 1927 Governor Young recommended that the work of consolidation should again be taken up and carried forward. In response to this, the legislature enacted a number of laws refashioning most of the departments created in 1921 and creating four new departments. This reorganization became effective as of July 29, 1927. The nine departments are finance, education, agriculture, public works, institutions, industrial relations, natural resources, public health, and social welfare. There are still thirty-nine independent agencies which are not included in these departments, thus leaving further consolidation to be desired.

#### Maryland

Agitation for reorganization began in 1916; though it was not until 1920 that the Legislature authorized a survey. Governor Ritchie appointed a committee of 100, which reported a plan, which the legislature accepted in principle in 1922. The plan in Maryland provides for the creation of nineteen departments, the heads of which are appointed by the Governor with confirmation by the Senate. Four types of departments are provided as follows: (1) The type headed by elective officers of which there are three (this being an exception to appointment by the Governor with confirmation by the Senate); (2) the type headed by non-salaried boards, of which there are six; the type headed by paid boards, of which there are five; (4) the type headed by single directors, of which there are five. The result is a rather decentralized system.

#### Tennessee

This was the first state in the South to reorganize. The movement began in 1921, became an issue of the campaign of 1922, augmented by severe financial conditions in the state. A survey of state administration was authorized and was made by Mr. A. E. Buck of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research. The resulting reorganization bill was endorsed by the legislature in 1923. The provisions are as follows: The creation of eight departments, the heads of the departments appointed by the Governor alone, and the Governor thus made the center of administrative organization.

#### Vermont

A state board of control was created in 1917, which employed Mr. A.E. Buck to make a comprehensive of the state's administrative organization. The results of the survey with recommendations were submitted to the Legislature in 1921. A consolidation bill was passed in 1923 with the following provisions: Seven departments were established, part of the departments headed by single commissioners, and part with a dual head, all the the heads appointed by the Governor with confirmation by the Senate.

### Pennsylvania

Governor Pinchot was elected in 1922 pledged to clean up "the financial and administrative mess". An administrative code was adopted in 1923. The plan has the following provisions: (1) It brought together 105 independent administrative agencies under fourteen departments and three commissions, leaving undisturbed, however, twenty independent boards and commissions; (2) centralized purchasing was provided; (3) salaries and positions were standardized; (4) executive budget was provided. The code was revised in 1927 under Governor Pinchot's successor. Two new departments were created. As the organization now stands, the sixteen code departments are state, justice, public instruction, internal affairs, military affairs, agriculture, forests and waters, labor and industry, health, highways, welfare, property and supplies, revenue, mines, banking, and insurance. The three commissions are game, fish, and public service. The heads of the departments are appointed by the Governor with the approval of the Senate.

### Minnesota

In 1913 the Governor of Minnesota appointed a commission which conducted a study of the administration of the state. In 1914 this commission published two reports recommending administrative consolidation and the adoption of a budget system. Nothing was achieved in the way of adoption until 1925 after a second survey and study, this time by an interim commission of the legislature. The reorganization act of 1925 establishes an executive council and thirteen departments, as follows: (1) Administration and finance; (2) conservation; (3) dairy and food; (4) agriculture; (5) highways; (6) education; (7) health; (8) commerce; (9) labor and industry; (10) taxation; (11) taxation; (12) rural credit, and (13) drainage and waters.

### South Dakota

Early in 1922 the New York Bureau of Municipal Research made a survey of the state government and recommended a complete reorganization of the state administration into eleven departments, which would perform the functions of some eighty existing administrative agencies. No favorable action came, however, until 1925 when only partial reorganization was adopted. Following Governor Gunderson's recommendations, the 1925 legislature passed an act creating a department of finance and a department of agriculture. Nine existing administrative agencies were consolidated in the former department and eighteen in the latter. Each department is headed by a secretary who is appointed by the Governor with the Senate's consent.

### New York

This state furnishes an example of the most extensive

reorganization program probably yet undertaken by any state government. The movement for administrative consolidation began in 1915 with an extensive survey of the existing conditions. The agitation continued until 1927 when the present administrative consolidation plan went into effect. A series of laws was passed by the 1926 legislature establishing eighteen departments, with the plan taking effect in 1927. These departments are: (1) Executive (2) audit and control; (3) taxation and finance; (4) law; (5) state; (6) public works; (7) conservation; (8) agriculture and markets; (9) labor; (10) education (11) health; (12) mental hygiene; (13) charities; (14) correction; (15) public service; (16) banking; (17) insurance; (18) civil service. Most of the eighteen departments have single administrative heads, though the organization is not as uniform as it might have been made. The Governor has fourteen of the departments under his direct supervision. He appoints the heads of these departments with the advice and consent of the Senate.

### Virginia

Survey and research relative to the Virginia situation began in 1916. In 1926 the New York Bureau of Municipal Research made a survey which resulted in recommendation of administrative consolidation. In 1927 an act was passed resulting in reorganization of the administrative machinery. Twelve departments were created as follows: (1) Taxation; (2) Finance; (3) highways; (4) education; (5) corporations; (6) labor and industry; (7) agriculture and immigration; (8) conservations and development; (9) health; (10) public welfare; (11) law; and (12) workmen's compensation.

### Colorado

Agitation for consolidation began in Colorado in 1915. In 1922 the New York Bureau of Municipal Research began a survey which resulted in a plan for consolidation. It was not until 1933 that a plan was adopted. The Colorado Administrative Code, passed in 1933, provides six departments, as follows: (1) Executive; (2) finance and taxation; (3) auditing; (4) law; (5) education; (6) state. An executive council is provided, consisting of the Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer, Auditor, and Attorney-general. Budget making, purchasing, administrative control of allocations and expenditures, investigation of duplications of work, and standardization are duties of the Council.

### Indiana

Governor Jackson, immediately following his election to the office in November, 1924, appointed a committee of three members to make a survey of the boards and commissions of the state to determine "which of them, from the standpoint of economy or efficiency could be abolished or consolidated". It was not until 1933 that a measure providing for consolidation on a large scale was passed. By this measure eight departments are established, as follows: Executive, state, audit and

control, treasury, law, education, public works, and commerce and industry. The Governor is named as the sole head of the executive department and a member of each of the boards placed in charge of the other seven departments.

### Kentucky

Kentucky seems to be the latest adherent to the group of administratively consolidated states, having enacted legislation to this effect in 1934. In 1922 Griffenhagen and Associates of Chicago were engaged to make a comprehensive survey of the existing situation. A two-volume printed report of 1,379 pages was presented and submitted to the 1924 legislature. The Act of 1934 provides for a number of departments and centralizes executive power in the Governor.

### CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN CONCERNING THE REORGANIZATION MOVEMENT.

Some twenty states have actually adopted plans of consolidated administrative systems. A number of the reorganization schemes now in effect are so complex as to indicate compromise of the basic principles of reorganization. Failure to go the entire distance along the path of reform is due in part to the need for compromise. Every reorganization movement has a multitude of enemies. Those who seem likely to lose prestige, positions or patronage by the change combine with those who honestly believe that the proposed plan will not serve the public interest; the ultra-conservatives, the defenders of the sacred status quo, also join the opposition. In order to get sufficient support, in many states it has been necessary to compromise, taking half loaf.

In this movement for reorganization, there has been a general preference for statutory reform, rather than Constitutional reform. This has meant, in most of the cases, only partial consolidation because Constitutions, as a rule, provide numerous administrative officers. Where Constitutions, have left the assignment of duties to the legislative bodies, it has been the rule to consolidate many of the duties of Constitutional officers in the reorganized departments. A survey of the experiences of the various states dealing with reorganization convinces one that the statutory method of consolidating has been the easier one. It requires no formal expression of approval by the voters, and it cannot be blocked by a persistent legislative minority. Only two states --Massachusetts and New York--have amended their constitutions in order to facilitate administrative consolidation. This leads to the statement that statutory consolidation is better than none at all, but also it is to be remembered that, without Constitutional change, administrative consolidation needs necessarily be compromised.

Another conclusion is that the various administrative programs have resulted in the adoption of plans, which can be grouped into two categories: one of these is typified in the so-called NEW JERSEY PLAN and the other in the ILLINOIS PLAN. The latter has by far the greater number of adherents. The New Jersey plan is characterized by a consolidation of many services into several departments, with departments ordinarily headed by boards, the members of which are usually appointed by the Governor and the Senate. The terms of board members are very frequently longer than the Governor's term and they are almost invariably overlapping. The Governor's power to make removals is carefully restricted. The departments, then, are practically independent of his control, and the term "chief executive" as applied to him is something of misnomer. In addition to New Jersey, Wisconsin and Michigan are the states following this plan. The chief characteristics of the Illinois plan, on the other hand, are departmentalization with the departments headed by single-headed administrators, appointed by the Governor with the consent of the Senate. Individually, the directors are responsible to the Governor for their departments; collectively, they serve as the Governor's cabinet. The different functions of each department are administered by superintendents, bureau chiefs, or similarly titled assistants, who are responsible to the director, although appointed by the Governor and the Senate. Paid boards are attached to the appropriate departments for the performance of quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions. In addition, unsalaried and advisory boards are utilized for certain services, such as agriculture, highways, and public welfare. An important feature of the system is found in the finance department, which is in reality the Governor's staff agency, through which he is enabled to control the activities in the various departments. The essential functions of this staff agency include the preparation of the annual budget, the examination and approval or disapproval of vouchers and bills of the various departments, and centralized control over purchasing of departmental supplies and materials. The states following the Illinois plan in the main are California, Georgia, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Indiana, and Kentucky.

#### RESULTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION.

Competent observers make specific and apparently well founded claims in favor of the actual achievements of reorganized administrative systems. The concrete achievements in the form of better roads, improved streets, bigger markets, lower death rates are recorded in many places and are attributed, in part, to the improved administrative machines.

A major objective in the reorganization movement is economy. Has it been achieved? For Illinois there is

considerable testimony in the affirmative. Governor Lowden writes,<sup>12</sup> "The Code went into effect on July 1, 1917, and we have been operating under it ever since. Appropriations made by our General Assembly, two years ago, were based upon pre-war prices and conditions. And yet we will have completed the biennium of June 30, (1919) without a deficiency in any department under the Code, with the exception of the single item of supplies for the charitable and penal institutions in the department of public welfare. And the deficit in this item will be more than counterbalanced by the unexpended balances in other departments at the close of the fiscal year". A.E. Buck of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research, in 1924, said of the Illinois plan,<sup>13</sup> "This system has been in operation over seven years, and during the time it has proven the means of systemizing the state's business, of giving the people better service at less cost, and it has demonstrated ability to withstand successfully political changes in administration." In Nebraska a special session of the legislature was called to reduce the appropriations for the biennium of 1921-1923 by \$2,000,000 after over two year's operation of the new code.<sup>14</sup> A most remarkable showing is recorded in Pennsylvania, where Governor Pinchot wiped out a deficit of \$29,000,000 within two years.<sup>15</sup>

Claims relative to savings in dollars and cents cannot always be taken at face value, perhaps; especially when made by the administrators themselves. It is to be noted, further, that all saving may not be always considered desirable, and sometimes a favorable showing is made only by the postponement of desirable expenditures, which later mount higher even on account of postponement. However, states Leonard D. White (now a member of the United States Civil Service Commission), "...Making all allowances it seems clear that the reorganized governments can rightfully claim to be more economical than their predecessors".

In addition to the claim for economy under the integrated systems, is the claim of greater efficiency in their favor. The departmentalized systems have tended to define efficiency in terms of administrative services and problems, and are setting up continuing mechanisms (such as fiscal supervision, unit costs, standardization, and so on) which reveal efficiency or waste. This in turn permits the establishment of standards of performance with sufficient preciseness and simplicity to enable public opinion to insist upon their observance. It has been the occasion for the release of a new spirit. Says Governor Davis of Idaho, "This is the dawn of a new era in civil

12. Lowden, F.O. "Problems of Civil Administration", North American Review, Vol. 210, pp.186-192 (1919)

13. Buck, A.E., Administrative Consolidation in State Governments p.9 (1924)

14. Buck, A.E. "Nebraska's Reorganized State Administration", National Municipal Review, Vol. 11, pp. 192-200 (1922)

15. See Pennsylvania Budget for 1925-1927, p. iii.

administration. ...I have actually seen the enthusiasm, the exchange of ideas; the feeling of added responsibility; as I sit in cabinet meetings and have noted the difference between the old regime and the new, I have come to believe the day past when the worn out, creaking system of state government will do. " 16

Leonard D. White is responsible for the statement that, "The new systems are laying the base for the next developments. These may be expected to include: (1) The more complete recognition of the importance and function of the expert; (2) the development of professionalism and the interchange of personnel; (3) inter-governmental cooperation, perhaps especially in the leagues of municipalities and between the states and the United States. None of these tendencies could develop with the handicap of the old type of administration." 17

Moreover, it is perhaps significant that not one of the reorganized systems has been abandoned. In the case of Nebraska is recorded an attempt on the part of Governor Bryan to dismember the consolidated administrative machine, but this attempt was unsuccessful. Since this attack in 1923, the administrative organization has continued to operate successfully. 18

#### UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES IN ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION PLANS.

It is reasonable to assume that the experiences of these several states, extending over a period of several years, have tended to crystalize and formulate certain rather definite principles with regard to administrative consolidation. What are some of these principles?

The means which the present reorganization movement is employing include: (1) The concentration of power to make conclusive administrative decisions; (2) the development of an independent review of administrative decisions, each of the foregoing involving the principle of subordination and the development of a hierarchy; (3) the more precise definition of responsibility, and (4) the greater coordination of effort, which is reflected chiefly in the reassignment of agencies to combine them into homogeneous units. 19

16. Davis, D.W. "How Administrative Consolidation is Working in Idaho", National Municipal Review, vol. 8, pp. 615-620 (1926).

17. White L.D., Public Administration, p.202, (1926)

18. When Governor Bryan came into office, in 1923, he attacked the code organization as being "undemocratic" and proposed the dismemberment of most of the code departments. The legislature, however, was not persuaded to take any action toward repealing the code or nullifying any of its provisions. During Governor Bryan's term, some of the code departments were without directing heads, owing to political difficulties and shortage of operating funds. In 1925, however, Governor McMullen restored the code organization to its former standing as a useful and efficient part of the state government. See Buck, A.E., Adm. Consolidation in State Governments, pp. 13-14

19. See White, L. D., Public Administration pp. 192-193 (1926)

The Pennsylvania Commission on Constitutional Amendment and Revision suggested the following generally admitted principles: (1) The work of the executive branch should all be concentrated in a limited number of departments, each directly responsible to the Governor; (2) the Governor should have freedom to devote his time to general direction and supervisory control; (3) the Governor should have the power to appoint all persons acting as heads of departments, except of the department or departments created to act as a check on expenditures; (4) one person should not be an officer or exercise functions in two departments; (5) appropriations for expenditures should be under an executive state budget system.<sup>20</sup>

It seems rather certain that the past decade and a half have tended to develop certain standards with regard to administrative reorganization and consolidation, which can be said not to be merely theoretical, but are based upon experience and supported by actual practice in several states. Four such principles are herewith differentiated and explained briefly.

First, departmentalization of administrative agencies along functional lines is an important principle. This calls for the grouping of all agencies performing services of like and similar functional nature into a few orderly departments. Proper integration within the department requires sub-grouping of closely related work under appropriate bureaus and divisions. The number and character of departments is determined by the conditions within the state government, but it should be noted that the number of such departments should not be too great.

Second, fixed and definite lines of responsibility for all departmental work should be provided. A department head-

ed by a single officer appointed and removable by the Governor places beyond question the responsibility for the administrative work of the state. This makes the Governor in fact, as well as in theory, the responsible chief executive of the state. The heads of the various departments are called upon to form a cabinet, meeting with the Governor for planning and cooperation. Within the department, realization of the principle calls for the placing of responsibility for closely related work upon single bureau or division heads, these heads being single officers, directly responsible to the Governor.

Third, proper coordination of the terms of office of administrative officials is essential. The four year term for the Governor seems preferable, and the terms of the department heads, if they are definitely fixed at all, should be carefully adjusted with reference to that of the Governor. It would seem that department heads should not have longer terms than that of the Governor, and it seems

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20. Lewis, William Draper, Memoranda and Briefs, No. 22, Pennsylvania Commission on Constitutional Amendment and Revision, Journal of Proceedings, vol. 2, p.91C (1919).

preferable to have them serve at the Governor's pleasure. Experience indicates that this exception may be made; The members of boards or commissions performing quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial, inspectional, or advisory functions under the departments or otherwise may be appointed for longer terms than that of the Governor.

Fourth, plural-headed agencies, as boards or commissions, are undesirable as purely administrative agencies. Boards in the purely administrative capacity are generally found inefficient owing to division of powers and absence of initiative and responsibility. Ex officio boards are almost never effective in the highest degree. Whenever there are quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial, advisory, or inspectional functions within a department, a board may with advantage be attached to the department to perform any one of these functions.<sup>21</sup>

#### NEED FOR A THOROUGH AND AUTHORITATIVE SURVEY OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION IN ARIZONA.

A diagnosis based on attentive and detailed examination of Arizona's administrative organization would seem mandatory to an attempt to prescribe for its administrative ills. That certain ills exist is apparent, and the nature of a few of them has been roughly indicated here within. But specificness and detailed concreteness can be made with assuredness only after an authoritative examination.

A few of the major problems inviting examination are indicated to be as follows: (1) The nature and extent of over-lapping functions that is, functions of similar or like nature, the performance of which is vested in two or more independent agencies; (2) the extent and nature of "passing the buck" relative to administrative functions by two or more agencies or by the members of a plural-headed agency; (3) the existence and extent of undernourished administrative functions, which, from the viewpoint of the public, need to be strengthened; (4) the determination of whether the present decentralized administrative system is conducive to placing consideration of the state's general citizenry (recipients of administrative services) in a back-seat position, as measured by actual administrative practices; (5) actual practices relative to the state's administrative personnel (the recruitment, examination, appointment, compensation, promotion, discipline, removal, and retirement of the several hundred administrative public servants--see p.4 of this study); (6) the nature and extent of financial waste as measured by standards of sound auditing and accounting; (7) present inefficiency as

21. See Buck, A.E., Adm. Consolidation in the State Gov'ts., pp. 5-6 (1928)

determined by accepted standards of governmental efficiency; (8) the actual functioning (or failure to function) of the state's budget and accounting system; (9) the practices relative to centralized purchasing of the state's administrative materials and supplies; and (10) the general tone of the state's administrative machinery and its functioning in terms of responsiveness to public need, accountability, and efficiency as a unified organization.

What precedent exists for such a suggestion? Who is responsible for sponsoring it?

In the first place, by far a majority of the states have recently authorized and sponsored missions of searching inquiry, finding answers to the above questions, as well as for others of importance. A perusal of the summaries with regard to the states now in the column of reorganized consolidated administrative systems will show that these states, almost without exception, preceded their consolidated programs by comprehensive surveys. In addition, many states which have not yet adopted such programs have made authoritative surveys. It seems conclusive that the practice of the states ESTABLISHES THE PRINCIPLE THAT A PRELIMINARY STEP TO ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION IS AN EXPERT AND AUTHORITATIVE DIAGNOSIS OF EXISTING SITUATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT. Further, it is entirely possible that an agency authorized to survey the state's administrative organization could, at the same time, be empowered to make a much needed survey of Arizona county government and administration. It is not without precedent that state and local taxation problems may, simultaneously, be examined for comprehensive report.

Those states which have recently authorized and promoted comprehensive administrative surveys and the agency utilized are as follows:<sup>22</sup>

New Jersey. Two surveys of state government and one of local government and finances have been made in recent years. A survey of the organization and administration (a publication of 381 pages) and an audit of financial affairs (a 182 page publication) of the state government were made by the National Institute of Public Administration in December, 1929. The survey of local finances and government was made under the general direction of H. L. Lutz of Princeton University with a staff from Griffenhagen and Associates of Chicago.

New York. Surveys of state and local finance and of local government in 1930 and 1932 were made by a temporary state commission headed by Robert M. Haig of Columbia University, and by the National Institute of Public Administration.

Maine. A report on State Administrative Consolidation in Maine was presented in October, 1930. The survey was made by the National Institute of Public Administration at the

<sup>22</sup>. See Fairlie, J.S., "Studies on State and Local Government", American Political Science Review, vol. XXVII, pp. 317-329, (Apr. , 1933)

request of Governor William T. Harding.

New Hampshire. The Report on a Survey of the Organization and Administration of the State, County, and Town Governments of New Hampshire was submitted in December, 1932 and is a substantial volume of 633 pages. It was prepared by the Institute for Government Research of the Brookings Institute (Washington, D.C.) at the request of Governor John G. Winant.

Arkansas. In August, 1920, a report of Findings and Recommendations on a Survey of the Administrative Structure of the State Government of Arkansas (a publication of 174 pages) was prepared by the National Institute of Public Administration.

Georgia. A survey of Georgia's government was made by Griffenhagen and Associates in 1922-1923, which has recently been extended.

North Carolina. A comprehensive survey of state administration and county government was made by the Institute for Government Research of the Brookings Institute in 1930, and was published in two volumes.

Virginia. A survey of state and county administrative government by the Institute of Public Administration was made just previous to 1927. In December, 1931 a commission on county government carried the survey further.

Mississippi. The report on a Survey of State and County Government in Mississippi was made in February, 1932, by the Institute for Government Research of the Brookings Institution. (a volume of 971 pages.)

Alabama. Under an act of January, 1931, a survey of state and county governments of Alabama was made by the Institute for Government Research of the Brookings Institution. The report, submitted in 1932, aggregates 1,930 pages in five volumes.

Texas. A survey of state and local government in Texas was made previous to 1933 by Griffenhagen and Associates, being thus authorized by a joint legislative committee on organization and economy.

Iowa.<sup>23</sup> A survey of state and local government in Iowa was begun early in February, 1933 by the Brookings Institute for Government Research, being authorized by Iowa's 45th General Assembly. The report was published in January, 1934 as a volume of 650 pages.

Wyoming. In February, 1933, the Wyoming legislature provided for a special joint committee to survey the state's government functions. This committee employed Griffenhagen

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23. Porter, Kirk H., "Surveys of State Administrative Organization: Iowa and Wyoming", Amer. Pol. Sci. Review, vol. XXVIII, pp. 481-488 (JJe., 1934).

and Associates of Chicago to make the survey, which was completed and published (December, 1933) in two volumes, aggregating about 900 pages.

In answer to the query: Who is responsible for sponsoring these surveys?----the answer seems to be an official state agency, as the Legislature or the Governor or both, though always the aid and persistent pressure of organized groups of progressive citizens has been indispensable.

SOME OBJECTIVES TO BE ATTAINED BY AN AUTHORITATIVE ARIZONA ADMINISTRATIVE SURVEY.

Throughout this study and report are indications of objectives to be realized from such a survey. In achieving specificness and concreteness concerning that which we now have in administrative organization, bases for accurate measurement of administrative economy, efficiency, and service are founded. Such information and knowledge are essential for the preparation of an intelligent public opinion to aid Arizona governmental officials to plan for the future of a greater and better Arizona.

Part II.

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT  
TO IMPROVEMENT IN COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN  
ARIZONA.

THE MOVEMENT FOR REORGANIZATION OF COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN  
OTHER STATES.

Local governments, in the United States, like our state governments, have grown and expanded to meet new needs without any pre-arranged plan, and in doing so they have developed some serious weaknesses which interfere with their efficient and economical operation. In 1888 James Bryce, a friendly foreign observer and student of American government, wrote that the government of cities was the "one conspicuous failure of the American people". At that time our city governments had reached the depths of corruption and inefficiency under the old "weak mayor" type of the mayor-council plan of government, in which there was no definite headship or responsibility for efficient city administration. About 1900, however, a strong movement set in to reorganize and improve our city governments. The commission plan, the city manager plan, and the newer "strong mayor" type of the mayor-council plan have swept the country. And Mr. Bryce in 1921 wrote that he was "astonished at the change for the better which had been made in our city governments. These plans have centralized and concentrated power, control, and responsibility in the hands of a few conspicuous city officials, and have greatly increased the efficiency of hundreds of our city governments.

County government has long been called the "dark continent of American politics". It has been referred to as "ramshackle county government," and recently it has been called the "last stand of the machine politician". That is, during the years when our state and city governments have been undergoing considerable revamping and reorganization, county government has been allowed to go on in all its well-known inefficiency. Within recent years, however, considerable attention has been given to a program of improving county government, and especially during the years of the depression, a movement to reorganize county governments has made such progress that it gives promise of developing the country as the city reorganization movement has done.

Several major defects are generally recognized to exist in our county governments throughout the country: (1) many counties are too small or too poor to provide certain services effectively and economically; (2) county governments and city governments concerning the same territory in many regions lead to unnecessary duplication and expense; (3) there are so many independent elective county officials that there is no effective concentration of power and responsibility; there is no head to county government; (4) appointments of county officials and employees are made in nearly all counties under the "spoils system"; (5) county governments in nearly all states are required by state constitutions

to be all exactly alike, irrespective of varying needs. Naturally, the principle efforts to improve county government are being directed toward correcting these defects.

Consolidation:-- A movement to consolidate county and city governments has made slight progress. The most notable and complete city-county consolidation is that of Denver county and Denver city in Colorado. There all the work of county government has been taken over by the consolidated government and all the old county officials have been abolished. Other cases less complete of city-county consolidations are Baltimore, San Francisco, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston.

In several states provision has been made for joint county cooperation in the maintenance of hospitals, poor houses, and roads. And in a few states legal provision has been made for optional complete consolidation of adjoining counties. This is true in Texas, and under a special act of the Georgia legislature Fulton County consolidated with Milton and Campbell counties in 1932. Local pride and the opposition of county office-holders, politicians, and conservative folk have prevented any substantial progress in county consolidation, however.

"Home Rule" for Counties:-- In nearly every state the law provides for the same type of government for practically all counties, as used to be the case with city governments for some time. In the field of city government, however, state laws and constitutions have now been so altered as to permit individual cities to select, more or less freely, the particular type of government organization which they desire, several states allowing cities practically unrestricted freedom in framing, adopting, and amending their own charters. This plan, called "home rule", has now been extended to counties in California and Maryland, and to a lesser degree in Virginia, Ohio, Nebraska, Texas, Montana, and North Carolina, and the movement to extend it to other states is now on in full force.

The County Manager Plan:-- Perhaps the most serious defect in our county governments is the lack of any concentrated control. In a typical county the voters elect a county board and from six to twelve other independent administrative officials each of whom is free from any effective supervision or control from any source, his duties being prescribed by state law. For some years, however, there has been a movement of increasing strength to introduce the Manager Plan into our county governments. This plan, taken from the field of city government, contemplates the concentration of county government power and responsibility in the hands of a small elective county board which appoints a county manager to direct and supervise the county's administrative work, as the city manager directs the city administration, and as the city superintendent of schools directs the city school system. The county manager

plan is now operating in six counties in the land. It was adopted in Durham County, North Carolina, in 1930; in Arlington County, Virginia, in 1931; in San Mateo and Sacramento Counties, California, in 1932; and in Albermarle and Henrico Counties, Virginia, in 1933. And similar plans, though less completely centralizing control ~~is~~ in operation in several other places. The movement is increasing in vigor, and the principal opposition has come from county office-holders and conservative politicians who are nearly always opposed to reorganizations of government.

The Merit System of Appointing County (and City) Officials and Employees:--In most of the larger cities of the country the law provides for the appointment and promotion of city employees on the basis of competitive examinations. In many cases the law is flagrantly evaded, however, and in most of the smaller cities the merit system has not yet been adopted. And it has been adopted in only about twenty of our nearly 3,100 county governments. There is a growing agitation favoring the extension of the merit system to our county, city, and state governments, but the opposition of machine politicians has been able, so far, to prevent its wide adoption. They have been able more or less effectively to evade the spirit of the plan where it has been adopted. And the "spoils system" still dominates a large share of our state and local government appointments. The desirability of the merit system of appointments and promotions is coming to be widely recognized, however, and it is steadily gaining ground along with the other improvements in local government. It is already in operation, more or less effectively, in over 356 cities.

(A later section of this report deals briefly with the merit system and makes recommendations for action in Arizona)

#### THE SITUATION IN ARIZONA.

The committee has not had the facilities for making a careful study of county government in Arizona. Such investigations as have been made, however, seem to reveal that some of the typical defects of county government exist in Arizona.

County government in Arizona should be a simple matter because of the rural and sparsely populated nature of the country. Our county governments have few intricate or complicated problems with which to deal. Consolidation of counties seems not to be a pressing need here, though city-county consolidations might very well be made in certain counties, especially Pima and Maricopa. And some counties appear to be unnecessarily small, considering their sparse populations and our modern means of transportation and communication.

Arizona counties are all uniformly organized on the

on the basis of a general state law operable to all counties. The typical decentralized, headless, irresponsible set-up exists. The county board has no effective control or supervision over the work of the seven independent elective county officials; sheriff, recorder, assessor, treasurer, clerk of the superior court, superintendent of schools, and county attorney. Indeed, we are fortunate in not having half a dozen more of these independent unsupervised officials in Arizona counties, as is the case in many other states.

Not only are most of the functions of our county governments carried on by officials who are free from any effective supervision or control by any executive county head, but there is no arrangement for any comprehensive or effective state supervision of these functions. The State Examiner is authorized by law to audit the books of county officials, but his office has never been given sufficient staff or financial support to enable it to function effectively. And irregularities which have been disclosed by his audits have not been followed up by the necessary legal action by the office of the Attorney General.

Appointments of appointive county officials and employees in Arizona are made without any plan for competitive merit examinations, and it seems to be the usual practise that positions are vacated and filled on a partisan or factional basis, as regards and penalties for partisan loyalties.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS.

Fortunately, the constitution of Arizona is peculiarly and almost uniquely free from provisions which restrict or restrain the state legislature in the matter of its power to provide by law for the organization and reorganization of county government. The framers of our constitution wisely left the legislature entirely free to consolidate counties, to create new counties, and to provide for the organizing and altering of county governments as changing conditions might require. The legislature is, therefore, empowered to make by statute virtually any changes in the existing situation which it may see fit to undertake without the necessity of waiting for the more difficult process of amending the state constitution .<sup>1</sup>

It is the opinion of the members of the Committee that the local control of county government functions in each county should be completely concentrated in the hands of a county board of supervisors of three members which should have power to arrange for the appointment of all other necessary locally selected county officials and employees, and upon which complete responsibility for

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1. See Constitution of Arizona, Article XII.

effective and economical management of all county functions should rest. The Committee further recommends that the county board in each county be authorized to select without regard to residence to select a county manager who shall have direct charge of the appointment and supervision, of all other necessary county officials, just as in full-fledged city manager cities, the manager is in direct charge of city administration, and as the city superintendent of schools is in direct charge of the city school system.

It is the sentiment of the Committee that some degree of variation in the details of county administrative organization ought to be provided for, considering the fact that the functions and problems of county governments must necessarily vary to some extent from county to county. It is recommended, therefore, that a careful county government function and problem analysis be made as a basis for working out a practicable plan for allowing a reasonable degree of local option in the details of county administrative organization.

The Committee recommends also that all county officials except the members of the elective board of supervisors and the county manager be appointed under a comprehensive merit system.

The Committee further recommends that careful study and serious consideration be given to : (1) the desirability and feasibility of consolidation of counties; (2) the desirability and feasibility of city-county consolidations; (3) the establishment of centralized authoritative state supervision of all county government functions; and, (4) the establishment of a comprehensive state police system which should take over the functions of the county sheriff's office in the matter of the detection of crime and the apprehension of criminals.

Part III.

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT  
TO ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MERIT SYSTEM OF  
APPOINTING AND PROMOTING STATE AND  
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND  
EMPLOYEES.

Modern government is essentially a business enterprise, the efficient administration of which calls for the services of a highly trained and experienced personnel. In recent years well managed private enterprises, having personnel needs at all comparable with those of our state and local governments, have established professionally manned personned agencies. Our Federal government, several states, a considerable number of cities, and a few counties have well established and efficient systems for the selection, retention, and promotion of employees on the basis of merit. While there have been some failures and there is still much in existing systems that is imperfect, it is believed that an impartial study of the facts must lead inevitably to the conclusion that much would be gained by the adoption of a modern thorough-going merit or civil service system in Arizona applicable both to the State and its local subdivisions.

The evils of the spoils system of making appointments to public office in Arizona are too well known to require long recital here. Our frequent elections and the almost invariable general exodus of appointive employees when newly elected officials take office is an experience so frequent that it passes with scarcely a protest from even those who so bitterly complain of the excessive cost and the inefficiency of government. Not even our law enforcement departments, health departments, penal institutions, and schools for the reform of wayward boys and girls escape the baneful effects of the spoils system.

There can be no doubt that the efficiency of the public service is materially effected by the spoils system. The incompetent, the inexperienced, and the dishonest are placed in charge of vital administrative functions. Square pegs are put in round holes and round pegs in square holes. Necessary records are often not kept and functions prescribed by law are not performed, because of the ignorance, inexperience, or dishonesty of appointive employees. Capable and self-respecting men and women are not and cannot be attracted to the appointive public service so long as appointments and promotions are made solely as a reward for personal and party loyalty. It is unfortunately true also that competent and unselfish men and women hesitate to seek or retain elective public office because of the disagreeable and humiliating experience of being the center of a partisan scramble for appointive office. Finally,

political parties, instead of being the means of presenting opposing policies and principles, become mere cleverly devised vehicles on which hob hungry politicians ride into power.

That the spoils system is extremely costly to the tax payers of Arizona cannot be denied. Votes are literally bought and paid for with jobs at the taxpayers' expense. Jobs are multiplied for the sole purpose of providing places for the faithful. Employees are not encouraged to put forth their best efforts because their tenure is but temporary and promotions, when and if made, are too frequently a reward for political usefulness rather than for efficient service. The dollars and cents cost of this antiquated personnel system is seldom fully appreciated because of the difficulty of accurate measurement. In a private enterprise the disastrous consequences of such practices would inevitably greet the employer in the form of red ink figures in the profit and loss statement. Unfortunately for the taxpayer-employer, there is no such certain and forceful means of focusing his attention on the equally disastrous consequences of these practices in the public service. All too frequently, he not only tolerates the spoils system but gives it at least his tacit approval, although he shows no evidence of having lost his powers of vocal expression when presented with his annual tax bill.

Authorities on public administration quite generally agree as to the functions which a personnel agency in the public service ought to perform. Among such authorities, however, there is considerable disagreement over details as to methods and the form of organization best adapted to the accomplishment of the tasks prescribed. These functions may be briefly stated as follows:

1. The Classification of Positions:-- The term classification embraces two groups of activities: the jurisdictional and the occupational. The former involves the designation of the positions to be excluded from the jurisdiction of the personnel agency (that is, the positions in the unclassified service), and the designation of the positions to be included (that is the positions in the classified service). The occupational or duties classification of positions (which means almost the same thing as "job analysis" as the term is commonly used in industry) involves the grouping together of positions sufficiently alike that the same descriptive title may be given to each, that the same qualifications may be prescribed for the successful performance of the duties; that the same tests of fitness may be used to choose qualified employees; and that the same schedule of compensation may be applied with equity.

2. The Compensation of Employees in the Classified Service:-- It is not here possible to fix the part the personnel agency, the budget officers, the chief executive, and the legislative body should have in the development and the administration of a compensation plan. It does seem

clear, however, that the personnel agency should have a part in the work and should be in a position to have its recommendations considered. Good results have been secured in a number of jurisdictions by having the personnel agency make the preliminary study and submit its findings and recommendations in the form of a general compensation plan; by securing criticism of this plan from administrative officers, from employees individually and through their organizations, from civic organizations, from taxpayers, and from budget authorities; by having the chief executive submit this plan with any modifications he cares to make to the legislative body; by having the legislative body adopt the plan with any changes it considers desirable; and by leaving the administration of the plan to the personnel agency.

3. The Selection of Employees for Entrance to and Promotion in the Classified Service:-- The selection of employees was originally almost the only function of the public personnel agency; necessarily, it must continue to occupy a place of primary importance. The normal procedure is to hold tests which as fairly as possible determine the qualifications, fitness, and ability of competitors actually to perform the duties of the class of positions to which they seek appointment. The agency should be free to use any investigation of character, education, and experience and any tests of capacity, technical knowledge, manual skill, or physical fitness which in its judgement serve the purpose. Every effort should be made to attract the best available persons to the public service. The names of those who successfully pass such examinations, arranged in the order of their excellence, constitute the eligible list from which actual appointments are made.

4. The Certification and Appointment of Eligibles:-- Supplying appointing officers with eligibles who have been tested and found qualified when vacancies are to be filled, is an important function of the personnel agency. This task is not as simple as it appears. Appointing officers often question the right of the agency to exercise it and seek by sundry subterfuges to defeat the objects of the merit system. All temporary appointments should be anticipated and filled from the eligible lists. Emergency appointments must not be allowed to extend into permanent appointments. On the other hand, appointing authorities must be stimulated into making use of their right of rejecting appointees during the probationary period may have appeared to be well qualified on the basis of formal tests but who fail to make good on the actual job.

5. The Regulation of Employees in the Classified Service:-- The personnel agency performs functions pertaining to the regulation of employees who are in the classified service, but there is a lack of agreement as to the exact part which it should take and as to its relation to employees and to administrative officers. The handling of transfers within and between departments, within and

between classes, the granting of leaves of absence, the determination of service (efficiency) ratings and standards, the working out and administration of training courses, the bringing about of and control of suspensions, demotions, and dismissals from the service for disciplinary purposes, the regulation of working hours, the checking of attendance of employees, the verification of payrolls, and the creation and administration of a sound retirement (pension) system, all present difficult problems which can only be solved by the cooperation of the personnel agency, the appointing authorities, and the employees themselves.

There are six either existing or proposed types of public personnel agencies. These are as follows:

1. An appointed <sup>by</sup>-partisan commission or board having three or five members with overlapping terms. This is the most common form of public personnel agency. As a rule the members are appointed by the chief executive with or without confirmation of the legislative body or one branch thereof.

2. An appointed <sup>by</sup>-partisan part-time commission or board of three or five members with a full-time technical administrative expert who is by statute the executive officer of the commission or board. Many authorities advocate that the commission or board should be made up of laymen who shall perform the quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial, and policy determining matters. On the other hand, they maintain that the administrative authority should be vested by law in an expert technical administrator chosen by competitive tests who is not a member of the commission or board but who is given statutory authority to attend meetings, make recommendations, participate in discussions, and carry out the policies and procedures adopted by the commission or board. This type of organization, or something that approaches it, already obtains in most jurisdictions in the United States where a high level of personnel administration obtains. While the existing laws and regulations do not legally confer upon the technical administrator, usually called the secretary-examiner, full executive authority; in practice he performs this function and the commission or board confines itself then to the quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial, and policy determining functions.

3. An appointed <sup>by</sup>-partisan commission or board with one active full-time member who is the executive head and two associate part-time members who participate only in quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial, and policy determining matters which come before the full commission or board. This is the form of organization now prevailing in Massachusetts.

4. An appointed commission consisting of one person who is responsible for the performance of all functions prescribed by the civil service statute. Most private enterprises, the State Of Maryland, numerous Canadian provinces, New Zealand, and Australia, have this type of personnel agency.

5. A commission or board consisting of one person chosen through competitive tests. This type of organization is in all respects like the one above except as to the method of selection of the commissioner. It has not as yet been tried out in practice but is advocated by the National Civil Service Reform League and the National Assembly of Civil Service Commissions. They maintain that many of the shortcomings of present system are due to the fact that the commissioners are themselves not experienced or otherwise qualified in personnel work.

6. A commission or board with an active full-time executive member selected by competitive tests and two part-time associate members, one appointed by the chief executive from among the administrative officers under him to represent the administrative viewpoint and the other to be elected by the employees in the classified service from among their own members to represent the employees viewpoint. This type of organization has not been actually tried in any public jurisdiction. It has been advocated, however, by the Civil Service Committee of the Governmental Research Conference.

It is recommended that the Legislature of Arizona refer to a vote of the people a constitutional amendment setting forth the frame work of a merit system for the public service of Arizona. The Constitutional provisions should be limited to the general principles to be included in the plan; details should be left to legislative enactment. No plan can hope to be perfect at the outset and too often rigid constitutional provisions prove to be a hindrance rather than an aid to the successful operation of a public personnel agency.

Like other administrative agencies, the unit cost of operation is materially affected by volume. For this reason it is believed that the ideal plan for Arizona would be a system similar to that of the State of New Jersey. Under this plan the commission or board has jurisdiction over all positions and employees in the classified service of the state government and over all such positions and employees in all counties, municipalities, and other local political subdivisions which have by referendum vote elected to adopt the merit system. The plan has worked well and not only reduces the unit cost, but makes it possible for political subdivisions having a relatively small number of employees to secure the benefits of the merit system.

Part IV.

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT  
TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFORM SYSTEM  
OF ACCOUNTING FOR THE STATE AND  
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

One obvious need of the State governments in Arizona at the present time is a thorough revision of its system of accounting. Responsibility for the keeping of adequate and intelligible accounting records is not fixed. No provision is made for regular periodic audits. Annual financial reports of the state treasurer and the state auditor are complicated and in many respects not reconcilable one with the other. Reports from the same office from year to year are not comparable.

The situation as to counties, cities, and other local political sub-divisions of Arizona is, if anything, worse than that of the State itself. Each county and city is typically a law unto itself. In fact, each change of administration, as often as not, means a change in the method of accounting. Many counties and cities not only keep inadequate records but even these are frequently poorly kept. Annual reports are not comparable for the same governmental sub-division from one year to another and little or no comparison can be made between reports of the several sub-divisions.

It is believed that the best results are likely to be obtained for the State government if responsibility for the keeping of adequate accounting records is centralized in the office of the state auditor or comptroller in the department of finance. In so far as practicable, the actual accounting work should be performed in such central office. When this is not practical the central accounting office should have authority to prescribe the nature of the records to be kept by other departments and maintain the necessary control accounts. The classification of the accounts should correspond with that used in the budget in order that direct comparison can be made at any time between actual receipts and expenditures and estimated and for authorized receipts and expenditures. Provision should be made for periodic audits by competent accountants selected on a basis of professional skill and integrity and not on a basis of contract to the lowest bidder as is frequently the case at present.

Responsibility and authority for proper accounting control in the several counties, municipalities, and other political sub-divisions should be centralized. Many states have secured excellent results by the appointment of a commission composed of able professional accountants to study the situation and recommend a system of uniform

accounts for all counties and municipalities. This does not mean identical records for all with no consideration given to differences in size and other circumstances. The same primary classifications, however, can be used and the same requirements as to principles can be made for all.

Again, the law should either require all political subdivisions to submit their accounts to a periodic audit by professional accountants or the state examiner's office should receive a sufficient appropriation to enable it to employ the necessary personnel actually to perform this work. At present, the latter office is so inadequately staffed that it is impossible for it to do the work required by law. It should be mandatory, moreover, for the Attorney General to bring the appropriate court action in all cases in which the Examiner reports expenditures made in violation of the law or other irregularities.

Part V.

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT  
TO IMPROVEMENT OF THE STATE COURT SYSTEM  
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

JUDICIAL RULE-MAKING.

Rules of procedure are effective and can be justified just in the degree that they remain merely a means to an end. The end to be attained is the presentation of issues before the proper tribunals upon their merits. On the other hand just in the degree that such rules clog or prevent determination of controversies on their merits, just in that degree do the rules become an end in themselves and are to be condemned.

Rules governing the administration of justice in the courts of Arizona are and will remain rigid, inflexible and ill-adapted to the purpose they are meant to serve just so long as they are laid down by legislative fiat. Herein lies many or most of the so-called "technicalities" of the law which result in delay and miscarriage of justice. The legislative branch of our state government cannot put the judiciary in a strait-jacket of inflexible rules and expect it to reach fair and just results between litigants on the merits of the causes litigated. Every day meritorious causes are prevented a speedy, fair and proper hearing on their merits because the meaning and application of legislative rules governing the tribunal become the all important issue. The rules themselves become the end instead of the means. The litigants and the public criticize the judiciary. But the judiciary cannot be held responsible till it is given authority commensurate with its responsibility.

It is recommended that the Arizona legislature enact the following statute, to wit:

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Arizona  
Section 1. The supreme Court of the State of Arizona shall, by rules promulgated by it from time to time, regulate pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts of Arizona, for the purpose of simplifying the same and of promoting the speedy determination of litigation upon its merits. Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant. The Supreme Court shall cause such rules to be printed and distributed to all members of the bar of the State of Arizona and to all applicants, and the same shall not become effective until thirty days after they have been so printed, made ready for distribution and so distributed.

Sec. 2. All statutes relating to pleading, practice and procedure, now existing, shall, from and after the passage of the Act, have force and effect

only as rules of court and shall remain in effect unless and until modified or suspended by rules promulgated pursuant hereto.

(This statute is proposed after detailed study of similar statutes of other states. It is taken from the 1933 session laws of New Mexico and is proposed because of its brevity and simplicity)

The Committee's information is not complete concerning the number of states in which the rule-making power has been given to the courts. However, among the states which now have court rule-making power in procedural matters are the following: New Jersey, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Washington, Virginia, Florida, Wisconsin, Michigan, Rhode Island, New Mexico, and Oklahoma. In England the rule-making power was originally in the courts, and it has been continuously exercised by the courts since the enactment of the Judicature Act of 1873. The national courts in the United States have exercised the rule-making power in equity and in admiralty since 1842. The New Jersey courts have had the power since 1912, and the Colorado courts have exercised it since 1913.

#### ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE COURT SYSTEM.

Because the State of Arizona has but fourteen counties and but one system of trial courts of record and no large cities, there can and should be a simple and therefore most efficient court organization in this state. Actually we have no court organization at all. Administratively "we have a series of slot-machine tribunals from which to draw out decisions or precedents from time to time as facts are put in by litigants." There is no connection between our courts except the common interest that they are engaged in a common pursuit. "We need a body of men competent to study the law and its administration functionally, to ascertain the needs of the community and the defects in the administration of justice not academically or a priori but in the light of every-day judicial experience and to work out definite, consistent lawyerlike programs of improvement"

This Committee recognizes that mere change is not necessarily progress. Too often impatience with evils that are perfectly patent creates a tendency to rush to make a correction. Very often ill-considered remedies are worse than the disease itself. Further, we are living in an evolving world. Changes must be made to meet changes. However, changes should be made in harmony with systems which have already proved their worth and have stood the test of time. Therefore, before we undertake to project a program of improvement for our judicial organization in this state, which in any event will involve changes in our state constitution, it is deemed advisable to get some necessary facts and data about the agencies now in existence and functioning.

This Committee believes that there are certain and definite changes w/hich should be made in the judicial machinery in the State of Arizona. Probably these changes should include:

- A. The establishment of a ministry of justice or unified court in which judges may be readily transferred from one part of the state to another as judicial business may require.
- B. Changes should be made in our method of selecting judges, both in courts of record and in courts not of record.
- C. Qualifications and salaries of judges should be increased, and perhaps the jurisdiction of our superior courts should be altered.
- D. The administration of our courts is a matter quite distinct from the judicial function involved in cases decided. In the field of administration perhaps the Arizona State Bar as well as the judiciary should participate.
- E. The functions of a magistrate sitting as such are not judicial. Every judge upon whom rests the obligation of deciding judicial controversies involving interpretation and application of the law should be trained in the law and be a member of the Arizona State Bar.
- F. Arizona should require every applicant for admission to the State Bar to have a minimum educational requirement of at least two years of college work and in addition thereto, three years of law school training. At the present time 26 states require such minimum educational qualifications. The are: Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.

No doubt other changes are desirable. However, such alterations in our laws should not be made without some accurate knowledge of the situation in Arizona. In order that these changes or any changes may be made intelligently concerning the whole system rather than piecemeal based upon guess work, it is recommended that there should be established in the state a Judicial Council with the function of studying the situation and assisting the Supreme Court in the work of administering the state's judicial system.

There are in Arizona at present two organizations or institutions which are directly concerned with the administration of justice. Those are the Supreme Court and the

State Bar of Arizona. In order that these institutions may be assisted in gathering scientific data concerning our judicial system, it is recommended that the Legislature should enact the following proposed statute, to wit:

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Arizona  
The Supreme Court of Arizona and The State Bar of Arizona are hereby authorized and empowered to create a Judicial Council for the continuous study of the judicial system and administration of justice in this state, and to assist the Supreme Court in Promulgating rules to regulate pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings in the courts of Arizona. The Supreme Court shall make rules, not inconsistent with law, for the creation, government, duties, membership, tenure of office of members, meetings, and continued existence of such Judicial Council. The clerks of the various courts, and other officials therof, shall make to the Judicial Council so created such reports from time to time as the Council may prescribe. Members of the Judicial Council shall receive no compensation for their services, but shall be allowed their actual expenses while engaged in discharging their duties as members of the Council.

At present 25 states have judicial councils with varying functions. They are: California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.

Part VI.

OBSERVATIONS ON LEGISLATIVE  
REORGANIZATION.

Bicameral legislatures in state and city governments have been under attack for many years. Most city councils have now come to be unicameral bodies. And in 1934 the voters of Nebraska adopted a constitutional amendment which provides for a one house legislature to consist of not less than thirty and not more than fifty members.

The attack on two house state legislative bodies centers largely around the charges: (1) that there is no real basis for two houses; (2) that the two branches are essentially duplicates of each other; (3) that in many states the houses have grown to be unreasonably large and cumbersome; (4) That instead of providing intelligent deliberation and a guarantee against hasty enactment of bad laws, as they are supposed to do, the two branches actually foster irresponsibility, and unreasonable delay, and in the passing of desirable laws constitute a handicap; and (5) that the system is unnecessarily expensive.

In 1913 the governor of Arizona recommended the adoption of a single chamber legislature, and a proposed amendment to that effect was defeated in 1916. And considerable study of the matter has been made recently by Mr. Mulford Winsor, Legislative Reference Librarian at Phoenix.

The houses of Arizona legislature are both small, and from that point of view need not be unwieldy. It is the opinion of the committee that the question of adopting a unicameral legislative arrangement is perhaps not of urgent and pressing importance, though it is difficult to find any overwhelming justification for the continuance of the bicameral system here; and the feasibility of making the change is recommended for serious consideration.

One of the fundamental weaknesses of American legislative facilities is the lack of any responsible and definitely accepted leadership---a total absence of any arrangement for comprehensive legislative program-making. The governor is expected to assume some leadership in the preparation and sponsoring of a limited administration legislative program, but there is always considerable jealousy and resentment among the members of the legislature with respect to this assumption of leadership by the governor, which is considered by many to be a usurpation and an encroachment upon legislative prerogative. Yet state legislatures themselves have been very tardy in setting up their own leadership.

For some years the National Municipal League has advocated the establishment of state legislative councils composed of the governor and a few members of the legislature

to be on duty all the time and having the responsibility for preparing for each legislative session a comprehensive program for its consideration. And in 1933 two states adopted legislative councils along this line. In Kansas the new legislative council consists of 10 senators and 15 representatives. And in Michigan the newly established council is composed of 4 members of the house of representatives, 3 senators, and the presiding officers of both houses-- 9 members in all.

This new device has not yet been in operation long enough to furnish a basis for an evaluation of its practical value. It represents, however, an effort to provide definite legislative leadership which has not yet been developed in this country. It should strengthen the legislatures, and its failure would seem to indicate that state legislatures as now organized were unable to provide themselves with leadership.

The Committee feels that no valid objection can be opposed to the idea of a legislative council, and recommends that such a device be established by the Arizona legislature.

Part VII.

CONCLUSION

This report has sought, briefly but rather definitely, to set forth the nature and scope of the problem of state and local government reorganization as it has confronted other states and as it now confronts the people of Arizona. The Committee has not been able to make a comprehensive and exhaustive survey of Arizona government which needs to be made before a detailed program for reorganization of its administrative machinery can be reasonably and intelligently evolved. And the conduct of such a survey is recommended as being basically necessary.

In certain aspects of the problem, however, the situation seems to be so clearly apparent and remedial principles which have been tried out in other states seem so thoroughly adaptable to our case that the Committee has ventured to make rather definite and specific recommendations. ("It is recommended that the principle of the city manager plan of government be extended to county government in Arizona. It is recommended that a comprehensive merit system of appointing and promoting state and local government officials and employees should be adopted. It is recommended that a system of state centralized financial auditing and control for all state and local government agencies be worked out. It is further recommended that the state supreme court be given comprehensive power to make rules of procedure for the trial courts, and that a judicial council be created by law to work with the supreme court and the State Bar Association in evolving a unified judicial administration for the state. And it is also recommended that the Arizona legislature establish a small legislative council composed of the governor and a few members of each house to serve as a permanent program-making agency for the legislature and to provide definite legislative leadership."

Such reorganization of state and county administrative machinery has been accomplished in other states, and such as the Committee believes to be needed in Arizona have had to be consummated in spite of the potent opposition of influential, interested, and partisan groups and conservative groups and conservative elements. The reorganizations have been branded everywhere, during the period of their considerations, as "un-American", "monarchical", "undemocratic", and "dangerous". And those who undertake to lead the movement in any state have had to be prepared to be characterized by the opposition as "dreamers", "radicals", and "impractical idealists".

Perhaps it is not to be expected that any reorganization which is likely to be made in any state will prove to be a panacea for all bad government. Yet, it is significant that no state which has made a comprehensive reorganization of its governmental machinery has ever abandoned it.

Respectively submitted,

Committee:

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N. P. Houghton, Chairman,

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