PERFORMANCE AUDIT

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

INSTITUTIONAL SECURITY AND STAFFING

Report to the Arizona Legislature
By the Auditor General
May 1991
91-4

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STATE OF ARIZONA
OFFICE OF THE
AUDITOR GENERAL

May 22, 1991

Members of the Arizona Legislature

The Honorable Fife Symington, Governor

Mr. Samual A. Lewis, Director
Arizona Department of Corrections

Transmitted herewith is a report of the Auditor General, A Performance Audit of the Department of Corrections, Institutional Security and Staffing. This report is in response to a June 14, 1989, resolution of the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee.

The report is a follow-up review that assesses actions taken by the Department to implement recommendations made in two previous performance audit reports. We found that DOC has made significant improvements in institutional security, and in its classification and personnel systems.

My staff and I will be pleased to discuss or clarify items in this report.

The report will be released to the public on May 24, 1991.

Sincerely,

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SUMMARY

The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance audit of institutional security and staffing at the Arizona Department of Corrections (DOC). The audit was conducted in response to a June 14, 1989, resolution of the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee as part of the Sunset Review set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§41-2351 through 41-2379.

This report is a follow-up review that examines the steps taken by DOC to implement recommendations made in two previous performance audit reports issued by our Office in 1985 and 1986: Report No. 85-12, an audit of Adult Institutions Security; and Report No. 86-1, Security Staffing Issues.

DOC Has Taken Significant Steps To Improve Security At Its Adult Institutions (see pages 3 through 10)

DOC has made significant improvements in both perimeter and internal security since our last audit.

- **Perimeter Security**
  - **Fencing** - DOC has increased the use of razor wire on its perimeter fences.
  - **Electronic Detection Systems** - DOC has addressed detection system failures through improved maintenance.
  - **Escapes** - DOC has reduced the number of escapes from 38 in 1986 to 12 in 1990.
- **Internal Security**
  - **Locking Systems** - DOC has replaced or refurbished broken systems, including some that had deteriorated to the point that in order to open one cell door, as many as 26 cell doors had to be opened at once.
  - **Communication Systems** - DOC has increased the number of radios and radio frequencies throughout the system.
- **Policies and Procedures**
  - **Visitation** - DOC has established security procedures and eliminated or reduced the number of food visits.

- **Medication** - DOC now requires that psychotropic medicines and controlled substances be delivered in no more than a one-day supply.

- **Inmate personal property** - DOC now limits the amount and type of personal property inmates may possess.

While marked improvements have been made, problems noted in some areas in 1985 still exist. These areas include tool control, inmate counts, utilization of temporary structures, the need for additional isolation cells, and facility designs.

New security issues were also identified during this audit. For instance, security inspections were found to be inadequate at most facilities; post orders were deficient at some institutions; key control problems were identified at some facilities; and personal body alarms are needed, particularly for security personnel in remote units.

DOC Has Implemented A More Objective Inmate Classification System **(see pages 11 through 13)**

Since the last audit, DOC has implemented a more objective inmate classification system. The Department's previous system underclassified inmates leading to increased security risks by placing higher risk inmates in lower security facilities. The new system has been reviewed and modified twice. Additionally, DOC plans to validate the system during 1991.

DOC Has Made Improvements In Its Personnel System **(see pages 15 through 20)**

With the implementation of a centralized hiring unit in 1985, DOC has significantly improved the efficiency and effectiveness of Correctional Service Officer (CSO) recruitment. There appears to be little more that DOC can do to hasten the hiring process without the authority and funding for advanced hiring. Currently, it takes approximately 11 weeks to fill a position, much of that time (seven weeks) is for pre-service training at the Correctional Officers Training Academy. To reduce that time, DOC would need the authority and funding to hire and train CSOs before vacancies occur. However, this would require an additional expenditure of $5.5 million annually.

In addition, DOC has also been able to reduce CSO turnover from approximately 31 percent five years ago, to the current rate of 20 percent for CSO Is and 8 percent for CSO IIs. However, DOC officials are concerned that salary, transportation, and housing problems may contribute to a future increase in turnover.

DOC Needs To Do More To Define Security Staffing Needs **(see pages 21 through 26)**

As noted in the 1986 report, DOC needs to periodically review its staffing formula. DOC has never recalculated the formula and has continually requested the staffing levels recommended in 1986. However, we recalculated the formula and found that staffing needs have changed since the last audit. For instance, in 1986 we recommended a staffing level of 5.3 Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) positions to cover a 24-hour post; however, since 1986 this figure has declined to 5.1.

In addition to a periodic review of the staffing formula, DOC also needs to do more to identify the number of posts needed at each institution. While DOC has identified security posts, the Department has not completed a comprehensive analysis of its security post needs. Such a review should include inspecting post positions, physical plant and ongoing program activities, and a review of staff assignment records, as well as the use and efficacy of management systems.

While DOC Has Made Strides To Increase In-Service Training, Many CSOs Still Do Not Meet Requirements **(see pages 27 through 32)**

Since the last audit, DOC has established a training academy to provide pre-service training and has increased the amount of in-service training that it provides to its correctional service staff. All CSOs now receive 288 hours of pre-service training and are required to obtain 24 hours of in-service training annually. However, a large number of staff still do not meet the requirement for in-service training. We found that 44 percent of all CSOs in 1989-90 did not obtain the required 24 hours. Additionally, over 10 percent received no in-service training. Many higher ranking security staff also failed to obtain the mandatory 24 hours.

Factors such as a lack of commitment at some institutions, staff vacancies, and a lack of resources to implement an effective tracking system may have hampered DOC's efforts to provide training to all of its correctional staff.

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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance audit of institutional security and staffing at the Arizona Department of Corrections (DOC). The audit was conducted in response to a June 14, 1989, resolution of the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee as part of the Sunset Review set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§41-2351 through 41-2379.

This report is a follow-up review that examines the steps taken by DOC to implement recommendations made in two previous performance audit reports issued by our Office in 1985 and 1986: Report No. 85-12, an audit of Adult Institutions Security; and Report No. 86-1, an audit of Security Staffing Issues.

Background

DOC is charged with serving and protecting the people of the State by imprisoning those adult offenders legally committed to the Department. In its mission statement, DOC states that it will accomplish its charge by maintaining effective custody control over offenders; maintaining a healthy, safe, and secure environment for staff and offenders; and providing quality programs to offenders.

As of February 1, 1991, there were approximately 13,900 inmates living in DOC's nine institutions. This is a 66 percent increase over the number of inmates incarcerated in 1985. To accommodate the growing prison population, DOC has added three new institutions (Douglas, Winslow, and Yuma) since the last audit. The prison system has also expanded through the construction of new units in Florence, Tucson, Safford, and Winslow and double-bunking in Perryville. Additional bed space has also been created through the modification of existing space (such as day rooms).

Institutional Security

In 1985, we reported several deficiencies in the area of security at adult institutions: 1) perimeter and internal security was inadequate at some DOC adult institutions; 2) contraband was widespread and easily accessible within the prisons; 3) the Department's inmate classification system did not properly categorize inmates, thereby increasing security risks; and 4) the Department's construction program, at that time, did not provide enough maximum custody beds to meet current or future needs.

Security Staffing

In 1986, we reported several deficiencies in the area of security staffing: 1) DOC could not properly determine its security staffing needs; 2) DOC was not able to hire enough Correctional Service Officers (CSOs) to meet its security staffing needs; 3) DOC's process for background checks for Correctional Service Officer applicants needed improvement; and 4) DOC had not provided Correctional Service Officers with adequate training.

Scope And Methodology

The primary focus of this audit was to follow up on recommendations made in our previous reports in 1985 and 1986; and to ascertain whether improvements in the areas of security and security staffing have been made. To assist in our review of institutional security, we contracted with security consultants to conduct a comprehensive review of six of DOC's nine adult institutions.

This audit was conducted in accordance with government auditing standards.

The Auditor General and staff express appreciation to the Director and staff of the Department of Corrections for their cooperation and assistance during the audit.

FINDING I

DOC HAS TAKEN SIGNIFICANT STEPS SINCE 1985 TO IMPROVE SECURITY AT ITS ADULT INSTITUTIONS

The Department of Corrections (DOC) has made substantial progress in upgrading institutional security in the past five years. Consultants retained by our Office found that all the recommendations in our 1985 report have been addressed to some extent.[1] Although security efforts have been enhanced, and significant improvements have been made in both perimeter and internal security, some problems discussed in our previous audit report continue to exist. In addition, during this review, several other security deficiencies were identified that need to be addressed to ensure the safe operation of the Department's facilities.

We first reviewed security at DOC institutions in 1985. At that time, security efforts were found to be inadequate at some facilities. Perimeter security was identified as a major problem area. Perimeter security deficiencies were found in fencing, electronic detection systems, use of guard towers, and visibility. A number of internal security problems were also identified. For instance, locking systems at some facilities were found to be improperly designed and inadequately maintained. Tool control was weak. Hacksaws, wire cutters, welding and cutting torches, and other tools were not secured. Control rooms, the "nerve center" of a prison, were poorly secured. Security personnel were also found to lack sufficient radios and frequencies to provide for proper inmate control.

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(1) We contracted with James D. Henderson and Associates, a criminal justice consulting firm, to assist with a follow-up review of security measures at the Department's adult correctional facilities. The consultant team visited six DOC complexes: Florence, Tucson, Perryville, Phoenix, Douglas, and Winslow. Together these institutions contain 26 inmate housing units, with a total inmate population of 12,522. The consultant team evaluated perimeter security measures at all units. They also examined a variety of factors affecting internal security (such as building design, yard lighting, inmate count procedures, and tool control procedures). The Appendix provides information regarding the consultants' backgrounds and a summary of their findings.

DOC Has Improved Security At Its Adult Institutions Since 1985

During the past five years the Department has significantly improved security at its correctional facilities. Our consultants found that perimeter security now is generally adequate at the institutions surveyed. In addition, some improvements in internal security were noted. Finally, DOC has revised or added a number of security-related policies and procedures.

Perimeter Security - DOC has improved perimeter security at its adult institutions since 1985. Improvements were noted in the following areas:

- **Fencing** - In 1985 we noted that perimeter fencing was inadequate at most of the Department's adult institutions. At that time, fences often were not secured in cement and lacked sufficient razor wire to discourage escape attempts. In addition, the minimum custody prison at Fort Grant, which had more escapes than any other prison complex in the Arizona system, had no perimeter fence. Our security consultants found the fencing now surrounding DOC institutions is excellent. The Department now makes increased use of razor wire on perimeter fences. In addition, in October 1986, to discourage escape attempts, DOC installed an eight-foot fence around the perimeter of the Fort Grant prison complex.

- **Electronic Detection Systems** - Deficiencies in electronic perimeter detection equipment were also noted in our 1985 report. In particular, the systems at ASPC-Tucson and ASPC-Perryville had persistent system failures. Auditor General security consultants tested the electronic perimeter detection systems at the institutions they visited in late 1990 and early 1991 and found that this equipment worked properly in most areas. In addition, most facilities that utilize electronic detection systems (such as microwaves and shaker wires) now have contracts with companies to maintain this equipment.

- **Escapes** - The 1985 report indicated that perimeter security deficiencies created opportunities for escapes. Between January 1984 and May 1985, 56 inmates escaped through the perimeters of DOC institutions. Improvements in perimeter security since that time appear to be responsible, at least in part, for a reduction in escapes from DOC's adult institutions. As Table 1 (see page 5), shows, the number of escapes has declined significantly since 1986. A total of 38 inmates assigned to DOC's adult institutions escaped in calendar year 1986. In contrast, only 12 inmates assigned to DOC's adult institutions escaped in 1990. It is worth noting that 83 percent of these escapes involved minimum custody inmates.

TABLE 1

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
ADULT INSTITUTIONS
ESCAPE STATISTICS(a)
1986-1990

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Adult Institutions(b)					
Escapes	38	40	29	32	12
Apprehensions	36	36	25	26	10
Outstanding	2	4	4	6	2

(a) Table excludes escapes involving inmates assigned to release centers, work furlough, or home arrest.

(b) Some of the escapes recorded in the table do not involve a breach of perimeter security, but occurred while inmates were temporarily outside of their institutions for activities such as work details or court hearings.

Source: Office of the Auditor General staff analysis of DOC Escape Log, 1986-1990 and DOC Escapee Hotsheet.

Internal Security - A number of internal security problems identified in our previous report have also been addressed by DOC. For example, improvements in internal security were identified in the following areas:

- Locking Systems - In 1985 we identified problems with the locking systems at Florence's maximum custody Central Unit. The locking system in cellblock 1 had shorted out and rusted due to leaky showers; consequently, cell doors had to be opened manually. In cellblock 2 and a portion of cellblock 4, staff were unable to open individual cell doors without opening all cell doors on a tier. In the case of cellblock 2 this involved opening 26 cells at one time. These locking system problems have been addressed. The Department replaced the locking mechanisms in cellblock 1 approximately three years ago and recently refurbished the locking systems in cellblock 2 and cellblock 4.

- Communication Systems - Significant communication system problems were also found in 1985. Our previous report noted that security personnel lacked sufficient radios and radio frequencies to provide adequate inmate control. At that time, housing officers in the medium custody South Unit at Florence were not issued radios. Further, complex security lacked a separate frequency for emergency communication at some institutions. Now, the consultants report that there are adequate numbers of radios and radio frequencies throughout the system. South Unit housing officers are now issued radios to reduce their vulnerability in case of an emergency. In addition, most institutions now have a separate radio channel for complex security personnel.

Policies and Procedures - A number of security-related policies and procedures have been improved or added since our previous audit. Improvements have been made in the following areas:

- **Visitation** - Our 1985 report was critical of DOC's monitoring of visitation and of DOC's policies allowing visitors to bring food into visitation areas. Both conditions provided an opportunity for the introduction of contraband. In 1989, the Department revised its visitation policy and established security procedures for visitation to address these problems. In addition, the policy eliminated food visits at medium and maximum custody facilities and limited the number of food visits at minimum custody units.

- **Control of Medication** - In 1985, inmates at some institutions were issued medication in multiple doses, enabling them to possibly save their medication for sale at a later date. Since that time, the Department has adopted policies and procedures for delivering medications to inmates. DOC now requires that psychotropic medicines and controlled substances be delivered in no more than a one day supply.

- **Inmate Personal Property** - In our previous report, it was noted that inmates were allowed to possess an excessive amount of property, making searches for contraband difficult. The Department's policy was revised in 1988 to limit the amount and type of property inmates were allowed.

Despite Marked Improvement In Security, Some Problems Identified In Our Previous Report Continue

Although DOC has improved security at its adult institutions, a number of problems identified in 1985 persist. Tool control remains a problem at many DOC facilities. The Department still does not require a sufficient number of formal inmate counts. Facilities available for inmate detention and isolation remain insufficient. Temporary structures continue to be used for housing inmates at some institutions. Finally, the design of some DOC housing structures still limits the staff's ability to control inmates.

Tool Control - Our previous security audit found that tool control policies and procedures were not consistently followed by institutional staff and needed to be revised. At that time, potentially hazardous tools were frequently observed to be unsecured. Our consultants found that tool control continues to be a problem at many DOC facilities. The consultant team again observed unsecured hacksaws, blades, cutting tools, and portable welding equipment. In addition, tool inventories were

sometimes found to be incomplete or did not exist. Finally, tools were often stored incorrectly, making it difficult to determine if items were missing.

Inmate Counts - Our 1985 report also noted that the number of formal counts required by DOC policy was insufficient. The policy required only three formal inmate counts each day. The Department's policy in 1991 continues to require only three formal counts daily. Our consultants also indicated that the length of time between counts is too long, reducing the staff's ability to account for inmates. They recommend that DOC increase the number of formal counts from three to five a day.

Detention and Isolation Cells - The number of detention and isolation cells continues to be insufficient at some institutions. In 1985, DOC had only 134 isolation cells, accounting for less than 2 percent of the Department's permanent bed capacity. At that time, we reported that the number of cells available for inmate lockup was not adequate to ensure effective inmate discipline.

DOC continues to have an inadequate supply of lockup cells at some institutions. Both the consultant team and an official from the American Correctional Association estimate that at any given time, 10 to 13 percent of the inmate population will require some form of locked-status housing for purposes such as detention or isolation.(1) However, the Department currently has only 367 cells for detention and isolation, enough for only 2.6 percent of the total inmate population. In addition, because only limited space is available, inmates in locked status frequently share a cell. The consultants believe this practice limits the staff's ability to adequately control inmates.

Temporary Structures - Our previous audit report noted that temporary structures were widely used for inmate housing at DOC facilities. The use of tents, quonset huts, and trailers for housing inmates was criticized because these structures lacked basic security features. Although the use of tents has been discontinued, temporary structures are

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(1) An inmate may be placed in locked-status housing for disciplinary reasons if he or she is found guilty of violating departmental rules. Additionally, lock-up cells are used to isolate inmates who are considered a risk to the general inmate population or an escape risk.

still being used at the ASPC-Florence East and North Units, the ASPC-Tucson Echo Unit, the ASPC-Douglas Gila Unit, and ASPC-Safford. Quonset huts and modular buildings are not designed to provide adequate observation of inmates. These structures are also not designed to serve as security barriers. The security consultants indicated that inmates could not be secured within their quonset huts during a disruption.

Facility Design - Some permanent inmate housing structures continue to pose risks to inmates and staff because of their design. In our 1985 audit, ASPC-Florence's South Unit was rated by security consultants as a low, medium-custody facility because it has dormitory-style housing and no single cells. The South Unit continues to be used to house "heavy", medium-custody inmates in a dormitory setting. Our consultants noted that the design of these housing structures limits the staff's ability to observe all inmate activity. The consultants were also critical of the design of inmate housing structures at the ASPC-Douglas Mohave Unit, because it contains a series of small rooms in which inmates could hide or isolate security personnel.

Several Additional Security Deficiencies Were Identified

Our current review identified several security problems that were not discussed in our previous report. The consultant team found that security inspections were inadequate at most DOC facilities. In addition, post orders were found to be deficient at some institutions, key control problems were identified at some facilities, and body alarms were not issued to staff at any of the institutions in the State prison system.

Security Inspections - Although DOC policy requires the routine inspection and maintenance of security devices, the policy is not readily adhered to by institutional staff. The Department's policy requires line and supervisory staff to inspect security devices such as gates, fences, locking mechanisms, and alarm systems during each shift. The consultants found that "security inspections are not generally being carried out in a consistent, complete, well-defined manner throughout the institutions visited." In addition, security consultants found that DOC institutions have not developed standardized methods for recording and reporting the security inspections conducted by staff.

Post Orders - Post orders were found to be deficient at a number of institutions. Our consultants found that the "nature and quality of post orders varied from institution to institution." The consultant team indicated that post orders frequently lacked information regarding hostage situations, the use of force, and emergency evacuations.[1] In addition, post orders sometimes did not contain a face sheet for employees to record that they had reviewed the post orders.

Key Control - Auditor General security consultants found that few DOC facilities have established comprehensive key-control systems. Master key inventories were found to be inaccurate or incomplete at several prison complexes. Listings of the number and type of keys assigned to each key ring sometimes were not maintained in the control rooms where the keys are issued. Keys were sometimes stored improperly, making it difficult to determine if key rings were missing. Key rings often were not properly soldered to deter the removal of keys from them. Emergency keys were sometimes not marked in such a way as to facilitate their use. In addition, emergency keys were not regularly tested to ensure that they worked properly. At one institution, emergency keys failed to provide access to the complex detention unit.

Body Alarms - The consultant team found that the Department does not issue body alarms to staff at any DOC facility. This equipment, which can be connected to an officer's radio, is designed to sound an alarm in the control center when an officer is in trouble. The consultants believe body alarms are a "cost effective method of providing personal protection for staff" and should be issued to security staff in certain locations. Body alarms should first be issued to staff in locked units and those on the more remote assignments.

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(1) DOC has established Departmental policies on hostage situations and use of force. However, the consultants believe these policies should be incorporated in the post orders to ensure they are reviewed frequently by staff.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Department of Corrections should revise several of its policies and procedures to reduce risks to both inmates and staff. Policies that require revision include security inspections, post orders, inmate counts, tool control, and key control.
2. The Department should determine the amount of additional lock-up space that is needed at DOC institutions and request additional funding for the construction of these facilities.

3. The Department should assess the need for body alarms for security staff and request additional funding for this equipment.

FINDING II

DOC HAS IMPLEMENTED A MORE OBJECTIVE INMATE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

DOC has improved inmate classification since the last audit. A new system was implemented in 1986 to resolve problems with the previous classification system. Since implementation, DOC has reviewed and modified the system twice and plans to continually evaluate the system.

Our 1985 review of DOC found that inmates were often misclassified causing increased security risks and other problems. Problems with classification occurred because of the subjective nature of the classification methods then in use. The Department's classification system lacked a formal model for making decisions regarding an inmate's custody level and institutional assignment. For instance, although staff were required to review the results of psychological and skills tests prior to making classification decisions, there were no guidelines for assigning weights to the test results or considering them in a structured manner. At the time of the audit, DOC was in the process of developing an objective system.

DOC Has Implemented A New System To Resolve Previous Problems With Inmate Classification

The Offender Classification System (OCS) was initiated by the Department in August 1986 to resolve problems with the classification methods that were in use at the time. Developed with the assistance of an outside consultant, the classification system is based on the Correctional Classification Profile, which involves the development of a series of numerical scores for ten factors related to inmates' risk-potential and needs. These factors include public and institutional risk; medical and mental healthcare needs; work skills, educational and vocational training needs; alcohol, drug, and sexual offense treatment needs; and proximity to residence. Classification guidelines and procedures were outlined in the OCS Operating Manual. DOC staff received training in the new classification procedures once the system was ready for implementation.

DOC Has Reviewed And Modified The Current Classification System Twice

The Department has reviewed and modified the classification system twice since the 1986 implementation. The Department first reviewed its new classification procedures in March 1987. The OCS Operating Manual was modified to address problems identified in the months following the implementation of the system. For instance, DOC decreased the number of risk score levels from ten to five to reduce the complexity of the system. However, this change affected the distribution of the inmate population, rapidly increasing the proportion of the inmate population in the lower public-risk custody levels.

In 1989, DOC again reviewed its inmate classification system. The evaluation was prompted by concerns that too many inmates had been classified below the appropriate risk levels. An independent consulting agency was asked to assist with the evaluation. The consultants, at that time, also validated the system. A number of recommendations were made to further improve the Department's classification system, including increasing the amount of time an inmate must serve before being considered for a lower public-risk score.

DOC Plans To Evaluate The System On An Ongoing Basis

The Department plans to continually evaluate the validity of its classification system. DOC staff recently attended a National Institute of Corrections training program on validating inmate classification systems. The information obtained from this training will assist DOC in constantly reexamining the system to ensure its effectiveness.

While DOC has implemented a more objective classification system, proper classification of inmates will continue to be hampered by limitations of bed availability. Many DOC institutional units are currently operating near capacity. In addition, the prison population continues to

increase at a rate of approximately 75 inmates per month.[1] The pressures of the increasing prison population make it difficult for the Department to place inmates in the facility most appropriate for their needs and risk potential.

RECOMMENDATION

DOC should continue its efforts to evaluate its classification system to ensure its effectiveness.

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(1) DOC projects that the prison population will increase at a rate of 75.1 inmates per month through December 1992. However, the Department projects that the long-term growth rate at DOC facilities will be 89 inmates per month.

FINDING III

DOC HAS MADE IMPROVEMENTS IN ITS PERSONNEL SYSTEM

In addition to addressing security deficiencies, DOC has also made improvements in several other areas since the last audit. The staff recruitment and selection process has been strengthened and little more can be done to speed up the hiring process without the authority for advanced hiring. The Department also has reduced staff turnover.

DOC Has Done Much To Speed Up Hiring

The implementation of a centralized hiring unit in 1985 has vastly improved the efficiency and effectiveness of CSO recruitment, selection, and hiring. DOC's Recruitment Unit for Selection and Hiring (RUSH) has replaced the previously inefficient method of hiring Correctional Service Officers. DOC can do little more to hasten the hiring process without the authority and funding for advanced hiring.

In our 1985 audit, we reported that DOC's hiring process was inadequate to meet its hiring needs. At that time, the responsibility for developing procedures governing the recruitment, selection, and hiring of CSOs was the responsibility of the Department of Administration's (DOA) Personnel Division. However, DOC had established RUSH and was to assume responsibility for the process. The establishment of RUSH in 1985 has greatly improved the process for recruiting, selecting, and hiring a large number of personnel on an ongoing basis. Through an intergovernmental agreement with DOA, DOC now has direct authority to recruit, select, and hire entry-level CSOs.

DOC begins the hiring process by forecasting annual staffing needs. RUSH utilizes a forecasting plan to predict when and where vacancies will occur. Through analysis of historical data on CSO attrition, RUSH, in conjunction with the Correctional Officer Training Academy (COTA), is

able to anticipate workload, institutional hiring needs, and the timely flow of cadets into training.

Efforts to recruit staff to fill forecasted positions are more aggressive and innovative now than in the past. In addition to basic newspaper advertising, the Department also sponsors job fairs. Additionally, DOC has acquired the services of an advertising agency that specializes in employee recruiting. Specifically, the agency assists DOC in conducting needed research and design, writing, and advertising. Advertising methods utilized include newspaper advertising, public service announcements, and posters. This new approach is aimed at increasing both the number and quality of CSO applicants.

Application processing and candidate screening are also more thorough and efficient. When RUSH receives an application (which is directly forwarded from the institutions, the DOA Personnel Office, or any DES job service office), the application is reviewed to determine if the applicant meets the minimum qualifications. The applicant is then notified within 3 to 4 days regarding his or her qualifications and is scheduled to appear for testing. Testing is much more comprehensive than it was prior to RUSH. Applicants must take a written exam, a psychological exam, a medical exam, undergo a background check, and have an interview.[1] Once applicants have successfully completed the entire screening process, their names are placed on hiring lists awaiting notice of vacancy by the institutions. As vacancies occur, candidates are selected for pre-service training at the academy.

In addition to the establishment of RUSH, there have been other improvements that have increased the efficiency of the hiring process. In our 1985 audit, it was noted that background checks of applicants are untimely, resulting in delays of more than 30 days. Decentralization of the background check responsibility was found to contribute to the delays. Additionally, it was noted that applicant processing was unnecessarily delayed while background checks were conducted. Since that audit, DOC has improved the timeliness of background checks. The process

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(1) Prior to RUSH, the screening process included only a background check and an interview at the institution.

is now centralized and takes an average of 5 work days.[1] However, to avoid any further delays, RUSH continues the hiring process during the background check.

Without the authority and funding to implement an advanced hiring program, DOC can do little more to speed up the hiring process. Currently, it takes approximately 11 weeks to fill a position.[2] Seven weeks are required for pre-service training at the academy. The remaining four weeks include about two weeks to process the position request and another two weeks for the applicant to report to the academy.

Advanced hiring would allow DOC to fill vacancies almost immediately by hiring and training CSOs before vacancies occur. Although DOC has continually requested funding for advanced hiring, the high cost of the program has prohibited annual appropriations from the Legislature. DOC estimates that it would cost approximately $5.5 million annually to fund 230 positions for advanced hiring.

CSO Turnover Rate Has Decreased

Steps have been taken to reduce turnover in recent years. However, DOC officials remain concerned about turnover rates and the factors that could increase turnover in the future.

During our last audit, DOC was experiencing high turnover of Correctional Service Officers. In fiscal years 1984 and 1985, the turnover rate for CSO positions was approximately 32 and 31 percent, respectively. In contrast, the turnover rate for all State employees was 20 percent and 18 percent for the same years. Additionally, the CSO turnover rate was also higher than the average rate for all positions within DOC (26 percent).

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(1) DOC also implemented a policy in 1988 that established guidelines for disqualifying CSO applicants. RUSH is responsible for determining qualifications based on a background check by the Inspections and Investigations Division.

(2) DOC staff report that it took up to 20 weeks or longer to fill vacancies prior to the establishment of RUSH.

Since the release of our last audit, some steps have been taken that have contributed to a decrease in CSO turnover.

- DOC has established an additional level for CSOs. In fiscal year 1986, a CSO II position was established to provide more of a career ladder for Correctional Service Officers.
- A centralized promotional system was established in 1986 that allows for more objectivity in the promotion process.
- Approximately five years ago, CSOs were given an automatic salary increase of 2.5 percent once they graduated from COTA.
- In 1986, CSOs were offered the opportunity of participating in a newly established correctional officer retirement plan that provided more of a career incentive for CSOs because it allows them to retire after 25 years of service, regardless of their age.
- Based on concerns noted in an employee survey, DOC provided basic supervisory training for its supervisors to help improve working relationships between supervisors and their staff.

Since these steps were taken, turnover has dropped to 20 percent for CSO Is and is about 8 percent for CSO IIs. Additionally, as of December 31, 1990, this rate had dropped even further to an annualized rate of 15 percent for CSO Is and 6 percent for CSO IIs, which is close to the current State service turnover rate of 11 percent.

Despite reductions in turnover, DOC officials remain concerned about factors that may contribute to a future increase in turnover. One factor that has always been a concern is CSO salary. Exit questionnaires completed by CSOs reveal that many staff, even though they enjoy their job, resign due to the low salary. As shown in Table 2 (see page 19), current starting salaries for CSOs are not competitive with similar positions both in-state and out-of-state. Concerns about salary have also been expressed by the Department of Administration. DOA has recommended that the Legislature fund an alternative salary plan for CSO Is that, beginning January 1, 1992, would increase the starting salary after graduation from the academy.

TABLE 2

COMPARISON OF CSO SALARIES WITH THOSE OF SIMILAR POSITIONS IN-STATE AND OUT-OF-STATE

Agency	Salary
California Dept. of Corrections	$29,436 (after academy)
Pima County (Detention Officer)	22,233 (entry level)
Federal Bureau of Prisons	21,023 (after 6 months)
Maricopa County (Detention Officer)	20,966 (after probation)
Nevada Dept. of Prisons	20,005 (after 1 year)(a)
Arizona Dept. of Corrections	18,199 (after academy)

(a) Nevada also pays 100 percent of the employee's retirement contribution.

Source: Office of the Auditor General February 1991 survey of CSO salaries.

Two other factors -- transportation and housing -- have emerged as factors that can and do impact turnover. DOC has found that, in addition to salary, transportation is a reason some CSOs resign. For instance, according to a DOC official, almost 500 of Florence's 1,700 employees commute round trip approximately 140 miles a day from Tucson. Some employees feel the cost of commuting is too high, especially when the salary is considered to be insufficient. In addition, inadequate housing in some prison locations contributes to the transportation problem. In some areas of the State, such as Winslow, housing is limited. According to the warden in Winslow, the biggest problem facing the prison is the lack of housing for the staff. The difficulty in attracting staff to some of these locations is evidenced by the incentive pay provided for some positions. DOC provides an additional 10 percent "incentive pay" to attract Correctional Service sergeants and captains. However, similar incentive pay is not offered to CSO Is and CSO IIs.

RECOMMENDATION

1. The Legislature should consider increasing the starting salary of Correctional Service Officers to allow DOC to be more competitive.

FINDING IV

DOC NEEDS TO DO MORE TO DEFINE SECURITY STAFFING NEEDS

DOC needs to do more to define security staffing requirements. DOC needs to periodically recalculate its formula for staffing to reflect current conditions. Additionally, while DOC has taken some steps toward identifying post positions, more needs to be done.

Security staffing needs in a correctional institution depend on two factors: 1) the number of posts required to maintain adequate security, and 2) the number of people required to cover each post. Specific posts are generally established on the basis of the need to monitor and control inmate movement and activity. Thus, the number and types of posts vary throughout the day and also from day to day, reflecting changes in the level and type of inmate activity. Coverage for a particular post ranges from 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to eight hours a day, five days a week or less. Once necessary posts are determined, the number of people needed to cover those posts is computed from a staffing formula. A staffing formula determines the number of people required to cover a post and takes into account the amount of time employees are expected to be away from the post due to vacations, illness, etc.

In January 1986, the Office of the Auditor General issued a performance audit report on DOC's Security Staffing (Report #86-1). That report concluded that DOC could not accurately determine its security staffing needs for two reasons. First, DOC's formula for determining the number of positions needed to cover a 24-hour post was not accurate and had not been updated for nine years. Second, a comprehensive post analysis had never been performed. This type of analysis is necessary to assess the impact of the size, nature, and design of each facility, the inmate custody level, and several other factors on staffing needs. We recommended that DOC review the staffing formula annually and undertake a comprehensive staffing study to identify post needs and periodically assess changes in conditions affecting staffing requirements.

DOC Should Review Its Staffing Formula

Our analysis of current security staffing reveals that a periodic review of DOC's staffing formula is essential. Conditions have changed since our 1985 report, and we found that staffing needs per post now are not as high. For example, DOC has made improvements in reducing staff turnover (as noted in Finding III) that have consequently reduced the turnover factor in the formula. DOC should periodically review its formula to account for changing factors.

DOC requests for staffing levels have not reflected changes in staffing - Although DOC has continually requested the staffing levels recommended by the Office of the Auditor General in the 1985 audit, these requests do not reflect the current level of security staffing. Since our last audit, DOC's requests to the Legislature for funding for security staffing have been based on the formula of 5.3 people to cover one 24-hour post. However, this staffing has not been authorized by the Legislature.

We recalculated DOC's current staffing formula and found that staffing requirements have changed since the last audit. We reviewed a statistical sample of payroll records for 341 Correctional Service Officers (CSO Is and IIs) to determine present post staffing needs.(1) The results of this recalculation showed that the number of staff needed to cover a 24-hour, seven-day post has declined from 5.3 to 5.1. Table 3 (see page 23), illustrates the changes in various categories since 1985 that have affected staffing. For example, DOC has been able to reduce turnover for CSO Is and IIs from 31 percent five years ago to an average of 18 percent. This reduced turnover has impacted the length of time needed to fill vacancies and thus has had an impact on the results of the calculation. While some factors have changed, DOC has never recalculated its staffing formula. As stated in our last audit, because the formula is sensitive to unstable factors such as turnover, it should be regularly updated to reflect current staffing needs.

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(1) Using a population of 3,095 CSO Is and IIs employed at DOC between October 1989 and October 1990, we selected a sample size of 341 employees based on a 95 percent degree of confidence and a five percent margin of error.

TABLE 3

COMPARISON OF 1985 AND 1990 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL STAFFING STUDIES

Category	Average Days Per Position 1985 Study	1990 Study
Regular days off	104.00 days	104.00 days
Annual leave	14.61	13.72
Sick leave	6.66	8.16
Holiday leave	5.68	4.90
Compensatory time taken	2.75	4.75
Military leave	.39	1.12(a)
Absence without approval	.15	.13
Administrative leave w/ pay	.04	.01
Administrative leave w/o pay	.26	1.21
Bereavement leave	.16	.38
Civic duty	.01	.05
Industrial leave	1.05	1.22
Education leave	5.00	3.00(b)
Time to fill vacancies	18.24	8.37(c)
Total number of days employee was away from post	159.00	148.87
Calculation of Staffing Formula		
365 days per year	365	365
Minus number of days employee away from post	-159	-148.9
Equals number of days employee available to cover post	206	216.1
Employees required:		
Seven-day, 8-hour shift	1.8	1.7
Seven-day, 16-hour shift	3.5	3.4
Seven-day, 24-hour shift	5.3	5.1

(a) Payroll records reviewed did not include the time period of the Gulf War. Therefore, current military leave time may have increased and would have had a greater impact on the staffing formula than was reflected in our review.

(b) In the 1985 audit in-service training was based on the ACA standard of 40 hours a year because at that time DOC had no official training policy. While our review of payroll records revealed an average of.85 days per position taken for training, DOC officials indicated that payroll records do not always capture time taken for in-service training. Our review also showed some training occurs on days off and is charged as compensatory time. Because actual training time is not available, we have incorporated the current DOC requirement of 24 hours into the 1990 staffing formula.

(c) This category is a combination of time spent during pre-service training (i.e., COTA) and the combined turnover rate for CSO Is and IIs. To arrive at the 1990 calculation, the time required to fill vacancies (9.3 weeks) was multiplied by 5 (the number of regular work days per week) to arrive at the number of days lost for each position each time turnover occurs. This number was then multiplied by the turnover rate (18 percent).

Source: Office of the Auditor General review of 341 DOC payroll records for CSO Is and CSO IIs during fiscal year 1989-90; DOC staff interviews; Auditor General Report No. 86-1; and a review of DOC's process for filling vacant CSO positions.

Post Positions Should Be Reviewed

In addition to a periodic review of its staffing formula, DOC needs to do more to identify the number of posts needed at each institution. While DOC has performed some staffing studies, these studies have been based on internal estimates of work activity and justifications for existing posts. A more critical review is needed.

Post positions have been identified - Since our 1985 audit, DOC has identified its security post positions. The 1985 audit revealed that DOC did not have an accurate list of the Department's posts on which to evaluate its security post requirements. Recently, each warden identified all security post positions in his institution, and testified about post functions to the House Subcommittee on Prison Staffing. This information was designed to justify existing posts.

More can be done to quantify post needs - While security posts have been identified, DOC has not completed a comprehensive analysis of Departmental post staffing requirements that includes the critical elements recommended in our 1985 report. The 1985 audit recommended a comprehensive study of staffing to determine the number of security posts that were needed, based on workload measures, detailed task analyses, staff utilization, and other factors affecting security staffing.

Although DOC has conducted some staffing studies, the Department has not performed a comprehensive study. We examined several DOC staffing studies such as a 1985 DOC Staffing Study,[1] and a Security Staff Analysis of ASPC-Douglas in July 1987. However, these studies rely on estimations of workload and institutional justification of post positions rather than a critical review of each post. Some states, such as California and Florida, have a central office function that performs staffing studies and validates post positions on a routine basis. For example, Florida has a full-time staffing coordinator to perform staffing studies and review the functions of each post task and position in each institution.

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(1) This study was conducted at the same time as our 1985 audit and, according to DOC staff, it was performed as a result of the recommendations in that audit.

Additionally, our security consultants in their observations of security staffing, noted that some housing units appeared to be understaffed. As a result, they have strongly recommended conducting an independent staffing study involving the analysis of post positions, physical plant and ongoing program activities, a review of staff assignment records, as well as the use and efficacy of management systems. Our consultants estimate the cost of such a study would be approximately $60,000.

Changing conditions impact staffing - The need for a staffing review assumes greater importance when other factors impact the staffing of security posts. For example, in 1990 DOC installed a telephone monitoring system that requires the on-line monitoring and recording of inmate telephone calls. DOC supervisors state that this task requires a considerable amount of CSO staff time. One institution reports that two CSOs are required to staff the phone lines six hours a day. Because this function is not defined as a post position, the duties are absorbed by current staff positions, thereby impacting the staffing of both the defined and undefined posts. Further, the utilization of security staff in nonsecurity positions impacts post position staffing. We found, for example, that CSOs are being utilized as locksmiths, timekeepers and training officers. A comprehensive analysis of staffing would measure the workload of each post and identify the type of staff best suited to performing each task.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. DOC should recalculate the staffing formula periodically.

2. DOC should request funding from the Legislature to have an independent comprehensive staffing analysis performed to determine the following:

   - the number of security posts needed, based on workload analysis; and
   - staff qualifications to determine if CSO staff are appropriately assigned.

3. DOC should also review post positions periodically to assess changes affecting staffing.

FINDING V

WHILE DOC HAS MADE STRIDES TO INCREASE IN-SERVICE TRAINING, MANY CSOs STILL DO NOT MEET REQUIREMENTS

Although DOC has made attempts to provide sufficient in-service training for its CSOs, further improvement is needed. While the average number of training hours has increased, many CSOs still have not met current DOC in-service training requirements. The reasons in-service training has been inadequate may be lack of commitment by institutions to ensure training is received and staff shortages.

Since the duties of correctional officers can impact their safety, as well as the safety and well-being of inmates and sometimes the public, proper training is essential. To receive proper training, the American Correctional Association (ACA), in cooperation with the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections, recommends that correctional officers receive 40 hours of training each year after their initial year of training. The ACA recommends that the training program include areas such as security procedures, inmate supervision, detection of the signs of suicide risk and precautions against suicide, the use of force regulations and tactics, fire and emergency procedures, firearms training, key control, and first aid.

In our 1985 audit, some CSOs had not received pre-service training prior to assignment to an institution. In addition, others did not receive sufficient in-service training to meet DOC's training requirement of 20 hours. For fiscal years 1984 and 1985, CSOs employed by DOC for more than two years had received an average of less than 13 hours of in-service training.

While More Training Is Being Provided, Many CSOs Still Do Not Meet Requirements

Although problems with pre-service training have been addressed, and in-service training for CSOs has increased since our 1985 audit, many CSOs still do not meet DOC training requirements. Furthermore, even when staff do receive training, it may not be enough.

Pre-service training is now provided to all CSOs - Since the 1985 audit, DOC has implemented its Correctional Officer Training Academy (COTA), which provides pre-service training to all new CSOs. Prior to that time, training was left to individual institutions, and some CSOs received little or no pre-service training. DOC's current pre-service training consists of a 288-hour, seven-week program encompassing nine major subjects: ethics and professionalism, inmate management, legal issues, communication skills, officer safety, security, custody and control, emergency procedures, conflict and crisis management, and medical and mental health. The first COTA class was held in January 1986. Since that time the academy has conducted about 130 classes, and approximately 4,500 cadets have graduated and been assigned to institutions throughout the Department. Once assigned to an institution, COTA graduates are required to attend an additional 40 hours of on-site orientation.

More training is being provided - In addition to ensuring that staff receive pre-service training, it also appears that DOC has increased the amount of training provided to its staff. In 1989 DOC adopted its current policy of requiring that CSOs receive a mandatory 24 hours of in-service training annually. To meet this requirement, DOC provides annual CSO refresher courses. These "refreshers" are generally taught in blocks of 3 to 5 days and are provided throughout the year. In addition to refresher courses, staff are provided with the opportunity to obtain training in other areas as well. Also, as new issues develop, training in these areas becomes mandatory.

Our review of 1989-90 training records[1] for Correctional Service staff reflects an improvement in the area of staff training. For 1989-90, training received by Correctional Service staff employed more than two years in each institution on average ranged from 20.7 hours to 71.5 hours. Overall, in 1989-90, those security staff employed more than two years received an average of over 33 hours of advanced training. In addition, while correctional staff are required to obtain 24 hours of training each year as part of their refresher courses, some institutions are providing more than 24 hours.

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(1) Because DOC training requirements are based on an Employee Performance Appraisal System (EPAS) year, our review of 1989-90 records is based on the most recently completed EPAS year (May 1, 1989 to April 30, 1990).

Many staff have not received sufficient training - Although the average number of training hours received has increased, and most staff attend training in excess of the 24-hour requirement, many staff still do not meet the training requirements. Our analysis of the training hours received by 1,970 security staff during 1989-90 revealed the following:

- Forty-four percent of all CSOs did not receive the required 24 hours.
- Over ten percent of all CSOs received no training.
- Many higher ranking security staff also failed to receive the mandatory 24 hours of training. Table 4 illustrates by employee classification the percentage of security staff that received training during 1989-90. Further, Table 5 (page 30) illustrates by institution the percentage of security staff that received training in 1989-90.

In addition, DOC may not be able to identify the specific subjects in which individual CSOs have received training. CSOs that attend the refresher courses are given credit for receiving a "CSO Refresher" on their training records in the Arizona Personnel Payroll Leave Education System (APPLES). We found that the type of training provided in the refresher courses varies by institution. While some subjects such as cell area searches, report writing, first aid, staff/inmate relations, and the use of force are offered at most institutions, not all institutions include these subjects in their annual refresher courses.

TABLE 4

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
PERCENTAGE OF IN-SERVICE TRAINING HOURS RECEIVED
BY CORRECTIONAL SERVICE STAFF IN 1989-90
BY EMPLOYEE CLASSIFICATION

Classification	0 Hours	1 - 23 Hours	24+ Hours
CSO I	14.8%	29.3%	55.9%
CSO II	12.9	27.4	59.7
Sergeant	8.8	32.5	58.6
Lieutenant	8.9	41.1	50.0
Captain	2.6	52.6	44.7
Major	0.0	58.3	41.7
All Classes	12.9%	30.7%	56.4%

Source: Office of the Auditor General staff analysis of training hours received by 1,970 DOC security staff in 1989-90.

TABLE 5

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
PERCENTAGE OF IN-SERVICE TRAINING HOURS RECEIVED
BY CORRECTIONAL SERVICE STAFF IN 1989-90
BY INSTITUTION

Institution	0 Hours	1 - 23 Hours	24+ Hours
Douglas	9.4%	24.7%	65.9%
Florence	17.0	49.2	33.8
Fort Grant	2.9	10.0	87.1
Perryville	20.4	32.7	46.9
Phoenix	21.0	22.9	56.1
Safford	4.3	27.7	68.1
Tucson	6.5	12.9	80.6
Winslow	2.7	14.9	82.4
Yuma	0.0	14.3	85.7
All Institutions	12.9%	30.7%	56.4%

Source: Office of the Auditor General staff analysis of training hours received by 1,970 DOC security staff in 1989-90.

DOC's 24-hour annual training requirement may not be enough - Although DOC has increased the required number of hours for in-service training since our 1985 audit, additional training requirements may be necessary. As noted earlier, DOC's annual training requirement is 24 hours each year, while the most recent information available from ACA standards suggest that correctional line staff receive 40 hours of training each year. Additionally, according to the National Institute of Corrections, 26 states provide their correctional officers with 40 hours of annual training. Four states provide more than one week of training.(1) One DOC official stated that the Department recognizes the need for increasing its training requirements and would eventually like to increase the requirement to 40 hours.

Lack Of Commitment And Resources May Have Hindered Training Efforts

Regardless of the number of training hours that are mandated, if institutional staff are not fully committed to ensuring that all staff receive training, then it is unlikely most staff will receive adequate

(1) Information obtained as of November 1988.

training. A lack of commitment to staff training may be one reason many correctional staff at DOC have not met training requirements. In addition, because of staff vacancies it may be difficult for CSOs to find the time for training. A lack of resources to implement an effective tracking system may also hamper training efforts.

Lack of commitment to staff training may be one reason that many staff do not meet requirements - A lack of commitment on the part of some institutional staff may be a reason that many CSOs have not obtained the necessary training. According to a DOC official, in order for CSOs to meet the requirement of 24 hours of training each year, the warden and staff at each institution must be committed to ensuring that all security staff receive the required hours of training. Without this commitment, it is not likely that the required number of training hours will be met. For example, a training officer at one institution recently noted that since the arrival of a new warden, attendance at training classes has greatly improved. He attributed the increase to the new warden's commitment to training. In fact, he noted evidence of how the importance of training has been stressed recently -- some officers were now coming in for weapons training who had not been certified for three or four years.

Staff shortages may prevent some staff from attending training - Even when there is a commitment to training, if there are a high number of vacancies in an institution, attendance at staff training may be low. One training officer noted that correctional supervisors tell him that they cannot afford to send CSOs to training because of staff shortages. Another training officer noted that the only reasons cited for lack of attendance at training are staff shortages in the units or due to illness.

Lack of resources may have also hampered training efforts - A lack of funding to improve DOC's system for monitoring training may also contribute to the problem of inadequate training. Since the 1985 audit, DOC has implemented an automated system to track training hours for all of its staff. DOC's initial attempt to automate used a personal computer that quickly ran out of space and capacity to handle training information for approximately 6,000 employees. As a result, the training records

management function was added to the mainframe system DOC was developing at the time, APPLES, for payroll and personnel information. APPLES was established in January 1988. However, according to a DOC official, the Department receives no funding for the personnel needed to run the system, although it does receive funding for processing time. DOC officials indicate that two programmers and a training person are needed to upgrade and maintain the system. Without sufficient funding for the APPLES system, the system's ability to generate adequate management reports on staff training is limited.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. DOC should ensure that each of its Correctional Service staff receive the required 24 hours of training by stressing the importance of advanced training on an ongoing basis even when there may be staff shortages.

2. DOC should review its refresher courses and determine which subjects are critical to all institutions. Those identified as critical should then be taught at all institutions.

3. DOC should review its training monitoring system to determine what changes can be made to make the system more effective in tracking staff training.

OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION

During our audit, we compiled data on the growing impact of compensatory time accumulated by security staff.

Growing impact of compensatory time - The impact of the use of compensatory time on security staffing is increasing. During our calculation of the security staffing formula (Finding IV , page 23) we found that, as compared to the 1986 formula, CSOs are taking nearly twice as much compensatory time off now. In fiscal year 1989-90, CSO Is and CSO IIs averaged 4.75 days off for compensatory time compared to the 1985 average of 2.75 days. In addition to taking time off, we found that many CSOs are receiving pay for compensatory time. In our sample review of 341 CSOs for the staffing formula, 200 (approximately 60 percent) were paid for compensatory time during fiscal year 1989-90. According to a DOC official, in fiscal year 1989-90 the Department paid $834,786.70 for compensatory hours to staff at the adult institutions, the majority of whom are Correctional Services staff. Additionally, DOC paid over $2 million during the first months of fiscal year 1990-91. This was a one-time payoff of all accumulated compensatory time and holiday leave time. DOC budget staff stated that this was the first time they had ever paid off the balances.

These large payments for compensatory time very likely will continue to grow. A court decision in June 1989 found that certain employees who work overtime have the option of receiving overtime payment or earning compensatory time. The employer and employee must reach an agreement or understanding prior to the performance of any overtime work. This decision applies to certain employees covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The Department of Administration was notified by the Attorney General's Office that this ruling would apply to Arizona. This decision will have a significant effect on agencies, especially those that operate on a 24-hour basis. Agencies such as DOC will have to give employees the option of taking compensatory leave or receiving pay for compensatory time. In fact, agencies will not be able to allow

employees, such as CSO Is and CSO IIs, who are subject to the FLSA to work unless the agency is able to pay time and a half or unless these employees have elected to receive compensatory leave. This policy will be implemented by DOC in May 1991. Over half of all eligible staff at the institutions have indicated that they would accept either compensatory leave or cash payment. An additional 20 percent elected cash payment only. DOC has requested $2.8 million to cover the cost of the compensatory time payments.

Security staffing will be impacted by this policy in several ways. First, CSOs are needed to work overtime during emergency situations, such as escapes, disturbances, and staff shortages. Should the agency be without funds to cover these overtime expenses, it is unlikely that some CSO staff would be available to work during emergencies or, if they must be used, DOC will have to make budgetary adjustments afterwards to cover the cost. DOC previously had the option to provide time off in lieu of overtime pay. Second, this policy could affect calculation of the staffing formula. Since employees may elect to receive a cash payment for overtime rather than time off, the amount paid for compensatory time may be increased and the amount of compensatory time taken as time off may decrease. In such a case, the staffing formula could be affected, potentially reducing the number of staff needed.

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FIFE SYMINGTON
GOVERNOR

SAMUEL A. LEWIS
DIRECTOR

May 17, 1991

Douglas R. Norton, Auditor General
Office of the Auditor General
2700 North Central Avenue, Suite 700
Phoenix, Arizona 85004

Dear Mr. Norton:

Thank you for the opportunity to review your revised draft as a result of our meeting on May 9, 1991. The Department of Corrections acknowledges and agrees to the changes of your preliminary draft.

Please include the Department of Corrections' comments where appropriate as submitted on May 7, 1991, in response to your previous draft dated April 30, 1991.

Thank you for your cooperation. If additional information is required, please advise.

Sincerely,

Samuel A. Lewis
Director

SAL:mlj

Arizona Department of Corrections

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FIFE SYMINGTON
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SAMUEL A. LEWIS
DIRECTOR

May 7, 1991

Donald R. Norton, Auditor General
Office of the Auditor General
2700 North Central Avenue, Suite 700
Phoenix, Arizona 85004

Dear Mr. Norton:

Attached is the preliminary response to the Performance Audit-Draft on Institutional Security and Staffing.

With minor exceptions, the Department of Corrections agrees and accepts the findings of this performance audit. Your office should be commended for producing a report that accurately describes performance deficiencies and recommendations on methods for improvement. The security consultants, Mr. James D. Henderson and David E. Musacchio were an excellent choice. Their knowledge and expertise was very evident. They offered valuable suggestions to our staff for improvement of security operations and always demonstrated their professionalism and leadership qualities.

Please be assured that this Department will make every effort to achieve our goals to improve security and maximize the use of staff as addressed in the attached response to your Performance Audit.

This audit will serve as a valuable resource and should prove significant in supporting our goals to operate efficient and safe prisons.

Sincerely,

Samuel A. Lewis
Director

SAL:mlj

Attachment

RESPONSE TO AUDITOR GENERAL PERFORMANCE AUDIT ON SECURITY AND STAFFING OF THE ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

The Department of Corrections is appreciative of the Auditor General's recognition of the significant improvements made by this Department since the two previous Audit reports issued by your office in 1985 and 1986.

The Department of Corrections agrees with most of the findings as submitted and offers the following comments and committment to improve the noted deficiencies.

TOOL CONTROL: pg. 6, 9

ADC policy requires that prisons maintain a complete and current inventory of all tools and materials that may affect the safe, secure and orderly operation of each facility. Wardens are again being directed to improve their procedures to properly monitor this most important issue. Annual review of all tool control operation will be conducted to ensure compliance with policy. Recent efforts have improved the tool control practice at most prisons. However, some institutions still are not in compliance.

INMATE COUNTS: pg. 6, 9

The Department's current policy requires a minimum of three formal counts (one each shift) at every institution. It's believed that increasing the number of counts to five is not necessary, costly, and would not significantly improve inmate accountability.

Our belief is that the Auditors may have been misled by the term "informal count". Informal counts are random periodic checks, established by ADC policy, to determine if **all** inmates are present and to monitor their well being. The number of informal counts is dependent on custody level but in all instances, occurs at least once between each formal count. Instances where inmates have not been accurately accounted for in a timely manner are almost non-existent except where human error or failure to follow established procedure occurs.

DETENTION AND ISOLATION CELLS: pg. 7

Double bunking Detention Cells is not good practice and limits the Department's ability to effectively manage and discipline inmates. Ideally, every unit would have a percentage of cells for Isolation and disciplinary problems. However, the costs are prohibitive. A more realistic goal would be to reduce the inmate population via alternatives to incarceration and other effective programs to make available more room in our current prisons so that they can once again become single cell operations.

TEMPORARY STRUCTURES: pg. 6

The Department agrees with the Audit findings that quonsets, trailers, modulars and some dormitory inmate housing are substandard. However, replacement costs for these units are conservatively estimated at $25,000 thousand per bed and with over 2,000 substandard beds or approximately $50,000,000 - the replacement costs are prohibitive. Realistically speaking, the state has not even been successful in keeping pace with its current prison population growth, let alone replacing existing inadequate facilities.

Replacement of these structures will become a priority as other priorities deminish or where there is a turn of unfavorable events that heightened the awareness of operating under such precarious conditions.

FACILITY DESIGN: pg. 6, pg. 8

The rapid growth and limited resources to meet the increased demands for additional prison space of the last 20 years have not kept pace. Temporary emergency beds with life expectancy of a few years somehow always seem to become permanent. Conditions which caused development of inadequate facilities are often forgotten. Fortunately the Legislature has begun to recognize the importance of good prison design and appropriated funds accordingly, examples of which are the Rynning Unit, SMU, ASPC-Winslow, ASP-Yuma and ASPC-Tucson. Once construction and inmate population growth level off, and the legislature appropriates funds, remodeling or replacement of inadequate facilities can become a reality.

Additionally, while the Department agrees with the comments regarding the South Unit's design, it should be noted that exceptionally good inmate management skills exist by staff at the South Unit to accommodate the successful placement of high medium custody inmates placed there, and because of this success it is not being recommended that a change in custody level for South Unit be made at this time.

KEY CONTROL: pg. 9

A Departmental policy is being promulgated to establish and monitor key control. The Department acknowledges that current procedures are inadequate. ADC policy will require that procedures be established 90 days after the effective date of the Key Control policy. Full compliance is expected by January 1, 1992.

PERSONAL BODY ALARMS: pg. 8, 10

Installation, monitoring equipment and costs for the personal body alarms will be examined; as will the effectiveness of the alarms. Based on the results of this investigation a decision will be made as whether to request funding for this additional safety equipment.

SECURITY INSPECTIONS: pg. 8

A policy requiring each institution to establish written procedures that require regularly scheduled and consistently documented security inspection for all aspects of prison security operations is being developed. Current ADC Policy 304.3, "Inspections of Department Facilities" shall be revised to adhere to Auditor's recommendations.

Institution will have 90 days from the effective policy date to establish their procedures. Full compliance is expected by January 1, 1992.

POST ORDERS: pg. 9

Hostages and use of force situations are issues that have already been established by Departmental policy and therefore should not be part of specific post orders.

However, the Department does agree that each job assignment or post should have post orders and signature sheets for employees to record that they have read and understand their job responsibilities. The wardens will be directed to meet full compliance through a directive from this office. A review for compliance will be part of the Security Inspections Policy.

INCREASE STARTING SALARY FOR CSO: pg. 20

The Department endorses the recommendation to increase the starting salary for Correctional Service Officers. The higher the starting salary the more attractive is the job, therefore, drawing a better qualified career oriented individual that helps to reduce employee turnover and improved job performance.

POST POSITION REVIEW: pg. 24, 25

The Department welcomes a comprehensive study of our staffing requirements. However, given the current economic condition in Arizona it may be a waste of the proposed $60,000 for the study unless the Legislature is prepared to allocate funds for additional positions as determined by the study. Previous studies completed internally all indicate a shortage of personnel. We believe any responsible analysis of staffing requirement would meet with the same conclusion.

WHILE ADC HAS MADE STRIDES TO INCREASE IN-SERVICE TRAINING, MANY CSO'S STILL DO NOT MEET REQUIREMENTS: pg. 27

"The reasons In-Service Training has been inadequate may be lack of commitment by institutions to ensure training is received, and staff shortages."

The lack of commitment may be accurate for one to two institutions according to data reported, but overall, the commitment to all aspects of training, in my opinion, is very high.

The following factors, have greater impact on lack of In-Service Training than institutions not committed to training:

1. Staff shortages at most institutions have had the greatest impact on ensuring staff receive the required and mandatory training. This also includes in many instances the lack of a Training Officer to direct and coordinate the required training program.

   Historically, filling vacant Training Officer positions has taken three to six months. Additionally, at two institutions, the legislature has not committed to funding Training Officer positions (i.e., ASP-Yuma and ASP-Safford). As new institutions are constructed and staffed, it is imperative that Training Officer positions be recognized as an important area to be funded. Also, it is essential that support staff (i.e., clerical) and operating resources be properly funded so that in-service can achieve the goals and mission of ADC.

2. Reporting of Training information may be a factor that contributed to the lack of required training. Entering data from institutions into the APPLES computer system is slow and in the past provided inaccurate information. To date, institutions and bureaus have not been provided the necessary information to indicate training deficiencies or problem areas to be corrected.

   Each fiscal year (starting with FY '91) Staff Development and Training will audit employee training records by conducting an employee review of their training records with the expectation of correcting any data entry errors or lack of training information. Then monthly, each Training Officer and institutional Administrator will be provided a status report on employee training. Quarterly, Staff Development will analyze employee training data and submit a report to ADC Assistant Directors, as to the status of employee training categories such as: Employee Orientation, Refresher Training, Weapons Qualification, Professional Development, etc. Improving data records and increasing the distribution of training data will hopefully eliminate the problem of staff who lack or do not meet training requirements.

MANY STAFF HAVE NOT RECEIVED SUFFICIENT TRAINING: pg. 29

The average of 33 hours In-Service Training is an acceptable figure.

The 44 percent of CSO's who did not receive the required 24 hour In-Service Training is not acceptable.

Many higher ranking security staff failed to receive 24 hours required training. The data indicates approximately 45% of security supervisors and managers did not achieve the 24 hours required training. The new Professional Development Program should eliminate this problem. It is projected that 220 supervisors will receive PDP Level I training and 160 managers will receive PDP Level II training during FY '92, assuming that the funding to conduct this Professional Development Program is available.

Arizona Department of Corrections may not be able to identify the specific subjects in which individual CSO's have received training.

1. This is not an accurate statement as institutional refresher training is entered into APPLES as a single entry but each specific course that comprised the refresher training is detailed in a separate section of APPLES documentation.

   It is true that ADC needs to standardize as much as possible the CSO Refresher Training and other types of refresher training. A Training Officer has been assigned the task of coordinating all refresher training and proposing a core curriculum for all institutions to comply with when conducting the required refresher training.

ADC'S 24 ANNUAL TRAINING REQUIREMENT MAY NOT BE ENOUGH: pg. 30

Arizona Department of Corrections recognizes that 24 hours of In-Service Training may not be sufficient but additional training will have a fiscal impact that will be difficult to increase. The Arizona Legislature and J.L.B.C. will have to understand the importance of adequate training for staff and commit the necessary appropriations to expand the present In-Service Training.

Presently, most institutions are conducting the 40 hours of refresher training for CSO's. This includes the 24 hours training required and approximately 8 hours of weapons qualifications. The other eight hours is determined by the institutional Training Advisory Committee and institutional Warden. Four of the nine institutions offer the 24 hours In-Service Training and one day for weapons qualification. It would be more accurate to say that ADC has a 32 hour In-Service refresher training program for Correctional Service series employees.

LACK OF COMMITMENT MAY BE ONE OF THE REASONS THAT MANY STAFF DO NOT MEET REQUIREMENTS: pg. 31

This reference is to ASPC-Florence where the refresher training was previously only 20 hours annual and staff were not mandated to attend, but were encouraged. Since Warden Roger Crist arrived at ASPC-Florence, he has committed to training and is in compliance by mandating 24 hours of In-Service Training and eight additional hours for weapons qualification.

RECOMMENDATIONS: pg. 32

Concur with all three recommendations.

Numbers 1 and 2 are in progress while recommendation number 3 will require time to research the problems with APPLES and the corrective measures needed for a quality training records system. Initial review indicates some fiscal funding will be necessary to revise and improve APPLES to meet the needs of Staff Development and Adult Institutions.

90% OF ALL ELIGIBLE STAFF WILL CHOOSE THE PAY OPTIONS: pg. 34

Initial data does not support this high percentage. I would suggest a lesser figure such as 50% of staff will choose the pay option.

This compensatory issue has a great impact on the COTA operation because it reduces the flexibility in designing and implementing the 288 hour curriculum. Additionally, the compensatory time issue will have a negative impact on staff who are able to attend In-Service and professional training programs.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

I would recommend that ADC pursue a longer pay period similar to law enforcement agencies instead of using the standard 40 hour work week. The 40 hour work week is very restrictive and causes compensatory time and overtime pay which could be greatly reduced by increasing the pay period to 80 or 160-hours.

Concur with recommendations on Page 20 to increase the starting salary to Correctional Service Officers to be competitive.

Recommend additional funding to provide transportation for staff to commute to institutions in remote areas such as ASPC-Florence and ASP-Fort Grant. ADC would define what is considered a remote location and in conjunction with state transportation (van pooling) staff would be supplemented for their daily commute.

Recommend ADC establish a centralized staff position control system on computer so all data elements can be entered to accurately reflect the factors for proper staffing.

The Correctional Officer Training Academy (COTA) should be recognized as a 288 hour pre-service training program for Correctional Service Officers with an additional 40 hours of On-The-Job Training (OJT) for graduated cadets at their assigned institution.

Marginal staffing has been created by the legislative appropriation's process and Representative Evans' sub-committee. This has resulted in:

1. Increased compensatory time especially at the line staff level.
2. Lack of commitment to training (and other lower priority activities) because of the importance to operate the institutions in a safe and secure manner is the highest priority.
3. Increased sick leave.

Therefore, it is imperative that the legislature recognize the importance of properly staffing institutions in order to meet the mission and goals of ADC. Continued marginal staffing will only result in continued areas such as training that will not be able to achieve the required objectives and possibly creating a liability situation.

Historical turnover rates for CSO I's indicates a higher percentage than the 18% stated on Page 23. Presently, the rate is 18% but over the past seven years, the figure would indicate a 20% turnover rate for calculating staffing needs. Additionally, the 18% figure could quickly increase due to economic recovery and other changes in the Arizona economy. If the Arizona Legislature does not improve the salary for Correctional Service Officers, the turnover rate will certainly increase, and will probably increase beyond the 20% average.

CSO I TURNOVER RATE

1984 - 32%	**1988 - 17%**
1985 - 30%	**1989 - 20%**
1986 - 19%	**1990 - 20%**
1987 - 20%	**To Date - 18%**

GROWING IMPACT OF COMPENSATORY TIME: pg. 33, 34

The Department of Corrections requested $2.3 million dollars for payment of overtime, unfortunately it was not funded. Therefore, the Department's position will be to only work those staff who choose to work for compensatory time.

STAFFING FORMULA: pg. 34

The Department agrees that several factors effect the staffing formula and should be addressed when opening new institutions and annually reviewed to ensure existing facilities are properly staffed.

APPENDIX

The Office of the Auditor General contracted with James D. Henderson and Associates to assist with a follow-up review of security at the Department of Corrections' adult institutions. Listed below are the names and backgrounds of the consultants.

- **James D. Henderson**, a retired warden and regional director for the Federal Bureau of Prisons, who is now a criminal justice consultant. Mr. Henderson has served as a consultant on projects involving prison operations, management, security, and staffing in 16 other states. He has participated in numerous special projects and training assignments, and co-authored American Correctional Association publications about riots and disturbances, and the development of security programs.

- **David E. Musacchio**, a former director of corrections for local government correctional facilities in Kentucky and Louisiana has worked in criminal justice consulting since 1980. Mr. Musacchio has served as a consultant on more than 150 projects involving criminal justice planning, and prison design and construction.

A copy of the Executive Summary from their report is attached.

Technical Assistance Visit
Arizona Department Of Corrections

James D. Henderson
David E. Musacchio
Criminal Justice Consultants

Executive Summary

This report summarizes the results of a technical assistance visit conducted during the period November 1990 through January 1991 for the Arizona Auditor General's Office by criminal justice consultants James D. Henderson and David E. Musacchio. The project involved on-site visits to six correctional complexes operated by the Arizona Department of Corrections: Perryville, Phoenix, Florence, Tucson, Douglas, and Winslow.

In general, this project resulted in a finding that substantial progress has been made toward upgrading institutional security in the five years since an earlier consultant review of the Department's operations by N.R. Cox Associates, Inc. From the results of this survey, it appears that master planning and other management improvements that have been the focus of Department activity in recent years are beginning to show appreciable returns. These efforts should be continued and expanded.

The Consultants generally found that the physical perimeter security of the institutions surveyed is adequate. While there remain individual areas that will require additional attention, and continual vigilance is necessary, overall, perimeter security was not a major issue, as evidenced by the reduced number of escapes annually.

The Department's inmate classification system generally appears to be functional, although increased consistency in procedures would be desirable. While there were signs of minor imbalances at some locations, considering the level of crowding the system is experiencing, the Department appears to be doing a satisfactory job in balancing the population at the various units. More creative program use of existing facilities could effect a reduction in the use of inmate transportation and ultimately impact the need for Cellblock Six and Special Management Unit assignments. This would, however, require more locked unit space in the various units.

The system as a whole does a very good job in employing inmates. In particular, the use of properly classified inmates on community service jobs is commendable, as are the efforts to occupy higher security inmates through Arizona Correctional Industries. As crowding continues, so should the efforts to expand job opportunities.

High security operations in the Special Management Unit and Cellblock Six, two of the most critical units in the system, appeared to be quite good.

Inmate accountability procedures in most locations appeared to be satisfactory. This is a critical factor in overall security, since inmates who are not properly controlled throughout the day will be able to exploit even minor weaknesses in an otherwise sound facility.

Procedural issues were somewhat more of a concern. Staff have undertaken to upgrade critical areas such as key and tool control, inmate accountability, security inspections, and post orders. However, system-wide, these are common denominator problem areas that will require additional direction by the Central Office and effort by institutional staff. Virtually every institution displayed these problems in one or more units. A system-wide security evaluation and monitoring process should emanate from the Central Office. This appears to be a new concept in the Department, but it could also improve communications, and the sharing of functional procedures and other improvements, throughout the system. Major findings on those points are enumerated in the body of the report.

In addition to these broad areas, there are several specific points of concern that were observed throughout the system.

Some units had little or no locked unit capacity; others had locked units that were double-bunked. Based on guidelines accepted by the American Correctional Association and generally accepted correctional practice, there does not appear to be a sufficient number of either isolation or segregation beds available in the system. Increases in this type of security housing in the individual complexes would improve overall system effectiveness. Double-bunking is not desirable in any medium or high security prison, and certainly not in special management or other locked-type units. Understanding that virtually every correctional agency in the Nation is double bunking to a significant degree, the Arizona system should make a concerted effort to eliminate it in all locked units.

Although hand-held radios were well-distributed throughout most institutions, there were no personal body alarms. This should be a high priority, starting with locked units and the more remote assignments. Body alarms should definitely be considered as a part of any radio equipment replacement program, as it is the most cost effective method of providing personal protection for staff.

Several of the housing units displayed less than ideal design features. This can only be improved with major renovations. Some detention units had doors that opened inward, making barricading easy. Other housing areas were so arranged as to make impossible proper supervision by any reasonable number of staff. In a similar vein, the use of trailer and other modular units, although necessitated by population pressures, is generally undesirable and inevitably will lead to high maintenance and repair costs.

Staffing was not a focus of this project, but there were clear indications of the need for a full study of the staffing requirements of the system. The Consultants strongly recommend that another consultant or consultant firm be engaged for this purpose. Such a project would entail, in each Department facility, a detailed review of personnel assignment records, extensive staff interviews, visits to posts, analyze the physical plant and ongoing program activities, as well as the use and efficacy of any unit management system. Such a study would be a major undertaking; it would involve not less than a week for each major institution like Central Unit. The use of arbitrary relief factors should be abandoned, since they do not reflect the true staffing situation in any institution or the system as a whole.

Overall, the Arizona Department of Corrections has made significant progress toward rectifying the conditions identified in the Cox report, and is continuing in its efforts to upgrade procedures and policies that will further strengthen internal inmate supervision and perimeter security. In addition to the specific questions and areas that were part of the project, some additional areas were examined. In addition to the above comments relative to tool control, key control, and inmate accountability, the following areas were observed: security inspections, policy implementation, post orders, and audit oversight.

Security inspections generally were not carried out in an organized manner. When and where they were conducted, there is no standardized method of recording and reporting that would allow for routine review by security supervisors.

Policy and audit oversight as described above, there are department level policies and directives on almost every subject. However, there currently is no process in place that reviews staff understanding of those documents or that monitors compliance. Such a process is recommended.

Post orders are inconsistent throughout the system. These should be standardized, and each should include a signoff sheet for staff manning the post, to sign, indicating they reviewed and understand the orders.

The Arizona Department of Corrections should be commended for their efforts to improve operations and security. The problems found in this survey are more in line with a need for streamlining, rather than a total re-design of the system. With the implementation of these recommendations, significant improvements can be expected.